JUDGMENT VAIDYA J.- This appeal involves an interesting point under section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, in addition to a point under the Limitation Act, 1908. 2. It is a First Appeal, directed against the judgment and decree, dated December 24, 1964, passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur, in Special Civil Suit No. 22 of 1962, filed, on July 11, 1962, by the respondent No. 1 plaintiff, Manikchand Tuljaram Shah, against (1) Manjulabai Laxman Chavan; (2) Tukaram Babaji Chavan; (3) Hindurao Tukaran Chavan; (4) Sadashiv Kondiba Chavan and (5) Namdeo Babaji Chavan as defendants Nos. 1 to 5. 3. The plaintiff's case, in the plaint, may be briefly stated as under: 4. In respect of a house, bearing Old Municipal No. 1759, New Municipal No. 1316, City Survey No. 2158, and, old Municipal No. 1760, new Municipal No. 1316 and City Survey No.2l59, situate at North Kasba Peth, Sholapur City, a mortgage was executed by the husband of defendant No.1, Laxman Nagu and defendants Nos. 2 to 5 under a registered mortgage-deed, dated February 20, 1943, and registered on February 23, 1943, for a sum of Rs. 5,500. 5. Under the mortgage-deed interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum on the principal amount and, the principal were payable within a period of 3 years. The interest was payable from year to year·, in advance at the commencement of the year. In the event of pay default in the payment of interest the arrears of interest due in the particular year carried a further interest at the same rate. According to the plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the mortgage-deed, the defendant No. 3 was aged 1½ years old and was represented by the guardian father defendant No. 2. 6. A part of the mortgaged property was, acquired for to Construction of a road, and the remaining property, which was the subject-matter of the present suit, bore City Survey No. 2158/1-A, measuring 98 square yards. A detailed description of the suit house is given in the plaint. The plaintiff claimed to have received the amount mentioned by him in various instalments set out in para E F of the plaint and after deducting the same, according to the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover Rs. 11,000, applying the rule of Damdupat, from the defendants. 7. A detailed description of the suit house is given in the plaint. The plaintiff claimed to have received the amount mentioned by him in various instalments set out in para E F of the plaint and after deducting the same, according to the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover Rs. 11,000, applying the rule of Damdupat, from the defendants. 7. In the statement of account, which he has so made, the plaintiff claims to have received from defendant No.2, the following amounts: Rs.440 added to the mortgage debt on the date of the mortgage, Rs. 900 paid, on, November 30, 1945, Rs. 360 paid on December 1, 1947; Rs. 300 paid on February 11,1948 Rs. 400 paid on June 17, 1948; Rs. 1,000 paid on July 31, 1950, the total payments amount to Rs. 3,340, which is calculated perhaps excluding Rs. 440 included in the mortgage debt of Rs. 5,500. 8. In other words, it is clear from the above particulars that the consideration of the mortgage debt was in fact only Rs.5,100, out of which the plaintiff had received Rs. 2,900 by 1950; and the plaintiff filed the suit to recover Rs. 11,000 in respect of the balance of the principal amount of Rs.2,200 i. e. Rs. 5,100-2,900, accepted under the mortgage bond. 9. It was stated in the plaint that Laxmao, defendant No. 1's, husband and uncle of defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 and the grand-father of defendant No. 3, died in or about the year 1947, leaving behind Manjulabai-defendant, No. 1, as his widow and defendant Nos. 2, 4 and 5 as his other heirs and legal representatives; and the defendants Nos. 2 to 5 where also the co-sharers in the joint Hindu family. The plaintiff further stated that he learnt when he filed a suit, that the suit property had been allotted to the shares of the defendants No.2 and 3 after a partition in the family, which took place 2 or 3 year's before the suit; and hence he had made all the defendants parties to the suit. 10. It was further stated in para. 7 of the plaint that the defendant No. 2 obtained the said mortgage loan in his capacity as the Karta and manager of the joint Hindu family for the necessities and benefits of the joint family. 10. It was further stated in para. 7 of the plaint that the defendant No. 2 obtained the said mortgage loan in his capacity as the Karta and manager of the joint Hindu family for the necessities and benefits of the joint family. The defendant No.3, who, had attained the majority, was liable to pay the debt. 11. To bring the suit within the limitation, the plaintiff alleged in para. 8 of his plaint that the defendant No.2 was carrying on all transactions from thee beginning to the end relating to acceptance of the loan, repayments etc. for and on behalf of all who executed the mortgage deed and who are defendants to the suit; and acting for and on behalf of the said persons, he had executed in favour of the plaintiff, on number of occasions certain documents ie1atipg, to payment of vasul and acknowledgments of arrears of debt, the last Vasul beiug paid on July 31, 1950; and further on August 17, 1951, the defendant No.2 acting for and on behalf of all concerned sent a letter to the plaintiff under his own hand acknowledging the suit debt and promising to repay, the same on September 1, 1951; and hence the plaintiff contended: "It is further stated that the persons who have originally executed the mortgage deed and the present defendants were members of a joint family and the defendant No.2 was the Karta of the said joint family. The defendant No.2 as the Karta of the joint family ha4 obtained the suit debt for the necessities of the joint family. The joint family has also benefited by the said debt. The defendant NO.2 paid the Vasul as the Karla and the agent of all concerned. He had also written acknowledgements in respect of the debt. The plaintiff now learns that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 have now become owners of the mortgage property after the family partition and they are also in actual possession of the same. The defendant NO.2 himself has been managing the mortgaged property paying taxes and taking all other necessary steps regarding the property from the earliest occasion. Looking at the matter from any angle, it will be seen that the suit is within limitation." 12. The defendant NO.2 himself has been managing the mortgaged property paying taxes and taking all other necessary steps regarding the property from the earliest occasion. Looking at the matter from any angle, it will be seen that the suit is within limitation." 12. After the defendant No.2 filed a written statement contending that the suit debt was extinguished under section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, under which an award was passed in respect of the debts owed by the defendant No.2 in Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Application No. 60 of 1948, the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint; and the amendment was granted on September 1, 1964, below the application for amendment, Exh. 43. 13. In that amendment, the plaintiff submitted that he was not at all aware of any proceedings of the Sholapur Court, bearing Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Application No. 60 of 1948; the plaintiff was never served with a notice therein; the defendant No.2 had deliberately withheld information regarding the suit mortgage debt in the said proceedings and had not furnished information in the said Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief proceedings, though it was obligatory on him to furnish such information to the said Court, under the provisions of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act; he had also deliberately hidden the fact that he was a debtor of the plaintiff to the present suit; and the said Court was not informed anything about the debt herein; he had also hidden the fact from that Court that he was a businessman and was then having a running business. 14. It was therefore, contended by the plaintiff that the Award passed, in the said proceedings, on April 4, 1952, was not, binding on the plaintiff. Under section 15 (2) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, it was also submitted, the defendant No.2 had colluded with the creditor in the said proceedings and the Court was misguided into passing the Award; and the defendant No.2 could not, therefore, take any advantage of his own fraud. 15. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed that the defendants should be ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in one sum, the amount of Rs. 15. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed that the defendants should be ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in one sum, the amount of Rs. 11,000, together with future interest, from the date of filing of the suit, till actual payment, at the rate of 8 per cent per annum; and in the event of the defendants failing to pay to the plaintiff, the decretal debt within the time specified by the Court, a decree for auction sale of the mortgaged property be passed; and the proceedings of the sale be utilised for paying for the decree to the plaintiff. 16. Defendant No.1, resisted the suit by filing her written statement, Exh. 34. She contended that her deceased husband, Laxman, had not received any consideration mentioned in the bond; that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim interest on interest; that the defendant No.2 had no authority to make or acknowledge any debt: and hence, the suit was barred by time. The defendant No.2 had adjudged as a 'debtor' under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. She therefore submitted that the whole debt was extinguished under the Act. 17. She also submitted that the mortgaged property was the exclusive property of Laxman; and the allegation that it was allotted to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in a partition was false. She contended that the letter, alleged to have been written by the defendant No.2, on August 17, 1951, was not binding against her; and the suit filed against her was barred by limitation. She denied that the defendant No.2 had obtained a loan for the necessities of the joint family, or the joint family benefited by the said loan, or that the defendant No.2 had paid vasul for and, on behalf of all concerned or as the Karta of their joint family, or even acknowledged the debts as such. She, therefore, contended that none of the acknowledgements or payments extended the period of limitation for filing the suit against her. She submitted that the suit was liable to be dismissed with costs against her. 18. Defendant No.1 died after filing the written statement during the pendency of the suit. Her heirs and legal representatives, defendants Nos. 1A, 1B, 1 C and J D, who are the appellants before us, filed a purshis, Exh. 67A, adopting the written statement, put in by the defendant No.1. 19. 18. Defendant No.1 died after filing the written statement during the pendency of the suit. Her heirs and legal representatives, defendants Nos. 1A, 1B, 1 C and J D, who are the appellants before us, filed a purshis, Exh. 67A, adopting the written statement, put in by the defendant No.1. 19. In the written statement filed by defendant No.2, Ex. 23, he contended that as the mortgage-deed stipulated that the interest should be paid on interest it was unlawful; and could not be enforced; that defendant No.2 was an agriculturist, who was adjudged to be a 'debtor' within the meaning of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, in the Bombay Agricultural Debtor-Relief Application No. 60 of 1948, after issuing a general notice under section 14 of the Act; and as the plaintiff did not appear in the proceedings and establish the suit debt, the mortgage debt no longer bound the defendant No.2 and his son defendant No.3. 20. He submitted: "The defendant No. 2 was not the Karta and manager of the joint Hindu family. The defendant No.2 an other defendants separated in the year 1945 by partitioning their moveable properties and since then they are living separately. In these circumstances the defendants have ceased to be members of a joint family since the year 1945." According to the defendant No.2, he had entered into the suit transaction for his own benefit and had paid the vasul as stated in the plaint; and the allegations in para. 8 of the plaint that the defendant No.2, acting for and on behalf of all, had sent a letter and paid Vasul, were not true. He also denied that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were the owners of the mortgaged property and contended that the property was not kept or treated as joint; and as the suit was filed 6 years after the period prescribed by law, the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were not personally liable. Defendant No.3 filed a written statement Ex. 24, adopting the contentions of defendant No . 2. 21. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 filed a written statement Exh. 2 and 3 were not personally liable. Defendant No.3 filed a written statement Ex. 24, adopting the contentions of defendant No . 2. 21. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 filed a written statement Exh. 20, stating that the mortgage deed was illegal, as it stipulated the payment of interest on interest; that the said defendants were not personally aware of the suit transaction or the Vasul paid after the said transaction, because the suit transaction was entered into by defendant No.2, and defendants Nos. 4 and 5 merely subscribed their signatures to the mortgage deed at the instance of defendant No.2. They too averred that the joint family of the defendants ceased to exist from the year 1945; that the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were living separately from the defendant No.2; and they had their own source of income for their livelihood; and that the defendant No; 2 was not the Karta of the family of the other defendants in the suit. They denied the execution of the alleged acknowledgements and the payments and other documents executed by defendant No.2 as binding on them; and contended that the suit was barred by time against them, stating that the defendant No.2 entered into the suit transaction for his Own benefit; and the other defendants were not all benefited by the transaction and in any event, they were not personally bound for the repayment of the suit debt. 22. The learned Civil Judge framed as many as 7 issues in view of these contentions. He found that the suit debt was extinguished in view of section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, and no decree could be passed against the defendant No. 2. He however, found that the plaintiff proved that the suit property was joint family property; and defendant No.2 had paid Vasul to defendants Nos.1 and 2, as alleged; and hence the suit was within time. 23. He, therefore, passed a decree in the sum of Rs. 11,000 with future interest at 6 per cent per annum on Rs. 5,500 against defendants Nos. 1, 3,4 and 5, although, defendant No. I died long before the passing of the decree, as it was reported by the plaintiff on August 19, 1963, that she was dead, see Ex. 45, and defendants Nos. 1A to 1D were brought on the record by the plaintiff's application (Ex. 5,500 against defendants Nos. 1, 3,4 and 5, although, defendant No. I died long before the passing of the decree, as it was reported by the plaintiff on August 19, 1963, that she was dead, see Ex. 45, and defendants Nos. 1A to 1D were brought on the record by the plaintiff's application (Ex. 49) dated October 11, 1963. 24. It is rather unfortunate that neither the Civil Judge nor the Officer of the Court of the Civil Judge, who drew up the decree cared to realise the defect in the judgment and the decree while passing such a decree against the dead person, though the title of the judgment and the decree set out the names of the heirs of defendant No.1. The said judgment and decree are challenged in the above First Appeal filed by the defendants Nos. 1A to 1D. 25. Prima facie, it appears to us that as there is no, decree passed, against defendants Nos. 1A to ID, they cannot be said to be persons aggrieved by the decree at all, but the Memo of Appeal filed by the appellants is on the footing that the decree is against the appellants original defendants Nos. 1A to 1D, who are described in the original Memo of Appeal as the heirs of original defendant No. 1 and who by printers mistake have he en described in the Memo of Appeal wrongly as "original plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 5”. 