JUDGMENT - N.B. NAIK, J.:---By this Revision Application the original complainant challenges the order of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, F.C., Poona Municipal Corporation Poona Court, discharging the accused-respondent under section 253(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The facts which are not in dispute are briefly these. 2. The accused is doing business in poona. On 8th March, 1973, 600 grams of sample of the groundnut oil was purchased by Mr. Swami, the Food Inspector of the Poona Municipal Corporation for analysis. After following the prescribed proceeding the sample was sent to the Public Analyst who, by his report Ex. 12 opined, that the sample was not of groundnut oil and that in fact it was of safflour oil and therefore misbranded under section 2(ix)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). After receipt of the said report the concerned papers and the report were placed before the Health Officer for sanction. The Health Officer endorsed below the report Ex. 12, about giving consent for the prosecution of the accused. Thereafter on 3rd May, 1973 the Food Inspector filed a complaint against the accused for an offence under section. 16(1)(a)(i) read with section. 7(ii) and section 2(ix)(c) for the offence of misbranding. A process being issued the accused appeared and made an application on 22nd November, 1973 requesting the Court to send the sample which was given to him, to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for his analysis and report. The learned special Judicial Magistrate granted that application and observed that the sample should be sent to ascertain as to whether the sample contained groundnut oil or any other oil. The Director of the Central Food Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the Director), after analysing the sample and giving out the date of the analysis found out, that sample was in fact of groundnut oil and that it was, however, adulterated. This certificate was received on 15th January, 1974. Inspite of the said certificate being received, the complainant Food Inspector who was examined before charge on 18-1-1974 did not at all refer to this certificate of the Director. The defence, however, in the course of the cross-examination before charge brought on record the certificate of the Director. To the other question put in cross-examination the Food Inspector conceded that safflour oil is superior to groundnut oil. The defence, however, in the course of the cross-examination before charge brought on record the certificate of the Director. To the other question put in cross-examination the Food Inspector conceded that safflour oil is superior to groundnut oil. Thereafter the Advocates were heard by the Court on the question of framing a charge. Having regard to the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act, it had to be conceded, that the prosecution had not established it case of the sample being misbranded, but it was, however urged on behalf of the prosecution, that view of the certificate of the Director, the Court should frame a charge against the accused for the offence of selling adulterated groundnut oil as distinguished from misbranded groundnut oil. This submission on behalf of the prosecution was repelled by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate. The first ground on which he repelled by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate. The first ground on which he repelled the submission was, that since the prosecution had come up with a specific case for an offence of misbranding it cannot be allowed to change its case to one of adulteration, as that would prejudice the defence of the accused. His next reasoning was that since the Director was asked only to express his opinion as to whether the sample though of groundnut oil, was adulterated. Therefore, observed the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, that he will have to ignore the uncalled for opinion of the Director about the sample of oil being adulterated. If that is so, observed the learned Special Judicial Magistrate to a charge for the offence of adulteration of food could not be framed. His next reasoning was that since the consent under section 20 of the Act, was for prosecution for the offence of misbranding, if he framed a charge for adulteration on the basis of the certificate of the Director, he refused to accept to the request of the prosecution was, that since the Food Inspector had conceded that safflour oil was superior to groundnut oil, it would be a gravesty of Justice to prosecute the accused for having sold a better variety than what was asked for. It is in that view of the matter that the learned Special Judicial Magistrate passed an order of discharge of the accused under section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. It is in that view of the matter that the learned Special Judicial Magistrate passed an order of discharge of the accused under section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The correctness of the said order of discharge is challenged by the Food Inspector original complainant. Mr. Aggarwal, the learned Advocate who has appeared on behalf of the complainant has assailed the order of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate on the ground, that having regard to the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act, the facts stated in the certificate of the Director being final and conclusive; and the provision of section 254 Cr. P.C. provide that a Magistrate shall frame a charge if he has ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, and the provisions of section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure make it obligatory on the Magistrate not to proceed untill sanction has been obtained by the prosecution for the new offence that has been disclosed by the certificate of the Director, the learned Special Judicial Magistrate was in error, in proceeding to pass an order of discharge. Mr. Aggarwal, therefore, submits that the proper course for the Magistrate would have been to stay the proceedings and ask the prosecution to secure the consent under section 20 of the Act for framing a charge against the accused for the offence of adulteration as is disclosed by the certificate of the Director. 4. Mr. Chitnis, the learned Advocate for the accused has supported the order of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate except with regard to the reasoning of the learned Magistrate that he could not take into consideration the opinion of the Director about the ground-nut oil being adulterated and that no action could be taken as the safflour oil is superior to ground-nut oil. 5. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, I see no reason to interfere with the order of discharge passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate. No can appreciate the conduct of the prosecution till the certificate of the Director was received on 15th January, 1974. Evidently the Food Inspector could only act on the report of the Public Analyst and the authorities under section 20 also could given consent for the complaint has to be filed for the offence as disclosed by the report of the Public Analyst. Evidently the Food Inspector could only act on the report of the Public Analyst and the authorities under section 20 also could given consent for the complaint has to be filed for the offence as disclosed by the report of the Public Analyst. But then, in the instant case, once the certificate of the Director was received long before the complainant was examined before charge, and that certificate disclosed that the report of Public Analyst that the article was misbranded, is not correct and that on the other hand it was to the effect that the article of food was adulterated, one should have expected, the prosecution to reconsider the step to be taken in the light of that certificate. Far from doing so, strangely enough, the prosecution set a Nelsons eye to that certificate, and whom the complainant went in the box and concluded his evidence in chief before charge he was content to state about the prosecution being for an offence of misbranding as disclosed by the report of the Public Analyst which was tendered, and about his having secured the requisite sanction under section 20 of the Act for the initiation of the prosecution for the said offence. One should have expected wiser Counsels to prevail. The prosecution as appears from the Evidence of the Food Inspector before charge, deliberately fought shy of telling the Court that in view of the certificate of the Director a fresh consent under section 20 of the Act for the initiation of the proceedings would be necessary. One would have further expected those in charge of the prosecution, not at all to put the complainant in the box at that stage, but to request the Court to stay the proceedings, to enable the prosecution to secure consent under section 20 of the Act for initiation of the prosecution for the offence as disclosed by the certificate. Strangely enough, nothing of that sort was done and the defence brought on record the certificate of the Director. Strangely enough, nothing of that sort was done and the defence brought on record the certificate of the Director. In the result having regard to the report of the Public Analyst, the consent under section 20 recorded under the report of the public Analyst, the allegations in the complaint and evidence in chief of the complainant the learned Special Judicial Magistrate had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that in view of the conclusive evidence furnished by the certificate, no case for framing a charge for misbranding was made out by the prosecution and that was precisely why he proceeded to discharge the accused. When the Court was being addressed before charge, a request appears to have been made on behalf of the prosecution to frame a charge for an offence as disclosed by the certificate of the Director. Even at that stage, it did not occur to any one in charge of the prosecution to tell the Court that in order that they may avail of that certificate, they will have to secure consent of the authority under section 20 of the Act and that to enable the prosecution to do so the Court should stay the proceedings and not to proceed to pass an order of discharge. What was argued on the other hand was, that a charge should in fact be framed for an offence as disclosed by the certificate. As against such background the learned Special Judicial Magistrate had evidently no alternative but to discharge the accused. 6. Mr. Aggarwal has drawn my attention to section 254 of the Criminal Procedure Code and argued that the learned Magistrate was in error in assuming that for the purpose of framing a charge he should restrict himself to the four corners of the complaint and the evidence of the complainant which has led before the charge and by doing so he ignored the provisions of section 254 of the Cr. P.C. which provide inter alia that : "If, when such evidence and examination have been taken and made, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence triable under this Chapter XXI, which such Magistrate is competent to try, which, in his opinion could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused." Relying on this provision Mr. Aggarwal argued that these provisions would show that it is not merely the complaint or the evidence which is led by the prosecution is to be looked into by the Magistrate for framing the charge, and that, the Magistrate shall have to take into consideration all the material places before him before considering the question of framing of the charge. Since argued, Mr. Aggarwal, in the instant case the certificate of the Director which is brought on record by the Accused shows that the accused had in fact committed an offence of selling adulterated oil and that material was before him it was the duty of the Magistrate who is competent to try the case and in the instant case there is no consent under section 20 for initiation of prosecution for an offence as disclosed by the certificate. Mr. Aggarwal having rightly conceded that point sought recourse to the provisions of section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 under the heading of the Charge which are to this effect :- " If the offence