Judgement This revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the orders dated 22-8-73 and 20-11-73 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No 1, Gauhati in Title Suits Nos. 21 of 1973 and 22 of 1973. 2. The facts leading to this revision petition may be briefly stated as follows. The petitioner who is a registered partnership firm entered into a contract with the opposite party for construction of some building works. During the course of the construction work a dispute arose and in accordance with clause 70 of the Contract Agreement the dispute was referred to arbitration. The petitioner got notice of the passing of the award dated 24-2-73. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition under Section 14, sub-section (2) of the Arbitration Act before the Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati, on 17-3-73 and that proceeding was numbered as Title Suit No. 21 of 1973. The opposite party also filed a petition under Section 14, sub-section (2) of the Arbitration Act on 24-3-73 and that proceeding was numbered as Title Suit No. 22 of 1973. The learned Assistant District Judge by his order dated 22-8-73, on the basis of the award which was marked "X", passed a decree in terms of the award. 3. The main grievance of the petitioner is that they did not get any notice of the filing of the award as required under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act. Hence Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that in order to exercise jurisdiction to pass the decree in terms of the award, there must be a notice given to the parties about the filing of the award. He further contends that the petitioner did not have any knowledge about the filing of the award nor did he get any notice about the filing of the award. Hence there is material irregularity in passing the decree by the learned Assistant District Judge and therefore the order passed by the learned Assistant District Judge on 22-8-73 making a decree in terms of the award must be set aside. 4. Hence there is material irregularity in passing the decree by the learned Assistant District Judge and therefore the order passed by the learned Assistant District Judge on 22-8-73 making a decree in terms of the award must be set aside. 4. Section 14 so far as it is relevant may be set out as below : "(1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. (2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award * * * *" 5. A host of cases have been cited at the bar. But I think discussion of a few of them should be enough. In Gurditta Mal v. Basanta Mal Panna Lal, reported in AIR 1925 Lah 619 (1), it was held that the provisions of clause 10 of Schedule 2 of the C.P.C. (which is similar to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act) are mandatory and the parties are entitled to notice even if they have knowledge of the date on which the award is filed. The omission to give such notice is a material irregularity, which entitles the party to have the decree passed on the award set aside in revision. The omission to give such notice is a material irregularity, which entitles the party to have the decree passed on the award set aside in revision. I think this case has gone a little further than it is intended in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nilkantha v. Kashinath reported in AIR 1962 SC 666 , where their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment observed as follows : "Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act X of 1940) requires the arbitrators or umpire to give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award. Sub-section (2) of that section requires the Court, after the filing of the award, to give notice to the parties of the award. The difference in the provisions of the two sub-sections with respect to the giving of notice is significant and indicates clearly that the notice which the Court is to give to the parties of the filing of the award need not be a notice in writing. The notice can be given orally. No question of the service of the notice in the formal way of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise in the case of a notice given orally. The communication of the information that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 14 with respect to the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filing of the award. Notice does not necessarily mean communication in writing. Notice, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, means intimation, intelligence, warning and has this meaning in expressions like give notice, have notice and it also means formal intimation of something, or instructions to do something and has such a meaning in expressions like notice to quit, till further notice. We are of opinion that the expression give notice in sub-section (2) of Section 14, simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award, which certainly was given to the parties through their pleaders on February 21, 1948. We are of opinion that the expression give notice in sub-section (2) of Section 14, simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award, which certainly was given to the parties through their pleaders on February 21, 1948. Notice to the pleader is notice to the party, in view of Rule 5 of Order III, Civil Procedure Code, which provides that, any process served on the pleader of any party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless the Court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person." 6. In R. D. Gupta v. Union of India, reported in 1971 (3) SCC 817 , where the award was filed in Court on 26th of May, 1966, and a notice of the filing of the award was served on the Union of India on May 30, 1966, the petition to set aside the award was made on June 26, 1966. Therefore prima facie the petition was in time having been filed within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. But it was contended on behalf of the appellant in that case that on the very day the award was filed in the Court, the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner passed the following order. "Arbitrator has filed the award along with the record of proceedings and his bill is amounting to Rupees 7,163. Issue notice on the parties fixing 14-7-1966." This order was shown to Mr. L. P. Changkakoti, Government Advocate and his signatures obtained. It was contended that this amounted to a service of notice under Section 14 (2) of the Act. Hence the petition filed on June 27, 1966, must be held to be barred. The Supreme Court held as follows. "It is true that notice under Section 14 (2) of the Act need not be in writing but we are unable to accept the contention that the information given to Mr. Changkakoti amounts to a notice to the Government under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act. All that Mr. The Supreme Court held as follows. "It is true that notice under Section 14 (2) of the Act need not be in writing but we are unable to accept the contention that the information given to Mr. Changkakoti amounts to a notice to the Government under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act. All that Mr. Changkakoti was told was that a written notice of the filing of the award will be given to the Government though he had come to know that the award had been filed into Court. Under the circumstances we are unable to hold that the information given to Mr. Changkakoti amounted to a notice under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act." From this case it is quite clear that if in the order of the Court it appears that notices should issue to the parties then in that case notice must be served on the parties. 