26. It is however, clear that the original defendants Nos. 1A to 1D have filed the above appeal apprehending that the decree passed by the lower Court may be executed against them though it was a decree against the dead defendant No.1 and not against them. Moreover, neither of the counsel appearing before us thought it necessary to refer to this defect in the decree and proceeded to argue the appeal as if the decree was passed against defendants Nos. 1A to 1D. 27. Mr. Adik, the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the appellants, submitted firstly, that the learned Civil Judge erred in holding that the mortgage debt was extinguished only against defendant No.2 and not against the other defendants and particularly defendants Nos. 1A to 1D. 27. Mr. Adik, the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the appellants, submitted firstly, that the learned Civil Judge erred in holding that the mortgage debt was extinguished only against defendant No.2 and not against the other defendants and particularly defendants Nos. 1A to 1D; and, secondly, that the suit which was filed on July 11, 1962, was clearly barred by time under Article 132 of the Limitation Act, 1908, inasmuch as the payments made and acknowledgements and other loans executed by defendant No.2 could not bind the other defendants, as the learned Judge erred in holding that defendant No. 2 as the Karta of the family, when he made the payments and executed those documents. Both these grounds are well founded and must be upheld. 28. A Exh. 154, there is the Award, dated April 10, 1952, (which is wrongly shown in the roznama as dated May 10, 1952) passed in Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief application No. 60 of 1948. That Award was passed at the instance of the creditor of defendant No.2 by name, Manikchand Raoji Shah. The certified copy of the proceedings in that application are produced at Exhs. 145 and 146. , Exh. 146 is a certified copy of the purshis filed by the creditor and his pleader on December 12, 1951, admitting that defendant No.2 was the debtor within the meaning of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947. On the basis of the purshis, which was recorded by the Bombay agricultural Debtors Relief Court, the debt was adjusted; and the award was passed in the sum of Rs, 2,880 with interest at 3 per cent payable in four instalments, beginning from April 1952. 29. In this connection it is~ necessary to note that on receipt of an application for 'adjustment” of debt, under section 14 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, the Court is required to give a notice to the debtors and to every creditor (other than the creditior who is himself an applicant) where names and addresses of creditors are given in the application; and to publish a general notice requiring the debtor and all creditors to submit a statement in the prescribed form-within one month from the date of the service of the notice or the publication of thee several notice, whichever is later. 30. 30. It is not disputed that such a public general notice was given; and the plaintiff, in the present case did not file a statement, as required by section 14. The effect of not filing such a statement is stated in section 15 of the Act, which runs as follows: . "IS (1), Every debt due from a debtor in respect of which no application has been made under section 4 within the period specified in the said section 4 or in respect of which no application for recording a settlement is made under section 8 within the period specified in the said section 8 or in respect of which an application made to the Court is withdrawn under section 12 and no fresh application is made under section 4 and every debt due from such debtor in respect of which a statement is Dot submitted to the Court by the creditor in compliance with the provisions of section 14 shall be extinguished. (2) Nothing in this section shall apply to any debt due from any person who has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted his creditor to believe that he is Dot a debtor for the purposes of this Act or that no application under section 4 can be entertained in respect of any debt owed by such person to such creditor by reason of the provisions of section 11." The learned Civil Judge negatived the contentions of the plaintiff that the defendant No.2 by his conduct represented to the plaintiff that he was a debtor; and recorded a finding that the debt was extinguished under section 15. That is why the learned Civil Judge did not' pass a decree against defendant No.2. That finding of the learned Civil Judge is not challenged before us by the plaintiff by filing an appeal or cross objection's. The finding is, therefore, binding on the plaintiff. 31. Nevertheless Mr. Abhyankar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, contended that having regard to the provisions of section 6 (1), of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, the finding of the learned Judge that the rest of the defendants are liable is correct, because it was not their case that the joint family of the defendants was a debtor, at the relevant time, within the meaning of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, is correct. Mr. Mr. Abhyankar submitted that, under section 15, the debt was extinguished only against the debtor and not against the joint debtors. For this purpose, he relied on the provisions of section 6, which runs as follows: “6(1) If the payment of a debt due by a debtor is guaranteed by a surety or if a debtor is otherwise jointly and severally liable for any debt along with any other person and jf the surety or such other person is not a debtor, the debtor may make an application under section 4 for relief in respect of such debt and the Court may after consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case proceed with the adjustment of debts under this Act in so far as such applicant is concerned (2) Whenever the debts due by a debtor which are guaranteed by a surety are adjusted under sub-section (1), the surety shall be discharged from liability in respect of the debts or portion of the debts of such debtor which are extinguished under sub· section (1) of section 15, sub-section (3) of section 17, sub section (5) of section 26, section 34 or sub section (2) of section 35; and the surety shall not be entitled to proceed against the debtor in respect of such debts or portion. 32. Mr. Abhyankar submitted that the fact that the Legislature dealt with joint-debtors under section 6 (1) and discharged the surety of his liability in respect of a debt guaranteed by him to the debtor in clause (2) and used the words in clause (1) "in so far as such applicant is concerned," clearly shows that the legislature intended to confer the benefit of section 15 only qua the debtors and not qua persons, who are liable for the debts jointly with the debtors, as in the present case. He wants us to read into section 15 (1), after the words "shall be extinguished" the words "in so far as such debtor is concerned." 33. It is not for the Courts to make law. It is the duty of the Court to apply the law as it finds it and interpret it in accordance with well known rules of interpretation, where there is some ambiguity about the words. It is not for the Courts to make law. It is the duty of the Court to apply the law as it finds it and interpret it in accordance with well known rules of interpretation, where there is some ambiguity about the words. It is not open to the Court to add words on the supposition that the Legislature must have intended that the provisions should be read with those words. The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases used by the Legislature must be considered in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. 34. The rule of construction is "to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed." The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. In our view, the words in section 15 (1), "Every debt due from a debtor ....... “shall be extinguished," are thus plain and admit of only one meaning viz. that the debt shall be extinguished in law. The words call for a full and fair application of particular statutory language used by the Legislature. 35. The desirability and undesirability of the conclusion as compared with another conclusion, which is being suggested by Mr. Abhyankar, cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision. It is well settled that where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. See Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, 1969, page 29. 