stated in the new or altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts founded." Mr. Aggarwal argued that on the same facts as these on which the new or altered charge was sought for the prosecution, the learned Magistrate ought not to have proceeded to discharge the accused, but he should have waited to enable the prosecution to obtain the consent of the authority under section 20 of the Act in respect of the offence as disclosed by the certificate. The difficulty in accepting the request of Mr. The difficulty in accepting the request of Mr. Aggarwal is that the section appears to come into play only when the offence stated in the new or altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary. The important words in the section are new charge, altered charged or added charge. New what is a new charge ? For that purpose we shall have to peruse the provisions of section 226, 227, and particularly 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 228 provided : "If the charge framed or alteration or addition made under section 226 or section 227 is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such charge or alteration or addition has been framed or made, proceed with the trial as if the new or altered charge had been the original charge. " The expression " new or altered charge" is used in just position to the original charged and it would show that there must be a charge and therefore, a new charge has to be framed. You cannot have a new charge unless there is an original charge. It is true that section 226 provides for a person being committed for trial without a charge, or with an imperfect or erroneous charge, either to the High Court or the Court of Sessions. In which case the Court of Sessions or the High Court may frame a charge or add to or otherwise alter the charge. It is only in such case it is possible to say that a new charge is framed. But so far as trials by Magistrate are concerned the expression " new charge" would only mean a charge in place of the original charge or in addition to the original charge. Therefore, if I am right in interpreting the provision of section 230, then it does not seem to come into play in the case of trial of warrant cases, till a charge had in fact been framed. It comes into play in the case of trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, a only after a charge has been already framed. Therefore, if I am right in interpreting the provision of section 230, then it does not seem to come into play in the case of trial of warrant cases, till a charge had in fact been framed. It comes into play in the case of trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, a only after a charge has been already framed. If subsequently it is discovered by reason of additional evidence coming on record that a new offence or additional offence has been committed and the Court finds that it could not take cognizance of the same without the previous sanction of the Competent Authority it is only in such cases that section 230 seems to come into play. Mr. Aggarwal, however, argued that the interpretation which I am trying to put or section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could lead to anomalous result. For instance, he argued that in the instant case if after a charge was framed or misbranding on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst, and a certificate of the Director was received subsequently showing that it was on offence of adulteration, on the interpretation which I am trying to put on section 230, it would have been permissible for the prosecution to press into service the said provision and that on the other hand, when as has happened in this case, a certificate has been received before charge, the prosecution could not avail of the provisions of section 230. I am not impressed with the submission of Mr. Aggarwal that my interpretation apart from being correct, grammatically leads to any such anomaly, when a charge has not been framed in cases which require prior sanction it is perfectly open to the prosecution, not to proceed with the case and to ask for a discharge on the ground of want sanction. If is certainly at liberty to initiate the prosecution afresh after taking the consent provided under section 20 of the Act or the sanction in cases which require sanction. When a charge has been framed, there would obviously be some difficulty. Once a charge is framed, there could not be a discharge and the only order which could be passed would be one of acquittal. When a charge has been framed, there would obviously be some difficulty. Once a charge is framed, there could not be a discharge and the only order which could be passed would be one of acquittal. That is precisely why the legislature seems to have enacted section 230 to meet the contingency of a case where, after a charge is framed, it is found that an offence is disclosed which requires previous sanction. Therefore, so far as the peculiar facts of our case are concerned, the Magistrate could not have framed a charge for a different offence as disclosed by the certificate of the Director. One cannot also ignore the conduct of the prosecution in this case. As already stated knowing full well that they could not got out of the certificate, they proceeded in persisting with their case of misbranding. The request of the type which had been made by Mr. Aggarwal for the first time before me, was not at all made to the learned Magistrate. What is more even when this Revision Application came to be filed, no such request was made in it. On the other hand the burden of the song in the Revision Application, is that the learned Special Judicial Magistrate ought not to have refused to frame a charge in respect of the offence of adulteration as disclosed by the certificate, and the concluding prayer is that the application be remanded back to the trial Magistrate and that this Court should direct the Magistrate to frame a charge. Surely this is not a fit case where this Court can interfere with the order passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate. 7. In the result, the Revision Application is rejected and the rule is discharged. -----