JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR J.-The main question which arises in this petition is whether the employees working in the Octroi Department of the petitioner Municipal Council, Mehkar, are “workmen" within the meaning of the term as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 194-7, and whether the said Octroi Department was an "industry" for the purposes of section 33C (2) of the said Act. The question raised was one of importance and indeed was really covered by an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Sabir v. Municipal Council, Bhandara1, but as it was sought to be argued on behalf of the employees that that decision needs reconsideration, we have heard elaborate arguments not only on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent in this petition but we also permitted Mr. R. B. Pendharkar, counsel for the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, and Mr. S W. Dhabe, Advocate, to address us because any decision on this question was likely to affect the Corporation of the City of Nagpur and its employees in the Octroi Department. The question in this petition arises on the following facts. 2. The employees of the Municipal Council, Mehkar, who are admittedly octroi moharirs and peons working in the Octroi Department of the said Council, applied before the Second Labour Court at Nagpur claiming computation of the benefit in the form of weekly off in terms of money. They also claimed overtime wages from the Municipal Council. This application was made under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The main grounds on which the application was contested were that there was no provision either in the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, or the Rules framed thereunder and operative at the relevant time, entitling the employees to get either overtime wages or to get money in lieu of a weekly off. It may be stated that the question whether the employees were workmen and whether the Labour Court had no jurisdiction on the ground that the Octroi Department was not an industry as defined in the Act, was not agitated before the Labour Court. It is not necessary to go into the details of the claim of the employees and it suffices to say that the Labour Court granted the claim of the employees for computation of the benefit of a weekly day of rest in terms of money. It is not necessary to go into the details of the claim of the employees and it suffices to say that the Labour Court granted the claim of the employees for computation of the benefit of a weekly day of rest in terms of money. This decision of the Second Labour Court at Nagpur is now challenged by the petitioner Municipal Council in this petition. 3. It was argued at the outset and that is the substantial point which is raised in the petition that the employees who approached the Labour Court for the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 33C (2) of the Act were not "workmen" within the meaning of the term as defined in section 2 (s) of the Act, nor was the Octroi Department an "industry" as defined in section 2 (j) of the Act, and consequently, according to the petitioner, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim made by the employees under section 33C (2) of the Act and the entire award was, therefore, without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Abdul Sabir's (cited supra) in which this Court has taken the view that the activities of the Octroi Department of a Municipal Council which in that case was governed by the provisions of section 105 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, could not be held to amount to an "industry" within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act. If this decision was to be applied, there can be no doubt that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner had to be accepted. But it was vehemently urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Potty that the decision in Abdul Sabir's case required reconsideration because a contrary view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Banga Municipality v. State of Punjab2. It was contended that the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which also dealt with the case of octroi moharirs had held that the Octroi Department of a Municipality was an "industry" as defined in section 2. It was contended that the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which also dealt with the case of octroi moharirs had held that the Octroi Department of a Municipality was an "industry" as defined in section 2. (j) of the Act, and in arriving at this decision the Full Bench had relied extensively Oft the decision in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees3 which, according to the learned Judges who decided that case was still good law. The Full Bench had rejected the argument in that case that the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case was shaken by the sub-sequent decision of the Supreme Court in the Management of SafdarJung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi4. Our attention was also drawn by Mr. Dhabe to a Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Shri Brahad Saurashtra Safai Kamdar Mandai, Rajkot5. The Division Bench in that case was concerned with the question whether the conservancy and sanitary activity carried on by the Panchayat was an "industry" and whether the Safai Kamdars employed in the Panchayat who rendered such service would be "workmen" as defined in section 2 (s) of the Act. The Division Bench of the Gujrat High Court in that case followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case and held that the activity in question carried on by the Panchayat was covered by the definition of the word "industry" and the Labour Court had, therefore, jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the Panchayat and the Safai Kamdars engaged by the Panchayat. Relying on these two decisions it was sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent and by Mr. Dhabe that the decision in Abdul Sabir's case required reconsideration. Relying on these two decisions it was sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent and by Mr. Dhabe that the decision in Abdul Sabir's case required reconsideration. The main ground urged in support of the contention that the decision in Abdul Sabir's case required reconsideration was that the activity of the Tax Department of a Municipal Councilor for the matter of that, a body like the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, cannot be considered in isolation and that an ever-all picture of the activities of a Municipal Councilor a Corporation has to be considered, and inasmuch as the main purpose of taxation was to raise funds which would go to provide money for the several activities of the Municipal Council or the Corporation, it was the dominant activity and the nature thereof that had to be considered, and since the Department of the Municipal Councilor the Corporation which dealt with taxation and the recovery of taxes was really in the nature of a feeding activity, the Tax Department must be held to be an "industry" and indeed, according to the learned counsel, it was so held in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. It was, therefore, argued that so far as a Municipal Committee governed by the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, as it was then in force, was concerned, the levy of octroi tax was governed by section 66 (1) (e) of that Act, and there was no reason why the octroi tax and tae employees engaged or employed in the Octroi Department of the Municipal Councilor the Corporation should be differently dealt with. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the petitioner and by Mr. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the petitioner and by Mr. Pendharkar that in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Secretary, Madra, Gymkhana Club Employees Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana Club6 (hereinafter referred to as the Madras Gymkhana club's case), The Management of SajdarJung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi (hereinafter referred to as the SafdarJung Hospital's case), and the Management of the Federation of the Indian Chamber of Commerce v. R. K. Mitta7 (hereinafter referred to as the Chamber of Commerce's case), the entire concept of what activity should be treated as an "industry" bas undergone a radical change and the tests for deciding whether an activity was an "industry" or not as laid down and reiterated in these three cases have substantially shaken the authority of the decision of the Suprrme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. It was urged that the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had failed to notice certain important observations made by the Supreme Court in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case, and since these important observations have not been noticed, the decision of the Full Bench docs not create any infirmity in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Sabir's case, and since Abdul Subir's case is based on the later decision of the Supreme Court, it really does not require any further reconsideration These contentions necessitate a discussion of the manner in which the definition of the word "industry" has undergone a material change from time to time. It will be a futile exercise at this stage to refer in detail to the two decisions of the Supreme Court which were rendered before the decision in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. These decisions, namely, the decision in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee8, which is also known as the Budge Budge Municipality's case, and the decision in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen9, along with the decision in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case, were considered in detail by the Supreme Court itself in the Madras Gymkhana Club's Case. In an earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us was a party, in P. M. Dumbhare v. Director of Public Health, Maharashtra Slate10 a resume of these decisions has already been taken, and referring to the decision in the SafdarJung Hospital's case, it was observed : "The Supreme Court has also observed that before an industrial dispute can be raised between employers and their employees or between employers and employers or between employees and employees in relation to the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, there must be first established a relationship of employers and employees associating together, the former following a trade, business, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employees in the production of material goods and material services and the later following any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen in aid of the employers' enterprise and it was not necessary that there must be a profit motive but the enterprise must be analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense. 13. It is thus clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case and the SafdarJung Hospital's case that before the work in which the employees are engaged can be described as 'an industry' it must bear the character of trade or business or manufacture or calling or must be capable of being described as an undertaking resulting ill material goods or material services. It is not necessary that the economic activity must be related to a profit motive, but what is material is that the material services must be brought into existence in a commercial way." 4. However, since an elaborate review has again been made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is useful to point out that summarising the Jaw as laid down in the Budge Budge Municipality's case and the Baroda Borough Municipality's case, the Supreme Court read these cases as laying down: “…that for an activity to be an industry it is not necessary that it must be carried on by private enterprise or must be commercial or result in profit. It is sufficient if the activity is analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business and involves co-operation between employers and employees. It is sufficient if the activity is analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business and involves co-operation between employers and employees. This result is reached by extending the meaning of 'undertaking' to cover adventures not strictly trade or business but objects very similar." Now, it is well known that the Act defines "industry" as meaning any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. The definition of industry as considered in the Budge Budge Municipalities case and the Baroda Borough Municipality's case was so construed as to mean that an activity which is not covered by business or trade or manufacture but is covered by the term "undertaking" the object of the undertaking must be similar or analogous to either trade or business. Now, before we go to the analysis of the term "industry" which was made by the Supreme Court in the Madras Gyamkhana Club's case, it is necessary to refer to the construction placed by the Supreme Court on that term in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. The whole question as to whether the approach which is adopted by the Supreme Court in construing whether an activity is an industry or not still holds good in the face of the later decisions of the Supreme Court substantially depends on whether the tests for deciding whether an activity was an "industry" or not adopted therein were really approved by the Supreme Court in its later decisions, or whether there are any observations, especially in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case, which indicate that the approach to the construction of the term "industry" in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case was being departed from. A discussion of this becomes necessary, as it appears that certain important observations as contended by Mr. Pendharkar have really not been noticed by the Full Bench in the Punjab case. 5. In order to properly appreciate the dispute which went to the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case, we must first refer to the decision of this Court in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. N. H. Mujumdar11. Pendharkar have really not been noticed by the Full Bench in the Punjab case. 5. In order to properly appreciate the dispute which went to the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case, we must first refer to the decision of this Court in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. N. H. Mujumdar11. The several disputes between the Corporation and its employees which arose out of the 21 demands of the employees of the Corporation were referred for arbitration to the State Industrial Court under section 39 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the C. P. Act). The arbitrator made an award which was challenged before the High Court. One of the challenges made on behalf of the Corporation was that the dispute in question was not an industrial dispute at all inasmuch as none of the activities of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur could in any sense be termed as industry within the meaning of the term as defined in the C. P. Act and, therefore, the award was without jurisdiction. This Court referred to a decision of the Privy Council in Notional Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation12 and observed that every function of a local authority does not come under the expression "trade" or "industry" though some or many of its functions may fall within that definition. A reference was made to the decision in the Budge Budge Municipality's case and it was pointed out that that decision cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that where some of the activities of a local authority partake of the character of a trade or industry all the activities of that authority must be deemed to be of the same kind. The matter was remanded back to the learned Arbitrator with these observations: "We are unable to understand what the State Industrial Court means by saying that the departments such as Octroi, Taxes, Assessment, Public Conveyance and Lighting, are commercial departments. From the mere fact that revenue is earned by the Corporation from Octroi, Taxes, Assessment and Public Conveyance, we fail to see how they can be regarded as commercial undertakings. We may add that assessment and levying of taxes are governmental functions delegated to the Corporation and cannot prima facie be regarded as industrial undertakings. From the mere fact that revenue is earned by the Corporation from Octroi, Taxes, Assessment and Public Conveyance, we fail to see how they can be regarded as commercial undertakings. We may add that assessment and levying of taxes are governmental functions delegated to the Corporation and cannot prima facie be regarded as industrial undertakings. We do not quite understand how the Lighting Department is a commercial department because it has not been made clear to us what is done in this department. As already stated, all the activities of the Corporation cannot be recorded as industrial activities and it was necessary to exami1e each activity separately and to ascertain whether it falls within the definition of 'industry' as contained in the Act." (Italics is ours) The matter thus went back to Mr. Muzumdar, Mr. Pendnarkar has made available to us some extracts from the operative order of the Arbitrator dealing with the question of examination of the activities of each and every department of the Corporation in the light of the definition of the term "industry" in section 2 (14) of the C. P. Act. The material portion to which a reference has to be made refers to the department dealing with the octroi tax and