36. It is also well settled that the expression all creditors used in section 14 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, in connection with the general notice under section 14 (b) is not limited to the class of creditors referred to in Sub-clause (a) of the section, but refers to "all creditors" of the debtor even though their names may not be in the application. Therefore, an award made under the Act is not only an award between the debtor and such of the creditors as are mentioned in the application made under section 4 of the Act or upon whom notice bas been served under section 14 (a) of the Act. 37. It is also an award between the debtor and all his creditors; and the latter are bound by it. See Keshav Ganshyam v. Waman Rangji Sakholkar1, where Chagla, C. J. observed at page 322 ; "The award is between the debtor and all his creditors, and it is for that reason that the award is binding upon all the creditors and not because it is a judgment in rem within the meaning of section 41 of the Evidence Act. The Legislature has provided for notice to be given to all the creditors and an opportunity is given to all the creditors to come forward and prove their debts. If a Creditor fails to do so, the award may be ex parte against !limo but all the same it is binding upon him. It maybe that in a particular case the creditor may not come to know of the general notice and that may result in a hardship, but it would be unsafe to base a legal argument upon an individual hardship which might take Place in certain cases. As against this individual hardship we have got to consider the object of the Legislature in passing the law, the scope and ambit of that statute, and the fact that special Courts were set up for a special purpose." 38. See also in this connection Virgonda Lingangouda Desai v. Malgonda Virgonda Desai,2 decided by Gajendragadkar J. (ail he then was) and Vyas, J., where in execution proceedings, it was contended that the decree holder was not entitled to execute the decree, as the decretal debt was extinguished; and Gajendragadkar, J. observed at page 614 : "If the decree under execution was passed on the basis that the plaintiff was entitled to possession as a mortgagee and the defendant's right to redeem was alive, there can be no doubt that the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder could have applied for adjustment of the mortage debt under section 4 of the Act. Therefore, in our opinion, the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that this decree and the rights and liabilities -created under it are outside the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. In our opinion, the position of the decree-holder is that of a creditor, and since no application was made in respect of the debt which is sought to be enforced in execution proceedings, the debt must be deemed to be extinguished under section 15 (1) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. The result is that the mortgage debt ill question is extinguished and the decree holder is not entitled to any relief in execution proceedings," With respect, the said observations will apply to the mortgage debt, in the present case also. 39. In our opinion, section 6 (1) is only an enabling section which empowers the Bombay Agricultural Debtor Relief Court to proceed with the adjustment of a -debt of a 'debtor' even though he may be jointly liable. It is enacted to prevent an objection that the application was liable to be rejected for nonjoinder of the other debtors. That section cannot take away the mandatory effect of section 15 (1) which extinguished the debt in toto. 40. If the debt itself is extinguished in law, it cannot be kept alive by passing a decree against the joint debtors as it ceased to exist in law. This will be further clear from the fact that under section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise; and each of two or more joint promisors may compel every other joint promisors to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. 41. According to Mr. Abhyankar, this section enables the creditor to proceed against Other joint debtors, though where one of the joint debtors is a debtor, the debt may be extinguished against him under section 15, which can be only after coming into force of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947. If Mr. 41. According to Mr. Abhyankar, this section enables the creditor to proceed against Other joint debtors, though where one of the joint debtors is a debtor, the debt may be extinguished against him under section 15, which can be only after coming into force of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947. If Mr. Abhyankar's argument be accepted, then after the coming into' force of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, the creditor can compel other joint debtors to pay what is due to him from them jointly with the debtor under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. The Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act deals only with adjustment of debts payable prior to' August I, 1947, by making application under section 4. Section 4 of the Act enables the debtor to make an application only in respect of such debts. Under the second part of section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, if the plaintiff recovers the decretal amount from the other defendants, the other defendants can compel defendant No. 2 to contribute equally with themselves to the decretal amount. 42. It is impossible to hold that the Legislature intended that the debt due from the debtor would be extinguished under section 15; and still a portion of it would be revived under section 43 and could be recovered under section 43 of the Indian Contract Act. We are, therefore, of the view that a plain reading of section 15, considering the object and scope of the Act, shows that there can be no doubt that every debt due from a debtor is extinguished for all purposes of law, under section 15(1) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947. 43. Mr. Abhyankar argued that such a view would be contrary to the decision in Suleman Rahim v. Datta Babaji Patil’s But the facts of the case are clearly distinguishable. In that case the liability of the original mortgagor was reduced by the previous application of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. The question was whether the purchaser of the mortgaged property was entitled to any reduction of a debt in a Darkhast filed by a mortgagee against the purchaser to recover the entire mortgage debt. In that case the liability of the original mortgagor was reduced by the previous application of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. The question was whether the purchaser of the mortgaged property was entitled to any reduction of a debt in a Darkhast filed by a mortgagee against the purchaser to recover the entire mortgage debt. It was held by Patel and S. M. Shah JJ., that he was not entitled after throwing some doubt on the decision of J. C. Shah J., (as he then was) in Ambu Rama Mhatre v. Bhau Halya Patil4. 44. Patel and S. M. Shah JJ., applied the principle laid down in Girdharlal M. Bhatia v. Mangharam Jeewandas5, where the question arose with regard to the liability of a non-displaced person, who was a joint debtor along with a displaced person under the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act. With respect to Patel and S. M. Shah JJ., we doubt whether the decision in Girdharlal Bhatia has any application or relevance to a case under section 15 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, because there is no section analogous or corresponding to section 15 under the Displaced persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. 45. Section 22 of that Act dealt with the apportionment of joint debts; and in terms said that if one joint debtor was a displaced person and another was not, such apportionment to non-displaced person shall not be contrary to law within the meaning of the Act. Such a section is not to be found in the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. Besides, the case of a purchaser of a mortgagor's property, with which Patel and S. M. Shah JJ., were concerned, is totally different from the case of a joint debtor as the purchaser was bound to pay the mortgage debt under the terms of the mortgage deed and could not after the debt of the mortgagor was extinguished, sue the mortgagor as a joint debtor under section 43. 