JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal from the judgment of our learned brother A. Misra, J. in Second Appeal No. 26 of 1967 which arose out of a suit filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant for declaration of his title to plot Nos. 2027, 2042 and 2042/3493 appertaining to Khata No. 1327/24 of Cuttack town and for recovery of possession of the same after setting' aside the order passed in favour of the Defendant-Respondents in a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. The disputed properties appertain to Touzi No. 2498 of which Motilal Pandit (Defendant No. 10) was the intermediary. The estate vested in the State Government on 1-5-1954. It is the Plaintiff's case that thereafter the proprietor who after reclaiming the disputed lands was in khas possession of the same included his name as a tenant in respect of these lands in the Zamabandi which he had submitted to Government. By operation of Section 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (Act 1 of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), these lands must be deemed to have been settled with Defendant No. 10 as an occupancy raiyat under the State Government. Defendant No. 10 thereafter' paid rent to Government which was accepted thus recognizing his occupancy rights in the lands. On 23-11-1957 Defendant No. 10 sold the suit plots to the Plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- by the registered Kabala Ext. 8. Since then the Plaintiff remained in possession thereof in his own right. The Defendants who are residents of mouza Pithapur, were the disputed lands are situated filed in 1958 -an application u/s 5(i) of the Act challenging the validity of the sale deed Ext. 6. This application was rejected by the order Ext. 6 dated 24-9-1960 of the Additional District Magistrate, I Cuttack which was confirmed in appeal by the Board of Revenue. The Defendants thereafter created disturbances in the possession of the Plaintiff in respect of the disputed lands. There was a proceeding u/s 115, Code of Criminal Procedure which terminated in favour of the Defendants. The Plaintiff then instituted the suit claiming the reliefs above-mentioned. 2. The Defendants thereafter created disturbances in the possession of the Plaintiff in respect of the disputed lands. There was a proceeding u/s 115, Code of Criminal Procedure which terminated in favour of the Defendants. The Plaintiff then instituted the suit claiming the reliefs above-mentioned. 2. The contesting Defendants while admitting that the suit plots form part of the Anabadi appertaining to Touzi No. 2498 of Defendant No. 10 stated that on the abolition of the estate with effect from 1-5-1954, Defendant No. 10 ceased to have any right, title and interest in the touzi as well as in the Anabadi appertaining to the same including the disputed lands. They denied that Defendant No. 10 had either reclaimed the disputed lands or was in khas possession of the same as claimed in the plaint. Defendant No. 10 having failed to file any claim in the manner prescribed by Section 8-A of the Act, he did not acquire any occupancy rights in respect of the disputed properties. He had no title to the same and consequently under the sale deed Ext. 8 the Plaintiff did not acquire any title to the suit lands. The disputed properties are a tank and its embankments and they were being used by the people of the locality for communal purposes from time immemorial and by such user they have acquired a right thereto. After the abolition of the estate Defendant No. 10 managed to get some rent receipts from the State Government in token of having paid rent for the disputed properties. But this cannot confer any right of occupancy on Defendant No. 10 in respect of the disputed properties, They admitted that heir application u/s 5(i) of the Act was rejected by the Collector but they pleaded this could not have the effect of conferring any title on Defendant No. 10 or on the Plaintiff. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit on the following findings: (1) The suit plots do not constitute communal property; (2) Defendants have not acquired and do not possess any customary or other rights in the suit tank or other disputed plots; and (3) Defendant No. 10 acquired a right of occupancy in the disputed properties and consequently the Plaintiff acquired a valid title thereto under the sale deed Ext. 8. 8. The lower appellate Court substantially affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the Defendants. 4. In the second appeal, our learned brother upheld the concurrent findings of the Courts below that the disputed plots do not constitute communal property and that Defendants do not possess any customary rights therein. It may be stated here that in the second appellate Court, the Plaintiff filed an application for permission to amend the plaint by adding therein an alternative claim to the effect that assuming that his vendor Defendant No. 10 had not acquired an occupancy right in the suit properties, the Plaintiff after purchase having paid rent for the disputed lands to the State and the State having accepted rent from him, he acquired an occupancy right in the lands. The learned Judge held that Defendant No. 10 having admittedly not preferred any claim u/s 8-A of the Act no tenancy rights accrued