Judgment 1. This second appeal is by the plaintiff, who instituted a suit for realisation of Rs. 2,000 as principal and Rs. 700 as interest against the defendants under the following circumstances : A sum of Rs. 2,000-00 was advanced by the plaintiff under a Hundi on 1-2-1960. (Ext. 1) which was executed by the first defendant. In the body of the Hundi, however, the name of the person (firm) to be charged upon was clearly stated and fully disclosed. It is necessary to quote the relevant recitals made in the Hundi, the English translation of that portion is as follows : "Greetings from Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company Drawn one Hundi on you for Rs. 2,000, half of which was Rs. 1,000 ............ in favour of Bhai Trilok Chandji Jain of Darbhanga for 180 days payable according to the custom. Sd. Rameshwar Lal Tulsiyan." The suit, however, was instituted by the plaintiff against defendant No. 1 and his three sons as Karta of the joint family and as the managing agent of the said business Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company, alleging that the money was borrowed by him from the plaintiff for the said joint family business and in proof of the same, he executed a Hundi in his favour. It was also alleged that as all the defendants had been benefited by the loan, all of them were liable to pay the dues. 2. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No. 1, the execution of the Hundi by him was not denied, but his plea with which we are concerned in this appeal was that the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company was not his ancestral business, but as a matter of fact, the same exclusively belonged to one Gopal Marwari of Calcutta, of which he was a mere manager on salary basis. The said business was closed by Gopal Marwari in the year 1961. The defendant No. 1 denied any personal liability for the claim of the plaintiff. 3. On these pleadings, one of the issues framed by the trial court was as to whether defendant No. 1 was personally liable for the loan in question and whether the plaintiff had any cause of action against the defendant. Evidence was adduced by both the parties in support of their respective cases. 3. On these pleadings, one of the issues framed by the trial court was as to whether defendant No. 1 was personally liable for the loan in question and whether the plaintiff had any cause of action against the defendant. Evidence was adduced by both the parties in support of their respective cases. The trial Court, on a consideration of the various documentary evidence, held that the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company was never the joint family business of the defendants and Gopal Marwari was, in fact, the proprietor of the said firm. It also held that the defendant No. 1 was not personally liable for the loan in question. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff in the lower appellate Court, the same questions were pressed as in the trial court and were answered again against the plaintiff and the findings of the trial Court were affirmed. 4. In this Court Mr. R. S. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellant, firstly contended that inasmuch as the Hundi in question was drawn by the defendant No. 1 without any qualification and indicating the capacity in which he drew the same, he was liable for the money advanced on its basis on the face of the document and the Courts below have committed an apparent error of law by permitting the defendant to lead evidence in order to contradict the legal presumption. He strongly relied upon Sec.28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and contended that even according to the admitted case of the defendant No. 1 that he was an agent of the debtors firm, he having signed his name on the Hundi without indicating therein that he was an agent of the firm, he was personally liable under the instrument. The second question raised by him was that under the provisions of Sec.230 of the Contract Act, defendant No. 1 was clearly liable. 5. In my opinion, the first contention of the learned counsel has no merit and must be rejected. In the body of the instrument in question, the defendant No. 1 had clearly indicated in express words as to who was the drawer and the drawee of the same. 5. In my opinion, the first contention of the learned counsel has no merit and must be rejected. In the body of the instrument in question, the defendant No. 1 had clearly indicated in express words as to who was the drawer and the drawee of the same. As would appear from the relevant recitals quoted above, after mentioning the name of the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company as the drawer, it was also expressly said "Hundi kita ek aap ke upar deni kari", in other words "drawn one Hundi on you". 