46. We do not share the doubt which was expressed by Patel and S. M. Shah JJ., regarding the view taken by J. C. Shah 1., (as he then was) in Ambu Rama Mhatre v. Bhau Halya Patil, which, in our opinion, is nearer to the facts of the present case before us. 46. We do not share the doubt which was expressed by Patel and S. M. Shah JJ., regarding the view taken by J. C. Shah 1., (as he then was) in Ambu Rama Mhatre v. Bhau Halya Patil, which, in our opinion, is nearer to the facts of the present case before us. That was also a case of co-mortgagors in which one was a 'debtor' under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. It was contended that in a debt adjustment application filed by the 'debtor' and others, the 'debtor' alone being entitled to claim the benefits under Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, the transaction could be declared a mortgage to the extent of his interest in the property; and that the mortgage debt could be scaled down to the extent of a fraction of the debt equal to the fractional interest which the debtor had in the property, and that the rest of the debt could not be scaled down under the Act. 47. It was held by J. C. Shah J., that as the respondent was one of the co-mortgagors, he was liable for the whole debt jointly and severally; he was entitled to redeem the entire property on payment of the debt declared to be due under the mortgage; and that, therefore, the Court had to take an account of the entire debt due under the mortgage even though some of the mortgagors were not debtors within the meaning of the Act; that the scaling down had also to be of the entire debt; and the award had also to relate to the entire debt and could not be limited to the fractional interest of the respondent in the property encumbered by the mortgage; and that, on payment of amount, declared to be due under the Act, the respondent was entitled to redeem the mortgage in its entirety and to obtain possession of the property. 48. The learned Judge held that under section 24, there was nothing to support the view that the declaration of the real nature of the transfer will be limited to the interest which the debtor had in the property transferred; and further in its very nature a mortgage was an indivisible transfer; and it could not be partially a mortgage and partially a sale or transfer of another character. 49. 49. In arriving at this conclusion, J. C. Shah J., discussed the ratio in V. Ramaswami Ayyangar v. T. N. V. Kailasa Thevar6, observing as follows: “Mr. Limaye on behalf of the petitioners has invited my attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in V. Ramaswami Ayyangar v. T. N. V. Kailasa Thevar, in support of the contention that where by a statute dealing with adjustment and scaling down of liabilities of certain classes of debtors relief is intended to be given to persons who fall within that class; and not to other persons. if a debt is scaled down, the benefit of that scaling down cannot be obtained by persons who did not satisfy the requirement of the statute. Now, in Ramaswami Ayyangar's case, a suit was filed to' enforce a mortgage executed by defendant No.1 for himself and on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 7. A preliminary mortgage decree was passed against defendant No.1 and defendants Nos. 3 to 7 for Rs. 1,06,098 and interest, and the suit was dismissed against defendant No.2. Appeals were preferred against that decree by the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 3 to 7 and during the pendency of the appeals the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, was enacted by the Legislature, and on the application filed by defendants Nos. 2 to 7 the amount of the decree was scaled down to Rs.49,255 and interest thereon at 6 per cent from October I, 1937, in so far as defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were concerned, but qua defendant No. r the decree for the fun amount decreed by the trial Court was maintained. Under the preliminary decree the amounts declared were not paid, and a decree absolute for sale was passed. Thereafter, there was a settlement of the decree. Under the settlement the decree-holder agreed to receive Rs. 24,000 from defendant No.2 and to release him and his share in the mortgaged property. Likewise the decree-holder agreed to receive Rs.48,000 from defendants Nos. 3 to 7 and to release them and their share of the mortgaged property. The amount payable by defendant No.1 was settled at Rs. 37,500 and that amount was to be paid by one Yakub Nadar and on payment of that amount the decree against defendant No.1 was to be as-signed to the said Yacob Nadar. Defendants Nos. 3 to 7 and to release them and their share of the mortgaged property. The amount payable by defendant No.1 was settled at Rs. 37,500 and that amount was to be paid by one Yakub Nadar and on payment of that amount the decree against defendant No.1 was to be as-signed to the said Yacob Nadar. Defendants Nos. 2 to 7 paid the amounts agreed to be paid by them and got released their shares in the property mortgaged. Yacob Nadar, however, did not pay the amount, but defendant No.1 paid Rs. 3,215 in Court and filed an application praying that as the amount deposited by him together with the payments already made by defendants Nos. 2 to 7 completely wiped off the debt due under the decree as scaled down, full satisfaction may be recorded and the property of defendant No. 1 be exonerated from liability for the mortgage debt. This application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge. On appeal to the High Court of Madras it was held that defendant No. 1 was entitled to the benefit of the scaling down in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to. 7 as the mortgage debt was one and indivisible. Against the decree passed by the Madras High Court an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court and their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the ratio decidendi of the cases in which it was held that a purchaser of mortgaged properties was entitled to the benefit of a decree which had been scaled down, even though the purchaser himself was not an agriculturist, was not applicable to the case before them. Their Lordships' observed that under the provisions of the Act, there was no objection to a decree for a reduced amount being passed against an agricultural debtor, while the same relief was not given to his co-debtors, and defendant No. 1 was, therefore, net entitled to., claim- Ute benefit of the scaling down of the decretal debt in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7. The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the decree passed by the Madras High Court and restored the decree passed by the learned trial Judge. It is, however, to be noted that in Ramaswami Ayyangar's case a preliminary decree was expressly passed against defendant No. 1 whereby his liability was fixed at Rs. 1,08,098 and the liability of defendants Nos. The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the decree passed by the Madras High Court and restored the decree passed by the learned trial Judge. It is, however, to be noted that in Ramaswami Ayyangar's case a preliminary decree was expressly passed against defendant No. 1 whereby his liability was fixed at Rs. 1,08,098 and the liability of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 paid amounts which they had agreed under the settlement with the decree-holder to pay and they got released their shares in the mortgaged property. Defendants Nos. 2 to 7 only redeemed their shares in the property and did not redeem the entire property on payment of the amount declared to be due under the mortgage. Defendant No.1 who was ordered to pay Rs. 1,08,098 then applied to the Court and sought to redeem by paying the balance of the amount remaining due by defendants Nos. 2 to 7 in order to obtain full benefit of the scaling down, and defendant No.1 claimed that the decree be marked satisfied. Evidently the liability of defendant No. 1 being for Rs. 1,08,098, the decree against him could not be satisfied by payment of an amount less than the amount directed to be paid by him. It was held, having regard to the terms of the decree and the provisions of the Act which provided for adjustment of liability of debtors and· also the adjustment of the decree, that defendant No.1 could not claim benefit of the scaling down of the debt in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7. The Supreme Court held that the unity of the mortgage was broken up by a term implicit in the decree and the settlement between the decree-holder and defendants Nos. 2 to 7. Their Lordships observed that it was a plain implication of the decree that on payment of the amount directed to be paid by defendants Nos. 2 to 7 their interest alone in the mortgaged property would not be liable to be sold. It is evident that if under the preliminary decree defendant No.1 desired to redeem the mortgage, he had to pay Rs. 1,08,098, and if defendants Nos. 2 to 7 desired to redeem the mortgage, they had to pay Rs. 49,255. 2 to 7 their interest alone in the mortgaged property would not be liable to be sold. It is evident that if under the preliminary decree defendant No.1 desired to redeem the mortgage, he had to pay Rs. 1,08,098, and if defendants Nos. 2 to 7 desired to redeem the mortgage, they had to pay Rs. 49,255. It also appears from the observations made at page 300 that under section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act which provides for separation of a debt incurred by a Hindu family, some members of which were agriculturists. while others were not, afforded a clear indication that the splitting up of a debt in certain circumstances was in accordance with the scheme of the Act. But under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act there is no provision whereby debts jointly due, can be slipt up between the promisors, who are debtors within the meaning of the Act and promisors who are non-debtors. There is nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court which supports a general proposition that in a mortgage suit where some of the mortgagors are entitled to the benefit of a special statute like the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and the rest are not, the right of the former is limited to redeeming only their fractional interest in the property and not the mortgage in its entirety. V. Ramaswami Ayyangar's case, therefore, has in my judgment no application to the facts of the present case." At page 977, after referring to section 6 (1) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, J. C. Shah, J. further observed: "Relying upon the expression" in so far as such applicant is concerned "Mr. Limaye contended that jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court to adjust only a fraction of the debt by the debtor. There is, in my view, on warrant for such a contention. The legislature has by section 6 provided that in the case of a joint liability the debt will be adjusted qua the debtor leaving it to the creditor or the debtor to take such proceedings as are open to him for enforcement of the liability of the non-debtors. Sub-section (2) of section 6 was also sought to be relied upon. The legislature has by section 6 provided that in the case of a joint liability the debt will be adjusted qua the debtor leaving it to the creditor or the debtor to take such proceedings as are open to him for enforcement of the liability of the non-debtors. Sub-section (2) of section 6 was also sought to be relied upon. That sub-sections provides that in the event of adjustment being made under sub-section (1) a surety shall be discharged from liability in respect of debts or portion of the debts of such debtors/which are extinguished under the provisions of the Act and the surety shall not be entitled to proceed against the debtor in respect of such debts or portion. In other words, when the liability of the principal debtor is extinguished, to that extent the liability of the surety also is extinguished and the surety cannot proceed against the debtor in respect of that portion of the debt which has been extinguished. That sub-section also can, in my judgment, have no bearing on the question to be decided in this case." 50. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by J. C. Shah, J. for the reasons already stated above, with regard to the interpretation of section 6. It is true that J. C. Shah, J. was not dealing with a case of extinguishments of a debt under section 13 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act; but the scheme of the Act with regard to extinguishments and the scheme with regard to adjustment of debt cannot be considered to be different for the purpose of determining the liability of the joint debtors. We, therefore, do not agree with Patel and S. M. Shah, JJ. in doubting the correctness of the decision of J. C. Shah, J. Once the debt is extinguished under section 15, therefore, mortgage being indivisible, the mortgage debt was extinguished against all the mortgagors. Once the debt was extinguished, the mortgage would be redeemed. 51. We, therefore, do not agree with Patel and S. M. Shah, JJ. in doubting the correctness of the decision of J. C. Shah, J. Once the debt is extinguished under section 15, therefore, mortgage being indivisible, the mortgage debt was extinguished against all the mortgagors. Once the debt was extinguished, the mortgage would be redeemed. 51. Under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, nothing shall entitle a person interested in a share only of the mortgaged property to redeem his own share only, on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage, except only where a mortgagee, or, if there are more mortgagees than one, all such mortgagees, has or have acquired, in whole or in part, the share of a mortgagor. But it is well settled that the last clause of section 60 of the Act, apart from the exception which it recognises, was intended to preclude mortgagors or persons deriving title from them from claiming, independently of the agreement to have an equity to redeem their own share on payment of a proportionate part of the mortgage money. (see Himmat Shahai v. Md. Moin.7) 52. In V. Ramaswami Ayyangar v. T. N. V. Kailasa Thevar, Mukherjea J. (as he then was) speaking for the Supreme Court, observed at page 299 : "The general law undoubtedly is that a mortage decree is one and indivisible and exceptions to this rule are admitted in special circumstances where the integrity of the mortgage has been disrupted at the instance of the mortgage himself, e. g., when there is severance of the interests of the mortgagors with the consent of the mortgagee or a portion of the equity of redemption is vested in the latter." But as pointed out, with respect, by J. C. Shah, J. the Supreme Court has laid down that this general rule applied to the provisions of section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, which provided for separation of a debt incurred by a Hindu family, some members of which were agriculturists while others were not. The Supreme Court observed that the catena of cases relied upon by the Madras High Court for taking the view that non-agriculturists' debtor's liability did not cease under the provision of the Madras Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. The Supreme Court observed that the catena of cases relied upon by the Madras High Court for taking the view that non-agriculturists' debtor's liability did not cease under the provision of the Madras Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. when the liability of agriculturist co-debtor may cease under the provisions of the Act, may be right or wrong. (see page 300) 53. After referring to the two decisions of the Madras High Court in Arunachalam Pilai v. Seetahram,8 and Pachicola v. Karatam,9 Mukherjee. J. observed at page 301 : "In both these cases, the question was raised in the proceeding for scaling down of the decree under the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act itself and that at the execution stage. There is, however, the case of Subrumanian v. Ramchandra,10 where the question arose in course of execution proceedings and a purchaser of a portion of the equity of redemption was held to he entitled to the benefit of the scaled down decree in favour of the mortgagors, although his own application for relief under the Act was refused. It is not necessary for purposes of this case to express any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of these decisions. It is enough to say that the ratio decidendi in all these cases is not applicable to the case before us. In the present case there is no purchaser of the mortgaged property and consequently there is no question of the purchaser, who is not an agriculturist himself, being entitled to the benefit of a decree which has been scaled down in favour of the agriculturist mortgagor. Here the judgment debtors are the mortgagors themselves and according to the plain provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act there could not be any objection to a decree for reduced amount being passed against an agriculturist debtor, while the same relief is not given to his co-debtors who do not fulfil that description." It is, therefore, clear that the view which we are taking in the present case before us, is consistent with the decisions of the Madras High Court, which remained untouched by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. 54. Mr. 54. Mr. Abhyankar then attempted to argue that in the present case, defendant No.2 had permitted the plaintiff to believe that he was not a debtor for the purpose of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, qua his debt due to the plaintiff; and that no Application under section 4 could be entertained in respect of the debt owned by him as it was more than Rs. 15,000/-. As stated already, it is not open to Mr. Abhyankar to raise such a point in this appeal, as he has not challenged the finding and the decree in favour of defendant No.2. Even assuming that he could urge this point before us, we find no substance in it. 55. As stated already, the application for adjustment for debt was not made by defendant No.2, but by his creditor; and hence it cannot be said that merely because the application was filed by the creditor, that a notice Was given to the debtor to state all his debts, as required under section 5 (1) (b) (iii) of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, nor it can be said that merely because the debtor did not file in the prescribed form the staternent under section 14, that the plaintiff was absolved from his duty. He could file a statement under section 14. 56. Section 15 (1) is very clear and emphatic and laying down that very debt due from a debtor in respect of which a statement is not submitted to the Court by the creditor in compliance with the provisions of section 14 "shall be extinguished." The creditor cannot, therefore, rely on the defaults made by defendant No.2 for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff was led to believe by defendant No.2 that defendant No.2 was not a debtor for the purpose of that Act or that no application could be entertained in respect of the debt having regard to the provisions of section 11 or of section 6 (2). 57. Mr. Abhyankar also referred to the recitals in the mortgage deed for showing that the consideration was taken for Hundekari business by defendant No.2 and other defendants to launch a new business; and, therefore, he was misled and believed that defendant No.2 was not a debtor. 57. Mr. Abhyankar also referred to the recitals in the mortgage deed for showing that the consideration was taken for Hundekari business by defendant No.2 and other defendants to launch a new business; and, therefore, he was misled and believed that defendant No.2 was not a debtor. This is entirely irrelevant because what the plaintiff had to prove was that he was misled when the Act came into force on May 27, 1947, to believe that he could not make an application under section 4 or that the defendant No.2, was the debtor for the purpose of suing under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. 58. There is no evidence on record to show that in 1947, there was anything which made the plaintiff to believe that the defendant No.2 was not a debtor or that he could not make an application under section 4, or in view of section 11. The recitals of the deed made in 1943 were irrelevant for this purpose. Moreover, as very emphatically and clearly laid down by Chagla C. J., in Kesha, Ganshyam v. Woman Rangaji, referred to above, the decision that defendant No.2 was a debtor is binding on all his creditors, including the plaintiff; and it is not open to the plaintiff to reagitate the question of the status of defendant No.2 in the present suit, as he was already held to be a 'debtor' and the debt was scaled down in the Award, Ex. 154, referred to above. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned civil Judge erred in law in holding that the mortgage debt was extinguished only qua defendant No.2 and not against the others. 59. In view of the above conclusion, the question of limitation becomes superfluous; and, the decree passed by the learned civil Judge deserves to be set aside. However, as Mr. Abhyankar tried to support the reasons and findings recorded by the learned civil Judge holding that the suit was within time, we thin~ it our duty to discuss even this point of limitation, which according to us, was wrongly decided by the learned civil Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 60. However, as Mr. Abhyankar tried to support the reasons and findings recorded by the learned civil Judge holding that the suit was within time, we thin~ it our duty to discuss even this point of limitation, which according to us, was wrongly decided by the learned civil Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 60. It should be noted that the only oral evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff to support the allegations made in the plaint that defendant No.2 had acknowledged and paid for and on behalf of himself and other defendants, consists of his own evidence at Ex. 103 and the evidence of documents at Ex. 104 dated July 31, 1950, the letter written by defendant No.2 to the plaintiff; Ex. 105 the letter dated August 17, 1951, receipt Ex. 107 dated November 30, 1945, receipt Ex. 108 dated December 1, 1947; and certain other letters written by defendant No.2 to him, Exhs. 109, 110 and 111. But in none of these letters has Tukaram said that he was writing the letters or signing the receipts for and on behalf of the other defendants. The mortgage deed itself does not recite that the husband of original defendant No. 1 and other defendants constituted a Joint Hindu Family. 61. Mr. Abhyankar submitted that, having regard to the fact that although the mortgage property was described as self acquired property, he had taken the loan under the mortgage for doing business with the other defendants; and also having regard to the fact that the family business was Hundekari business, which was mentioned in the deed; and it was also stated that new business was started with the money which was borrowed on the mortgage and also having regard to the evidence of the plaintiff, who stated that the family continued to be joint till August 29, 1959, when the partition was effected under a deed, it should be held that the acknowledgments and payments made by defendant No.2 were of dates prior to 1959, and hence they were on behalf of and for all the defendants. 62. Under section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to produce any evidence for the purpose of adding or explaining the terms of the contract recorded in the registered mortgage deed. 62. Under section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to produce any evidence for the purpose of adding or explaining the terms of the contract recorded in the registered mortgage deed. Nothing was simpler th1n to mention that the husband of defendant No.1 and other defendants were all members of the Joint Hindu Family. But the document itself shows that the defendants signed the document stating that the mortgage property was the separate property of the husband of defendant No.1 and without stating that they were members of the Joint Hindu Family or coparceners. The oral evidence of the plaintiff cannot be relied upon by the Court for varying the recitals of registered mortgage deed. So also the evidence of the scribe, Ramkrishna Narayan, examined by the plaintiff, cannot be sufficient to hold that defendant No.2 was the Karta of the joint family. 63. In the cross-examination, this scribe admitted as follows: "I knew Tukaram-for about five years before the suit bond was written. 1 knew about the suit property of Tukaram only. Laxman was the uncle of Tukaram. Laxman stated to me that it was his self acquired property. Laxman was doing Hundekari business. He used his carts on hire for that business. The title deed was handed over to the plaintiff. 