JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This Secund Appeal is by Defendant No. 2 from the confirming decision of the 1st Additional Sub-Judge, Cuttack in Title Appeal No. 86/68/10/69 decreeing the suit. 2. The Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that he is the occupancy tenant in respect of the suit land in Schedule A of the plaint comprising of plot 1202 (0.18), plot 1204 (0.20) of village Kundi, plot 311 (1.42) of village Mallikpur" plot 39 (0.75) of village Nandakishorepur and for permanent injunction against Defendants 1 and 2 restraining them from disturbing his possession over the same, and to confirm his possession thereof and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession. Admittedly, the suit land belongs to the deity Dadhibaban Jew of village Kundi, P.S. Mahanga which is a public excepted temple. The marfatdari right in respect of this institution vests in a body of persons including Defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 7. Defendants 1 and 2 have -/5/- interest and Defendants 4 to 7 have -/6/- interest in such marfatdari right. The Plaintiff's case is that Jogeswar Das, father of Defendants 4 to 7 inducted his father Hadibandhu Das as a tenant in respect of the suit land and other lands as the managing marfatdar of the deity. This induction is evidenced by the lease deed dated 5-4-1941 (Ext. 21). Hadibandhu and after him the Plaintiff have been cultivating the suit land on payment of produce rent. There arose some dissensions amongst the marfatdars, in consequence whereof, the Endowment Commissioner in his order dated 5-8-1946 declared the deity as a public deity and appointed Defendant No. 1 as the sole non-hereditary trustee, but as he was resisted by his co-sharer marfatdars in getting possession, the Endowment Commissioner directed him by order dated 8-10-1952 to obtain possession through Court. Instead of doing that, he filed a review petition before the Endowment Commissioner and in course of that proceedings he entered into a compromise on 28-10-1953 with the parties to that proceeding including Defendants 4 to 7. Under the compromise, the deity's properties were divided into Schedules A and B, and it was provided that Defendants 3 to 7 would remain in possession of Schedule A properties while Defendant No. 1 would take possession of Schedule B properties which include the present disputed property through Court. Under the compromise, the deity's properties were divided into Schedules A and B, and it was provided that Defendants 3 to 7 would remain in possession of Schedule A properties while Defendant No. 1 would take possession of Schedule B properties which include the present disputed property through Court. Subsequently, Defendant No. 1 was discharged from his trusteeship and a Board of Trustee was constituted of 8 members with one Chakradhar Mohapatra as the Managing Trustee. Sometime there-after, a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated regarding some properties of the deity including the suit land, in which the managing trustee of the Board, the present Plaintiff and some others were members of the first party and the second party members comprised of Defendant 1, one Panu Samal and some others. It terminated with declaration of possession in favour of the first party members. Then, Panu Samal a member of the second party started one O.T.R. Case claiming bhag chasi right in respect of 1.68 decimals (part of the present disputed land and of some other land) in which he impleaded the present Plaintiff as one of the opposite parties. This case was compromised on 29-2-1960. By this compromise, Plaintiff gave up 47 decimals out of plot 1610, but his right over plot No. 39 was confirmed and acknowledged, by the then Managing Trustee, Chakradhar Mohapatra. Thus, the Plaintiff's possession over the suit land in the capacity of a raiyat extended for more than 12 years and consequently he acquired occupancy right in the same. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 contested. They denied all the Plaintiff's allegations and pleaded that their ancestors were appointed as archak-cum-trustees with hereditary right of succession in respect of the public excepted temple in which Dadhibaban Jew was the presiding deity. The Endowment Commissioner, by his order dated 16-8-1961 passed in F.A. 28/58-59, has declared this institution as on excepted temple with these Defendants as hereditary trustee-cum-archaks. In pursuance of the order of the Endowment Commissioner dated 12-6-1962, the Defendants had acquired possession of the properties of the Deity. The permanent lease granted by Jogeswar to the Plaintiff on 5-4-1941 is void being in contravention of the provisions of the then Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939. 4. The trial Court found that the unregistered lease deed dated 5-4-1941 (Ext. The permanent lease granted by Jogeswar to the Plaintiff on 5-4-1941 is void being in contravention of the provisions of the then Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939. 4. The trial Court found that the unregistered lease deed dated 5-4-1941 (Ext. 21) executed by the father of Defendants 4 to 7 as share-holders in favour of Plaintiff's father Hadibandhu is a valid document and it is on immaterial consideration if in granting this lease, Jogeswar had or had not obtained prior sanction of the Endowment Commissioner. since Defendant. No. 1 who was a member of the second party in the 145 proceeding had not filed a suit challenging the final order in that proceeding declaring the first party members to be in possession, his right, if any, to the suit properties stood extinguished. The Plaintiff and before him, his father having been found to be in continuous possession since 1941, the Plaintiff must be held to have acquired right of occupancy tenant by virtue of Section 5 read with Section 23 of the O.T. Act. Defendants 1 and 2 have never been in possession of the disputed properties. On these findings, he decreed the Plaintiff's suit. 5. The lower appellate Court confirmed, the trial Court's finding that the lease deed in favour of Plaintiff's father was valid and the question as to whether such a lease was for legal necessity of the deity did not arise for consideration. Even if it be held that the unregistered lease deed is not admissible in evidence on account of its non-registration, nevertheless, since lease can be created by acceptance of rent and rent has been accepted from Plaintiffs' father, he must be treated to be a tenant. 6. The contentions of the Appellant are that in order to be entitled to the reliefs of declaration of occupancy right sought for, the Plaintiff must prove that he is a settled raiyat of the village and that he has held the disputed land as a raiyat. Jogeswar Das, one of the marfatdars of the deity was not competent to create a permanent lease in favour of the Plaintiffs' father without the consent of the co-sharers, and accordingly, Ext. 21, the permanent lease deed dated 5-4-1941 executed by Jogeswar Das in favour of the Plaintiff's father, Hadibandhu Das is invalid. Jogeswar Das, one of the marfatdars of the deity was not competent to create a permanent lease in favour of the Plaintiffs' father without the consent of the co-sharers, and accordingly, Ext. 21, the permanent lease deed dated 5-4-1941 executed by Jogeswar Das in favour of the Plaintiff's father, Hadibandhu Das is invalid. It is also invalid for the further reasons that creation of permanent lease was without legal necessity, and that the lease being for more than 5 years, and no prior sanction of the Commissioner of Endowments having been obtained, the transaction is void and inoperative. In result the father of the Plaintiff cannot be said to have got the suit land in the capacity of a raiyat, so as to acquire the right of occupancy by operation of law, namely-Section 24 of the Orissa Tenancy Act.It was also contended that though the Defendants have specifically denied the Plaintiff's claim to the status of settled raiyat in the village, nevertheless, the trial Court did not frame any issue, nor did he record any finding on that point. The lower appellate Court committed on error of record in holding that undisputedly the Plaintiff was a settled raiyat of the village. It is also contended that Ext. 21 purporting to create a permanent lease, was not registered and in absence of such registration, the document would be inadmissible In evidence u/s 17 of the Registration Act and evidence with regard to its other terms will also be precluded u/s 91 of the Evidence Act. Ext. 21 is thus excluded from consideration there is nothing else upon which the conclusion would be based that the Plaintiff's father acquired any interest of raiyat in the suit land. The Plaintiff having omitted to implead the deity in the suit, is not entitled to a declaration that he is occupancy raiyat in respect of the disputed lands of which the deity is the owner. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent, however,contended that the lease, Ext. 21 being void, possession of the lessee became adverse and such adverse possession having enured for more than 12 years', the lessee gets raiyati interest by prescription. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent, however,contended that the lease, Ext. 21 being void, possession of the lessee became adverse and such adverse possession having enured for more than 12 years', the lessee gets raiyati interest by prescription. To meet this, the learned Counsel for the Appellant resorts to Article 134B of the old Limitation Act and contends that under this Article, a manager of a Hindu Religious Endowments has got 12 years to recover properties of the institution transferred by a previous manager for valuable consideration from the date of the death, resignation or removal of the transferor, which means the transferor's possession does not become adverse to the religious institution, until the death, resignation or removal of the transferor, and as 12 years of adverse possession, since the death of Jogeswar Das, has not been proved or established, the Plaintiff cannot succeed on the basis of his adverse possession or to get a declaration of his occupancy raiyat. 7. I think it would be appropriate to dispose of the technical point raised at this stage, namely, that the suit must fail due to non-implead on of the deity. Though such on issue was raised, it was not pressed in the trial Court and the Defendant-Appellants are not entitled to reagitate this point here. It, however, appears that the entire body of marfatdars of the deity are on record, and they can as well be taken to represent the deity's interest, even though the deity is not a party eo nomine. This point, in my view, has no substance. 