7. In Union of India v. Radhanath Nanda, reported in AIR 1961 Orissa 143, while the Court was considering Article 158 of the Limitation Act (9 of 1908) and Section 14 sub-section (2) of the Arbitration Act, it was held "Article 158 does not require any express written notice. Where a party enters appearance in Court and thus knows of the filing of the award in Court, actual service of notice on him is not necessary for the purpose of limitation. Therefore, the date on which the party while present in Court became aware of the filing of the award would be the starting point for limitation." 8. From the above decisions the principles that can be culled are that notice under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act is mandatory but it need not be in writing. It may be conveyed orally or through pleaders or when the party is aware of the filing of the award in the Court being present. What is required under sub-section (2) of S. 14 is to bring to the notice of the party about the filing of the award by whatever mode it may be. Therefore, we are required to see under what circumstances the impugned decree was passed and also to see whether the petitioner was aware of the filing of the award. From a perusal of the order sheet of Title Suit No. 21 of 1973, it appears that on 28-4-1973 the following order was passed. Therefore, we are required to see under what circumstances the impugned decree was passed and also to see whether the petitioner was aware of the filing of the award. From a perusal of the order sheet of Title Suit No. 21 of 1973, it appears that on 28-4-1973 the following order was passed. "The petitioner is present. The Presiding Judge is on special leave. Notice has been issued. Service report not received. Await fixing 1-6-1973." On 1-6-1973 it was ordered - "Petitioner and opposite party are present. The award is filed. Issue notice on the opposite party fixing 26-6-1973. Petitioner is to take steps within 5 days." On the same date it was ordered again - "It appears that the opposite party has filed T. S. No. 22 of 1973 regarding the same matter. Let the record of the said case be filed with the records of this case. Since the opposite party is also present, no notice is required to be served upon him. The parties now can file their objection as regards the award within 2-7-1973." It may be mentioned here that in the translated copy given by the petitioner regarding the order-sheet at page 14 of the paper book, it is translated in the penultimate line of the later order of 1-6-1973 as "Since the opposite party is present no notice is required to be served upon him." But the correct translation from the original should be "Since the opposite party is also present no notice is required to be served upon him." In the translation found in the paper book, the word also is missing. The present opposite party No. 1 was the opposite party in T. S. No. 21 of 1973. From a reading of the entire order dated 1-6-1973 it appears that the petitioner was present in the Court and the earlier order of that date for issue of notice to the opposite party was cancelled by the Courts later order of the same date because the opposite party was also present in the Court. From this it appears that the petitioner was present in the Court and he knew about the filing of the award. From this it appears that the petitioner was present in the Court and he knew about the filing of the award. As the petitioner was present in Court on 28-4-1973 as it appears from the order-sheet about which the petitioner also admits, on that date he knew that the next date was fixed on 1-6-1973 and so it is difficult to believe that he would not be present in court on 1-6-1973. 9. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner urges that from the record it does not appear that the petitioner was present on that date. He further submits that the petitioner was appearing through his advocate and from the record it appears that on 28-4-1973 the advocate appeared in that case and he filed a hajira. But on 1-6-73 there is no hajira filed by the advocate and therefore the petitioner was not present through his advocate. I find it very difficult to accept this proposition which I have discussed in the foregoing paragraph. There is no law that the petitioner or his advocate should file a hajira. If the petitioner or his advocate is present in Court when the case is called for hearing then in that case no hajira need be filed. From a reading of the order of the learned Assistant District Judge dated 1-6-1973 I am satisfied that the petitioner was present in Court either by himself or through his advocate and he came to know about the filing of the award. By reading the order-sheet of Title Suit No. 22 of 1973 which is also filed along with the petition the learned Court on 1-6-1973 passed the following order. "The petitioner is present. This suit is put up together with T. S. 21/73. Same order passed today in the aforesaid case." The petitioner in his petition makes a statement that he came to know of the filing of the award and the judgment and decree passed in terms of the award on 8-1-74 and immediately thereafter he applied for the certified copy of the order-sheets of both the title suits Nos. 21 of 1973 and 22 of 1973 as also the decree passed by the Court and obtained the same on 16-1-74. After obtaining the certified copies of the aforesaid orders he filed the present petition on 17-1-74. 21 of 1973 and 22 of 1973 as also the decree passed by the Court and obtained the same on 16-1-74. After obtaining the certified copies of the aforesaid orders he filed the present petition on 17-1-74. The petitioner has also filed a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the present petition, impugning the order of the learned Assistant, District Judge dated 22-8-1973. I have already observed earlier that on 1-6-1973 the petitioner was either personally present or he was present through his advocate because on earlier dates he was represented by his advocate. In his petition there is no mention whether he appeared through his advocate in the case or not. Further, there is no affidavit filed by the learned Advocate to whom the case was entrusted to state that he was also not present in the Court on 1-6-73. Therefore, I find it difficult to disbelieve the order of the learned Assistant District Judge passed on 1-6-1973. When even in spite of the knowledge of the filing of the award before the Court the petitioner did not take any step in filing any objection, the Court had to pass the impugned order dated 22-8-1973 which resulted in the passing of the decree in terms of the award. 10. In view of the conclusion that I have reached the petition under Sec. 5 of the limitation Act is without any merit. The Court below has not committed any illegality or irregularity in passing the impugned order. I do not find any ground to interfere with the order and decree passed by the learned Assistant District Judge on 22-8-1973. The petition stands dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs. The stay order granted by this Court on 17-1-1974 stands vacated. Petition dismissed.