JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner Shankarlal has been removed from the office of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Kua, Tehsil Rajpur, District West-Nimar, by a motion of No-confidence passed against htm in a meeting held on 4-6-1973 for that purpose in accordance with section 24 of the Madhya pradesh Panchayat Act, 1962. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges his removal and consequently prays for quashing the resolution dated 4-6-1973 to this effect (Annexture d to the petition ). ( 2. ) THE strength of Panehas of the Gram Panchayat, Kua, was sixteen. However, prior to the notice of motion being moved and passed against the petitioner, one of the Panehas died so that the total number of Panehas constituting the Gram Panchayat for the time being was reduced to fifteen only when the resolution was passed on 4-6-1973. It is also not in dispute that the notice of motion was given in the prescribed form in accordance with Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Gram Panchayats (No-confidence Motion Against sarpanch and Up-Sarpanch) Rules, 1964, to the Secretary which was received by the Secretary on 27-4-1973. The content of this notice of motion is also not in dispute so that the genuineness of this notice of motion, on the basis of which the meeting was called and held on 4-6-1973, is also not in question. It is, however, a common ground before us, being alleged in the petition and admitted in the return filed by respondents Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5, respondent no. 2 having chosen not to file any return, that the Secretary, on receiving the notice of motion under sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh gram Panchayats (No-confidence Motion Against Sarpanch and Up-Sarpanch)Rules, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), did not sign thereon a certificate stating the date on which and the hour at which the notice had been given to him. Thus non-compliance to this extent of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the rules is not in dispute. The effect of such non-compliance is the main controversy before us. ( 3. Thus non-compliance to this extent of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the rules is not in dispute. The effect of such non-compliance is the main controversy before us. ( 3. ) SHRI S. L. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner, argues that the resolution passed against the petitioner is invalid for the following reasons:- (1) The strength of the Gram Panchayat being sixteen, the requisite majority for passing the resolution validly, was a strength of nine instead of eight by which it was passed (2) The voting should have been by secret ballot instead of by show of hands; (3) The principles of natural justice were violated since the petitioner was not given a copy of the notice of motion before the meeting was held so that the petitioner did not know the reasons for the motion before the meeting itself; and (4) Rule 3, sub-rule (2) of the Rules being mandatary, its mere noncompliance in the above manner rendered the resolution invalid. ( 4. ) THE first argument of Shri Garg has no merit and he has very fairly pointed out to us that the point is concluded against him by a decision of this court in Govindkumar v. Gram Panchayat, Pipalgone and other, Misc. Petition No. 120 of 1971 decided on 30-7-1974. No further argument on this point being advanced by Shri Garg, it is not necessary for us to deal with the same at any length. We would, however, add only this much that the expression "by a resolution passed by a majority of more than one-half of the total number of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat for the time being. . . . . . " occurring in sub-section (1) of section 24 of the madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 leaves no doubt that the actual number of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat when the resolution is passed provides the basis for determining majority. In the present case admittedly the actual strength of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat on 4-6-1973 when the resolution was passed was only fifteen. This being so, the resolution passed by eight of them was necessarily passed by a majority of more than one-half of the total number of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat at that time. This argument is, therefore, rejected. ( 5. This being so, the resolution passed by eight of them was necessarily passed by a majority of more than one-half of the total number of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat at that time. This argument is, therefore, rejected. ( 5. ) THE next reason given by Shri Garg is also without merit and Shri garg once again pointed out very fairly that the point is concluded against him by two decisions of this Court in Sojharmal Sawandas v. Municipal Council, kharsia and others, 1964 MPLJ 293. and Ramdas Surjansingh v. State of M. P. and others, 1974 MPLJ 300 . The requirement contained in Rule 7 of the Rules of entering the names of Panchas voting for and against such motion and of those remaining neutral being in the minutes of the proceedings, is sufficient to negative this argument. This contention also, therefore, fails. ( 6. ) WE also do not find any substance in the third reason for invalidity of the resolution suggested by Shri Garg. The provisions do not require a copy of the notice of motion to be given to the person against whom it is made. Rule 4 expressly requires a copy of the notice of motion to be sent to the chief Executive Officer of the Janapada Panchayat concerned but makes no such provision for supply of a copy to the person against whom it is made. The only requirement in the rules in this connection is of a notice of such meeting specifying the time and place thereof to be despatched by the Secretary to every Panch seven clear days before the meeting. There is no dispute that the requisite notice was given to every Panch, including the petitioner, in the present case. In addition, sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, gives such a person a right to speak at the meeting and to participate in the same. No other opportunity of any kind is contemplated by the relevant provisions. Thus, these provisions do ensure that the accusation is made known to the person and he has an opportunity to meet the same in the meeting of which he has prior notice. The basic requirements of the principles of natural justice are fulfilled in this manner. The only requirements laid down for giving the requisite opportunity to the petitioner were undoubtedly complied