JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR J.- The petitioner, which is a partnership firm and is carrying on the business of purchasing and selling gold and silver ornaments as also silver bars, has filed this petition challenging the validity of rules 43, 45 and 47 of the Octroi Rules for the assessment, collection and refund of the cess imposed under section 114 (1) (e) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 19408, and for prevention of evasion thereof, on goods and animals brought within the octroi limits of the Nagpur Corporation for sale, consumption or use therein. These Rules will hereinafter be referred to as the Octroi Rules and the City of Nagpur Corporation Act will be referred to as the Corporation. Act. The occasion to challenge these rules arise because of the issue of a notice by the Octroi Superintendent of the Corporation calling upon the petitioner to furnish information as required under section 150 (b) of the Corporation Act read with rule 43 of the Octroi Rules, regarding import an. export of articles made by the petitioner during the period 1-4-1967 to 20-11-1961 in the requisite form which was attached to the notice. The form which it filed by the petitioner contains 8 columns referring to- (1) Name and description of goods imported j (2) Weight of the goods imported; (3) Value of the goods; (4) Invoice No. and Date; (5) Consignor's name and address in full; (6) Octroi Receipt No. with date if any; (7) If exported, the place and full address of the person to whom it was sent with date; and (8) Remarks. The petitioner did not comply with the notice issued by the Corporation and has filed this petition challenging the validity of the notice which, according to him, could not be issued to it. The argument appears to be that the levy of octroi tax by the Nagpur Corporation is itself illegal and in any case rules 43 and 45 are attracted only in cases dealt with by rules 11 (d), 13 and 14 of the Octroi Rules and cannot be invoked by the Corporation in the case of the petitioner. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Corporation Act and the Octroi Rules. 2. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Corporation Act and the Octroi Rules. 2. Part IV of the Corporation Act deals with taxation and section 114 enumerates taxes which could be imposed by the Corporation under the Act. So far as the octroi tax is concerned, the relevant provision is to be found in clause (e) of sub-section (1) and it reads: "114. (J) For the purposes of this Act. the Corporation shall impose- ***** (e) a cess on animals or goods brought within the City for sale, consumption or use therein. " While sub-section (1) of section 114 enumerates what could be called compulsory taxes to be imposed by the Corporation, sub-section (2) enables the Corporation to impose some more taxes and there is a residuary provision in clause (g) which empowers it to impose, with the previous approval of the State Government and for the purposes of the Act "any other tax which the State Legislature has power to impose in the State under the Constitution." Sub· section (3) provides: "The State Government may, by rules made under this Act regulate the imposition, assessment and collection of taxes under this section and specify maximum amounts of rates for any tax and for preventing evasion of assessment and payment of taxes." Section 115 prescribes the procedure for imposing the taxes referred to in section 114. A resolution proposing to impose a tax is to be passed by the Corporation. A notice is then published in accordance with the rules made under the Act defining the class of persons, of description of property proposed to be taxed, the amount or rate of the tax to be imposed, and the system of assessment to be adopted. Residents within the city have a right to object to these proposals, but the final proposals are to be forwarded to the State Government by the Corporation. Under sub-section (6) of section 115 it is provided that the State Government shall either refuse to sanction them or return them for further consideration, or sanction them without modification or with such modification not involving an increase of the rate to be proposed as it thinks fit. This sanction is to be published in the Gazette and the tax then comes into force on such date as may be specified in that notification. This sanction is to be published in the Gazette and the tax then comes into force on such date as may be specified in that notification. S. The relevant rules for the imposition of the cess referred to as octroi duty in the rules framed under section 114 (1) (e) of the Corporation Act on goods and animals brought within the octroi limits of the Corporation for sale, consumption or use therein were duly sanctioned by the State Government and they came to be published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 26th May 1966. In the same Gazette, Octroi Rules providing for assessment, collection and refund of a cess on animals or goods brought within the City for sale, consumption or use therein framed under section 114 (3) read with clause (e) of section 114 (1) and section 420 (2) (t) and (4) were published. It is the latter rules with which we are really concerned in -this petition. Only of the rules, being rule 11 (d), empowers the Municipal Commissioner to permit in writing any trading or manufacturing firm to import dutiable articles without paying duty at the outpost and in such cases, duty is to be paid at the Central Octroi Office at such times and at such intervals as the Municipal Commissioner may prescribe. This is an exception to the general provision that when goods are brought within the City or the octroi limits they shall not pass the octroi post unless proper octroi duty is paid. There is power in the Corporation to have dutiable goods which are imported to be removed to a proper warehouse if the importer refuses or is unable to pay the duty on the goods. The Octroi Rules provide for an Octroi Free Zone and firms or distributing agencies can be allowed to import and keep such goods in the godowns specially created for this purpose on the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Corporation. The Octroi Rules provide for an Octroi Free Zone and firms or distributing agencies can be allowed to import and keep such goods in the godowns specially created for this purpose on the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Corporation. Special provision is made providing for exemption in respect of goods imported for manufacturing purposes in the Nagpur Central Jail, but it is provided that the goods so used for manufacturing articles actually sold by such jail to the public will be taxed, and at the close of each quarter, the Superintendent of the jail shall forward to the Nagpur Corporation a statement showing the amount of dutiable raw material (goods) used in the articles sold to the public during the quarter and shall also send the amount of duty leviable thereon. Similarly, in the case of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation where goods are imported for sale, use or consumption by the Transport Corporation, octroi duty is to be paid at the naka but refund of such a duty could be granted on the goods that are exported without being used or consumed on the certificate of the Manager or Assistant Manager. Then come the relevant rules which are challenged in this petition, which are quoted below extensively: "43. Every person, importing or exporting goods, if required at any time by the Superintendent or Deputy or Assistant Superintendent of Octroi or by any officer authorised by the Municipal Commissioner in this behalf to produce any document may give (the word 'made' appears to be a misprint) statement or furnish information regarding the goods imported or exported by him, shall be bound to produce them, give statement or furnish information as the case may be, to the best of his knowledge and belief. 45. (1) When the Municipal Commissioner or the officer authorised in this behalf by the Municipal Commissioner is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of the Corporation revenue to issue a requisition requesting any importer or a dealer within the limits of the Corporation to file a declaration in the prescribed form regarding the imports made by him or by his agent during a specific period of dutiable articles within the octroi limits such a declaration duly signed by the importer shall be submitted by him to the Municipal Commissioner within a fortnight from the date of receipt of such requisition. If the Municipal Commissioner or the officer authorised by him in this behalf has reasons to believe that such a declaration is false or otherwise incorrect, it shall be competent for the Municipal Commissioner or the officer authorised by him in this behalf to require such importer to produce in the municipal office within such reasonable period as the Municipal Commissioner shall prescribe such account-books and furnish relevant extracts of the said account-books under his signature. (2) If the Commissioner on going through the accounts is satisfied that due amount of octroi duty has not been paid by the importer concerned, the Commissioner may call upon the importer to pay up to twice the amount of octroi duty evaded and he shall be bound to comply with such demand. (3) If the amount is not paid on demand, it shall be recoverable by distress and sale of the movable property or by attachment and sale of the immoveable property of the importer as prescribed under Chapter XII of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (II of 1950). 47. An infringement of rules 8 (a), (b), (c), 9, 10 (C) and (d), 11 (b), 11 (c), 13 (d), 13 (g), 14 (a), 14 (b), 14 (c), 14 (f), 14 (h), 16 (b) (v), 16 (f), 16 (h), 31 (b), 41, 43,44 and 45 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 500." 4. Now, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Deo that the power to fix the rate of tax is a legislative power and cannot, therefore, be delegated to a local authority, and since the Legislature itself has not fixed the rate of the octroi duty, the levy of the octroi tax itself is illegal. We have been referred to certain observations of Das Gupta C. J., as he then was, in Calcutta Corporation v. Sarat Chandra1. In paragraph 17 the learned Chief Justice observed: "To my mind the most important question of policy which the Legislature has to determine in a taxing statute is the question of the rate of tax. We have been referred to certain observations of Das Gupta C. J., as he then was, in Calcutta Corporation v. Sarat Chandra1. In paragraph 17 the learned Chief Justice observed: "To my mind the most important question of policy which the Legislature has to determine in a taxing statute is the question of the rate of tax. To leave the determination of this matter to any other authority without indicating clearly principles on which (sic.) principles for determination cannot be considered permissible delegation." And in paragraph 20 it was observed: "My conclusion, therefore, is that there is nothing in principle or authority that would permit delegation of the question as to how the rate of tax should be determined to a subordinate body." The relevant provision which fell for consideration in that case was section 229 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, which provided: "Every person who erects, exhibits, fixes or retains upon or over any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure any advertisements, or who displays any advertisement to public view in any manner whatsoever, visible from a public street or other public place shall pay for every advertisement which is so erected, exhibited, at such rate and in such manner and subject to such exemptions as the Corporation may prescribe by rules with approval of the State Government." Referring to these provisions, the learned Chief Justice observed: "In my opinion, the legislation in section 229 in so far as it leaves the determination of the rate of what it calls a licence fee but is in reality a tax to the Corporation with the approval of the State Government is beyond the limits of permissible delegation and so invalid." 5. Bachawat J., who was another member of the Bench which decided that case, however, differed from the view of the learned Chief Justice and he took the view, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Banarsi Das v. State of M. P.2: "The law there declared by the Supreme Court seems to be that the rates at which the tax is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods are matters of detail in the working of the taxation laws and may be left to be determined by the Executive." The learned Judge, however, found that in that case it was not necessary to pronounce on the general question of the validity of the delegation of the power of taxation and of the power to fix the rates of tax. It appears to us however, that it is too late in the day to countenance an argument that it is not permissible for the Legislature to entrust a local body with the power to fix the rate of tax or that such a delegation is not permissible. 6. In Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema3 the Supreme Court was considering the validity of a licence fee imposed in respect of a cinema house, and the contention was that section 5i8 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, which provided that every licence granted under the Act shall specify the tax or fee, if any, paid for the licence and for every such licence except when it is otherwise expressly provided, a fee may be charged at such rate as may from time to time be fixed by the Corporation, was bad on the ground that it was a piece of delegated legislation and that since the rate of tax was an essential legislative function, it could not be delegated to the Corporation. The Supreme Court, after referring to several decisions, took the view that the fixation of the rates of taxes was not of the essence of legislative power of taxation and that there was clear authority for the proposition that fixation of rates of taxes may be legitimately left by a statute to a non-legislative body. At the same time, it was observed that when the power to fix rates of taxes is left to another body, the Legislature must provide guidance for such fixation. At the same time, it was observed that when the power to fix rates of taxes is left to another body, the Legislature must provide guidance for such fixation. What kind of guidance there can be was then pointed out and it was held that the needs of the taxing body for carrying out its functions under the statute for which alone the taxing power was conferred on it may afford sufficient guidance to make the power to fix the rate of tax valid. With reference to the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, it was observed: "The validity of the powers to fix rates of taxes delegated to the Corporation by section 548 of the Act must be Judged by the same standard. Now there is no dispute that all taxes, including the one under this section can be collected and used by the Corporation only for discharging its functions under the Act. The Corporation, subject to certain controls with which we are not concerned, is an autonomous body. It has to perform various statutory functions. It is often given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed. For all this its needs money and its needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. Its power to collect tax, however, is necessarily limited by the expenses required to discharge those functions. It has, therefore, where rates have not been specified in the statute, to fix such rates as may be necessary to meet its needs. That, we think, would be sufficient guidance to make the exercise of its power to fix the rates valid ..... In the case of a self governing body with taxing powers, a large amount of flexibility in the guidance to be provided for the exercise of that power must exist." In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Gotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills4 the Supreme Court again laid down the limits of permissible delegation and the proposition that delegation of the power to fix rates of taxes to a local body would not be bad if there was guidance in the Act for the exercise of that power was reiterated. In Paragraph 28 it was observed: "A review of these authorities therefore leads to the conclusion that so far as this Court is concerned the principle is well established that essential legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot be delegated by the Legislature. Nor is there any unlimited right of delegation inherent in the legislative power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution. The Legislature must retain in its own hands the essential Legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the Courts should not interfere. What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. Further it appears to us that the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the matter of delegation." Dealing with the form which the guidance may take, it was observed: "The guidance may take the form of providing maximum rates of tax upto which a local body may be given the discretion to make its choice, or it may take the form of providing for consultation with the people of the local area and then fixing the rates after such consultation. It may also take the form of sl1bjecting the rate to be fixed by the local body to the approval of Government which acts as a watch dog on the actions of the local body in this matter on behalf of the Legislature. There may be other ways in which guidance may be provided. But the purpose of guidance, whatsoever may be the manner thereof is to see that the local body fixes a reasonable rate of taxation for the local area concerned. There may be other ways in which guidance may be provided. But the purpose of guidance, whatsoever may be the manner thereof is to see that the local body fixes a reasonable rate of taxation for the local area concerned. So long as the legislature has made provision to achieve that reasonable rates of taxation are fixed by local bodies, whatever may be the method employed for this purpose provided it is effective, it may be said that there is guidance for the purpose of fixation of rates of taxation. So long as the law has provided a method by which the local body can be controlled and there is provision to see that reasonable rates are fixed, it can be said that there is guidance in the matter of fixing rates for local taxation. As we have already said there is pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of rates of tax to the local body and so long as the Legislature has provided a method for seeing that rates fixed are reasonable, be it in one form or another, it may be said that there is guidance for fixing rates of taxation and the power assigned to the local body for fixing the rates is not uncontrolled and uncanalised. " 7. In Jaliundur Rubber Goods Manufacturers' Association v. Union of India5 the question was whether section 12 (2) of the Rubber Act, 1947, suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, and the Supreme Court reiterated these principles and observed: "It is well established that essential legislative functions consist of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot be delegated by the legislature. What can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purpose and objects of an enactment. Where legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down the Courts will not interfere. It will depend on consideration of the provisions of a particular Act including its preamble as to the guidance which has been given and the legislative policy which has been laid down in the matter. Where legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down the Courts will not interfere. It will depend on consideration of the provisions of a particular Act including its preamble as to the guidance which has been given and the legislative policy which has been laid down in the matter. In a taxing statute the guidance may take the form subjecting the rate to be fixed by the local body to the approval of the Government which acts as a watch-dog on the actions of the local body in this matter on behalf of the legislature. The reasonableness of the rates may be ensured by providing safeguards laying down the procedure for consulting the wishes of the local inhabitants. So long as the law has provided the method by which the local body can be controlled and there is a provision to see that reasonable rates are fixed it can be said that there is guidance in the matter of fixing the rates for local taxation." 8. Indeed, the provisions of section 114 of the Corporation Act were already subjected to scrutiny in N. J. Nayadu & Co. v. Administrator of the City of Nagpur6. In that case the levy of the theatre tax by the Corporation in exercise of the power given under section 114 (2) (g) of the Corporation Act was challenged as amounting to excessive delegation of legislative power and, therefore, void. The question which the Bench was called upon in that case to consider was whether sufficient guidelines cannot be said to exist in the provisions of section 114 of the Corporation Act. Referring to those provisions it was pointed out in paragraph 15: "It will now be useful at this stage to compare the provisions of section 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act with the provisions of section 114 of the Corporation Act, with which we are concerned in this case. If sufficient guidelines are found indicating the policy of the Legislature and the limits within which the tax should be imposed under section 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, we do not see why sufficient guidelines cannot be said to exist in the provisions of section 114 of the Corporation Act as well. If sufficient guidelines are found indicating the policy of the Legislature and the limits within which the tax should be imposed under section 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, we do not see why sufficient guidelines cannot be said to exist in the provisions of section 114 of the Corporation Act as well. It is necessary to point out that the power to impose taxes, whether compulsory or optional, has been granted to the Corporation for the purposes of the Act which itself is a sufficient guideline according to the decision of the Supreme Court. The Corporation is charged was multifarious duties. It has to find funds, finances and revenues for discharging its functions effectively and efficiently. It knows as a representative body what are the needs of its people, residents and citizens and ho w they should be met. The proposals for imposing the tax in the first instance are subject to objections which are required considered. They are further subject to scrutiny by the State Government at a responsible level. The rules to be made are again the responsibility of the State Government. All these safeguards in our opinion, therefore, are sufficiently defensive to protect the provision from challenge as a piece of excessive delegation of legislative power. There is a provision for budget. The budget is to be scrutinised by the Government. There is overriding power in the State Government under section 144 of the Corporation Act to order exemption from payment of any tax in whole or in part in proper cases and in case of particular class of persons, and Government is also empowered to required the Corporation to reconsider its proposal of impost if it results in an unfair incidence or is injurious to the interests of the general public as provided under sub-section (2) of section 144. The guidelines that are to be sought in the legislation are to be found in such and similar provisions of the Corporation Act and we are satisfied that on the test laid down in the case of Liberty Cinema by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that section 114 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power." With respect, we agree with these observations. 9. 9. Wherever a legislative enactment delegates the power to fix the rate of tax to a local body, such a legislation cannot be open to challenge merely on the ground that the power to fix the rate of tax has been delegated. Delegation of the power to fix the rate of a tax is permissible if there is guidance provided in the Act for the exercise of such delegated power. Such guidance can be found in section 115 (6) of the Act which makes the rate to be fixed subject to the sanction of the State Government which acts as a watch· dog on behalf of the Legislature. As pointed out in N. J. Nayadu’s case the Corporation Act itself provides sufficient guidance in the matter of fixation of rates of a tax. It is not, therefore, possible to accept the contention that the levy of octroi tax itself is bad on the ground of excessive delegation. 10. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner IS that by enacting section 114 (3) of the Act the power to levy the tax has been made subject to the satisfaction of the condition precedent that the maximum amount of the rate of tax is fixed by the State Government by rules. We have been referred to a passage from Craies on Statute law, seventh edition, at page 297, where the learned author has observed: "The initial difference between subordinate legislation (of the kind dealt with in this chapter) and statute law lies in the fact that a subordinate law-making body is bound by the terms of its delegated or derived authority, and that Courts of law, as a general rule, will act give effect to the rules, etc., thus made, unless satisfied that all the conditions precedent to the validity of the rules have been fulfilled." 11. Reference was also made to a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shreeramul Chetty v. The State7 where the same principle was accepted and it was observed: "Where powers are delegated to an authority, that authority is bound by the terms of it, delegation and any exercise of the powers in contravention of conditions precedent or the statutory essentials laid down will be invalid and ultra vires." On the basis of these authorities it was urged that unless maximum amounts of rates of tax are fixed by the State Government, the Corporation, itself could not exercise its own power of levying the octroi tax. Now, it is difficult for us to read the provisions of section 114 (3) as mandatory requiring the State Government to fix the maximum rates of tax before it can make rules with regard to the imposition, assessment and collection of tax as provided in that section. The several clauses in sub-section (3) in our view must be read disjunctively and the powers which are given to the State Government under subsection (3) must be read as independent powers for making rules with regard to the imposition, assessment and collection of taxes. The power to make rules prescribing maximum rates of tax could be independently exercised, but there is nothing in the section which would make it obligatory for the State Government to first specify the maximum amount of rates of tax before it exercises is another independent power of making rules for imposition of a tax. The power to make rules for imposition, assessment and collection of taxes cannot be read all being subject to the power to prescribe or specify the maximum amount of rate of any tax. The two powers are independent of each other and it is not possible for us to read the power of making rules with regard to imposition of taxes to be dependent upon the exercise of the power of fixing the maximum amount of rate of tax. The principle, therefore, that unless the condition precedent is satisfied, the delegated legislation cannot be effective will not apply in the instant case. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reference on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussain v. State of Bombay8, The Supreme Court there was dealing with section 11 of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reference on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussain v. State of Bombay8, The Supreme Court there was dealing with section 11 of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939. The Market Committee had made bye-laws prescribing certain fees; but on a construction of section 11 of the relevant Act it was held that it will not be possible for the Market Committee to prescribe any fees under section 11 through bye-laws till the State Government prescribes the maximum under section 11, and as no such maximum had been prescribed in the rules, the fees which were being charged under the bye-laws for the purposes of section 11 were ultra vires of that section. Now, it appears to us that the decision turned mainly on the construction of section 11 which is very differently worded. That provision read: "The market Committee may. Subject to the provisions of the rules and subject to such maximum as may be prescribed, levy fees on the agricultural produce brought and sold by licensees in the market area." Thus, though section 11 gave a power to the market committee to levy fees that power Was circumscribed and it was subject to the maximum being prescribed by the State Government, and inasmuch as the maximum fees Were not prescribed by the State Government, it was held that the bye-laws or the rules of the market committee could not be operative. We have already pointed out that under sub-section (3) of section 114 of the Corporation Act it was not obligatory for the State Government to specify the maximum amounts of rates, though it is true that where the maximum amounts of rates are specified those rates would furnished the limit beyond which no rates could be fixed by the Corporation. However, the failure to prescribe the maximum rates does not deprive the Corporation of the power to fix the rates in the manner prescribed by section 115. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot, therefore, be of any assistance to the petitioner. 13. We next come to the Contention of the petitioner that rules 43, 45 and 47 are invalid. For the present, we shall consider the contention in so far as rules 43 and 45 are concerned. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot, therefore, be of any assistance to the petitioner. 13. We next come to the Contention of the petitioner that rules 43, 45 and 47 are invalid. For the present, we shall consider the contention in so far as rules 43 and 45 are concerned. Now, the argument is that rules 43 and 45 do not apply to the petitioner and those rules could really be properly invoked only in cases Covered by rule 11(d), 13 and 14. Now, on this argument it is clear that even according to the petitioner there are cases contemplated by the rules in which the provisions of rules 43 and 45 could properly be invoked by the Corporation and, therefore the argument that the rules are invalid must be rejected. The argument in substance appears to be that so far as the petitioner is concerned, no action can be taken by the Corporation invoking rules 43 and 45 against it and consequently, as the argument ultimately turns out, the notice is liable to be quashed. The argument is based on sections 150 and 151 of the Corporation Act. Section 150 reads: "Every person bringing or receiving within the limits of the City any article in respect of ' which a toll or cess on imports is payable, shall when required by an officer duly authorised by the Chief Executive Officer in this behalf and so far as may be necessary for ascertaining the amount of tax chargeable, (a) permit the officer to inspect, examine, weigh and otherwise deal with the article, (b) and communicate to the officer any information and exhibit to him any bill, invoice or document of a like nature which such person may possess relating to the article." Section 151 then reads: "151. (I) If any person, bringing or receiving within the prescribed limits of the City a conveyance or package on which a toll or cess on imports if or is believed to be leviable, refuses on the demand of an officer authorised by the Chief Executive Officer in this behalf to permit the officer to inspect. (I) If any person, bringing or receiving within the prescribed limits of the City a conveyance or package on which a toll or cess on imports if or is believed to be leviable, refuses on the demand of an officer authorised by the Chief Executive Officer in this behalf to permit the officer to inspect. weight or otherwise examine the contents of the conveyance or package for the purpose of ascertaining whether it contains any article in respect of which a toll or cess on imports is payable, or refuses to communicate to the officer any information or to exhibit to him any bill, invoice or document of a like nature which he may possess relating to the article, or with the intention of defrauding the Corporation Communicates false information or exhibits any false, forged, or fraudulent bill, invoice or document of a like nature, he shall be punished with a fine which may extend to fifty rupees. (2) Any such person may demand that the conveyance or package or both, as the case may be, shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the Chief Executive Officer or a person appointed by him for this purpose, who shall cause the inspection to be made in hill presence.” Now, section 150 makes it obligatory for the person bringing or receiving any article on which octroi duty is payable to permit an officer to inspect, examine, weigh or otherwise deal with the article. There is also an obligation to communicate to the officer any information and produce before him any bill, invoice or document of a like nature which such person may possess relating to the article. It is in accordance with the provisions of section 150 (b) that the impugned notice has been issued. Now, the argument is that there is no power in the officer of the Corporation to ask the petitioner for the details which have been asked for in the form which has no basis, because that form is not prescribed under any rule. Now, the argument is that there is no power in the officer of the Corporation to ask the petitioner for the details which have been asked for in the form which has no basis, because that form is not prescribed under any rule. It is urged that while the goods are being brought within the limits of the City, the power under section 150 may be exercised at that time at the ocroi post, and if goods pass the octroi post without payment of octroi duty if it is payable, then it is open to the Corporation staff at a later stage while in transit to get hold of those goods and make the inquiry contemplated by section 150, but that no such inquiry can be made from the petitioner after he has already received the goods. It is urged that there is no time-limit and no octroi duty is paya1ille on exports and, therefore, the authorities have really no jurisdiction or power to ask for any information with regard to the goods exported by the petitioner. Now, having read section 150 carefully, it appears to us that the very narrow construction which the learned counsel for the petitioner is wanting to place on it will really not be permissible. It cannot be disputed that when octroi tax has been levied and goods on which octroi duty is pavable are brought within the limits of the City, they can be brought in various ways. They may be brought by road and in such a case they could be intercepted at the octroi post. They may be brought by rail and the goods could be subjected to levy of octroi at the octroi naka if one is established near the railway station. But apart from this, the goods could be brought within the City clandestinely. Evasion may take place by the person bringing them not stopping a' the octroi post. Goods may be brought in by postal parcels or in such a way that they may not be subjected to inspection or verification at the octroi post. But apart from this, the goods could be brought within the City clandestinely. Evasion may take place by the person bringing them not stopping a' the octroi post. Goods may be brought in by postal parcels or in such a way that they may not be subjected to inspection or verification at the octroi post. But the fact that they have not been inspected or were not possible to be inspected at the octroi post cannot affect the liability to pay the octroi duty if it was in law payable, i.e. if the goods were such as were specified in the rules regarding levy of octroi and they were brought for the purposes of consumption, sale or use in the City. While the power under section 150 of inspection and asking for information could no doubt be exercised when the goods are inspected at the octroi post, the obvious purpose of using the words "every person bringing 01' receiving within the limits of the City" was to indicate not the time when the power could be exercised but to indicate the person who was obliged to permit inspection and furnish information and the event which would give rise to the exercise of such power of inspection or asking for information. In the case of octroi, the taxing event is the import of the article within the limits of the Corporation and that is why the words used are "bringing or receiving within the limits of the City." When lands were brought within the City or when they were received was really not relevant. But if it is found that the goods were in fact brought or received by a person then under section 150 the person, who has either brought or received the article, incurs the liability under that section. The Octroi Rules are framed with a view to enforce the liability for payment of octroi and to avoid evasion of octroi duty and it is to subserve this object that rules 43 and 45 have been made. The Octroi Rules are framed with a view to enforce the liability for payment of octroi and to avoid evasion of octroi duty and it is to subserve this object that rules 43 and 45 have been made. Rule 43, therefore, enables the Superintendent or the Deputy Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Octroi or any officer authorised by the Municipal Commissioner to require every person importing goods to produce any document or to make a statement or furnish information regarding the goods imported by him and there is, therefore, an obligation on him to produce them, give statement or furnish such information as he has to the best of his knowledge and belief. Having regard to toe object and purpose of section 150 it appears clear to us that if the petitioner or a person bringing or receiving within the limits of the Corporation any goods which were liable to duty and that had to be ascertained, nothing prevented the authorities concerned from asking the necessary information from the petitioner the whole object being to ascertain whether the octroi duty has been paid or not. It is of course open to the petitioner to give such information as is true to his knowledge and belief, subject to the consequences which may follow if the information is found to be false or incorrect. 14. Now, it is true that rule 43 also refers to the information regarding exported goods. It is also true that no octroi duty is leviable in respect of the exported goods. But the provision requiring the person to give information regarding exported goods appears to us to have been made for the benefit of such person. If he is able to show that he has exported certain goods which meant that they were neither used nor consumed nor sold Within the Corporation limits, octroi duty would not be leviable in respect of those goods. The Corporation is entitled to levy octroi duty only according to law, that is, in respect of goods which are brought within the Corporation limits for consumption, use or sale. The Corporation is entitled to levy octroi duty only according to law, that is, in respect of goods which are brought within the Corporation limits for consumption, use or sale. Any recovery in respect of exported goods will, therefore, be ultra vires and illegal, and if it is bound under the law to recover the correct duty, then we fail to see why the Corporation cannot ask for information as to whether any goods were exported as this information is necessary for the Corporation to perform its legal function of levying the correct amount of octroi duty. In a given case, a trader or merchant may refuse to give such information but that will be to his prejudice. Thus, having regard to the object of the Rules, namely, that the correct amount of duty should be levied, it would be permissible for the authorities to collect information about the goods exported by the person concerned. 15. Rule 45 is also in furtherance of the object of ensuring and determining the liability for payment of octroi duty and it requires the person concerned to make a declaration. For the same reasons for which we have found that rule 43 can be invoked in the case like that of the petitioner, in our view, rule 45 can also be invoked by the Corporation. Thus, wherever the Corporation is in need of any information with regard to the question whether octroi duty has been paid or not by the person concerned in respect of the goods which are brought or received within the Corporation limits, having regard to the object of section 150, in our view, a notice like the one impugned in this petition can be validly issued by the Corporation. 16. That brings us to the contention that rule 47 is invalid because while a breach of rules 43 and 45 is made punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 500/- section 151 which, more or less, contains an identical provision prescribes that the fine which could be levied may extend only to Rs. 50/-. Now, in the instant case, in our view, no occasion has yet arisen to adjudicate on the validity of rule 47 in so far as it prescribes a penalty for breach of rules 43 and 15. 50/-. Now, in the instant case, in our view, no occasion has yet arisen to adjudicate on the validity of rule 47 in so far as it prescribes a penalty for breach of rules 43 and 15. No action has been taken by the Corporation under rule 47, nor has any order been passed levying a fine in accordance with rule 47. It is open to the petitioner to raise the question with regard to the validity of rule 47 in proper proceedings when the occasion so arises. 17. In the view which we have taken, we reject the petition with costs. Petition rejected.