Judgment :- 1. In a suit for partition of the assets of a marumakkathayam tarwad, the plaintiff died pending suit, and the action was continued by his heirs at law, who got themselves impleaded as additional plaintiffs. A preliminary decree declaring the plaintiffs' share was followed by a final decree which inter alia permitted the plaintiffs to recover mesne profits from the defendants for a specified period anterior to the passing of the final decree. In execution of that decree, a property set apart to the defendants under the final decree was sold in court auction. In the meanwhile, the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 11 of 1970, (for brevity, 'the Act') came into force. The 4th defendant sought to avoid the sale on the strength of S.20 of the Act by filing an application on the execution side as E. A. No. 90 of 1971. The decree holders opposed the application, inter alia contending that the liability under the decree is not a debt within the meaning of the Act, and for that purpose they relied on S.2 (4) (c) of the Act. While the executing court upheld the contention of the decree holders, the lower appellate court rejected it on the ground that the liability cannot get exempted under S.2 (4) (c) of the Act. 2. The 2nd decree holder, who is the revision petitioner before me, reiterated the contention that the mesne profits decreed by the final decree is in the nature of a tortious liability and as such outside the purview of the definition of debt contained in the Act. Sub-section (4) of S.2 of the Act which while defining the expression 'debt', enumerates certain liabilities which are not debts. Clause (c) of S.2 (4), on which reliance is placed in this case, reads as follows: "(c) any liability arising out of a breach of trust or any tortious liability." 3. Inasmuch as the expression 'tortious liability' is not defined in the Act, its true import has to be ascertained with the assistance of the general law of torts. 4. Men learned in law do not profess that the expression'tortious liability' is susceptible of precise and comprehensive definition. Inasmuch as the expression 'tortious liability' is not defined in the Act, its true import has to be ascertained with the assistance of the general law of torts. 4. Men learned in law do not profess that the expression'tortious liability' is susceptible of precise and comprehensive definition. Sir Percy Winfield attempted a definition in the following terms: ' "Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law; such duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages." Clark and Lindsell, while broadly approving the above definition thought it fit to add a rider that "an alternative remedy for the recovery of possession may be appropriate in a few cases, such as detinue and ejectment, and the action must lie at common law and not, for example, as a remedy for collision under Admiralty law." Unauthorised entry into the land belonging to another undoubtedly can give rise to a liability in tort as could be seen from the well-known treatises on this subject. The respondents pressed into service a strict application of the above definition in the case of damages for unfawful entry into land as well. It was contended that unless the tortfeasor had an obligation at law to protect the rights of the owner, a liability in tort in the strict sense cannot arise. I do not think that in this case it is necessary for me to examine that contention because yet another important aspect, in adjudging the liability in matters of this kind, is significantly absent in this case. While dealing with trespass, Salmond has pointed out (Salmond on the Law of Torts, 15th Edition, page 57) that "a trespass is actionable only at the suit of him who is in possession of the land, using the word possession in its strict sense as including a person entitled to immediate and exclusive possession." Thus, it is a right to exclusive possession that confers a right on the aggrieved person to claim damages from a person who has infringed that right. Can it be said in this case that the plaintiffs had any exclusive right of possession and let alone factual possession. What the preliminary decree in this case did was to convert the joint tenancy in the estate into one as tenancy¬in-common. Can it be said in this case that the plaintiffs had any exclusive right of possession and let alone factual possession. What the preliminary decree in this case did was to convert the joint tenancy in the estate into one as tenancy¬in-common. Until there was a physical partition and allotment of the assets of the tarwad by the final decree it cannot be said that any member of the tarwad had a right to exclusive possession of any land. The utmost that a member of the tarwad can claim at that stage was that he had a right to joint possession and nothing beyond that. That being the position at law, it is not possible to characterise the possession of the defendants as the possession of a trespasser, or, at any rate, an invasion of the right which the plaintiffs had for exclusive possession of the assets of the tarwad. The mere use of the expression'mesne profits' in the decree is not conclusive of the legal incidents of the liability which the defendants had to discharge. The liability in cases of this kind is at best only a liability to render accounts for appropriating the income which was legitimately due to another sharer. Thus, whether viewed from the side of the owner claiming exclusive possession, or from the side of the person who infringes that right, it is not possible to hold that in cases of this kind there has been the commission of a tort. The lower appellate court was therefore right in holding that the debt which culminated in the sale is within the purview of the Act. I confirm the order and dismiss this revision. No costs.