the Arbitrator observed: "In my opinion, therefore, those activities which are connected with assessment or levy of taxes mentioned in section 114(1) (a) and (e) exclusively would have to be excluded from the definition of industry as these activities are not such a private person could indulge in but are purely governmental functions delegated to the Corporation. There is no separate staff for collection of the taxes referred to in section 114 (1) (a). There is, however, separate staff for assessment and levy of the tax referred to in section 114 (1) (e), which is known as 'Octroi Tax'. The Octroi department and all the employee working therein would, therefore, have to be excluded as the department could not be included within 'industry' and the employees could not, therefore, be considered as employees within the meaning of the term as defined in the C. P. and Berar Industrial Settlement Act." 6. The Octroi department and all the employee working therein would, therefore, have to be excluded as the department could not be included within 'industry' and the employees could not, therefore, be considered as employees within the meaning of the term as defined in the C. P. and Berar Industrial Settlement Act." 6. We have referred to this particular part of the award to underline the fact that when the matter went directly in appeal against this award to the Supreme Court admittedly the employees in the Octroi Department did not file any appeal against the finding of the Arbitrator that the Octroi Department did not come within the purview of the term "industry" as defined in the C. P. Act. As observed by this Court in Dumbhare's case, there is no substantial difference between the definition of the term "industry" in the Act and the definition of that term in the C. P. Act. There was, therefore, no occasion for the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case to consider whether the Octroi Department of the Corporation was covered by the term "industry". This was made clear by the Supreme Court in the concluding portion of the judgment when it was observed that the State Industrial Court held that five of the departments of the Corporation did not fall within the terms of the definition of "industry" in the Act and the employees of these departments did not file any appeal against the finding of the State Industrial Court and the Supreme Court, therefore, did not propose to express any final opinion on the correctness of the decision of the Industrial Court in regard to those activities. It is, therefore, clear that there is no adjudication by the Supreme Court on the question whether the Octroi Department in a Municipality or in the Nagpur Corporation was an industry with the meaning of the C. P. Act. 7. We must now refer to the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case while construing the term "industry". 7. We must now refer to the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case while construing the term "industry". Relying on the decision in The Federated State School Teachers' Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria13 the Supreme Court held in paragraph 15: "If a service performed by an individual is an industry, it will Continue to be so not withstanding the fact that it is undertaken by a Corporation," Before the Supreme Court the activities of the Municipality were sought to be divided into three classes; (i) the activities of the department which performs the services; (ii) those of the departments which only impose taxes, collect them and administer them; and (iii) those of the departments which are purely in administrative charge of other departments. Negativing such a division Supreme Court observed in paragraph 17: "We do not see any justification for this artificial division of municipal activities. Barring the regal functions of a municipality, if such other activities of it, if undertaken by an individual, would be industry, then they could equally be industry in the hands of a municipality. It would be unrealistic to draw a line between a department doing a service and a department controlling or feeding it. Supervision and actual performance of service are integral part of the same activity. In other words, whether these three functions are carried out by one department or divided between three departments, the entire organisational activity would be an industry." It was further observed that integrated activities-s of a municipality cannot be separated to take in some under the definition of "industry" and exclude others from it. It is these observations on which heavy, reliance is placed by Mr. Dhabe to contend that the activities of the Corporation should be looked at from this point of view, and since taxation is merely' a source of revenue for financing the other activities, the department dealing with taxation could not be excluded from the purview of the definition of "industry" in the Act. The Supreme Court summarised the earlier discussion in the judgment in paragraph 20 as follows: "The result of the discussion may be summarised thus:(1) The definition of "industry" in the Act is very comprehensive. It is in two parts: One part defines it from the standpoint of the employer and the ether from the standpoint of the employee. The Supreme Court summarised the earlier discussion in the judgment in paragraph 20 as follows: "The result of the discussion may be summarised thus:(1) The definition of "industry" in the Act is very comprehensive. It is in two parts: One part defines it from the standpoint of the employer and the ether from the standpoint of the employee. If an activity falls under either part of the definition, it will be an industry within the meaning of the Act. (2) The history of industrial disputes and the legislation recognizes the basic concept that the activity shall be an organized one and not that which pertains to private or personal employment. (3) The regal functions described as primary and inalienable functions of State though statutorily delegated to a Corporation are necessarily excluded from the purview of the definition. Such regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. (4) If a service rendered by an individual or a private person would be an industry, it would equally be an industry in the hands of the Corporation. (5) If a service rendered by a Corporation is an industry, the employees in the departments connected with that service, whether financial, administrative or executive, would be entitled to the benefits of the Act. (6) If a department of a municipality discharges many functions some pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and other non-industrial activities, the predominant functions of the department shall be the criterion for the purposes of the Act." 8. These conclusions summarise the view of the Supreme Court so far a9 the construction of the word "industry" in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case is concerned. Now, what is contended on behalf of the Municipal Council and b} Mr. Pendharkar is that the first proposition that the definition is in two parts is expressly negatived by the decision in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case, and so also is the fourth proposition, namely, the test that if a service rendered by an individual or a private person would be an industry it would equally be an industry in the hands of a Corporation. Then it is urged that the Madras Gymkhana Club's case also further create-s a class of excluded activities in addition to the class of regal functions because in proposition No. (3) above the Supreme Court mere1yexc1uded the regal functions from the purview of the definition of "industry". It is then urged that that propositions Nos. (5) and (6) deduced by the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's cafe were themselves sufficient apart from the observations in the Baroda Borough Municipality's case to show that it would not be proper to view the entire activities of the Municipal Councilor the Corporation and that the Supreme Court itself permitted the activities to be considered on departmental basis. We shall refer to the latter contention later but at the moment we must point out that so far as propositions Nos. (1), (3) and (4) are concerned, they are not approved by the Supreme Court in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case. In paragraph 10 of the judgment in that case the Supreme Court pointed out the difference- between the view taken in the Budge Budge Municipality's case and the Baroda Borough Municipality's case in which, according to the Supreme Court, the activity of the municipality in the first two cases was not attempted to be brought within the expressions "business" and "trade" and that it was term "undertaking" which was held to cover the activity of the municipality. But it was in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case that the need to consider the scope of the words "trade" and "business" arose directly because the word "undertaking” in the definition of "industry” in the C. P. Act was qualified by the words "manufacturing or mining", and therefore, that word could not be given the wide meaning which was given in the earlier two cases. The relevant part of the definition of the word "industry" in the C. P. Act is: "(a) any business trade, manufacturing or mining undertaking or calling of employers, (b) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employees, and (c) any branch of an industry or a group of industries." The Supreme Court observed that in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur' s case the activity of the municipality was brought within the expression "trade and business". Referring to the judgment in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case it was observed: "The Court observed that there was nothing in the earlier cases to show that a municipal activity was held excluded from those words. As a matter of fact, it did (see p. 308) (The reference appears to be to the report in 1953 S C R 302). Of course, there was nothing to show that this Court on the earlier two occasions thought it even remotely possible." It is here that for the first time an infirmity is pointed out in the earlier judgment in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case which seems to have taken the view that there was noting in earlier two cases to show that a municipal activity was held excluded from the terms "trade and business". Then it was further observed: "In the Nagpur Corporation's case the Court proceeded to consider whether a corporation could be legitimately said to be carrying on business or trade or calling. It found the definition to be 'very clear' and 'not susceptible of any ambiguity', and observed that all the words were very wide and that even if the meaning could be cut down by the aims and objects of the C. P. and Berar Act as disclosed in the preamble, the main object, namely, social justice demanded a wide meaning. The Court distinguished between (a) regal and (b) municipal functions of the Corporation and found the latter analogous to business or trade because they were not regal and the activity was organised and service was rendered. To distinguish between a regal function and a municipal function the test applied was: Can the service be performed by an individual or firm for remuneration? This test was not applied in one later case but is not enlightening; because there is hardly any activity which private enterprise cannot carry on. As Mr. Gomme in his Principles of local Government (1897) observed: 'Any municipal service can be made to pay dividends on private capital if only the means of levying a revenue or granted to private owners.' Even war can be financial waged by commercial house. They manufacture ammunition and war equipment and can carryon war with mercenaries. Even the infrastructures of Aden Smith can be provided by private, enterprise. The East India Company did both. They manufacture ammunition and war equipment and can carryon war with mercenaries. Even the infrastructures of Aden Smith can be provided by private, enterprise. The East India Company did both. It is not a little surprising that except in one case in which there is a passing reference to it the Corporation of City of Nagpur case has not been referred to in the later cases of this Court." (Italics is ours) These observations, therefore, clearly indicate, in our view, that the test, namely, whether the service can be performed by an individual or a firm for remuneration which is applied in the Corporation of City of Nagpar' s case was not accepted by the Supreme Court in the later cases, and as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it was not referred to in the later cases. The test was as' a matter of fact a corrollary of the division of the activities of a municipality between regal functions and municipal functions. 9. The Supreme Court then in the same case formulated tests which were adopted in the later cases of that Court. The first test was that the activity must be organised as business or trade is ordinarily organised and this was to be taken with the earlier test that "undertaking" must be analogous to business, trade or calling, as pointed out in the first two cases. The second was that the activity need not necessarily be preceded by procurement of capital in the business sense nor must profit be a motive, and so long as relationship, of employer and workmen is established with a view to production of material goods or material services, the activity must be regarded as an undertaking analogous to trade or business. 10. The Supreme court then reviewed the decisions in the State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha14; Ahmedabad Textile industry Research Association v. State of Bombay15; and National Union of Commercial Employees v. M. R. Meherl6 as also the decisions in Harinagar Cane Farm v. State of Biharl7 and university of Delhi v. Ramnath18. It was then pointed out that the two parts of the definition of “Industry" in the Act did not independently lay down what activity was considered to be an industry within the meaning of terminate Act. According to the Supreme Court, both the parts of the definition' of "industry” had to be read together. It was then pointed out that the two parts of the definition of “Industry" in the Act did not independently lay down what activity was considered to be an industry within the meaning of terminate Act. According to the Supreme Court, both the parts of the definition' of "industry” had to be read together. This was 18th September 1974 emphasised in paragraphs 17 and 20 of the judgment. The test which was said to be cardinal was laid down in paragraph 17 in these words: "The cardinal test is thus to find out whether there is an industry according to the denotation of the word in the first part. The second part will then show what will be included from the angle of employees." In paragraph 20 it was observed: "….The definition of 'industry' is in two parts. In its first part it means any business, trade undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. This part of the definition determines an industry by reference to occupation of employers in respect of certain activities. These activities are specified by five words and they determine what an industry is and what the cognate expression 'industrial' is intended to convey. This is the denotation of the term or what the word denotes. We shall presently discuss what the words 'business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or call1ng' comprehend. The second part views the matter from the angle of employees and is designed to include something more in what the term primarily denotes. By the second part of the definition any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen is included in the concept of industry. This part gives the extended connotation. If the activity can be described as an industry with reference to the occupation of the employers, the ambit of the industry, under the force of the second part, takes in the different kinds of activity of the employees mentioned in the second part. But the second part standing alone cannot define ‘industry'. An industry is not to be found in every case of employment or service. An individual who employs a cook gets service from his employee whose avocation is to serve as a cook but as the activity of the individual is neither business, nor trade, nor an undertaking, nor manufacture, nor calling of an employer, there is no industry. An industry is not to be found in every case of employment or service. An individual who employs a cook gets service from his employee whose avocation is to serve as a cook but as the activity of the individual is neither business, nor trade, nor an undertaking, nor manufacture, nor calling of an employer, there is no industry. By the inclusive part of the definition of the labour force employed in an industry is made an integral part of the industry for purposes of industrial disputes although industry is ordinarily something which employers Create or undertake. " 11. The Court then directed itself to find out the meaning of the words “business-trade, undertaking manufacture'. While dealing with the question it was observed in paragraph 23: "The principles so far settled come to this. Every human activity in which enters the relationship of employers and employees, is not necessarily creative of an industry. Personal services rendered by domestic and other servants, administrative services of public officials, service in aid of occupations of professional men, such as doctors and lawyers, etc., employment of teachers and' so on my result in relationship in which there are employers on the one side and employees on the other but they must be excluded because they do not come within the denotation of the term 'industry'. Primarily, therefore, industrial disputes occur when the operation undertaken rests upon co-operation between employers and employees with a view to production and distribution of material goods, in other words, wealth, but they may arise also in cases where the co-operation is to produce material services. The normal cases are those in which the production or distribution is of material goods or wealth and they will fall within the expression trade, business and manufacture. The word “trade” in this context bears the meaning which may be taken from Halsbury's Laws of ,England, Third Edn. Vol 38, P. 8- (a) exchange of goods for goods or goods for money; (b) any business carried on with a view to profit, whether manual, or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions and from agriculture and business means an enterprise which is an occupation as distinguished from pleasure. Manufacture is a kind of productive in which the making of articles, or material (often on a large scale) is by physical labour or mechanical power. Manufacture is a kind of productive in which the making of articles, or material (often on a large scale) is by physical labour or mechanical power. Calling denotes the following of a profession or trade." It was pointed out by the Court that before the work engaged it can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite character of "trade" or "business" or "manufacture" or "calling" or must be capable of being described as an undertaking in material goods or material services. Such an undertaking may be an enterprise of a private individual or individuals, or it may not, and according to the Supreme Court, it was not necessary that the employer must always be a private individual who carries on the operation with his own capital and with a view to his own profit, and the Act clearly contemplates cases of industrial disputes where the Government or a local authority or a public utility service may be the employer. Thus, it was firstly laid down in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case that before an activity can be described as an industry, it must positively have the character of trade, business, manufacture or calling, or it must at least be capable of being described as an undertaking in material goods or material services, and the word "undertaking" must be taken to mean "any business or any work or project which one, engages in or attempts as an enterprise analogous to business or trade." It was noted by the Supreme Court that this was the test laid down in Banerji's case (Budge Budge Municipality's case) and Baroda Borough Municipality's case; but at the same time it was observed: "Its extension in the Corporation case was unfortunate and contradicted the earlier cases." Another test which was then laid down was that the activity to be considered as an industry must not be casual but must be distinctly systematic but that it was not necessary that the industry must necessarily run with capital and with a view to profits. It was pointed out that it was the industry which was the nexus between employers and employees and it is this nexus which brings two distinct bodies together to produce a result. 12. It was pointed out that it was the industry which was the nexus between employers and employees and it is this nexus which brings two distinct bodies together to produce a result. 12. Another important aspect of the Madras Gymkhana Club's case- which must be referred to in the context of the present case is contained in the observations made in paragraph 26 of the judgment where it was positively pointed out that the local authorities cannot be regarded as industry unless they pro" duce material goods or render material services and do not share by delegation in governmental functions or functions incidental thereto. It was pointed out that though Government and local authorities act as individuals do and the policy of the Act was to put the Government and local authorities on par with private individuals, Government cannot be regarded as an employer within the Act if the operations are governmental or administrative in character. 13. Now, the concept of industry as defined in the Act was put in a more or less fully crystallised form in the SafdarJung Hospital's case. The matter which went to the Supreme Court arose out of an application by a lower division clerk working under the Management of the SafdarJung Hospital under section 33C (2) of the Act complaining that the Management of the Hospital had failed to give him pay in the scale revised by the Government of India and he, therefore, claimed Rs. 914 from the Management. The application was contested on he ground that the employee was a Government servant governed by the conditions of service for Government servants and he could not, therefore, invoke the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act since the Safdarjung Hospital was not an industry. The tests laid down in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case were reiterated and the Supreme Court further elucidated the concept of material services which was referred to while construing the definition of "industry" in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case. It was observed in paragraph 16: "What is meant by 'material services' needs some explanation too. Material services are not services which depend wholly or largely upon the contribution of professional knowledge, skill or dexterity for the production of a result. Such services being given individually and by individuals are services no doubt but not material services. It was observed in paragraph 16: "What is meant by 'material services' needs some explanation too. Material services are not services which depend wholly or largely upon the contribution of professional knowledge, skill or dexterity for the production of a result. Such services being given individually and by individuals are services no doubt but not material services. Even an establishment where many such operate cannot be said to convert their professional services into material services. Material services involve an activity carried on through co-operation between employers and employees to provide the community with the use of something such as electric power, water, transportation, mail delivery, telephones and the like. In providing these services there may be employment of trained men and even professional men, but the emphasis is not on what these men do but upon the productivity of a service organised as an industry and commercially valuable. Thus the services of professional men involving benefit to individuals according to their needs, such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, solicitors, etc., are easily distinguishable from an activity such as transport service. The latter is of a commercial character in which something is brought into existence quite apart from the benefit to particular individuals. It is the production of this something which is described as the production of material services." The test in its crystallised form is put in paragraph 19 where it was observed: "It, therefore, follows that before an industrial dispute can be raised between employers and their employees or between employers and employers or between employees and employees in relation to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, there must be first established a relationship of employers and employees associating together, the former following a trade, business, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers in the production of material goods and material services and the latter following any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen in aid of the employers' enterprise. It is not necessary that there must be a profit motive but the enterprise must be analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense." Thus, splitting of the definition of "industry" into two parts independent of each other, as was done in the first proposition laid down in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case, was not accepted by the Supreme Court in the later cases. This case also expressly overruled the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Hospilal Mazdoor Sabha where the hospitals run by Government and even by private associations not on commercial lines but on charitable lines or as part of the functions of Government Department of Health, were held included in the definition of industry on the ground that the second part of the definition of industry contained an extension of the first part by including other items of industry and it was observed that the Hospital Mazdoor Sabho's cose took an extreme view of the matter which was not justified. With reference to the Safdarjung Hospital it was observed that it was not embarked upon as an economic activity which could be said to be analogous to trade or business and that it was a part of the functions of Government and the Hospital was run as Department of Government and could not, therefore, be said to be an industry. Safdarjung Hospital's case is, therefore, all authority for the proposition that where an activity is run as a Department of Government as a part of the governmental functions, it is not covered by the term "industry". 14. We need refer to only one later case of the Supreme Court in the Management of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Their Workmen. This decision does not lay down any new test, but review the decisions in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case and the Safdarjung Hospital's case and accepts the earlier test as self complete. The matter arose out of an award by the Labour Court directing reinstatement of an employee of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This decision does not lay down any new test, but review the decisions in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case and the Safdarjung Hospital's case and accepts the earlier test as self complete. The matter arose out of an award by the Labour Court directing reinstatement of an employee of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. One of the grounds raised was that the Federation was not an industry inasmuch as the Federation did not follow any trade, business, manufacture or undertaking or calling of employers in the production of material goods or material services nor did it have a profit motive. The object of the Federation was to subserve the good of the business of the community as a whole, and for this purpose it organised exhibitions with active financial support and co-operation of the Government; and in order to promote Indian business, it undertook publications and arbitration which were ancillary to its main activities, namely, the promotion of business for the community as a whole which is an object of general public utility. Referring to the tests laid down in the earlier cases, they were summarized as follows: "It appears to us that the tests for determining whither a dispute is an industrial dispute or not have been enunciated and the principles crystallized as a result of the several decisions of this Court which is what are applicable to this case. There is therefore no warrant to allow any other element to be added to the criteria laid down for determining what an industry is. In our view, the linchpin of the definition of industry is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging namely whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade, or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employees. In our view, the linchpin of the definition of industry is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging namely whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade, or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employees. If it is that and there is co-operation of the employer and the employee resulting in the production of material services, it is an industry notwithstanding that its objects are charitable or that it does not make profit or even where profits are made, they are not distributed among the members." On the facts of that case, however, it was found that the Federation carried on systematic activities to assist its members and the other businessmen and industrialists and even the non-members as for instance in giving them the right to subscribe to their bulletin; in taking up their cases and solving their difficulties and in obtaining concessions and facilities for them from the Government. These activities were construed as business activities and as material services which were not necessarily confined to the illustrations given by Hidayatullah C. J. in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case. Therefore, the Federation was said to fall in the definition of '"industry" in section 2 (j) of the Act. 15. This is how the matter now stands regarding the construction of the word "industry" as a result of the several decisions of the Supreme Court, and we, must, therefore, be guided by the law laid down mainly in the two decisions, namely, Madras Gymkhana Club's, case and the Safdarjung Hospital's case, in order to find out whether an activity which is sought to be called an industry within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act was really a systematic activity and whether it partook of the nature of business or trade or an undertaking resulting in the production of goods or material services of commercial value. There is no reason why in view of these two later decisions these tests must also be satisfied where a particular activity of a local authority is sought to be covered by the definition of industry in the Act, Therefore, even in the case of a local authority, as was expressly pointed out by Hidayatullah C. J. in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case, an activity cannot be regarded as an industry unless it produces material goods or renders material services and does not share by delegation in governmental functions or functions incidental thereto. If it is found that any activity of a local authority partakes of governmental functions or functions incidental thereto or it does not result in the production of material goods or rendering material services, in view of the statement of the law laid down in the later decisions, that activity of a local authority cannot be covered by the term "industry". Having regard to these two tests, it is difficult to reject the argument that the basis of the decision in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case has substantially been shaken inasmuch as the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case merely excluded the regal functions from the definition of "industry". The three regal functions, which were expressly referred to by the Supreme Court in that case were the functions continued to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. It will be recalled that the only test in order to distinguish between a municipal function and regal function which was laid down in that decision was to see whether a private individual would have carried on an activity if it was an activity in the exercise of regal functions, and if a private individual could have carried on that activity, then, according to the Supreme Court in the ' Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case, the test of an industry was satisfied and, that, activity was liable to be held as an industry; We have already pointed out earlier that this test has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in the two later cases. 16. Another circumstance which we must immediately point out at this stage is that the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case is not an authority for the decision that an activity relating to the levy, of octroi was an industrial activity. 16. Another circumstance which we must immediately point out at this stage is that the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case is not an authority for the decision that an activity relating to the levy, of octroi was an industrial activity. That question was expressly left out of consideration since the employees had not filed any appeal and that decision, therefore, cannot be treated as an authority which foreclosed all further consideration of the question whether the Octroi Department of a Corporation or a Municipal Council was covered by the term "industry", whether in the C. P. Act or the Central Act. It cannot be disputed that the power to tax is essentially a legislative power and taxation is a legislative function, and it will, therefore, even otherwise expressly fall within the concept of the regal functions contemplated by the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case in Supreme Court. Dealing with the power of taxation, Willis on Constitutional Law, 1936 edition has observed at page 224: "The three great legislative powers usually exercised by any Government are the powers of taxation the police power, and the power of eminent domain. The power of taxation may be defined as the legal capacity of Government to impose charges upon persons or their property to raise revenue for governmental Purposes. The levying of taxes is a legislative function; the determination of the amount of each individual's tax is an, administrative function; but whether either function has been properly exercised is a judicial (unction." The power of taxation is called a sovereign power by Willis, and according to him, taxation is a legal capacity of sovereignty or one its governmental agent to execute or impose a charge upon persons for the support of Government and far the payment far any other public purpose which it may constitutionally carry out. 17. So far as our constitutional structure is concerned, here is a clear prevision in Article 265 that no tax shall be collected or levied except by authority of law. 17. So far as our constitutional structure is concerned, here is a clear prevision in Article 265 that no tax shall be