Judgment 1. This second appeal is by the plaintiff. A suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 9,537.79 as principal besides interest and costs was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants on the basis of a usufructuary mortgage bond dated 1st July 1947 executed in his favour with respect to eight annas proprietary interest in Tauzi No. 781 in Mahal Rupaulia Khurd and 9 Bighas 16 Kathas and 3 Dhurs of lands, including Bakast land, of Tauzi No. 781 and Tauzi No. 780/1 in village Rupaulia Gopi for a consideration of Rs. 15,000/-. According to the plaintiff, he came in possession of the mortgaged property by virtue of the aforesaid document, but in pursuance of the vesting of the Tauzis in the State of Bihar on the 25th January 1955 under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the plaintiff was dispossessed from the mortgaged properties. Sometime thereafter he preferred a claim under Sec.14 of the Act notifying that to the Claims Officer for the purpose of determining the amount of debt legally and justly payable to him. The plaintiff had made a claim for a sum of Rupees 19,821/8/9, with interest, but the Claims Officer determined the amount to the extent of Rs. 7,622-00 only. On appeal to this Court, being Claim Appeal No. 31 of 1965, this Court allowed the plaintiffs claim at Rs. 10,744/2/11. The State Government determined the amount of compensation payable for the estate of the defendants under the mortgage security of the plaintiff at Rs. 1,206.40 only. The plaintiff adjusted this amount against his claim and filed the present suit for the balance of the claim, seeking a personal decree against the defendants. 2. The defendants contested the suit, inter alia, on the following grounds: 1. The suit was not maintainable and was hit by Sec. 4 (d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 2.In any event, the suit was barred by limitation, the same not having been brought within a period of six years from the date of dispossession of the plaintiff from the mortgage security under Article 116 of the Limitation Act (Old). 3. The trial Court decreed the suit. 2.In any event, the suit was barred by limitation, the same not having been brought within a period of six years from the date of dispossession of the plaintiff from the mortgage security under Article 116 of the Limitation Act (Old). 3. The trial Court decreed the suit. On the first question by committing an error of record, it held that the mortgaged property consisted also tenancy lands and the claim could be enforced against these properties under the ordinary law. On the second question, it took the view that the date from which the period of limitation would begin to run in this case was 22-1-1961, the date when the claim of the plaintiff was finally determined by the High Court and, therefore, the suit was not barred. It accordingly decreed the suit and passed a decree in the form of a preliminary decree granting two months time to the defendants to pay the amount, failing which the amount could be recovered from the properties which were mortgaged and had not vested in the State of Bihar, and if the decretal amount could not be fully satisfied out of those properties, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same from other properties of the defendants. 4. In the Court of appeal below, however, on the question of limitation, the plaintiffs learned counsel conceded that inasmuch as the claim of the plaintiff being a simple money claim, based on the dues, and not on any registered instrument, the period of limitation applicable was only three years, and the suit in question was instituted within the period or three years from the date of determination of compensation payable to the plaintiff. It, however, took the view that the suit was not maintainable by virtue of the provision of Sec. 4 (d) of the Act, as according to the said provision, no suit could lie in a Civil Court for the recovery of any amount due from the defendants who were ex-intermediaries and the payment being secured by a mortgage on their estate, the same had vested in the State of Bihar. He, accordingly, dismissed the suit. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in support of the appeal, vehemently contended that the view of the learned District Judge was entirely erroneous. He, accordingly, dismissed the suit. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in support of the appeal, vehemently contended that the view of the learned District Judge was entirely erroneous. According to the learned counsel, the claim as determined under Sec.16 of the Act would be in the nature of a debt, which the defendants were bound to pay, and the plaintiff was, accordingly, entitled to recover the same from the defendants as any other claim for money, and the intention of the law was not to wipe out the claims of the creditors on account of the vesting of the estate of a proprietor or tenure-holder. 6. The question raised by Mr. Kailash Boy for consideration by this Court is a vexed question and has fallen for consideration by this Court as well as the Supreme Court in some form or the other. I shall refer to those decisions a little later. But the ratio of the decisions, as it seems to me, is that once the entire mortgaged property is vested in the State of Bihar, then the claim for relief by the mortgagee under the ordinary law becomes absolutely barred and his only remedy lies in following the procedure as laid down under Chapter IV of the Act. According to Sec.14 of the Act, however, every creditor, whose debt is secured by the mortgage, or is a charge on, any estate or tenure may notify within the prescribed period and in the prescribed manner his claim in writing to the Claims Officer, who shall determine the principal amount justly due to him and the interest (if any) due at the date of such determination in respect of such principal amount (Sec.16). According to sub-section (5) of Sec.24 of the Act, in the case where the interest of a proprietor or tenure-holder is subject to a mortgage or charge, the compensation shall first be payable to the creditor holding such mortgage or charge and the balance, if any, shall be payable to the proprietor or tenure-holder concerned. According to sub-section (5) of Sec.24 of the Act, in the case where the interest of a proprietor or tenure-holder is subject to a mortgage or charge, the compensation shall first be payable to the creditor holding such mortgage or charge and the balance, if any, shall be payable to the proprietor or tenure-holder concerned. It has been specifically laid down in this provision that the amount of compensation payable to a creditor on account of such mortgage or charge shall be the amount determined under Chapter IV which, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, shall not in any case exceed the amount of compensation payable in respect of the estate or tenure or portion thereof which is subject to such mortgage or charge. This provision, in my opinion, is a complete answer to the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant as it has, by express words, limited the rights of the creditors and the compensation payable on account of the security of the estate or tenure or any part thereof shall not in any case exceed the amount of compensation payable in respect thereof. It appears to me that a kind of safeguard was intended by the legislature to the proprietors or tenure-holders under the scheme of the Act and their liabilities on the security of the estate or tenure, etc. was reduced to the extent of the compensation determined under Sec.24 of the Act, and the Civil Court was precluded from entertaining any suit for recovery of any money due from such a proprietor or tenure-holder. I am supported in my view by the observations of Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) in Krishna Prasad V/s. Gouri Kumari Devi, AIR 1962 SC 1464 . This case went to the Supreme Court from a decision of this Court. The learned Judge after referring to the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act observed that the provisions contained in Sec.16 in regard to the scaling down of the debts due by the proprietors and tenure-holders clearly indicated that another object which the Act wanted to achieve was to give some redress to the debtors whose estates have been taken away from them by the notifications issued under Sec.3. I shall refer to this case again a little later. 