6. Let me now consider the various authorities relied upon by learned counsel in support of his first contention. He relied upon the case of Firm Sadasuk Janki Das V/s. Sir Kishen Pershad (AIR 1918 PC 146) which has been followed in all the subsequent cases. In this case one Mohan Lal had borrowed from the appellants before the Privy Council a sum of Rs. 35,000-00 and to secure repayment had drawn and accepted in their favour fourteen Hundis, each for the sum of Rs. 2,500-00, payable on different dates. In the operative part of the instrument, there was nothing to show that except Mohan Lal, anybody also was bound. Each of the Hundi was drawn and accepted by him without any qualification. In the execution portion, however, after putting his signature, he had described himself as "Acting Superintendent of the Private Treasury of His Excellency Sir Maharaja, the Prime Minister of H. H., the Nizam". The suit was instituted by the plaintiff against Mohan Lal and the Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad Bahadur, claiming a joint decree against them. The trial Court passed a decree against Mohan Lal alone. On appeal, the lower appellate Court took a different view and held that the form of the Hundi was sufficient to charge the Maharaja. On second appeal, however, the view of the trial Court was upheld and thereafter the matter was taken to the Privy Council. On a reference to the recitals in the instrument referred to above, their Lordships held that it was of the utmost importance that the name of a person or firm charged upon a negotiable instrument should be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document, so that the responsibility can be made plain and can be instantly recognised as the document passes from hand to hand. As in that case no such mention was made, it was held that it was Mohan Lal alone who was liable. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel upon a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in R. P. Koneti Naicker V/s. Jatu Gopala Aiyar (AIR 1916 Mad 293) (FB) where the executant of the promissory note in question as the maker of the same unequivocally had said "on demand, I promise to pay this sum of rupees six hundred and ninety-four and annas six with interest at Rs. 5-8-0 per cent per mensem from this date.........". In these circumstances, it was held that the maker described himself in the body of the note as an agent, no doubt, but his promise to pay was unqualified qualified by any reference to his alleged principal and the note was also signed without any addition to the signature. Either of the aforesaid decisions does not lend any support to the appellant. In the body of this instrument, defendant No. 1 had clearly indicated, as already stated, as to who was the real person who was liable for the debt in question and nowhere there was any unqualified promise to make the payment. True it is that in the signature portion he did not make any addition to show that he was signing as an agent, but the document must be taken as a whole to construe the same. The next case relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee is the case of this very Court in the case of Bank of Behar Ltd. V/s. Madhusudan Lal (AIR 1937 Pat 428). In this case also the promissory note admittedly was executed by defendant No. 1 alone and there was no suggestion by the either party that there was any indication on the face of the bill that the second defendant was the real debtor. The suit, however, was filed by the plaintiff Bank against both the defendants. In that case although it was found that the loan in question was advanced to defendant No. 2, but in spite of the said finding, the decree was passed only against defendant No. 1. The suit, however, was filed by the plaintiff Bank against both the defendants. In that case although it was found that the loan in question was advanced to defendant No. 2, but in spite of the said finding, the decree was passed only against defendant No. 1. The learned Single Judge who decided this case, however, observed that the only way to get out of that for the plaintiff was, if he desired, to make defendant No. 2 liable or to have sued the defendant on the loan, and not on the promissory note. For the aforesaid reasons, this decision is also of no assistance to the appellant. 7. Mr. N. P. Agarwala, learned counsel for the defendants, however, contended that the plaintiff in this case actually did not sue on the basis of the instrument, but on the basis of the loan. He referred to the case of the plaintiff made out in the plaint, which I have already referred to in the earlier portion of the judgment. He, accordingly, contended that in any view of this fact, no advantage could be taken by the plaintiff on the basis of the Hundi and that when the plaintiff impleaded other defendants and claimed a decree against them on the allegation that the firm in question was the joint family firm and all other defendants were also benefited by the loan, it was open to the defendants to raise issue on this question and to show by cogent evidence that the loan was actually not taken by the defendants, much less, the business in question belonged to the family of the defendants. There seems to be great force in this contention. The recitals in the plaint basically assume that the loan in question was advanced to the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company, and on this assumption the plaintiff alleged that the said business belonged to all the defendants and they were liable for the same. The giving of the loan in question is, therefore, admitted to have been advanced by the plaintiff to the said firm. The contention also finds support from the observation of the learned Single Judge in the Bank of Behars case AIR 1937 Pat 428 (supra). 