with in the present case. The basic requirements of the principles of natural justice are fulfilled in this manner. The only requirements laid down for giving the requisite opportunity to the petitioner were undoubtedly complied with in the present case. Accordingly, in our opinion, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice in the present case. This argument also has no merit. ( 7. ) THE last argument of Shri Garg is that Rule 3 (2) of the Rules is mandatory so that its literal compliance was necessary for passing a valid resolution and the non-compliance by itself renders the resolution invalid. To support this argument, Shri Garg contends that the use of the word "shall" in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 and the requirement of stating also the "hour" in addition to the date, clearly shows that the provision is mandatory. On the other hand, Shri P. L. Mehta, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5, simply asserts that the provision is directory in character. Shri Mehta has, however, not suggested any reason or cited any authority to support his argument. Shri S L. Dubey, counsel for respondents Nos. 12 to 19, has placed before us the decision by a Division bench of this Court in Balwantsingh v. Collector, Shivpuri and another, 1971 MPLJ 381 =air 1971 M P 204. wherein a substantial compliance with this provision has been held to be sufficient. In balwantsinghs case (supra), the Secretary omitted to mention the hour even though he mentioned the date of receipt of the notice of motion by him and also did not acknowledge its receipt. Such a noncompliance of sub-rule (2)of Rule 3 was held not to vitiate the resolution by which the motion of no-confidence was passed and, in the facts of that case, mentioning of the date alone was held to be a substantial compliance with the provision. Balwant-singhs case, there fore, holds that a substantial compliance of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 is enough so that the provision was not held to be mandatory in nature. In the present case also, two out of the three requirements of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 were admittedly not fulfilled. We have, therefore, to consider the effect of such omission. ( 8. In the present case also, two out of the three requirements of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 were admittedly not fulfilled. We have, therefore, to consider the effect of such omission. ( 8. ) AS already stated, there is no dispute that the notice of motion was received by the Secretary on 27-4-1973 even though the date is also not specified as required by sub-rule (2) of Rule 3. ( 9. ) WE shall first state the principles on the basis of which this question has to be determined. In maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth edition, it is stated as follows: - "it is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. "no universal rule," said Lord Campbell L. C, "can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatary enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. " And Lord Penzance said: "i believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory. " (pp. 314-315.)Dealing with cases in which statutory requirements have been held to be directory, it has been stated in "maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, twelfth Edition" at page 318 as follows: - "the regulations for the conduct of elections under the Ballot Act, 1872 were held to be so far directory only that an election was not invalidated by the non-observance of them unless it was of a character contrary to the principle of an election by ballot and was so great that it might have affected the result of the election. " The ultimate position is neatly summarised in Justice G. P. Singhs "principles of Statutory Interpretation" thus :- "the study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. " (p. 187) "if object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent person without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory. " (p. 188 ). The guiding principle even in cases of non-performance of a public duty is pointed out in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, AIR 1979 PC 142. "when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done. " The Privy Council was called upon to decide the effect of failure to revise the jury list inspite of elaborate provisions for its revision. The consequent trial was challenged as corum non judice due to non-observance of those provisions. It was held that the provisions were directory and their non-performance by itself did not render the trial a nullity. ( 10. ) IT is, therefore, clear that the whole scope of the statute has to be seen and the importance of the provision disregarded together with its relation to the general object of the enactment ascertained and thereafter the conclusion has to be reached in that light. The object of the provision apparently is confined only to the maintenance of a proper record with full particulars in the office of the Gram Panchayat and that has no material relation to the validity of the resolution ultimately passed at the meeting. The object of the provision apparently is confined only to the maintenance of a proper record with full particulars in the office of the Gram Panchayat and that has no material relation to the validity of the resolution ultimately passed at the meeting. The consequence of non-observance of this provision is not stated in the enactment. To hold that its mere non-observance would render the meeting invalid would work serious general inconvenience and injustice to persons who have no control over the situation and at the same time would not promote the object of the legislature. Applying the above test, we have no doubt that sub-rule (2) of rule 3 of the Rules, must be construed as directory in nature in relation to the validity of a resolution passed at the meeting held on its basis. Consequently, the mere non-compliance of the same doss not render invalid the consequent resolution by which the motion of no-confidence was passed. The petitioner has not alleged any prejudice as a result of the non-compliance of this provision and relies only on an automatic invalidity from non-compliance of this provision treating the same to be mandatory. This being so, the argument is rejected on our conclusion that the provision is directory in nature. ( 11. ) CONSEQUENTLY, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 100 if certified. The respondents Nos. 12 to 19 shall get their costs from the petitioner, while the remaining respondents shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.