( 1 ) A short but an important question arises for decision in this petition under Arts. 226 and 227, and that is, whether the Collector of Central Excise, under the proviso to S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 is required to give notice to the concerned person before he extends the period to issue show cause notice against the confiscation of the seized articles. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the petition are these: On 24-6-1. 969 the central Excise Authorities searched the petitioner at HAL Airport, Bangalore, and seized 230 gold sovereigns for the contravention of the provisions of the Gold (Control) Act. The seizure was made under the provisions of s. 66 of the Gold (Control) Act since the petitioner did not produce any permit or authorisation for its possession acquisition. On 11-6-1970 the collector of Central Excise issued notice to the petitioner and two other concerned persons calling upon them to shqw cause as to why the gold seized should not be confiscated with in imposition of personal penalty. The said notice was evidently issued beyond the period of six months from the date of the seizure of the gold, but it was within the period extended by the Collector of Central Excise. On 5-12-1969 that is before, the period of six months from the date of seizure. the Collector extended the period up to 23-6-1970 for issuing show cause notice to, the petitioner. The said order of the Collector reads :" Order under proviso to S. 79 (ii) of Gold (Control) Act, 1968. Whereas 230 gold sovereigns weighing 1,821 grams seized from the possession of Sri Vipin Kumar Jain, son of Hazarilal Jain, 33, Malvia Nagar t. T. Naiar, Bhopal-3, by the Central Excise Staff. Bangalore on 24th June 1989 at HAL Airport, Bangalore and whereas sufficient cause has been shown to me to the effect that the show cause notice in this case cannot be issued within the period of six months of the seizure. T. in exercise of the powers conferred on me under proviso to S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) act, 1968, hereby grant extension of time upto 23rd June 1970 for issue of show cause notice, under S 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 sd Asst. Collector (Technical) Central Excise, Bangalore. (M. C. Das, Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore. Collector (Technical) Central Excise, Bangalore. (M. C. Das, Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore. ""the petitioner resisted the action for confiscation of the gold, inter alia contending that he was entitled to restoration of possession of the seized gold immediately after the expiry of the initial period of six months from the date of its seizure, and the notice issued after the said period was invalid as the Collector axteded the period without affording him of anv opportunity of being heard. That contention was not accepted by the collector. He made the order dt. 15-1-1973 directing the confiscation of the gold with a panalty of Rs. 5,000 on the petitioner. The validity of the said order is shallonged in this writ petition " ( 3 ) MR Jeshima] learned Counsel for the petitioner urged the following two contertion in the alternative. (1) The power conferred on the Collector of' Central Excise under the proviso to S 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act. 1968 is quasi-judicial and therefore the Collector ought to have issued notice to the petitioner before he extended the period for issuing the show cause notice; and (2) Even assuming that that power is administrative, since the order , of the Collector affected the petitioner's rights, the petitioner was entitled to a notice under the rules of nature justice ( 4 ) BOTH the above contentions are based on the decision of the supreme Court in Astt. Collector of Customs v. Charan Das, AIR. 1972 SC. 689. . In that case the scope of the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 was considered. The said proviso also authorised the Collector of Customs to extend the period for issuing show cause notice to the concerned person, before the confiscation of the seized goods. But that extension is- required to be made on sufficient cause being shewn The Supreme Court observed:" The words ' sufficient cause being shown' must mean that the Collector must determine on materials placed before him that they warrant extension of time, and the enquiry to be held by the Collector has to be, on facts and not on his subjective satisfaction". It was also, observed that since the Collector has on facts to decide on the existence of a sufficient cause though his decision of a sufficient cause and although his decision as to sufficiency of materials before, him may be within his exclusive jurisdictin, it is none the less difficult to apprehend how he can come to, his determination unless he has before him the pros and cons of the question. It was further held that the power under the proviso to S. 110 (2) of the, Customs act is not to be exercised without an opportunity off being heard being given to the person from whom the goods are, seized. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the decision qf the Supreme Court in Charan Das's cose (1) is on all fours on the question before us. The Counsel would be right if the proviso to S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 is identical with the provisions of the proviso, to S. 110 (2) of the. Customs Act, 1962. In order to appreciate the contentions, it is necessary to set out these provisions. Section 110 (2) of the Customs Act, 1962 provides :"where any goods are seized u/sub-sec. (1) and no notice in respact thereof is given under clause (a) of S. 124 within six months qf the seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the person from vhere possession they were seized : provided that the aforesaid period of six months may, on sufficient cause long shown, be extended by the Collector of Customs for a period not exceeding six months. "section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act, so far as it is relevant provides: " S. 79-No order qf adjudication of confiscation or penalty shall be made unless the owner of the gold, conveyance, or animal of other person concerned is given a notice in writing- (i)". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii) giving him a reasonable opportunity of making a, representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified is the notice against the confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein, and, if he so desires, of being heard in the matter: provided further that where nq such notice is given within a period of six months from the date, of the seizure qf the gold, conveyance, or animal or such further period as the Collector cf Central Excise or customs may allow, such gold, conveyance, or animal shall be returned after the expiry of that period to the person from whose possession it was seized" on comparison of the abqve provisions, I find there is a material difference between the provisions of S. 110 (2) of the Customs Act and S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act. The words " the period of six months may, on sufficient cause being shown, be extended by the Collector" which are found in the provisq to S. 110 (2) of the Customs Act are significantly not fqund in the proviso to S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act. The observation qf the Supreme Court that the power conferred on the Collector under the proviso tq S. 110 (2) of the, Customs Act could rot have been exercised without a notice to the person from whom goods were seized, was based on the above words. It would be, therefore, difficult to extend the principle stated in Charan Da's case (1) to the interpretation of the provisions ' of S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act. In my view, it is not obligatory for the Collector to make any judicial determination qf the facts, before he 'extends the period under the proviso to S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) act. Under the said proviso the Collector could extend the period on his subjective satisfaction without notice to the petitioner and the order made by the Collector on 5-12-1969, is therefore, not open to attack. ( 5 ) I shall now turn to the second contention. Under the said proviso the Collector could extend the period on his subjective satisfaction without notice to the petitioner and the order made by the Collector on 5-12-1969, is therefore, not open to attack. ( 5 ) I shall now turn to the second contention. It was urged for the petitioner that immediately after the period of six months from the date of seizure of the gaid, the petitioner got a right tq obtain the return of the gold without any enquiry and that right cannot be taken away by the Collector by the unilateral extension of time. Again reliance was placed on some of the observations of the Supreme Court in Charan Das's case (1 ). Here also I find that the observation of the Supreme Court in the said case, is of no assistance to the case of the petitioner. Those observations were based on the specific provisions of S. 110 (2) of the Custom's Act. Under s. 110 (2) of the Customs Act if no notice is given within a period of a month from the date of seizure of the goods, a right to, get return of the seized goods arises to the concerned person. That right is a civil right and it cannot be prejudicially affected or taken away by any authority without an opportunity to the person aggrieved. Even an administrative order affecting the civil rights of a party has to be made in a manner consonant with the rules of natural justice. The rule that a, party to whose prejudice the order is intended to be passed, is entitled to a hearing, applied alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of personsinvested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. See State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina pant Deair. 1972 SC. 1269 and dfo Souch Kheri v Ram Sanehi Singhair. 1972 SC. 205. . These principles would have been applicable to the case of the petitioner, if he had a right to obtain return of the seized gold after the period of 6 months from the date of its seizure. But it seems to me no such right had accrued to him after the said period of six months. 1972 SC. 205. . These principles would have been applicable to the case of the petitioner, if he had a right to obtain return of the seized gold after the period of 6 months from the date of its seizure. But it seems to me no such right had accrued to him after the said period of six months. Under S. 79 (ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, the right to get back the seized gold arises only when the entire period inclusive of the extended period tq issue notice expires This is very clear by the proviso therein. It reads :" Where no such notice is given within a period of six months from the date of the seizure of the gold. . . . . or such further period as the Collector of Central Excise on Customs may allow, such gold. . . . . shall be returned after the expiry of that period to the person from whose possession it was seized. (Underlining italics is mine ). The words after the expiry of that period referred to in the said proviso is inclusive of the period if any, extended by the Collector and not after the expiry of the initial period of six months from the date of seizure. Sinco, in this case, the shqw cause notice was issued before the expiry of the period extended by the Collector, the petitioner was not entitled tq any other notice from the Collector. In any view of the matter, I do not find any reason tq quash the impugned order of confiscation. ( 6 ) BEFORE I part with the petition, 1 may refer to one Qther contention which was urged and subsequently withdrawn by the Counsel. He urged that the petitioner was entitled tq retain the seized gold without any declaration under sub-sec. (5) of S. 16 of the Gold (Control) Act) since the seized gold was evidently less than 2,000 grama which is said in the provision. The said contention was not specifically taken in the present petition and there was therefore no opportunity for the respondents to controvert it. The counsel for the petitioner then sought leave to withdraw the contention as he intends to prefer an appeal against the order of confiscation and imposition of penalty. I therefore express no opinion on the said contention. The said contention was not specifically taken in the present petition and there was therefore no opportunity for the respondents to controvert it. The counsel for the petitioner then sought leave to withdraw the contention as he intends to prefer an appeal against the order of confiscation and imposition of penalty. I therefore express no opinion on the said contention. ( 7 ) IN the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances I make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .