JUDGMENT 1. THIS maritime action in personam was commenced on the Original Side of this Court. The plaintiff is the owner of Motor Launch "palash". The defendant is the owner of Steam Launch "elizabeth". A collision occurred between them on the river Hooghly. Hence, the plaintiff has claimed Rs. 14,278.09p. as damages charging the defendant with negligence for the said collision. The defendant has denied the said charge and has counter-charged the plaintiff with negligence. The following issues were settled by consent of the parties: - (i) Was the collission caused by the negligence of plaintiff or the defendant as alleged in the pleadings ? (ii) If it was due to the negligence of the defendant, what sum, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to as damages? (iii) Has this Court any jurisdiction to try this suit in its Ordinary original Civil Jurisdiction ? 2. THE counsel for the parties have invited me to decide the last issue as a preliminary issue of law for this action must fail if it is answered in the negative. In these circumstances, they have reserved their right to call further witnesses on other issues if this preliminary issue is decided in the affirmative. The defendant carries on business within the territorial jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court. The said collision occurred within its said limits. The question is whether this court has any jurisdiction to try this action under Clause 12 of the Letters patent in view of Clause 32 of the letters Patent. 3. BECAUSE of the judgment dated november 17, 1972 of our Court of appeal delivered by my learned brother mr. Justice B.C. Mitra sitting with me in Appeal No. 194 of 1964 in the case of Anil Kumar Samanta v. Sankar Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. and ors., it has been conceded by the learned counsel Mr. Surhit Kumar Roy Chowdhury, appearing for the plaintiff, that this suit could have been filed by the plaintiff under Clause 32 of the Letters Patent. He has, however, argued that this Court, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, has jurisdiction to try this suit for in the case of The Chartered Mercantile bank of India, London and China v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation co. He has, however, argued that this Court, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, has jurisdiction to try this suit for in the case of The Chartered Mercantile bank of India, London and China v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation co. Ltd., reported in 10 Q.B.D. 521, it has been observed by Brett, L. J., at page 537 of the report, that an action in personam for a tort committed on the high seas by a foreign ship can be maintained in the Courts of Common law. But, I am not impressed by this contention for in the cases of Kamalakar mahadev Bhagat v. Sc India Steam navigation Co. Ltd, reported in A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 186 and Bai Kashibai and anr. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. reported in A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 200, it has been held by Shah J., (as he then was)that Clause 32 of the Charter confers exclusive jurisdiction on the High court to try all maritime actions in tort committed on the high seas and that the High Court, under Clause 12 of the charter, and the City Civil Court under its relevant provision, have no jurisdiction to try such suits. 4. IN support of his above contention, Mr. Roy Chowdhury then drew my attention to a passage from The british Shipping Laws, Volume 4 where it has been stated that the County courts of England have jurisdiction to decide similar actions in personam but the said passage deals exclusively with a recent legislation in England and therefore, it has no application in this country. I will now dispose of three decisions cited at the Bar before going into the main contentions of Mr. Roy chowdhury. In the case of Robasa khanum v. Khodadad Bomanji Irani, reported in A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 272, cited by him, it has been held that the High court has jurisdiction to try a matrimonial suit under clause 12 of the letters Patent because it was not triable under clause 35 of the Charter. In the cases of Bold v. Bucclugh, reported in 7 Moo P.C. 267, and "the Tolten", reported in 1946 p. 135 it has been held that the Court of Admiralty exercises exclusive jurisdiction in actions in rem and these two decisions were cited by the learned Counsel Mr. In the cases of Bold v. Bucclugh, reported in 7 Moo P.C. 267, and "the Tolten", reported in 1946 p. 135 it has been held that the Court of Admiralty exercises exclusive jurisdiction in actions in rem and these two decisions were cited by the learned Counsel Mr. B.L. Jain, appearing for the defendant, in support of his contention that this suit cannot be tried under Clause 12 of the charter. But, these cases are not the authorities on the question involved before me, and hence, no principle can be deduced from them and to apply it here in view of the recent judgment of the Division Bench dated February 13, 1974, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 70 of 1973 in the case of Sri Sri Radha gobinda Jew and ors., v. Sm. Kewala devi Jaiswal and ors., delivered by me sitting with my learned brother Mr. Justice A.C. Gupta, (since reported A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 285) in which we have followed the observations of Lord Halsury in the case of Quinn v. Leathem, reported in 1901 App. Cases 495, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Sudhansu sekhar Misra and ors., reported in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 647. 5. THEN in aid of his above contention Mr. Roy Chowdhury referred to the entries 1 and 2 of The First schedule to the City Civil Court Act, 1953, being West Bengal Act XXI of 1953. Entry 2 has been deleted by a [recent amendment of the said Act. These entries are as follows :- Entry-1 : "suits and proceedings triable by the High Court as a court of Admiralty or Vice Admiralty, or as a Colonial court of Admiralty." entry 2 : "suits and proceedings relating to or arising out of shipping or navigation (including in particular carriage by sea, ships, cargo, freight, collisions, salvage, average, maritime lien, bottomary, respondentia, wages of seaman or master, and disbursements) not otherwise triable under entry 1." 6. UNDER sub-section 4 of Section 5 of the said Act, the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of the descriptions specified in the First Schedule. In these circumstances, it has been contended by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that, prior to the recent amendment, the High Court, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, had jurisdiction to try those suits and proceedings contemplated by entry 2. In these circumstances, it has been contended by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that, prior to the recent amendment, the High Court, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, had jurisdiction to try those suits and proceedings contemplated by entry 2. He also argued that by the deletion of entry 2 the legislature has now conferred jurisdiction on the City Civil Court to try all suits and proceedings contemplated by entry 2 and therefore it should be held that under Clause 12 of the Charter this Court had jurisdiction to try those maritime actions previously as they were not triable under clause 32. But all those suits and proceedings mentioned in entry 2 in the said schedule are directly covered by Clause 32 of the Letters Patent read with Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774 and, therefore, this entry was deleted by the recent amendment and moreover the jurisdiction in maritime actions cannot be conferred on the City Civil Court by the mere deletion of entry 2 without deleting the entry 1 for Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774 reads as follows : - Clause 26. "and it is our further will and pleasure, and we do hereby grant ordain, establish, and appoint, that the said Supreme court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal, shall be a Court of Admiralty, in and for the said provinces, countries, or districts, of bengal, Behar and Orissa, and all other territories and islands adjacent thereunto, and which now are, or ought to be, dependent thereupon; and we do hereby commit and grant to the said Supreme court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal, full power and authority to take cognizance of, hear, examine try and determine all causes, civil and maritime and ail pleas of contracts, debts exchanges, policies of assurance, accounts, charter-parties agreements, loading of ships, and all matters and contracts, which in any manner whatsoever relate to freight, or money due for ships hired and let out, transport-money, maritime usury or bottomary or to extortions, trespasses, injuries, complaints, demands, and matters civil and maritime, whatsoever, between merchants, owners, and proprietors of ships and vessels, employed or used within the jurisdiction aforesaid, or between others contracted, done, had, or commenced, in, upon or by the seal, or public rivers, or ports, creeks, harbours, and places over-flown, within the ebbing and flowing of the sea and high-water mark, within, about, and throughout the said three provinces, countries or districts, of Bengal, Bihar, and orissa, and all the said territories or islands adjacent thereunto and dependent thereupon, the cognizance whereof doth belong to the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, as the same is used and exercised in that part of Great Britain called england, together with all and singular their incidents, emergents and dependencies annexed and connexed causes whatsoever, and to proceed summarily therein with all possible despatch, according to the course of our Admiralty of that part of Great Britain called England, without the strict formalities of law, considering only the truth of the fact, and the equity of the case." 7. AND Clause 31 of the Letters patent of 1862, gave this Court all "such civil and maritime jurisdiction as was exercised by the Supreme Court as a Court of Admiralty or by any judge of that Court as Commissary to the Vice-Admiralty Court, and also such jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions as "was vested in any Commissioner or Commissioners under 39 and 40 Geo. III", and further clause 32 of the Letters Patent of 1865 reads as follows :- "and we do further ordain, that the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall have and exercise all such civil and maritime jurisdiction as may now be exercised by the said high Court as a Court of Admiralty, or of Vice-Admiralty, and also such jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India as may now be exercised by the said High Court." 8. THE Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction of this Court was abolished by the colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 and Section 2 of that Act invested full admiralty jurisdiction on this Court to be exercised by this Court as a Court of Admiralty. Therefore, I am not impressed by the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury and hold that the City civil Court has no jurisdiction to try any maritime action in view of retention of entry 1 in the said Schedule to the City Civil Court Act, 1953. The next main contention of mr. Roy Chowdhury is that this Court under Clauses 12 and 32 exercises concurrent jurisdiction in maritime actions, when such actions cover the same field. There is no direct authority on this question and, therefore I must look to clauses 12 and 32 to find out whether this contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury can be supported by any legal principle I have already quoted the relevant provisions of the Charters relating to the Admiralty jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, I will now briefly deal with Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 9. THIS Court, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, has jurisdiction to try "suits of every description" provided the pre-conditions laid down therein are satisfied. I will leave out suits for land and the suits filed with the leave off this Court for the present purpose. To put it in a nutshell, this Court has jurisdiction under Clause 12 of the letters Patent, to try every suit if either the whole cause of action has arisen within its territorial limits or the defendant resides or carries on business or works for gain at the time of institution of such suit within its territorial limits. 