7. I shall refer to this case again a little later. 7. I now propose to discuss some of the authorities of this Court and of the Supreme Court, where the relevant provisions of the Act fell for consideration. This Court in two Full Bench decisions, namely, Sukhdeo Das V/s. Kashi Prasad Tiwari, AIR 1958 Pat 630 (FB) and Sidheshwar Pd. Singh V/s. Bam Saroop Singh, AIR 1963 Pat 412 (FB) had taken the view that the effect of Sec. 4 (d) read with Sections 3 and 6 of the Act was not to destroy the mortgage in its entirety and some interest was left with the mortgagor landlord in the Bakast land in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 6 and the mortgagee was entitled to follow that property, namely, the Bakast land and enforce the mortgage security against that property. It is not necessary to refer to other decisions of this Court which were based upon the above Full Bench decisions. In Krishna Prasads case, AIR 1962 SC 1464 (Supra), the question that arose for decision by the Supreme Court was whether a mortgagee decree-holder could proceed against the properties of the mortgagor other than those mortgaged which had not vested, in enforcement of the personal covenant. That question was answered in the negative. In that case also, as in the case before me, it was contended before the Supreme Court on behalf of the mortgagee that the object of the Act was not to extinguish debts due by the proprietors or tenure-holders and so it would be reasonable to confine the operation of Sec. 4 (d) only to the claims made against the estates which had vested in the State, and not others. This case was proceeded with on the footing that the entire property covered by the mortgage had vested in the State. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the Scheme of the Act postulates that where the provisions of the Act apply, claims of the creditors have to be submitted before the Claims Officer, the claimants have to follow the procedure prescribed by the Act and cannot avail of any remedy outside the Act by instituting a suit or any other proceedings in the Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. I may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Kishore V/s. Ram Pratap, AIR 1967 SC 801 where, however, some of the properties given in mortgage had not vested in the State. It was held in this case also that where the whole of the property mortgaged is an estate, there can be no doubt that the procedure prescribed by Chapter IV has to be followed in order that the amount due to the creditor should be determined by the Claims Officer. It was also held that the other items of property which were outside the purview of the Act, it did not apply to those properties and the same were available to the mortgagee for recovery of the mortgage money. The next case of the Supreme Court which is more in point is the case of Shivashankar Prasad San V/s. Baikunth Nath Singh, AIR 1969 SC 971 . The mortgagee decree-holder in this case sought to execute a decree against the Bakast land of the judgment-debtor, but in the meantime his estate vested in the State under the Act. Objection was taken by him that the decree became inexecutable. On a reference to Sec. 4 (a) of the Act, it was held that once an estate vests in the State, the various rights in respect of that estate enumerated therein shall also vest in the State, absolutely, free from all encumbrances, and the proprietor loses all his rights in the estate in question, except those interests which were expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act and although the lands enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Act, the State settled on them the rights of raiyats and the deemed settlement took place simultaneously in law, the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a vesting of the estate in the State absolutely, and free from all encumbrances, and then followed the deemed settlement by the State of raiyats right on the quondam proprietor. It was further held that under the circumstances, the only remedy open to the decree-holder was as provided in Chapter IV of the Act, reference to which I have already made above, and the views expressed by this Court in the aforesaid Full Bench decisions were held to be incorrect. 8. It was further held that under the circumstances, the only remedy open to the decree-holder was as provided in Chapter IV of the Act, reference to which I have already made above, and the views expressed by this Court in the aforesaid Full Bench decisions were held to be incorrect. 8. From the discussions made above, I have no doubt in my mind that the contention put forward by Mr. Kailash Roy has got no substance and must be rejected. Taking of a different view would mean that what is prohibited under the Scheme of the Act directly will be permitted to be achieved indirectly by the mortgagee if a suit for a money decree on the basis of the determination of the amount due to him under Sec.16 was allowed and the safeguard and protection provided under the Act to the quondam proprietor will be taken away. The determination of the amount under Chapter IV of the Act is done for a very limited purpose, namely, for the purpose of payment to the creditor out of the compensation payable to the proprietor and to settle priorities amongst the different creditors of the intermediaries and to ascertain their claims against the intermediaries to be recovered by instituting a suit or any other proceeding in the Court of ordinary Civil Jurisdiction as contended by Mr. Roy. The result of the vesting of an estate under the provisions of the Act is that the encumbrance, if any, on such an estate stands entirely discharged or liquidated, save and except in the manner and to the extent of as prescribed under Chapter IV of the Act and the mortgagee has to be content with the amount of compensation that may be available to him under S. 24 (5) of the Act. The interest created in favour of the proprietors under the deemed settlement is untainted with and free from the past liabilities and it emerges all glorious, without any shadow or burden of its past life. This view finds ample support from the three decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and, therefore, the contention raised by Mr. Kailash Roy must be rejected as being devoid of any merit or substance. 9. The question raised on behalf of the appellant, therefore, having been answered against him, this appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed with costs.