8. The Plaintiff was inducted as a tenant on the disputed land by one of the marfatdars, Jogeswar Das on the basis of a permanent lease. Accepting the defence contention that the permanent lease has been created without legal necessity and by one of the co-sharer, marfatdars without the consent of others, and in express breach of the mandatory provision of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act. 1939, prohibitinggranting of lease for more than 5 years without prior sanction of the Endowment Commissioner, the transaction of lease become void, and as such the possession of the Plaintiff becomes adverse from the date of the permanent lease deed, that is, with effect from 5-4-1941. Since the Plaintiff entered upon the land on the footing of a raiyat, he can merely prescribe for a raiyati interest by his adverse possession. Since the Plaintiff entered upon the land on the footing of a raiyat, he can merely prescribe for a raiyati interest by his adverse possession. Both the Courts below have found that the Plaintiff's father, Hadibandhu Das possessed the land under, the permanent lease deed, Ext. 21 and on his death, the Plaintiff as his heir also continued in possession till the date of the present suit, i.e. 27-7-1962. The Plaintiff is entitled to tack the period of adverse possession of his father to his own, because he is not on independent trespasser but has succeeded to the possession as heir of his father. Consequently, the aggregate period of 12 years adverse possession with effect from 5-4-1941 ending on 5-4-1953, the Plaintiff would acquire the status of a raiyat on the expiry of such 12 years. It is also found that both the Plaintiff and before him, his father, while in possession of the suit land, were paying report to the landlords. So, after 1953, on the expiry of 12 years from 5-4-1941, the Plaintiff becomes not only a raiyat but also a settled raiyat u/s 23 O.T. Act. There is ample authority for the proposition, as indicated above, that if the lease deed is void and the lessee gets possession in pursuance of that deed, his possession becomes adverse and the nature of his possession, without anything more, would be no more than a lessee's possession, or in other words, a tenant's possession as stipulated in the void lease deed. See cases of Maharaj Singh and Another Vs. Budhu Chamar and Others, and Alakhdeo Singh Vs. The Gaya District Board, and Ekadasi Sahu v. Hari Sankar Singh and Ors. 21 (1955) C.L.T. 78. In this connection, the next question to consider is whether the Plaintiff was in occupancy raiyat of the village. There is no doubt in the legal position that if he is found to be a settled raiyat of the village on the date when one acquires the tenancy right in the suit land, by adverse possession, he would immediately acquire occupancy status (see Section 24 of the Orissa Tenancy Act). Exts. 19 and 22 would show that the Plaintiff had got occupancy lands. The Plaintiff, under Ext. 22; held land as a raiyat with effect from 22-8-1935, under Ext. 19 also held occupancy lands with effect from 19-8-1947. Exts. 19 and 22 would show that the Plaintiff had got occupancy lands. The Plaintiff, under Ext. 22; held land as a raiyat with effect from 22-8-1935, under Ext. 19 also held occupancy lands with effect from 19-8-1947. By virtue of Section 23 of the Orissa Tenancy Act, the Plaintiff becomes or shall be deemed to have become a settled raiyat of that village on expiry of 12 years with effect from 22-8-1935, when he acquired occupancy lands under Ext. 22 and with effect from 19-8-1947 when he purchased occupancy lands under Ext. 19. Therefore, he was a settled raiyat when he acquired raiyati interest in the suit lands on the expiry of 12 years period from 5-4-1941. He, therefore, acquires immediately a right of occupancy in the suit land by virtue of Section 24 of the Orissa Tenancy Act. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to go into other aspects of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. It is further necessary to deal with one contention, namely the contention Cased on Article 134B of the Limitation Act. Article 134B does not apply to void transactions and, it has application only to voidable transactions. Where transfers are void ab initio, possession becomes adverse from the date of alienation and in such a case, Article 144 (old Limitation Act) would apply. The language of Article 134B makes this position clear. It contemplates a transfer by a manager for valuable consideration which is a voidable transaction. In that instant case, the grant of permanent lease being in violation of the statutory provisions u/s 58 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, is void ab initio. Accordingly, this Article of the Limitation Act has no application. 9. In result, for the aforesaid reasons, I am of opinion that the Plaintiff had acquired occupancy right in respect of the suit properties and the Courts below are justified in granting the reliefs sought for. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed