J. B. MEHTA, P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this petition challenges the orders of respondent No. 1 Special Land Acquisition Officer dated June 16 1971 by which he refused to make this reference under sec. 18 (2) of the hand Acquisition Act 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act on the ground that the application of the petitioner claimant was time-barred and he also refused to condone the delay. ( 2 ) THE award was in the present case made on January 5 1971 and it was not pronounced in the presence of the parties and no date of 1 pronouncement had been fixed. The alleged notice under sec. 12 (2) was served on January 13 1971 merely stating the true area and the total compensation amount of Rs. 1865-73 P. without any grounds for making that award. The petitioner therefore made an application for a certified copy of that award on January 22 1971 which was supplied oily on March 26 1971 The application for reference was made on April 16 1971 The petitioners case is that the award having been communicated actually on March 26 1971 which for the first time fastened him with the requisite notice under sec. 12 (2) the reference application made on April 16 1971 was clearly within time of six weeks. In any event the petitioner claimed condonation of this relevant period for getting actual notice of the award made against him. ( 3 ) SEC. 18 (2) requires that the Reference application shall be made to the Collector :- (A) if the person making it was present or represented. before the Collector at the time when he made his award within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award; (B) other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under sec 12 sub-sec (2) or within six months from the date of Collectors award whichever period shall first expire. Admittedly the first clause was not applicable is this case. Therefore under sec. 18 (2) (b) for determining the period of limitation for this application we would have to consider whether it was made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under sec. 12 (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award whichever period expires first. ( 4 ) MR. Therefore under sec. 18 (2) (b) for determining the period of limitation for this application we would have to consider whether it was made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under sec. 12 (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award whichever period expires first. ( 4 ) MR. Jani vehemently argued that the notice under-sec. 12 (2) was served on January 13 1971 and therefore this reference application was clearly not within time as it was beyond the period of 42 days from the date of the receipt of that notice. The legal position in this connection is completely well settled. In Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1503 their Lordships pointed out that this requirement of the award being brought to the notice of the party was not only a requirement of Law of Contract the award being merely an offer binding to the State but also an essential requirement of principles of fair play and natural justice. The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive being thus an essential requirement of the principles of fair play and natural justice it was held that the expression date of the award used in the proviso must mean the date when the award was either communicated to the party or was Known by him either actually or constructively. Therefore mechanical construction of the words from the date of the Collectors award used in the proviso in sec. 18 was not adopted because of this essential requirement of fair play and justice. Their Lordships further considered that oven the scheme of sec. 12 (2) that the notice was obligatory on the Collector to the persons interested who were not present personally or by their representative when the award was made which itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The legislature recognised that the making of the award under sec. 11 followed by its filing under sec. 12 (1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. The legislature recognised that the making of the award under sec. 11 followed by its filing under sec. 12 (1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. The legislature thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation was placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned by giving such notice under sec. 12 (2) immediately after making the award. Therefore their Lordships held that because the communication of the order was regarded by the legislature as necessary that sec. 12 (2) had imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause of the proviso was read in the light of this statutory requirement of sec. 12 (2) it was clear that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It was pointed out that a curious result would follow merely because of the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation in law under sec. 12 (2) which would have immediately tended to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under sec. 18 and that result could never have been intended by the legislature. Series of decisions were considered where it was held that where the rights of a person were affected by any order and limitation was prescribed for enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. In State of Punjab v. Mst. Quaisar Jehan Regum A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1604 the aforesaid ratio was reiterated by their Lordships and it was further held at page 1607 that the knowledge of the award did not mean mere knowledge of the fact that the award had beer made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award which must be made known either actually or constructively. If the award was communicated to a party under sec. 12 (2) of the Act the party must be obviously fixed with the knowledge of the contents of the award whether he read it or not. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award which must be made known either actually or constructively. If the award was communicated to a party under sec. 12 (2) of the Act the party must be obviously fixed with the knowledge of the contents of the award whether he read it or not. Similarly when a party was present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award was made by the Collector it must be presumed that he knew the contents of the award. Therefore it was in terms held that looking to the scheme of the Act knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. ( 5 ) IN view of this settled legal position there can be no valid notice under sec. 12 (2) until the essential contents of the award are brought home to the party affected by actually communicating the award. The order was communicated by giving the certified copy which in the present case was for the first time supplied on March 26 1971 ( 6 ) MR. Jani vehemently argued that the prescribed form was sufficiently compiled with by such cryptic notice stating merely the correct area and the total compensation amount. The requirement of this statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) has to be understood in view of the aforesaid settled legal position because such a notice really meets with the essential requirement of principles of fair play and natural justice. That is why this requirement was explained by their Lordships as communication of the essential contents of the award. In Harish Chandras ease their Lordships had pointed out that the award made by the Collector was in law not more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property. Even as a normal requirement under the contract law such an offer must be communicated to the party concerned. In order that such a communication to the award may be meaningful so that the party can exercise a right of making an application for reference under sec. 18 (1) it is obvious that it must give all the grounds and not the final offer itself. In order that such a communication to the award may be meaningful so that the party can exercise a right of making an application for reference under sec. 18 (1) it is obvious that it must give all the grounds and not the final offer itself. It is only after communicating the grounds or the essential conclusions of facts on the basis of which this offer has been made that the claimant could make an application for reference under sec. 18 (1 ). Under sec. 18 (2) it is a legal requirement for making an application for reference that the claimant must state the grounds on which the objection to the award was taken. Therefore unless the claimant knows all the grounds on which the offer has been made i. e. the award has been made this right of making a reference would be meaningless. Even the form of the award as specified in sec. 26 (1) requires the Land Acquisition officer not merely to specify the amount awarded as the market value under sec. 23 (1) but to specify the amounts awarded under each of the various clauses of that sub-section together with the grounds of awarding each of these amounts. That is why sec. 26 (2) in terms deems every such an award a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment. Therefore the meaningful supply of grounds as required under sec. 12 (2) or the statutory notice could mean that the claimant must have this judgment in the form of a statement of grounds as a result of which the final award or offer is made to the petitioner so that he can effectively exercise his right of making an application under sec. 18 (2) by stating all his grounds on which he objects to the award. Therefore there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Jani that merely stating the area and the compensation amount in such a notice would amount to communication of the award. The notice was clearly incomplete at that stage and it actually was completed only when this copy of the judgment is the form of the statement of all grounds for making this award had been supplied to the claimant on March 26 1971 Therefore the limitation could not run even on the basis of sec. The notice was clearly incomplete at that stage and it actually was completed only when this copy of the judgment is the form of the statement of all grounds for making this award had been supplied to the claimant on March 26 1971 Therefore the limitation could not run even on the basis of sec. 18 (2) (b) earlier part from the date of the service of the notice from any time prior to March 26 1971 In that view of the matter the reference application was clearly within time. ( 7 ) MR. Jani vehemently argued that it was stated in the affidavit that an inspection of the award was given to the petitioner. In fact the petitioners contention is that the award was not ready when the petitioner vent for inspection. Any way this is a disputed question of fact which need not be resolved as the authority had never relied on this ground. Besides the affidavit has been deliberately kept vague as to the date on which such inspection was offered Similarly it is equally irrelevant whether the same Advocate Mr. Oza had filed the application for reference for other claimants within time because in each case the limitation would depend on the date when the award was actually or constructively brought to the notice of the claimant concerned. ( 8 ) MR. Jani however vehemently relied on the decision of the Division Bench of the Maharashtra High Court in Khasba Daji v. At. V. Hinge I. L. R. 1965 Bom. 831 which dealt with a totally different aspect as to whether the petitioner was entitled to get time for getting certified copies excluded under sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. We are not concerned with that contingency because in our view the application was clearly within the time from the date of the communication of the award or the notice under sec. 12 (2) on March 26 1971 Therefore it is not necessary to go into the other question as to whether the petitioner was entitled to any exclusion of time or for getting the delay condoned. In that view of the matter this petition must be allowed by quashing the impugned order of respondent No. 1 of June 16 1971 holding that the reference application was time-barred and respondent No. 1 is directed to discharge his duty of making statutory reference under sec. In that view of the matter this petition must be allowed by quashing the impugned order of respondent No. 1 of June 16 1971 holding that the reference application was time-barred and respondent No. 1 is directed to discharge his duty of making statutory reference under sec. 18 in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible as sufficient time has now elapsed. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. Rule made absolute. .