Judgment :- 1. The Land Tribunal, Pampakuda by the order impugned in this petition held that the application for shifting of a kudikidappa moved by the petitioner under S.77 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1963, Act 1 of 1964, had to be dismissed since the landlord had not established the requirement of the site of the kudikidappa for the construction of building for his residence. The landlord is admittedly in possession of 7 acres of land including the property of 2 acres and 39 cents in a corner of which the kudikidappa is situate. According to the kudikidappukaran the area in the possession of the landlord is more extensive, but on that there is no evidence. The Tribunal found that even on the facts admitted it must be found that there is necessary space available in the property wherein the landlord wants to construct the building even without disturbing the residence of the kudikidappukaran. The Tribunal therefore took the view that the need for displacing the kudikidappukaran from the site which he is occupying had not been established and the claim in that behalf by the petitioner has not been shown to be bonafide. This is a finding on facts reached on very relevant considerations and so it is not for this Court to interfere. Normally the matter should have come to rest at that. But the learned counsel Sri. P. N. Sankaranarayana Pillai, appearing for the landlord, the petitioner herein, took up the stand that it is not for the kudikidappukaran to remind the landlord that he had other land in which he could conveniently construct a building and that it was not open to the kudikidappukaran to dictate to the landlord as to where the latter should construct the building. In other words the stand taken by the learned counsel is that any landlord could, notwithstanding the fact that he might have other land in his possession equally or more suitable for putting up a building claim that he wants the site of the kudikidappu for the building. The choice in that behalf, counsel contends, must be left to the sweet will and pleasure of the landlord. 2. S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act deals with the rights and liabilities of Kudikidappukars. The choice in that behalf, counsel contends, must be left to the sweet will and pleasure of the landlord. 2. S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act deals with the rights and liabilities of Kudikidappukars. That reads: "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a home-stead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landlord) in the occupation as a kudikidappukaran may, if he bonafide requires the land (a) for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters; or (b) for purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority; or (c) for any industrial purpose, require the kudikidappukaran, to shift to anew site belonging to him subject to the following conditions, namely: (i) the landholder shall pay to the kudikidappukaran the price of the homestead, if any, erected by the kudikidappukaran; (ii) the new site shall be fit for erecting a homestead and shall be within a distance of one mile from the existing kudikidappu; (iii) the extent of new site shall be the extent of the existing kudikidappu subject to a minimum of three cents if within the limits of a city or a major municipality five cents if within the limits of any other municipality and ten cents if in any Panchayat area or township; (iv) the landlord shall transfer ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran and shall pay to him the reasonable cost of shifting the kudikidappu to the new site. Where the above conditions are complied with, the kudikidappukaran shall be bound to shift to the new site. It Evidently what is urged is that it is sufficient if the person in possession of the land in which there is a homestead or a but in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran shows that he bonafide requires the land for building purpose or other purposes mentioned in the section. It Evidently what is urged is that it is sufficient if the person in possession of the land in which there is a homestead or a but in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran shows that he bonafide requires the land for building purpose or other purposes mentioned in the section. This should, according to counsel, be understood as meaning that once the requirement of a site for the purposes mentioned in the sub-section is established choice of the site must be with the person mentioned in the section, namely, the landlord, and he can reasonably or unreasonably seek the the very site in which the kudikidappu is situate irrespective of availability with him even of more suitable sites, or, to put it in another way, what is required to be established is merely the necessity of a plot of land for the construction or for the other purposes mentioned in the sub-section and once this is established there is nothing more remaining to be shown since automatically the kudikidappu will have to be shifted if it is so desired by the landlord. I am afraid, to read this section in this manner would render the right conferred on a kudikidappukaran under S.80A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act to purchase the kudikidappu illusory. The right conferred by the Section is a very substantial and valuable one. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force the kudikidappukaran is enabled, subject to the further provisions of that section, to have the right to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him and the lands adjoining thereto. I may also refer in this context to S.75 which confers fixity on a kudikidappukaran. That provides that he is not liable to be evicted except on certain specified grounds. By way of exception to this rule provision for the shifting of a kudikidappu has been made in sub-section 2 of the very same section and that would be on the showing of certain conditions. In other words while the normal rule is that the kudikidappukaran cannot be evicted, in certain cases the landlord may be entitled to seek the shifting of the site of the kudikidappu, on certain requirements being satisfied, to other suitable land. In other words while the normal rule is that the kudikidappukaran cannot be evicted, in certain cases the landlord may be entitled to seek the shifting of the site of the kudikidappu, on certain requirements being satisfied, to other suitable land. To read S.75(2) of the Act as one enabling a landlord to seek the shifting of the site of a kudikidappu merely on showing that the landlord requires some land for the purposes mentioned in the sub-section would be to make serious inroad into the right of the kudikidappukaran to