in his favour and consequently the Plaintiff under the sale deed Ext. 8 did not acquire any right in the disputed properties. It was contended before him that even assuming that Defendant No. 10 did not acquire any such right u/s 7 of the Act, and consequently the disputed lands vested in the State, Defendant No. 10 having subsequently paid rent for the same to the State which was accepted, he acquired rights of occupancy in the properties. This contention was rejected. On the ground that there was no such pleading in the plaint. Dealing next with the alternative case set up by the Plaintiff by seeking an amendment of the plaint, the learned Judge held that to allow the application would amount to allowing the Plaintiff to make out a different title' quite foreign to the one on the basis of which' he sought relief in the plaint and therefore rejected the petition. He incidentally observed that even if the petition for amendment is allowed still the Plaintiff cannot succeed on merits because mere payment and acceptance of rent would not be sufficient in all circumstances to infer creation of a tenancy unless the intention to transfer any property by one to another is established and that there is no such evidence on record to show that by accepting rent from the Plaintiff the State intended to create a tenancy in his favour in respect of the disputed lands. In the result, the second appeal was allowed and the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The learned Judge, however gave leave to appeal to the Plaintiff and accordingly the present appeal is filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant. 5. Four main questions arise for consideration in this appeal, namely, (1) whether by operation of Section 7 of the Act, as it stood before it was amended by Orissa Act 15 of 1956, Defendant No. 10 acquired occupancy right in the disputed lands;(2) assuming that he did not acquire any such right u/s 7, did he acquire occupancy rights in the lands by payment of rent to the State and acceptance of the same by the latter, and (3) whether Plaintiff's application for amendment of the plaint should be allowed and in that event; (4) assuming that Defendant No. 10 did not acquire any occupancy right either by operation of Section 7 or by payment of rent to the State, did the Plaintiff independent of Defendant No. 10 acquire any occupancy right by payment of rent to the State and acceptance of the same by the latter? 6. An estate notified u/s 3 of the Act vests in the State free of all encumbrances. The quondam proprietor of the estate loses all interests in the estate and as proprietor he retains no interest in respect of any interest whatsoever. But in respect of the lands enumerated in Section 7, he is deemed to have acquired a right of occupancy in there by payment of rent to the State. Although in fact the vesting of the estate and the deemed settlement of raiyat's right in respect of certain classes of lands enumerated in Section 7 take place simultaneously, in law,the two must be treated as different transactions. First, there is a vesting of the estate in the State absolutely free from all encumbrances. Then follows the deemed settlement by the State of the raiyat's rights on the quondam proprietors. See Shivashankar Prasad Shah and Others Vs. Baikunth Nath Singh and Others, and Bhudan Singh and Another Vs. Nabi Bux and Another. The disputed touzi in this case vested in the State on 1-5-1954. The Act as it then stood did not require the quondam proprietor to make any application to the State to obtain the deemed settlement contemplated in Section 7. Baikunth Nath Singh and Others, and Bhudan Singh and Another Vs. Nabi Bux and Another. The disputed touzi in this case vested in the State on 1-5-1954. The Act as it then stood did not require the quondam proprietor to make any application to the State to obtain the deemed settlement contemplated in Section 7. If he was in Khas possession of any lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes on the date of such vesting he acquired the status of an occupancy tenant subject to payment of rent and acceptance of rent by the State. By the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act. 1956 (Act 15 of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act), Sub-section (2) of Section 7 was deleted, Section 8-A was inserted and Section 9 was substituted. Section 8-A newly inserted so far as material reads thus: 8-A. Filing of claims under Sections 6, 7 and 8 and dispute relating there to: (1) The Intermediary shall file his claim in the prescribed manner for settlement of fair and equitable rent in respect of lands and building which are deemed be settled with him u/s 6 or Section 7 before the Collector within six months from the date of vesting. (2) Any person who is discharged from the conditions of personal service under Sub-section (3) of Section 8 may file his claim in the prescribed manner before the Collector within six months from the date of vesting for settlement of the lands under the terms and conditions of such service. Provided that the Collector shall, as soon as may be, after any such claim under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) is filed, give public notice thereof by beat of drum in the appropriate locality and by placards posted at such conspicuous places as he deems fit, inviting objections from persons interested. Provided further that in respect of estates which have vested in the State Government prior to the date of commencement of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Second Amendment) Act, 1957, (Orissa Act 3 of 1958), the claims mentioned in Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be filed before the Collector within a period of Fix months from the said date. xx xx xx Sub-section (2) of Section 9, as amended, reads thus: 9. xx xx xx Sub-section (2) of Section 9, as amended, reads thus: 9. Appeal against Collector's order under Sections 5, 6 or 7: xx xx xx xx (2) All claims referred to in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8-A allowed by the Collector prior to the date of commencement of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Orissa Act 15 of 1956) shall as soon as may be after the, said date, be notified in the prescribed manner by the Collector. Any objection received within a period of three months from the date of the said notification shall, after the parties are given an opportunity of being heard, be duly considered by the Collector who shall pass such order as he thinks fit and proper and the,order so made shall be final. 7. Section 8A and the substituted Sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Act introduced a radical change as to how the claims are to be filed. Under the Act, before it was amended in 1956, unless a dispute was raised, the claim was decided in favour of the intermediary. But under the amendment, the second proviso to Section 8A provided that in respect of an estate which had vested prior to 'the commencement of the Amendment Act, the claims mentioned in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8A should have to be filed within three months of the commencement of the Amendment Act. This Amendment Act came into force on 21-6-1956. Section 9(2) which are also brought into the statute book by the Amendment Act refers to cases where claims to the nature referred to under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8A had been allowed by the Collector prior to, the date of commencement of the Amendment Act. Reading the second proviso to Section 8A and Sub-section (2) of Section 9 together it appears to us that Sub-section (2) of Section 9 is intended to apply to cases where there was a prior settlement of the lands in favour of the ex-intermediary by acceptance of rent from him u/s 7 while the second proviso to Section 8-A is intended to apply to cases where there was no such settlement by acceptance of rent. In other words in those cases where the estate vested prior to 1956, but there was no settlement of the lands in favour of the ex-intermediary by acceptance of rent from him, the intermediary was required to file a claim under the second proviso to Section 8-A. But in cases where there was already a settlement prior to 1956, there was no obligation upon the ex-intermediary to make an application himself in terms of the second proviso to Section 8A, but the Collector was required to notify the claims referred in Sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 8-A and if any objection is received within a period of three months thereafter to dispose of the claim after hearing the parties. Admittedly in this case, the Collector did not notify the claim of the ex-intermediary as required u/s 9(2) of the Act. The question is what is the effect of the failure of the Collector to notify the claim. 8. Mr. R.K. Mohapatra, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant contended that the failure on the part of the Collector to notify the claim u/s 9(2) does not affect the right of occupancy which Defendant No. 10 had already acquired by virtue of operation of Section 7 of the Act. We, however, feel that it is not necessary to decide this question in this case, because, having regard to materials on record we are satisfied that even otherwise Defendant No. 10 did acquire an occupancy right in the disputed holdings before he sold the lands to the Plaintiff under Ext. 8. As already indicated, on the issue of vesting notification u/s 3, the entire estate free from all encumbrances vested in the State, and has become the property of the State. If it was not followed by the deemed settlement u/s 7, as we assume in this case, it was not, the disputed lands were entirely at the disposal of the State. Clause (9) of Section 3 of the Orissa Tenancy Act says that the expression 'land-lord' includes Government. Consequently for the purpose of the tenancy laws, Government is in the same position as an ordinary private landlord. Clause (9) of Section 3 of the Orissa Tenancy Act says that the expression 'land-lord' includes Government. Consequently for the purpose of the tenancy laws, Government is in the same position as an ordinary private landlord. It is well settled that under the tenancy laws a formal document is not necessary to create an agricultural tenancy and a tenant can be inducted to an agricultural holding by mere acceptance of rent where after he would acquire the status of a tenant See Basiruddin and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors. ILR 1961 Cutt. 595 Bhikari Tripathy v. Kashinath Misra and Ors. ILR 1964 Cutt. 289 State of Orissa and Ors. v. Bhakta Charan Naik and Ors. ILR 1965 Cutt. 22 and The Collector of Puri v. Budhinath Samantray and Anr. 35 (1969) C.L.T. 552. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. H.S. Rikhy and Others Vs. The New Delhi Municipal Committee our learned brother A. Misra, J. in the judgment under appeal has expressed the view that the mere fact that one person pays and another receives rent from the former does not necessarily create relationship of landlord and tenant between them. The Supreme Court case was one relating to letting out of shop houses and the question arose whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. One of the circumstances relied upon in proof of existence of such relationship was that the landlord's agent had received rent and had granted receipts. Stating that these circumstances, alone were not, conclusive, their Lordships observed: The question must, therefore, depend upon whether or not there is a relationship of landlord and tenant in the sense that there is a transfer of interest by the landlord in favour of the tenant. That decision, therefore, is distinguishable and cannot be of any assistance to determine the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of an agricultural holding. 9. A half-hearted contention was advanced during the course of arguments on behalf of the Respondents that as the disputed properties consist of a tank and its embankments, the lease is not for agricultural purposes and consequently tenancy of such properties cannot be created by mere acceptance of the rent. No such plea was advanced in the written statement and both parties went to trial on the basis that the disputed properties were agricultural lands. No such plea was advanced in the written statement and both parties went to trial on the basis that the disputed properties were agricultural lands. At this belated stage, therefore, the Respondents are not' entitled to advance a plea the decision of which, would depend upon investigation into questions of fact. That apart, the term "agriculture" is of wider import than the term "cultivation" and consequently a purpose for which a lease is taken may be connected with agriculture but not necessarily ancillary to cultivation. We may in this connection refer to a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Kumar Sen Chaudhury and Ors. v. Chandratara Nath and Ors AIR 1931 Cal. 1353. In that case, a certain lease by one Patta had for its subject, matter a tank and the lands on its embankments. The lease was for rearing fish in the tank and stacking grass for cattle on the banks. Whether the cattle were for purposes of cultivation or not was however not mentioned but there was evidence to the effect that cattle were for cultivation. It was held that the lease was of one indivisible holding as regards the tank and land on the bank and it was a lease for agricultural purposes and as such was governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is, therefore, clear that the mere fact that the disputed properties include a tank does not necessarily make the lease one for non-agricultural purposes, we would, therefore, hold in agreement with the decision of the trial and the first appellate Courts that the disputed lands are agricultural and if it is established that after the abolition of the estate the ex-intermediary paid rent to the State in respect of the disputed properties and the State accepted the rent, he acquired occupancy rights in the disputed properties. 10. 'There is, however, no independent evidence on record to show payment of rent by Defendant No. 10 to the State. In proof of the Plaintiff's case that Defendant No. 10 paid rent to the State and that the State recognised him as an occupancy tenant, reliance is placed on certain admissions made in the written statement and on the order Ext. 6 passed on the application u/s 5(i) of the Act filed by the Respondents before the Collector. In proof of the Plaintiff's case that Defendant No. 10 paid rent to the State and that the State recognised him as an occupancy tenant, reliance is placed on certain admissions made in the written statement and on the order Ext. 6 passed on the application u/s 5(i) of the Act filed by the Respondents before the Collector. In paragraph 4 of the plaint; it was specifically averred that after the abolition of the estate, Defendant No. 10 paid rent to the State and had obtained receipts. This allegation was denied by the Defendants in para, 8 of the written statement wherein it was averred that if at all the Defendant No. 10 had obtained rent receipts from the State they were obtained in connection with the State officials. This averment made in the written statement cannot, therefore, be taken as an admission made by the Defendants that Defendant No. 10 had paid rent for the disputed holding to the State authorities and that the latter had accepted the same. But in the proceeding u/s 5(i) of the Act (Ext. 6), Defendant No. 10 who was opposite party No. 1 therein, bad asserted that after the vesting he was a tenant in respect of the disputed lands under the State Government and had obtained receipts from the Anchal on payment of rent for the lands. The Additional District Magistrate who enquired into that petition of the Respondents adverted to the' fact that after the abolition of the estate the ex-proprietor Defendant No. 10 has shown his name in the Zamabandi as a tenant in respect of the disputed lands and had automatically become a tenant under the State by operation of Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act provides that all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes which were in khas possession of an Intermediary on the date of such vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such Intermediary and he shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as raiyats under the State Government having occupancy' rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner. To acquire occupancy rights, therefore, it is not only necessary that the ex-intermediary should have been in khas possession of the land, but he should also have paid the fair and equitable rent as determined by the Collector. In Ext. 6 the Additional District Magistrate has held that Defendant No. 10 had acquired occupancy rights in the land. Such a determination pre-supposes not only that he was in khas possession of the lands at the time of vesting but that he had also paid the fair and equitable rent to the State., Ext. 6, therefore, supports the claim made in the plaint that Defendant No. 10 had paid rent for the disputed lands and the same had been accepted by the State. 11. It is, however, argued that Ext. 6 is not admissible in evidence in the suit. Section 35 of the Evidence Act runs thus: 35. An entry in any public or other official book, register, or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any other person in performance of a duty, specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. The principle on which the S.I.s based is the circumstance that such record have been made by authorised and accredited agents appointed for the purpose and partly also the publicity of the subject matter to which they relate. The law reposes such a confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trust with accuracy and fidelity and therefore whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duly may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true, under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require. In Maheswar Naik and Others Vs. Tikayet Sailendra Narayan Bhanj Deo the dispute related to certain rights which the villagers of mouza Patia were claiming in certain forests belonging to the Raja of Kanika. In Maheswar Naik and Others Vs. Tikayet Sailendra Narayan Bhanj Deo the dispute related to certain rights which the villagers of mouza Patia were claiming in certain forests belonging to the Raja of Kanika. The question arose whether a report prepared by one N.N. Dutt, Deputy Magistrate relating to jungle rights of Killa Patia in which he recognised the rights of Sahar residents of mouza Patia to take minor forest produce from the unreserved portion of the forest for purposes of domestic consumption and for sale in small quantities by head-loads was admissible in evidence. A Bench of this Court consisting of Jagannadhadas and Narasimham JJ, held: Official reports are valuable and in many cases, that is the only best evidence of facts stated therein. Hence a report of a revenue enquiry relating to jungle' rights definitely recognizing the rights of certain persons to take minor forest produce for certain purposes based on personal information received from competent witnesses, is admissible in evidence in a case where such rights are in question. But a distinction has to be made between the statements contained therein relating to relevant facts and the opinions expressed therein as to such relevant facts. So far as mere opinions are concerned, while they are admissible the value to be attached is comparatively less. In Chandulal v. Pushkar Raj and Ors. AIR 1952 Nag. 271, a Bench of Nagpur High Court held: Reports made by revenue officers though not regarded as having judicial authority where they express opinions on the private rights of the parties are entitled for great consideration being reports of public officers made in the course of duties in so far as they supply information of official proceedings and historical facts and also in so far as they are relevant to explain the conduct and acts of the parties in relation to them and the proceedings of the Government founded on them. In the proceedings which terminated in the order Ext. 6, the main contesting parties were the Plaintiff and the Defendants in this litigation. The dispute related to the very properties which are the subject matter of this litigation. The Defendants contended before the Additional District Magistrate that after the vesting of the estate, the ex-proprietor (Defendant. In the proceedings which terminated in the order Ext. 6, the main contesting parties were the Plaintiff and the Defendants in this litigation. The dispute related to the very properties which are the subject matter of this litigation. The Defendants contended before the Additional District Magistrate that after the vesting of the estate, the ex-proprietor (Defendant. No. 10) who was also a party to that proceeding being opposite party No. 1 lost all his rights in the disputed properties and consequently the sale effected by him in respect of the same properties in favour of the present Plaintiff was invalid. The Defendants also claimed for themselves communal rights over the disputed properties. The Revenue Officer after due enquiry rejected the claim of the Defendants and held that after the vesting of the estate, the ex-proprietor (Defendant. No. 10) acquired occupancy rights in the disputed lands and that he was therefore free to sell the same to the Plaintiff. In these circumstances, Ext. 6 is not only admissible in evidence but being between the same parties and relating as it did to the very properties which are in dispute in the present litigation, the decision is also entitled to a very great weight. Relying on this decision the Courts below came to the conclusion that Defendant No. 10 did acquire occupancy rights in the disputed properties and that consequently the Plaintiff had acquired title thereto under Ext. 8, we are not prepared to say that their conclusion is wrong. 12. There then remains for consideration the application made by the Plaintiff during the pendency of the second appeal for amendment of the plaint. By, the proposed amendment he wants to take the plea that even assuming that Defendant No. 10 had no occupancy rights in the disputed lands which he could transfer to the Plaintiff under Ext. 8, the Plaintiff after the purchase having paid rent to the State in respect of the disputed lands and the State having accepted rent from him, he has, acquired right of occupancy in the disputed properties. The application for amendment was rejected by our learned brother A. Misra., J. on the ground that if the Plaintiff is permitted to set up an independent title acquired directly from the State, it will be wholly inconsistent with the tide which he sought to make out in the plaint. 13. Mr. The application for amendment was rejected by our learned brother A. Misra., J. on the ground that if the Plaintiff is permitted to set up an independent title acquired directly from the State, it will be wholly inconsistent with the tide which he sought to make out in the plaint. 13. Mr. S.K. Mohanty learned Counsel for the Respondents while supporting the ground on which the application for amendment was rejected submits that if for any reason the amendment is to be allowed, the case would have to be remanded to the trial Court giving the Respondents liberty to contest the new claim set up by the Plaintiff. The contention of Mr. Mohapatra learned Counsel for the Appellant is that by the proposed amendment he is not claiming a new title to the suit properties but is claiming the same occupancy status which he had originally claimed in the plaint but that the proposed amendment is only an additional approach based on facts which are already in the pleadings and the evidence. In deciding the question whether an amendment of the pleading should or should not be allowed, the following principles have to be kept in view. (1) A prayer for amendment should not be disallowed merely because the Plaintiff is negligent or careless and the application for amendment is filed at a late stage; provided allowing such amendment would not result in any injustice to the other side. (2) One of the classes of cases in which an amendment would work injustice to the opposite party is where it takes away from the latter a right accrued to him by lapse of time. Therefore, ordinarily a Plaintiff will not be allowed to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which since the date of the claim has become barred by the statute of limitation. (3) The above however, is not a universal rule and under peculiar and special circumstances an amendment may be allowed even where it has the effect of depriving a Defendant of his right to plead limitation. This circumstance, however, should be one of the factors to be taken into consideration in the exercise of the Court's discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed, but that does not affect the power of the Court to order if that is required in the interest of justice. This circumstance, however, should be one of the factors to be taken into consideration in the exercise of the Court's discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed, but that does not affect the power of the Court to order if that is required in the interest of justice. In the case before us, the Plaintiff doubtless had not pleaded in the plaint that after purchasing the properties under Ext. 8 he had paid rent to the State and that the rent was accepted. But he had produced in Court Exts. 10 and 10/a showing acceptance from him of rent by the State authorities in respect of the disputed properties. Exts. D and D/1 are rent receipts,produced by the Defendants showing payment of rent by them to the State authorities in respect of the disputed lands but here again in the tenant's column the name of the Plaintiff appears. These rent receipts establish that not only that the name of the Plaintiff has been recorded as a tenant of the disputed lands in the State records but also that the State had accepted rent from him on some Occasions. Subsequently when the Defendants paid rent for the disputed properties, the State authorities treated the Defendants as agents of the Plaintiff for payment of rent. When the Defendants themselves paid rent for the disputed lands and obtained rent receipts which showed that it is the Plaintiff whose name is recorded in respect of those properties, they cannot be heard to say that they were in any way taken by surprise at the claim though belatedly made by the Plaintiff that after he purchased the disputed properties under Ext. 8 he has been paying rent to the State for the same and that the rent was being accepted from him. No exception could have been taken if in the plaint originally filed the Plaintiff had advanced the alternative claim which he now wants to set up by way of amendment. It is true that if such a claim had originally been made it would have been open to the Defendant are to contend that no such rent had ever been paid by the Plaintiff and that the State had not accepted him as tenant. It is true that if such a claim had originally been made it would have been open to the Defendant are to contend that no such rent had ever been paid by the Plaintiff and that the State had not accepted him as tenant. But in view of the fact that the Defendants themselves have produced rent receipts which would establish beyond doubt that the Plaintiff's name had been recorded as a tenant in respect of the disputed lands in the records maintained by the State, there is no further scope for the Defendants to contend that they would be prejudiced if the amendment is allowed. With great respect to A. Misra, J., we find it difficult to appreciate how the claim now advanced by the Plaintiff by way of amendment is inconsistent with the case he had originally set up in the plaint. In the plaint his case is that he is an occupancy tenant, having acquired the occupancy right from Defendant No. 10 under the sale deed Ext. 8. We may in the circumstances as explained above assume that he had made an averment in the plaint that after purchase he has been paying rent to the State and obtaining rent receipts and that his name is recorded as an occupancy tenant in the records maintained by the State. On the basis of these facts, he now wants the Court to draw a legal inference that in case it is held that he has not acquired a valid title under Ext. 8. it may be held that independent of Ext. 8, he became an occupancy tenant under the State. This is only an additional approach to the same facts. The Supreme Court in A.K. Gupta and Sons Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation while dealing with amendment of pleadings observed thus: In the matter of allowing amendment of pleading the general rule is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new cause of actions barred. Where, however, the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts the amendment is to be allowed even after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. Where, however, the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts the amendment is to be allowed even after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander and Others. Mr. S.K. Mohanty urged upon us not to allow the amendment on the ground that to do so would change the very foundation of the suit. But we are unable to find anything in that judgment to support Mr. Mohanty's contention or which goes contrary to the principle enunciated in A.K. Gupta and Sons Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation referred to above. We would, therefore, allow the amendment of the plaint sought for by, the Plaintiff-Appellant. 14. To sum up, therefore, the position that emerges is this: After the abolition of the estate, the entire touzi including the disputed properties vested in the State free of all encumbrances. We assume in the present case that Defendant No. 10 the ex-intermediary did not obtain a deemed settlement of the disputed properties by virtue of Section 7 of the Act. The disputed properties would, therefore, remain the properties of the State. There is no dispute in this case that the properties are agricultural. There is evidence to show that Defendant No. 10 in the Zamabandi which he submitted to the State had shown his name as a tenant of the disputed properties and that the State authorities accepted rent from him. Defendant No. 10 therefore became an occupancy raiyat in respect of the disputed properties. Under Ext. 8, therefore the Plaintiff acquired a valid right thereto. Assuming for any reason that Defendant No. 10 had not acquired any such occupancy right and consequently the Plaintiff did not acquire any under Ext. 8, the Plaintiff having paid the rent for the disputed lands and that refit having been accepted by the State, evidenced by the rent receipts Exts. 10, 10/a, D and D/1, supported further by the circumstance that the Plaintiff's name is recorded as tenant in respect of the disputed lands, it must be held that he has acquired rights of occupancy therein. 10, 10/a, D and D/1, supported further by the circumstance that the Plaintiff's name is recorded as tenant in respect of the disputed lands, it must be held that he has acquired rights of occupancy therein. The claim of the Defendants, that the lands are communal in nature and that they representing the villagers are in possession of the same had been concurrently rejected by all the Courts below. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed. 15. We would accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decree passed by the learned Single Judge and decree the Plaintiff's suit. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs here and in the Courts below. G.K. Misra, C.J. 16. I agree. Final Result : Allowed