JUDGMENT K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is a writ petition against the judgment and order passed by the Board of Revenue on a reference made by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, with the recommendation that the revision be allowed and the application of Shiv Mangal be dismissed. This reference was accepted and the proceedings started on the application of Sheo Mangal were ordered to be abated. 2. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are as follows: There were consolidation proceedings in the village in which the dispute between the parties was whether Shiv Mangal and others were Bhumidhars of certain plots. The consolidation authorities decided on the basis of an award by the Civil Judge that Shiv Mangal and others were grove holders of the disputed plots. On the basis of this order the petitioners Ram Ganesh and others made an application. After the conclusion of the consolidation proceedings, Shiv Mangal made an application before the Assistant Collector for correction of revenue records. The Assistant Collector passed an order that the name of Sheo Mangal alone be recorded and correction be accordingly made. The petitioners then filed a revision before the Commissioner. During the pendency of this revision, Sheo Mangal died on June 27, 1968 and no substitution application was made till April 30, 1970 to bring on record his heirs. In the affidavit, it was stated that Shiv Mangal had died outside his village and, therefore, no knowledge of death could be had earlier. No application was filed along with the substitution application to condone the delay, if any. 3. On reference the Board of Revenue held that as a matter of practise, substitution application in a revision before the Board of Revenue was being made within ninety days and this rule has been adhered to since long. Therefore the application for substitution was barred by limitation as the reason for delay was not properly explained. Therefore, it was ordered that the revision be abated. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no period of limitation has been provided under the rules for making application for substitution within a certain period and the practise which has since been followed was contrary to the principles laid down in a recent Full Bench case Chandradeo Pandey and others v. Sukhdeo Rai and others, 1972 A.L.J. 603. and as such the Board of Revenue failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. 5. In order to decide this question, it has first to be decided as to what is the period of limitation for making such applications. A perusal of the Land Revenue Act would show that under Section 204 of the said Act, 30 days period was prescribed for appeal from the date of the order complained of unless otherwise expressly provided in this Act. It is conceded that the U.P. Land Revenue Act or the Land Manual did not prescribe any period of limitation for filing revisions or making substitution application in such revisions. All that has been followed till now by the Board of Revenue is that as a matter of practise the limitation of 90 days and four months have been adhered to. The revision is provided under Section 218 of the Land Revenue Act which reads as follows: "The Commissioner, the Additional Commissioner, the Collector, the Record Officer, or Settlement Officer may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceeding held by any officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying him self as to legality or propriety of the order passed and as to regularity of proceedings; and, he is of opinion that the proceedings taken or order passed by such subordinate officer should be varied, cancelled, or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Board, if the case is of a judicial nature or connected with the Settlement, or for the orders of the State Government if the case is of a non-judicial nature not connected with the settlement; and the Board or the State Government, as the case may be, shall thereupon pass such orders as it thinks fit." Under this Act, the Board has power to call for the record suo moto and satisfy itself about the legality of regularity of the order passed. This power can be exercised even on an application or motion by a party. 6. Where such a powder vests in the Board itself, even when a legality or regularity is brought to its notice, should the Board or Commissioner fail to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that application by a party had been made after the period of limitation which has been adhered to since long. 6. Where such a powder vests in the Board itself, even when a legality or regularity is brought to its notice, should the Board or Commissioner fail to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that application by a party had been made after the period of limitation which has been adhered to since long. In this connection, reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of the Board of Revenue Raj Kumar v. Bhagwant Singh, 1956 A.L.J. 233 (Revenue). While dealing with this, Sapru, Judicial Member, observed as below which was accepted by other members of the Bench as well; "Before proceeding to discuss the principal question involved, namely, whether the Khasra entries can be corrected by the Collector alone and whether proceedings relating to the correction of Khasra entries are judicial or non-judicial. I shall in a few words dispose of the question of limitation when the Board is satisfied that it should act suo moto exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The period of four months limitation is not prescribed statutorily; it is laid down only for private parties and it is insisted upon only as a matter of common practise which has grown up. Even in the case of private parties Board has wide powers of waiving such limitation and the Board itself is certainly not bound by it when it comes to exercise its powers in revision." 7. This decision was cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in support of his contention that four months limitation which has grown up as a matter of practise should not be interfered and should be adhered to. A perusal of Raj Kumar's case, referred to above, leaves no room for doubt that the Full Bench of the Board was of the opinion that in revisional jurisdiction the Board was not bound by four months rule which are grown up out of common practise. The Full Bench, as shown above, was of the opinion that such limitation could be waived and the Board was not bound by it while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. I have already observed above that the Board under Section 218 has power to call for the record itself and to see and satisfy itself about the legality and regularity of the order passed. I have already observed above that the Board under Section 218 has power to call for the record itself and to see and satisfy itself about the legality and regularity of the order passed. Will it matter if an irregular order is brought to the notice of the Board by a party after the period of limitation which has been adhered to as a matter of practise. That would mean nutting a premium on the power of the Board as provided under Section 218 of the Land Revenue Act. 8. A similar question came up for decision in a Full Bench case of this Court Chandradeo Pandey and others v. Sukhdeo Rai and others (supra) wherein it was held as below: "That the application for substitution of heirs in revision is an application under Section 151, C.P.C. can admit of no doubt. Therefore, the period of limitation for bringing the heirs of the deceased, opposite party No. 10 would be three years under Article 137 of the new Limitation Act. The application for substitution was filed within three years of the death of opposite party No. 10, so there is no question of abatement or of condonation of delay." Earlier in paragraph 14 the Full Bench observed as below: "Even if there be some doubt about the applicability of Article 137 to applications under other Acts, about which we express no concluded opinion, there is not the slightest doubt that Article 137 would cover applications under the Code of Civil Procedure." 9. On this observation, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that this Full Bench decision of this Court laid down the law only so far as civil revisions are concerned and not about revisions or proceedings arising under the Revenue Act. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents has much force in it. No doubt the question of application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act regarding revisions before Revenue Court was not decided by this Full Bench. 10. There is no doubt that no limitation was prescribed under the Land Revenue Act for revisions or making an application for substitution in such revision applications. As observed earlier, the Full Bench of the Board held in Raj Kumar's case that the Board had a wide power of waiving such a limitation and the Board itself is not bound by it. As observed earlier, the Full Bench of the Board held in Raj Kumar's case that the Board had a wide power of waiving such a limitation and the Board itself is not bound by it. This observation by the Full Bench of the Board clearly goes to indicate that the view I am going to take is fully justified. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that proceeding under Section 39 of the Land Revenue Act is of a summary nature and a party even if the decision goes against him has got a right to file a regular suit and as such the discretionary power under Article 226 should not be allowed. Had this revision been decided on merits by the Board of Revenue, this question might have arisen. Even if a party has an alternative remedy he can invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution provided the alternative remedy has not been sought. In this instant case, the petitioners had the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the revenue court under Section 39 to get the alleged wrong entry corrected in a summary proceeding. One may go in a regular suit if this summary proceeding ended against him certainly if the summary proceeding ended in his favour, he would be saved from spending a lot of time and money in pursuing a regular suit. In the instant case, the power which was vested in the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue was not exercised and the revision application was ordered to stand abated only on the ground that the heirs of Sheo Mangal had not been brought on record within the period of limitation adhered to by the Board of Revenue by practise. In this connection, reference may also be made to Section 29 of the Limitation Act which reads as below: "29. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law......." 12. This clearly indicated where a local law prescribed any period of limitation for a suit, appeal or application different from the one given in the schedule of the Limitation Act and as laid down under Section 3, that period of limitation would be taken under law to be one prescribed in the schedule itself. 13. Thus I find that no period of limitation was prescribed under the limitation Act for revisions and substitution applications in revision in revenue cases. Therefore, should that practise of four months' limitation which had come to exist on the basis of practise should be adhered to or not. This practise can be adhered to in revisions where the Board or the Additional Commissioner has power suo moto to examine the record to satisfy itself about the correctness or otherwise of the order. If this practise is adhered to then it would amount to denial of the power conferred on Board in its revisional jurisdiction. When the Board can itself examine the record in revision why such a bar be placed on a party who moves the Board to exercise such a jurisdiction This bar, therefore, should not be placed as has been held by the Board in Raj Kumar's case. 14. The question next arises is as to whether residuary Article 137 should be applied to such proceedings in revision in revenue cases. There is no doubt that Article 113 of the new Act is the residuary Article regarding suit for which no period of limitation has been prescribed. Similarly Article 137 is the residuary Article for applications in which no limitation has been prescribed. Article 113 runs as below: 113. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule. 3 years When the right to sue accrues. Article 137 reads as below: 137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division. 3 years When the right to apply accrues. 15. As decided by the Full Bench of this Court in Chandradeo Pandey's case, Article 137 was applied to revisions and substitution applications in revisions under the Civil Procedure Code. It should be noted here that there was no limitation prescribed for such substitution application regarding cases to which C.P.C. applied and the rule which was being followed was ninety days for substitution, This was also based on practise. It should be noted here that there was no limitation prescribed for such substitution application regarding cases to which C.P.C. applied and the rule which was being followed was ninety days for substitution, This was also based on practise. Under Article 120 of the new Limitation Act, 90 days limitation was prescribed to bring on record the legal representatives on the deceased plaintiff or appellant or of the deceased respondent. This Article reads as below: 120. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or of a deceased defendant or respondent made a party. 90 days The date of death of the plaintiff, appellant, defendant or respondent as the case may be. 16. Even in cases under the C.P.C. there was no provision for making substitution application within 90 days in the Full Bench case referred to above, the question arose as to whether such an application should be made within 90 days from the date of the death of the deceased applicant or opposite party. There were two Division Bench cases on this point. The one was Union of India v. Seth Shanti Swarup, A.I.R. 1966 All. 530 wherein it was held that since there is no period of limitation prescribed for an application for substitution in revision, it can be made at any time so long as the application in revision is pending. The other Division Bench case is Khuda Bux v. Mahanand Tewari, A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 84. in which it was held that such application should be presented within a reasonable time and it should be as mentioned under Order XXII C.P.C. and the revision application would abate and the proceedings would cease unless no cause was shown for condoning the delay. 17. The position in the reported cases is no way different from the position which existed about revisions and substitution proceedings arising out of C.P.C. In this view of the matter. I am of the opinion that Article 137 could apply to application for substitution in revisions in revenue court as well and this leads to the conclusion that the Board of Revenue by dismissing the revision as abated failed to exercise its jurisdiction and decided the question on wrong proposition of law. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds. The impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue is quashed. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds. The impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue is quashed. The revision should be heard on merits after bringing the legal representatives of the deceased Shiv Mangal on record. Parties shall bear their respective costs of this writ petition.