S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) S. No. 36 of Taiyabpura in Kapadwanj Taluka of Kaira District was sold by respondents Nos. 1 to 9 by a registered sale deed to the petitioner on 29th March 1957. In 1967 respondents Nos. 1 to 9 filed against the petitioner Regular Civil Suit No. 45 of 1967 in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division at Kapadwanj for a declaration that the sale in respect of S. No. 36 was not binding on them. The petitioner filed his written statement and resisted the suit. One of the contentions which he raised in that suit was that in any case he had been a tenant in respect of the land in question prior to its sale by respondents Nos. 1 to 9 in his favour on 20th March 1957 and that therefore he had become a deemed purchaser of the land in question. One of the issues which the learned Trial Judge raised was whether the petitioner was the tenant in respect of the land in question prior to 20th March 1957 and under sec. 85a of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act for the sake of brevity) he referred that issue to the Mamlatdar Kapadwanj. The Mamlatdar decided the issue on merits by his order dated 28th February 1969 He held that the petitioner was not the tenant in respect of the land in question prior to 20th March 1957. The petitioner appealed against that decision to the Deputy Collector at Anand who did not decide the appeal on merits but dismissed it on the ground that the reference made by the Civil Court to the Mamlatdar was incompetent. He recorded that conclusion because in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Musamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari Govindbhai Ratnabhai and others A. I. R. 1969 Supreme Court 439 the issue whether the petitioner was a tenant could not be decided by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70th) of the Tenancy Act. The petitioner challenged that decision in a revision application which he filed in the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. 70th) of the Tenancy Act. The petitioner challenged that decision in a revision application which he filed in the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal modified the order made by the Deputy Collector and held that the order made by the Mamlatdar was incompetent and directed the Mamlatdar to return the reference to the Civil Court unanswered ( 2 ) IT is that order of the Revenue Tribunal which is challenged by the petitioner In this petition. ( 3 ) MR. Shah who appears for the petitioner has relied upon amended sec. 70 (b) and sec. 85a of the Tenancy Act and contended that the Mamlatdar had the jurisdiction to decide the reference which was made to him by the Civil Court. Sec. 70 (b) was amended by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. It reads as follows:-For the purposes of this Act the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar (A) to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant; Prior to the enactment of Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 by which sec. 70 (b) was amended it read as under:-For the purposes of this Act the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar (B) to decide whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. It is quite clear therefore that prior to its amendment by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 sec. 70 (b) conferred jurisdiction upon the Mamlatdar to decide the question of the present tenancy of a person and did not confer upon him jurisdiction to decide the question relating to his past tenancy. That is the view which the Supreme Court has expressed in Musamiyas Case (supra ). After the amendment of sec. 70 (b) Mamlatdar has been empowered to decide questions relating to the past tenancy of a person. Therefore ex facie Mamlatdar has now jurisdiction to decide whether the petitioner was a tenant prior to 20th March 1957. The question which therefore arises before me is whether Mamlatdar had the jurisdiction at the date when the reference was made to him by the Civil Court to decide whether the petitioner was a tenant in respect of the land in question prior to 20th March 1957. In order to show me that sec. The question which therefore arises before me is whether Mamlatdar had the jurisdiction at the date when the reference was made to him by the Civil Court to decide whether the petitioner was a tenant in respect of the land in question prior to 20th March 1957. In order to show me that sec. 70 (b) applies to all pending proceedings Mr. Shah has invited my attention to sec. 85a of the Tenancy Act which also has been amended. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 85a as amended by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 reads thus :- if any suit instituted whether before or after the specified date in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle or deal with such issue under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the competent authority) the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. The provisions of sec. 85a as amended govern all suits irrespective of whether they were instituted before or after the specified date. Specified date has been defined by clause (16c) of sec. 2 of the Tenancy Act. This clause was also inserted by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. The expression specified date is defined to mean the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1972 which is Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. When sec. 85a as amended by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 is read in light of clause (16c) of sec. 2 of the Tenancy Act it becomes quite clear that the direction contained in sec. 85a to stay the suit and to refer the issue arising under the Tenancy Act applies to suits instituted either before or after the specified date. The present suit was instituted prior to the specified date. It is therefore expressly governed by sec. 85a read with clause (16c) of sec. 2 of the Tenancy Act Therefore even if I confirm the decision of the Revenue Tribunal on the ground that when it was rendered it was lawful under the law then obtaining the petitioner has now a fresh right under sec. It is therefore expressly governed by sec. 85a read with clause (16c) of sec. 2 of the Tenancy Act Therefore even if I confirm the decision of the Revenue Tribunal on the ground that when it was rendered it was lawful under the law then obtaining the petitioner has now a fresh right under sec. 85a (as amended) of the Tenancy Act to make a fresh application to the Civil Court to refer the issue relating to his past tenancy to the Mamlatdar and the Mamlatdar will have under the amended sec. 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act jurisdiction to decide it. It is quite clear therefore that the amended sec. 85a governs all pending civil suits. Therefore if an issue as to the past tenancy of a person arises in proceedings pending on the date when Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 came into force it must be referred to the Mamlatdar by virtue of the amended sec. 85a read with clause (16c) of sec. 2 of the Tenancy Act and the Mamlatdar must decide it under sec. 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act In this state of law it is more advisable to remand the case to the Deputy Collector to decide it on merits rather than confirm the decision of the Revenue Tribunal and to force the petitioner to make a fresh application to the Civil Court for a fresh reference of the issue to the Mamlatdar under the amended sec 85a of the Tenancy Act. Since ill my opinion sec. 85a is attracted to all pending proceedings the civil suit which is pending before the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division at Kapadwanj is also governed by it. Therefore though the Mamlatdar did not have jurisdiction at the date when the reference was made to him by the Civil court at Kapadwanj he has now the jurisdiction to decide the issue Therefore the issue must be decided on merits. He has already decided it on merits. Therefore there is no point in remanding the matter to him. It was the Deputy Collector in appeal who did not decide the question on merits. It would therefore be appropriate to remand the case to him with a direction to decide it on merits. He has already decided it on merits. Therefore there is no point in remanding the matter to him. It was the Deputy Collector in appeal who did not decide the question on merits. It would therefore be appropriate to remand the case to him with a direction to decide it on merits. ( 4 ) IN the result I allow this petition set aside the impugned order passed by the Revenue Tribunal and the Deputy Collector and remand the appeal to the Deputy Collector with a direction that he shall decide it on merits and according to law. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Petition allowed. .