JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This appeal is by the Plaintiff from the reversing decision of the lower appellate Court and arises out of a suit for declaration that the suit house described in the Schedule 'A' of the plaint belongs to the Plaintiff in which the Defendants 3, 4 and 5 have no manner of right, title and interest and that Defendants 1 and 2 cannot attach and sell the same in execution of any decree obtained by them against Defendants 3, 4 and 5 and for eviction of Defendants 3 and 4 therefrom and for recovery of possession of the portion of the house in occupation of Defendants 3 and 4. 2. The Plaintiff's case is that the disputed property belonged to one Munilal and Defendants 3 to 5 were tenants under him in respect of the suit house. Plaintiff purchased the house from Munilal for a consideration of Rs. 5000/- by a registered sale deed dated 1-8-1956 (Ex. 4). Defendants 3 to 5 continued as tenants under the Plaintiff thereafter. Defendants 3 and 4 refused to pay rent when demanded by the Plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 2 obtained a money decree against Defendants 3 and 5 and levied execution of the same and put the disputed house under attachment. The Plaintiff filed a claim case under Order 21 Rule 58, CPC which is Misc. Case No. 52/60. Before disposal of this claim case the Plaintiff has filed the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. 3. Defendants 3 and 5 remained ex parte. Defendants 1, 2 and 4 filed a joint written statement. Defendants 3 and 5 are brothers and Defendant 5 is the brother-in-law (sister's husband of the Plaintiff). Defendants 3 to 5 were carrying on jointly tobacco business and wanted in that connection the disputed, house site (without the house) for constructing house therefore for their business. To effectuate that object Defendants 3 and 4 filed, an application before the Zamindar on 15-2-1949 to take lease of the disputed site. The Zamindar received a salami of Rs. 150/and agreed to lease the suit site. In the meantime, Defendants 1 and 2 had filed a suit against Defendants 3 and 5 in March 1949. To effectuate that object Defendants 3 and 4 filed, an application before the Zamindar on 15-2-1949 to take lease of the disputed site. The Zamindar received a salami of Rs. 150/and agreed to lease the suit site. In the meantime, Defendants 1 and 2 had filed a suit against Defendants 3 and 5 in March 1949. In order to avoid any future possibility of the disputed site being attached and sold in execution of the future money decree that may be passed against them, the lease, was obtained benami in the name of Munilal on 18-4-1949. Thereafter, Defendants 3 to 5 constructed the suit house and are in possession of the same in their own right. Munilal has, however, admitted the benami character of the lease deed in a letter dated 4-6-1952 written by him to Defendant 5 and accordingly, he is estopped from disputing the benami character of the lease deed in his name. Defendants are not tenants under the Plaintiff and the suit is barred by limitation. This is the defence story put forth in the written statement. 4. The principal question which arose for determination in the suit was whether Munilal. (p.w. 3) was a benamidar for Defendants 3 to 5. In order to determine the question whether the transaction of lease was, benami or not the trial Court considered and examined the following five judicially recognised tests with reference to the evidence adduced by the parties. The tests examined were: (a) source from which consideration was paid; (b) possession; (c) motive; (d) previous and subsequent conduct; & (e) custody of the document. In dealing with the question of benami he rightly placed the onus of establishing the lease transaction to be benami on the contesting Defendants and acted on the principle that where a plea of benami transaction is raised, the ostensible title cannot be displaced except on cogent and clear proof of the benami character of the impugned transaction. The first question the trial Court examined was the genuineness of the application for lease purported to have been made before the Zamindar by the Defendant 5 (Ex. A). He found on consideration of the testimony of d.w. 1 that the defence case as to the amount of najarana; paid is discrepant, and that the defence case of perpetual lease made out in the written statement is not borne out by evidence. A). He found on consideration of the testimony of d.w. 1 that the defence case as to the amount of najarana; paid is discrepant, and that the defence case of perpetual lease made out in the written statement is not borne out by evidence. He also found that the defence case that Ex. A was signed by Defendants 3 and 4 are not true on the basis of defence evidence itself. That apart, he round various other features of suspicious character dealt in detail in the judgment, on the basis of which he concluded that Defendants 3 to 5 never applied for lease in respect of the suit site or that the Zamindar agreed to grant any such lease to them. Coupled with these features the trial Court drew adverse inference from non-production of any receipts regarding payment of najarana and from omission to call for the registers,which could have shown payment of such najarana or grant of receipts for the same and which are admittedly maintained for such purposes. On the contrary, he took into consideration the admission of d.w. 1 that there was no mention in the relevant books maintained in the Zamindar's office that Defendant 5 presented the application to the Zamindar for lease. This witness for the Defendants has further admitted that the Zamindar did not pass any order any where on the request of Defendant 5 to issue a