collected or levied except by authority of law. The Supreme Court in Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U. P.19 has quoted with approval the observations of Chief Justice, Marshall in M. Cullock v. Maryland20 in which the power .of taxation was described as the sovereign right of the State, and it was observed: "The power or taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of Government and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it." Now, it is well known that it is this power of taxation which constitutionally belongs to the Parliament which is delegated to the local authorities by appropriate legislation. So far as we are concerned, there was the provision in section 66 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, which enumerated the several taxes which may be imposed by a Municipality and section 66 (1)(e) provided for an octroi on animals or goods brought within the limits of Municipality for sale, consumption or use within those limits. Sa far as the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, is concerned, the power to impose a tax is given to the Municipal Council under section 105 primarily and in respect of the taxes named therein and in section 108 in respect of certain other taxes enumerated therein. In the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, Chapter XI deals with taxation and authority has been vested in the Corporation under section 114 of the Act to impose taxes enumerated in that section, in which the octroi tax is referred to as a cess on animals or goods brought within the City of Nagpur for sale consumption or use therein. Indeed, octroi tax is one of the well recognised sources of revenue which has been vested in the local authorities by appropriate legislation. If taxation was essentially a legislative function and, therefore, it really partook of a regal function, the administration of the Tax Department and performance of the functions incidental thereto will clearly, in our view; be in the nature of a governmental function because it is a part of the governmental activity to recover taxes and make adequate provision fur their recovery. Therefore, any activity which is connected with or is incidental to the power of taxation will, in our view, be clearly covered by governmental functions and cannot be termed as an "industry", as the concept has now been explained by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to earlier. That is the view which is taken by this Court in Abdul Sabir's case in which it was observed that ordinarily imposition, collection and levy of tax was the function of the State and no one else could impose, collect or levy the taxes, and it was thus primarily a governmental function which could not be carried out by any individual or a firm like other activities, for example, supply of water, lighting, markets or such other activities. That was why the activity of the Octroi Department of a Municipality which was charged with the duty of collecting the octroi tax on the goods brought within the octroi limits was held a regal or governmental function and it was held that it could not be termed as an activity which would amount to "industry" within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Act. 18. Now, it is no doubt true that a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Banga Municipality's case referred to earlier has on the basis of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case decided by the Supreme Court held that the Octroi Moharrirs were, "workmen" within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act, and it is this decision which, according to Mr. Dhabe necessitates a reconsideration of the earlier view in Abdul Sabir's case. We have carefully gone through this decision, and with respect we are unable to agree with the view taken therein that the activity of a Municipality in the Octroi Department is covered by the term "industry". We find that the judgment is itself prefaced by the observations that the question whether the Octroi Department of a Municipality is an industry and the dispute between the employer and employees partook of the nature of an industrial dispute was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. We find that the judgment is itself prefaced by the observations that the question whether the Octroi Department of a Municipality is an industry and the dispute between the employer and employees partook of the nature of an industrial dispute was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. It is not possible to find out from the judgment of the Full Bench as to whether the concluding paragraph of the decision in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case was brought to the notice of the Full Bench because that paragraph as earlier pointed out expressly makes it clear that the question with regard the Octroi Department and the employees there in was really not considered by the Supreme Court at all in view of the fact that the employees had not challenged the award which went against them so far as the Octroi Department was concerned. The judgment of the Full Bench is also silent on the question as to the production of what material goods or rendering of what material services by the Octroi Department of the Municipality was in their mind when that was the only test which had to be applied having regard to the observations of the Supreme Court in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case in paragraph 26 of the judgment. We have earlier pointed out that if taxation was a sovereign function, and if sovereign functions and governmental functions are excluded from the definition of "industry", why this reasoning did not apply to the Octroi Department is not at all clear from the decision of the Full Bench. We have earlier pointed out that if taxation was a sovereign function, and if sovereign functions and governmental functions are excluded from the definition of "industry", why this reasoning did not apply to the Octroi Department is not at all clear from the decision of the Full Bench. There are no doubt, observations to the effect that the activities of the Octroi Department of a Municipality were not a regal function, but there are no reasons from which this conclusion could follow unless the reasons are to be found in the next sentence where the Full Bench has observed that "it has a direct bearing on the other activities of the Municipal Committee which render material services to the community at large because the funds realised by the Municipal Committee from any source, including the Octroi Department, are spent for rendering the material services." This passage indicates that the Full Bench did not think it proper to consider the activities of the Octroi Department as, independent of other activities an approach again not warranted by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case and the, safdarjung Hospital’s case. It is obviously relying on these observations of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that it was argued by Mr. Dhabe that the Corporation must be considered as a whole and the functions of the Corporation cannot be divorced from the functions, of its Departments and even the activities of the Tax Department which were only intended to provide money for financing its other activities were liable to be held as an "industry". Our attention was invited to section 50 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, which is the relevant Act which then governed the Municipal Council, Mehkar Section 50 enumerated the duties of a Municipal Committee, such as, lighting public streets, places and building; cleaning public streets, places and sewers; disposing of night-soil; extinguishing fires and protecting life and property when fires occur; regulating or abating offensive or dangerous trades or practices etc. Now, in our view, if in the case of a statutory body like a Municipality or a Corporation where a part of the Governmental functions are parted in favour Of a such a local body it was laid down by the Supreme Court that governmental functions cannot be covered by the term "industry", then such governmental functions will have to be clearly left out of consideration whatever may be its impact on other activities of a local body; Indeed, the case of a local body like a Municipality or a Corporation was very much present to the mind of the Supreme Court when they decided the Madras Gymkhana Club's case, and such a case being present to their mind yet it was observed in paragraph 26 that local authorities cannot be regarded as indus1ry unless they produce material goods or render material services and do Rot share by delegation in governmental functions or functions incidental thereto. This approach clearly contemplated a functional division of the activities of the local authority and that decision, therefore, leaves no scope for the argument that the activities of the Corporation as a whole had to be taken into consideration, which, if accepted, would not even justify the leaving out of the activities in the nature of regal or governmental functions. 19. It is no doubt true that there are certain observations in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case with regard to the tax Department which seem to have weighed with the Full Bench in arriving at the decision in Banga Municipalities case. Now, if the observations of the Supreme Court with regard to the Tax Departmen1 in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case are properly read, we find that the Supreme Court treated the conservancy and water rate as fees and not as taxes, arid it was not disputed that there was no separate 'staff for the assessment and' levy of property taxes, and that the work of assessment and levy of water rate and scavenging rate for private latrines was far heavier than the other works entrusted to the Tax Department. There again; the test which the Supreme Court applied was: "The services, namely, scavenging and supply of water, can equally be undertaken by a private firm or an individual for remuneration and the fact that the municipality does the lame duty does not make it any the less a service coming under the definition of 'industry' ". 20. As already pointed out this approach has not been accepted later by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court later no doubt observed as follows: "We would, however, prefer to sustain the finding on a broader basis. Then cannot be a distinction between property tax and other taxes collected by the municipality for the purpose of designating the tax department as an industry or otherwise. The scheme of the Corporation Act is that taxes and fees are collected in order to enable the Municipality to discharge its statutory functions. If the functions so discharged are wholly or predominantly covered by the definition of 'industry' it would be illogical to exclude the tax department from the definition. While in the case of private individuals or firms services are paid in cash or otherwise, in the case of public institutions, as the services are rendered to the public, the takes collected from them constitute a fund for performing those services. As most of the services rendered by the municipality come under the definition of 'industry', we should hold that the employees of the tax department are also entitled to the benefits Under the Act." These observations must now be read subject to the law as now laid down in the decisions referred to above. Here again, the concept that the property Tax Department could not be considered separately is shaken by the later decisions of the Supreme Court. The test whether a private individual can perform an activity which a Corporation is performing stands rejected by the Supreme Court and in view of the rejection of this test and the new test laid down, the question whether the services which were then found in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case as covered by the term "industry" will require fresh consideration. The observations in the Nagpur Corporations case must, therefore, be now restricted to that case alone and the later decisions which clearly lay down separate tests for construing an activity to be an industry cannot be ignored. The observations in the Nagpur Corporations case must, therefore, be now restricted to that case alone and the later decisions which clearly lay down separate tests for construing an activity to be an industry cannot be ignored. It is in the light of those decisions that the question whether a particular activity, whether it is by a Corporation or by any other employer, falls within the definition of "industry" has to be considered. It may also be pointed out that in the Corporation of the City at Nagpur’s case itself, the approach which is now canvassed by Mr. Dhabe was not accepted. Indeed, the activities of the Corporation were expressly considered department wise, such all, public conveyance Department, Fire Brigade Department, Lighting Department, Water Works Department, City Engineer's department, Enforcement (Encroachment) Department etc In passing, we might point out that so far as the Health Department is concerned, one of the functions, namely, running of public dispensaries, has been held to be an industry. In a proper case even this question may be required to be reconsidered in the light of the authority in the Safdarjung Hospital's case. We are referring to this fact merely to point out that now it has to be decided on facts as to whether a given activity Dew satisfies the requirements of an "industry" as continued by the Supreme Court in the Madras Gymkhana Club's case and the Safdarjung Hospital's case, and it cannot be an answer to any such contention that the matter is covered by the Corporation of the City of Nagpur's case. It is this aspect of the matter which has persuaded us to go into the matter in such detail as questions with regard to local bodies are likely to arise though in the instant case we are only concerned with the Octroi Department. Having read the decision of the Full Bench we are not satisfied, therefore, that the reasoning therein makes out any ground for reconsideration of the earlier view of this Court in Abdul Sabir’s case. 21. Mr. Dhabe has also brought to our notice a decision of the Division Beach of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal. That was a case in which there was a dispute between Safai Kamdars and the Gram Panchayat which was established under the Gujrat Panchayats Act,1961. 21. Mr. Dhabe has also brought to our notice a decision of the Division Beach of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal. That was a case in which there was a dispute between Safai Kamdars and the Gram Panchayat which was established under the Gujrat Panchayats Act,1961. the contention was that the provision of the Industrial Dispute Act were not applicable to the employees of the Gram Panchayat because they belonged to the civil service of the State, and in any case, they were not “workmen” within the meaning of section 2 (s) of the, Act. In that case, the Division Bench of the Gujarai High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur’s case and held that the Safai Kamdars were workmen. Now, in our, view, we need not consider this decision because it does not deal with the taxing activity of a local authority. It is also not necessary for us in this case to go into the question whether the conservancy and sewage activity carried on by a local body is an industry, and it will all depend on how we look at it, whether we look at it from the point of view of the activity being a part of the Public Health Department of the Government as a governmental function or an activity of a Corporation rendering material services as contemplated by the decisions of the Supreme Court. This decision, therefore, must be left out of consideration so far as this case is concerned. 22 We thus see no reason to depart from the view taken Abdul Sabir's case that the Octroi Department of Municipal Council is not an “industry" within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act. On this finding it must therefore, be held that the employees in the instant case who had applied for payment of overtime wages and computation of benefit for the day of rest Were not entitled to invoke the provisions of section 33C (2) of the Act. It is no doubt true that their claim for overtime wages was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that there was no evidence that they bad worked overtime. It is no doubt true that their claim for overtime wages was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that there was no evidence that they bad worked overtime. It is also true that after rule 23 of the Minimum Wages Rules was amended with effect from 4-4-1964 a provision for payment at an overtime rate for work done on a day of the rest was made for the period after 4-4-1964. As already held by us Special Civil Application No. 444 of 1967 decided on 11th September 1974 there was no right to have that right computed because no rate for payment for work done on a day of rest was prescribed either by the rule originally made by the former Government of Madhya Pradesh or by the Government of Maharashtra. The claim for the period before 4-4-1964 was, therefore, not tenable at all. But assuming that the claim could not be made in the forum of the Labour Court. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to go into the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner Municipal Council that the Labour Court which adjudicated upon the claims of the employees was not a specified Labour Court as required by section 33C (2) of the Act. In the view which we have taken, the order of the Labour Court must be quashed and the Applications of the employees must stand rejected. The petition is thus allowed but we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.