8. The giving of the loan in question is, therefore, admitted to have been advanced by the plaintiff to the said firm. The contention also finds support from the observation of the learned Single Judge in the Bank of Behars case AIR 1937 Pat 428 (supra). 8. Learned counsel for the appellant then placed reliance upon the case of Sitaram Krishna V/s. Chimandas Fatehchand (AIR 1928 Bom 516) in support of his contention that if the Hundi was signed by the defendant No. 1, it was not open to him to allege and prove that he was acting for another. But in that case it was found that the mere mention of the name of the firm did not absolve the maker of the Hundi and in any event, he had described himself as the proprietor of the said firm. The facts of the instant case are, however, entirely different. If the name of the firm would not have been mentioned on the face of the instrument, being expressly stated that the said firm was the drawee, without any mention of the name of defendant No. 1 at all, the question raised on behalf of the appellant might have been of some relevance. But on the facts and for the reasons already stated above and also for the reason that the suit seems to be based more on the basis of the loan, and not on the Hundi, this contention also is not acceptable. The trial Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in framing an issue and deciding the question of fact as to whether the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Co. belonged to the family of the defendants or somebody else. As this finding is well-founded and the plaintiff himself haying participated at the trial stage and joined issue, it is too late in the day for him to raise any technical argument regarding the scope of the suit and the ambit of the inquiry to be held by the Court. The first contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee has, therefore, no merit and it must be rejected. 9. Now I take up the second question raised on behalf of the appellant. The first contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee has, therefore, no merit and it must be rejected. 9. Now I take up the second question raised on behalf of the appellant. It has been urged that in the Hundi it was not disclosed as to who was the real owner of the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company mentioned in the body of the instrument as the drawer and the drawee, and as it is open to any person to carry on a business in any assumed name, in the absence of the disclosure by defendant No. 1 of the fact to the plaintiff, either in the instrument itself or otherwise that it was not he who was the owner of the said firm, but the aforesaid Gopal Marwari, and having executed the same without any qualification or disclosing his capacity to execute the same, the plaintiff was entitled in law to sue defendant No. 1 for the loan advanced by him. From the evidence of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, it appears that the loan under the Hundi was paid to defendant No. 1 personally. Defendant No. 1 has not stated in his evidence that he had disclosed the name of his principal to the plaintiff at the time of taking the loan and executing the Hundi Both the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are residents of the town of Darbhanga itself and the plaintiff was kept under the impression that it was defendant No. 1 who was the real owner of the said business and he instituted the suit accordingly. It is well settled that in absence of any contract to the contrary, a contract can be personally enforced against an agent and shall be presumed to exist where the agent does not disclose the name of his principal. In this view of the matter, defendant No. 1 himself being the contracting party and having signed the instrument without any qualification, showing that he was signing the same as an agent of some named principal, he must be held to be personally liable, although in the body of the instrument the name of a firm was mentioned, without any indication as to who was the real owner of the same. Apart from this reasoning, as already stated above, the plaintiff really seems to have based has suit on the basis of the loan which was admittedly advanced to defendant No. 1 himself. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to get a personal decree against defendant No. 1. The Courts below were, therefore, not right in dismissing the plaintiffs suit on a finding that the firm Sri Ganeshji Umbrella Manufacturing Company was owned by a different person, a fact which was disclosed to the plaintiff for the first time in the written statement filed in the suit. The defendant No. 1 cannot, therefore, escape his own personal liability. 10. In the result, I would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below and decree the suit of the plaintiff against defendant No. 1 only with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum pendente lite and future till realisation with costs throughout.