10. A tort is a civil wrong. An action in tort is cognisable by the courts of Common Law. 10. A tort is a civil wrong. An action in tort is cognisable by the courts of Common Law. A collusion due to negligence is a tort and the plaintiff has the choice of pleading and the forum. The plaintiff has satisfied those two alternative pre-conditions of clause 12. It is also true that the expression "suits of every description" used in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is wide enough to include within its scope and ambit all types of suits but the question does not rest here. The legislative intent in enacting Clauses 12 and 32 must be gathered from the words used therein. Actions relating to maritime matters whether in rem or in personam come directly within the plan and the crystal clear words of Clause 32 of the Letters Patent read with Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, however, says that this Court in its ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction to try "suits of every description". Therefore, the expression "suits of every description" must necessarily include maritime actions is the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury. 11. THEN, why clause 32 of the letters Patent was at all enacted ? And why this Court shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction in such cases ? If the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury is well-founded then an action can be commenced by one party against the other in personam or in rem on the original Side of this Court in view of the expression "suits of every description", if any of the pre-conditions stated earlier is fulfilled in a particular case. Similarly, the defendant in such a suit can commence an action in personam or in rem against the plaintiff in the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court under Clause 32 of the Letters Patent. It is true that in an action in personam the plaintiff abandons his maritime lien against the ship and he can recover the full damages personally from the defendant whereas in an action in rem he retains his maritime lien and cannot recover the damages more than the value of the ship, but this substantive law has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction involved before me. 12. 12. IF two cross-suits are filed on the same day, one under Clause 12 and the other under Clause 32 of the Charter, none of them can be stayed for section 10 of the Code will not apply in such a situation nor they can be tried together in view of the special Rules relating to the actions in rem framed by this Court. Therefore, to accept the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury is to create a conflict in the matter of exercising jurisdiction of this Court in maritime actions. Further, if full effect is given to the expression "suits of every description" used in Clause 12 it will render Clause 32 wholly nugatory for these reasons in a case where the defendant resides or carries on business or works fee gain within the territorial limits of the Original Side of this Court and the collusion takes place on the high seas or on the public river actions both in personam and rem will lie on the Original Side of the Court in view of the expression "suits of every description" used in Clause 12 of the Charter. Therefore, clause 32 will completely eclipse from the Charter. Further, to construe these Clauses in the manner suggested by him will also lead to such an incongruous position that there will be a possibility of constant conflict in the matter of exercising jurisdiction of this Court under these two Clauses as already pointed out. 13. HENCE, it is my duty not to create these incongruities but to resolve the conflict by applying the Rule of harmonious construction of statutes. Hence, by applying this Rule, I hold that this Court does not exercise concurrent jurisdiction under Clauses 12 and 32 of the Charter as contended by mr. Roy Chowdhury. 14. IN my opinion, all maritime actions in torts whether in rem or in personam must be commenced in this court under Clause 32 of the Letters patent which confers exclusive Admiralty jurisdiction on this Court and no other Court in this State has any jurisdiction to try any such maritime actions not even this Court in exercise of its ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. I have also reached the same conclusion for this additional reason clause 12 is a general provision relating to the Ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction of this Court with regard to every suit, whereas Clause 32 is a specific provision relating to the Admiralty jurisdiction of this Court in relation to all types of maritime actions both in personam and in rem. Therefore, Clause 12 must be read subject to clause 32 and it must give way to clause 32 in all maritime actions for "in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision" is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of j. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 1961 3.C. 1170 at p. 1175 of the report. In this case it has also been said at p. 1174 of the report that the general provision must "yield to special provision" and this Rule should be invoked "to resolve a conflict between the general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument." And the Supreme court also applied the well-established rule of harmonious construction of statutes to resolve the conflicting provisions in the same statute which was before it. 15. IN the premises, I am not impressed by the contentions of Mr. Roy chowdhury and hence, my answer to this issue is in the negative. This action, therefore, fails for want of jurisdiction and the suit is dismissed. The parties shall pay and bear their own costs.