fixity, for, the question of shifting would then depend not upon the necessity of the particular site in which the kudikidappu is situate, nor upon the availability of other suitable sites in the possession of the landlord, but merely upon the will of the landlord to displace the kudikidappukaran. To construe the section in that manner would be to jeopardise the right of the kudikidappukaran to fixity contemplated by the Act. Not that this result should persuade the court to construe the provision in a manner different from what it plainly speaks to. But I am referring to this only as a prelude to reading and understanding S.75(2) as it should be. 3. It is not difficult to notice the emphasis in sub-s. (2) to the requirement of "the land". That section indicates that the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran may, if he bonafide requires the land for certain purposes apply for shifting. The reference to the possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but is followed by the reference to requirement of the land. In other words, the requirement must be of the land on which there is a homestead or hut. It can admit of no serious doubt that the landlord should establish not only that he bonafide requires some land for one or other of the purposes mentioned in the section, but that he bonafide requires "the land" for that purpose. In the context of the earlier reference to the land as that in which there is a homestead or hut, the words "the land" occurring again in the sub-section can mean and can only mean the site of the homestead or hut. In the context of the earlier reference to the land as that in which there is a homestead or hut, the words "the land" occurring again in the sub-section can mean and can only mean the site of the homestead or hut. May be, the site on which the kudikidappu is situate is required by the landlord for the purpose of construction particularly because of its location. Or its situation may have relevance to his profession. It is possible to conceive of many such similar situations. The section enables the landlord in such cases to seek shifting. In other words, it is open to the landlord to show that, notwithstanding the fact that he possesses other lands on which he could have constructed buildings for the purposes mentioned, the land on which the kudikidappu is situate is the most suitable site. In such cases, notwithstanding the possession of other land he will be able to establish that he requires "the land". Once it is shown that his requirement will be satisfied only by the land on which the kudikidappu is situate or that it is that land which will meet his requirement most satisfactorily it will not be an answer to say that the landlord should nevertheless choose some other land in his possession. This I understand to be the position and this, according to me, would be consistent with the scheme of the provisions relating to fixity granted to the kudikidappukaran under the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964. 4. My attention has been drawn by learned counsel Sri. Sankaranarayana Pillai to a decision of Eradi J. reported in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry and Ors. (1973 KLT. 923). One of the questions with which the learned judge was concerned in that case was the distinctive feature of the term "requires" as opposed to the term "needs", a question with which I need not be concerned there. The Tribunal whose order was under challenge in that case had, in considering the requirement of the landlord, referred to various circumstances such as the fact that the kudikidappu was existing in the property for many years without any request for shifting by the landlord and the court found these circumstances to be irrelevant to the decision on the question whether the landlord's requirement was bonafide. In considering the approach of the Land Tribunal whose order was challenged before the learned judge, reference was made to the scope of S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the learned judge said: "The section does not require that the applicant should make out a dire necessity or need for recovering possession of the site of the kudikidappu. In other words, it is not incumbent on the applicant, who moves the Land Tribunal under S.77 of the Act, to establish, in a case falling under Clauses (a) to (c) of S.75 (2) of the Act, that the member of the family for whose building purpose the application has been filed is in a sorry state without any place wherein he can reside at the time of instituting the application. Of course, it would undoubtedly be open to the Tribunal in testing the bona fides of the plea of requirement put forward by the owner to investigate and determine whether having regard to the ordinary course of events there is a reasonable probability of such an intention being entertained by the applicant, the object of such investigation being only, as already pointed out, to test the bona fides of the plea of requirement put forward by the applicant and riot for finding out whether the requirement, even if it exists, Can be met otherwise than by shifting the kudikidappukaran. If the requirement does, in fact, exist the owner of the land has the freedom to decide whether he would put up the building in the site where the kudikidappu stands or whether he would rather not disturb the kudikidappukaran." It is the last sentence in the above passage that is strongly relied on by Sri. Sankaranarayana Pillai, for, according to him, this observation unequivocally indicates the view that when once the requirement is shown to exist the landlord has freedom to decide whether he would put up the building in the site where the kudikidappu stands or he would rather not disturb the kudikidappukaran. This observation, according to the learned counsel, clearly indicates that the choice is in the landlord and in him only. 5. I do not think it is necessary for me to explain this passage because my learned brother Eradi J. himself has noticed a similar argument pressed before him on a later occasion relying on the decision. This observation, according to the learned counsel, clearly indicates that the choice is in the landlord and in him only. 5. I do not think it is necessary for me to explain this passage because my learned brother Eradi J. himself has noticed a similar argument pressed before him on a later occasion relying on the decision. I find that the learned judge has placed the matter beyond doubt in the judgment in that case. In 1974 KLT. 741 the learned judge said: "Although the order passed by the Tribunal is not very happily worded and contains several grammatical and other mistakes, it is clear on a perusal thereof that what it intended to express was that it is not at all likely that a person situated like the petitioner the petitioner is a merchant carrying on business in Copra and he is apparently in affluent circumstances would entertain a genuine intention to construct a residential house in the A schedule land which is only a narrow strip of 'chira', particularly when he has in his possession the B schedule land which is eminently suitable for use as a building site and lies adjoining a main road. The learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner sought to rely on certain observations contained in a judgment of mine reported in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry (1973 KLT. 923) as lending support to the petitioner's contention that it was not open to the Land Tribunal to say that the B schedule property is much more suitable for construction of a residential building for the petitioner and so reject the prayer for shifting on such a ground. What has been laid down by me in that decision is only that in cases where the owner of the land who has applied for relief under S.75 and 77 has satisfactorily established that he bonafide requires the land.on which the kudikidappu is situated for build ing purposes it is not open to the Tribunal to reject the prayer for shifting on the ground that the applicant is in possession of some other property which is better suited for serving the said requirement. Care was taken by me to make it clear in the said judgment that it will be perfectly open to. Care was taken by me to make it clear in the said judgment that it will be perfectly open to. the Land Tribunal to take into account the existence of such other suitable sites while considering the question whether the plea of bona fide requirement put forward by the owner can be accepted as true. If the owner satisfies the Tribunal that he genuinely intends to construct a residential building on the land where the kudikidappu is situated in such a case the Tribunal cannot thereafter disallow the prayer for shifting on the ground that in its opinion, it will be more advantageous for the land owner to construct the building on some other land belonging to himself which it may regard as most suitable for the said purpose. The prayer for shifting is liable to be granted only after the tribunal is satisfied that the land holder requires the land, viz., the site of the homestead occupied by the kudikidappukaran, for the purpose of erecting a residential house for himself. In adjudicating upon the plea put forward by the landlord that he bona fide requires the said land for the said purpose the Land Tribunal can certainly rake into account the nature of the property where the kudikidappu is situated, the existence of other alternative sites belonging to the landlord and consider whether, in the ordinary course of circumstances, a reasonable person situated in the position of the land owner in the case before it would ordinarily entertain a genuine intention to construct a residential house on the site of the kudikidappu. Nothing contained in my decision afore-cited precludes the Land Tribunal from conducting such investigation; as already indicated, in the present case, what the Land Tribunal has stated in its order is that judged by the ordinary and reasonable probabilities it is not at all likely that the petitioner would have a genuine or bonafide intention to put up a residential house in the A schedule property having regard to the nature and lie of the said land and also the availability of a much better site in his possession, viz., the B schedule property. It was perfectly competent for the Tribunal to arrive at such a finding and it being a question of pure fact there is no scope at all for any interference therewith by this court either under Art.226 or Art.227 of the Constitution." Evidently therefore the view taken by the learned judge is not in any way in conflict with the view expressed by me here and the passage in the reported decision of my learned brother to which my notice has been drawn cannot serve to promote the case urged by the petitioner's counsel before me. 6. I may also in this context refer to an unreported decision of my learned brother Isaac J. in O. P. 1665 of 1973. In Para.2 of the judgment the learned judge observed: "There is no case that the first respondent has not got a son as alleged by him, and there is no need to construct a building to set up a separate residence for the son. The only contention was that the first respondent had other lands in which he may more advantageously construct a house for his son's residence. The land owner must have his own choke of the land where he may put up a residence for his purpose. It cannot be dictated by the kudikidappukaran. The learned counsel drew my attention to this decision contending that the view taken by Issac J. is the same as that of Eradi J. in Janaki v. Land Tribunal Tellicherry (1973 KLT. 923). But the observation of Isaac J. as I understand it, is capable of the same explanation as is given to the similar observations of Eradi J. by the learned judge himself. In other words, when once the requirement of shifting of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is proved, it is not for the kudikidappukaran to dictate to the landlord and tell him that nevertheless he should choose some other land which he is possessed of. I cannot read the judgment of my learned brother Isaac J. as laying down the principle that even without showing the requirement of the site in which the kudikidappu is situate the landlord is entitled to seek shifting of the kudikidappu. 7. The result of the above discussion is that the application should fail. The Land Tribunal was right in holding so. 7. The result of the above discussion is that the application should fail. The Land Tribunal was right in holding so. It held that the bonafide requirement of the land by the landlord was not shown. An extensive area was available to the petitioner landlord and if he should succeed it is up to him to show that the particular site which is occupied by the kudikidappukaran was required for the construction. The case of the landlord was that he required 50 cents for the construction of a building. Assuming that so much area was necessary it would be possible to take it out of the very same property without disturbing the kudikidappu. The petitioner would say that it would not be possible to construct building other than on the site where the kudikidappu is situate, without cutting trees. Apart from the fact that it does not appear to be a relevant consideration, it is not for this court to go into these matters in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. There is no merit in the petition. It is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.