patta in the name of Munilal. He also discredited the defence case of obtaining lease through Defendant 5 on account of the Kabuliat (Ex. C) granting lease for 30 years only running counter to the defence case of a perpetual lease in the written statement. He discarded Ex. G series from consideration on the ground that they were not admissible u/s 21 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, he discarded Ex. H on the ground that it has not been proved. He disbelieved d.w. 5 who purported to prove Ex. H because he ultimately admitted that he was not acquainted with the hand-writing of the writer of Ex. H, namely, Defendant 5 nor had he ever seen him writing. In fact, he took a specimen writing from Defendant 5 and on comparison with Ex. H he came to the conclusion that the writer of Ex. H and of the specimen writing is not the same person. H, namely, Defendant 5 nor had he ever seen him writing. In fact, he took a specimen writing from Defendant 5 and on comparison with Ex. H he came to the conclusion that the writer of Ex. H and of the specimen writing is not the same person. In this state of evidence (sic) on behalf of the Defendants and relying upon the Plaintiff's evidence be held that it is the Plaintiff who obtained the lease. Similarly, after carefully considering the evidence he held that the title deed was in the custody of Munilal all along and none of the Defendants 3 to 5 had been in custody of the same. He had given very good reasons to discard the defence story as to the circumstances under which the custody of the title deed passed from Defendant 5 to Munilal. Similarly, coming to the question of possession he held that it is Munilal who constructed the suit house and was in possession of the leasehold size immediately after the lease was obtained. In rendering this finding he has relied upon Ex. 1, rent receipt, Ex. O series the mutation notices, and Ex. 2 series and Ex. 3 series showing payment of rent to the Plaintiff by Defendant 5. The defence story that they constructed a house has been disbelieved for very good reasons, like, non-examination of carpenters admittedly to be alive and non-filing of accounts also admitted to have been maintained. He has also come to the conclusion that the Defendants have failed to prove the motive for the benami transaction. He was taken into account the subsequent conduct of the Defendants who never tried to obtain any re-conveyance of the suit site from Munilal or take proper safeguards to ensure their title, before they commenced construction of the house on the acquired site. On the other hand, he found that Munilal has mutated his name obtained rent receipt from Defendant 5 and has acted as true owner of the suit site and the house. After elaborate consideration of all the five tests and careful analysis of the evidence led by both sides he ultimately rendered the finding that the ostensible title of Munilal must prevail. 5. After elaborate consideration of all the five tests and careful analysis of the evidence led by both sides he ultimately rendered the finding that the ostensible title of Munilal must prevail. 5. On going through the lower appellate Court's judgment it appears to me that he placed the onus on the Plaintiff, in the matter of establishing his title though the title deed ostensibly stood in his name and has dismissed the suit on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed to establish his title. Dealing with the question of benami the appellate Judge hag no where considered the five tests categorically and elaborately and has not met the reasons of the trial Judge in overruling his findings. He also does not appear to have considered the rent receipt granted by the landlord to Munilal (Ex. 1), mutation notices Ex. 5 series and money order receipts and acknowledgments (Ex. 2 series and Ex 3 series) all of which have vital bearing on the question of possession. Though he has referred to Ex. A, curiously enough he has refrained from addressing himself to the numerous aspects from which the genuineness of that document was considered by the trial Court and the very clear and cogent reasons given to disbelieve the defence case that Ex. A, application for lease was filed by Defendant 5 for himself,and on behalf of Defendants 3 and 4 or 'that any najarana was paid by the Applicants for lease. In regard to all other tests of the trial Court, the lower appellate Court has not dealt with the reasons given by the trial Judge in reaching his conclusion. This criticism also applies to the findings rendered by the trial Court as to 'construction of the house by the Plaintiff. 6. The Supreme Court has laid down the duty of the appellate' Court In the matter of appreciation of evidence in the case of T.D. Gopalan Vs. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras. It has been said there: The uniform practice in the matter of appreciation of evidence has been that if the trial Court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness, the appellate Court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion about accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial Court. The appellate Court has acted in direct breach of this dictum. I am, not, therefore, inclined to maintain the decision of the lower appellate Court. Since the evidence adduced in this case by both the sides is fairly large, I do not propose to go through them myself, but would remit the case back to the lower appellate Court for rehearing the appeal. 7. In result, I set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and remit the case back to him for fresh disposal keeping in mind the observations made above and the dictum of the Supreme Court extracted above. Costs will abide the result.