1 do not know if Tukaram and his brother have any separate property of their own. I do not know what was the business of Tukaram's father Babaji. At the time of the bond, defendants stated that they were joint and the Hundekari business was their joint family business. I did not think it necessary to write that. Hundekari business was the business of the joint family. The signboard of the defendants' shop was as 'Tukaram Babaji Chavan'. I do not know if there was any partner in that shop. At the time of the suit bond defendant had no cloth business. I do not know when defendant started the cloth-shop after the suit bond. Only twice Tukaram met me after the cloth shop. I did not meet the other defendants after the suit bond. There are many rooms in the suit house. I only used to meet male members. At the time of the suit bond, I had gone to the defendants and met them on the upper floor. Thereafter, I had never gone to the suit house. I did not meet the other defendants after the suit bond. There are many rooms in the suit house. I only used to meet male members. At the time of the suit bond, I had gone to the defendants and met them on the upper floor. Thereafter, I had never gone to the suit house. The kitchen was on the upper floor. The kitchen was one. It was visible from the entrance. I did not know Tukaram's wife. I did not know any female members. I only saw one chula in the house." 64. It is difficult to believe that having regard to this evidence he could have had enough knowledge about the status of the family, which enabled him to say that Tukaram was the Karta of the joint family. It is also difficult to believe that plaintiff could not lead evidence to the affect that the defendants were living as a joint family if at all the defendants were, as stated by the plaintiff, members who constituted the joint family. 65. The only other witness examined on behalf of the plaintiff was Kashinath, who had let out his shop to Tukaram, defendant No.2 for running his cloth shop. He, however, admitted in his cross-examination that he had seen Tukaram only twice in the shop, in connection with the collection of rent; and only sometimes he had seen the brother of Tukaram. It is difficult to believe him in view of the last statement which this witness had made in the examination-in chief, when he admitted in the cross-examination that he had gone only twice to Tukaram and he had met Tukaram only in the shop. Apart from section 92 of the Evidence Act, therefore, we find no satisfactory evidence led by the plaintiff to prove that the defendants constituted a joint Hindu family; and the defendant No.2 was the Karta of that family. 66. As against this, we have the evidence of defendant No.2 himself, who stated in the examination-in-chief that the money was borrowed only by himself and Laxman, the husband of original defendant No.1 and other brothers did not get any benefit of the amount. He stated that after the mortgage bond, he ran a cloth shop in his own name; and the defendant No.1, his brothers and Laxman had no concern in the said shop. He stated that after the mortgage bond, he ran a cloth shop in his own name; and the defendant No.1, his brothers and Laxman had no concern in the said shop. He produced the ration-card of his family showing only his wife, son and daughter as the members of his family. He stated that his brother and his uncle Laxman had separate ration cards in 1945, because there was a partition in the family prior to that. In 1945 and since 1945, his brother lived separately from him. He said that the partition was made in 1945 in respect of the immoveable property; and till then they used to divide the income of the land. He also said that the mortgaged property was not included in the partition deed because it belonged to Laxman. He denied that he was the Kana of the family after the year 1945. 67. In the cross-examination he said that till the partition in 1945, he was the Karta of the family; and he did not know if there was any document of partition between Laxman and his father Babaji. He, at the same time, denied that he was the Karta of the joint family, including Laxman. In other words, although he admitted that he was the Karta of the family consisting of himself and his brothers till 1945, he denied being the Karta of the family, consisting of the defendant No.1, Laxman and all the other defendants as alleged by the plaintiff. 68. His evidence is supported by the ration card, which he has produced at Exhs. 155 and 156, as well as the registered partition-deed dated 19-8-1959 Exh. 157. If is true that in the said partition-deed the recital is made that till the date of the partition, defendant No.2 and his brothers, defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were members of the joint Hindu family. But the statement must be read along with other recitals, which show that the immoveable properties of the family were already partitioned; and each of the brothers was enjoying them separately. 69. Mr. 4 and 5 were members of the joint Hindu family. But the statement must be read along with other recitals, which show that the immoveable properties of the family were already partitioned; and each of the brothers was enjoying them separately. 69. Mr. Abhyankar submitted that the normal presumption of Hindu law would be applicable to the family of the defendants; that it must be presumed that till 1959; the family continued joint; and that the defendant No.2, who claimed to have been the Karta till 1945 and who was the eldest member of the family of himself and defendants Nos. 4 and 5, continued to be the Karta. It is not possible to draw such a presumption in the present case, as neither in the document (Ex. 95) nor in the acknowledgment and receipts, the defendant No.2 has described himself as the Karta of the family, or as a member of the family, or as a member auth0rised to sign on behalf of other members. Even in the registered partition-deed, we find that Laxman, the husband of original defendant No.1 was not made a party and the suit property, which was described in Ex. 95, as the property of Laxman, was not included. 70. Mr. Abhyankar then submitted that the burden of proof was on the defendants to establish that they were not a joint family; and the acknowledgments and payments made by the defendant No.2 were not made on their behalf, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to take advantage of burden of proof when he was the party, who failed to lead the evidence to show that the suit was in time. The plaintiff's suit must be held time barred unless it is proved by satisfactory evidence that the acknowledgements and payments made by the defendant No.2 were on behalf of defendant No. 1 and others. We and that the plaintiff has failed to lead such evidence. 71. The learned civil Judge has, however, came to a contrary conclusion. He held that the recitals in the mortgage-deed, Ex. 95, were sufficient for inferring that there was no partition between Babaji the father and defendant No.2 and Laxman. He was of the view that the recitals in Ex. 71. The learned civil Judge has, however, came to a contrary conclusion. He held that the recitals in the mortgage-deed, Ex. 95, were sufficient for inferring that there was no partition between Babaji the father and defendant No.2 and Laxman. He was of the view that the recitals in Ex. 95 showed that the said suit property was purchased by Laxman by his own personal income; and he had thrown the said property into the joint stock and the property became the joint property of Laxman and defendants Nos. 2 to 5. This inference of the learned Judge was entirely unfounded. If at all this inference was supported by other evidence, it would have been perhaps a different matter. There is no evidence at all to show that the property was thrown into the common stock. The recitals in the mortgage-deed, on the other hand show that property was the separate property of Laxman. 72. Having regard to the provisions of section 92 of the Evidence Act, it was not open to the plaintiff to contend that those recitals should be varied by leading oral evidence to show that in spite of the recitals, which were signed by all the members of the family, the plaintiff could ask the Court to infer and hold that the suit property was the joint family property. We do not thinks that it is open to the Court to jump to the conclusion that the property which is described by the members of the family as belonging to one member separately, can be treated as the property which was thrown into common stock by that member merely because he gives security of the property for helping the other members to raise a loan for doing some new business or continuing the old business, as in the present case. 73. Another circumstance, which the learned Judge relied upon for holding that the suit property was a joint family property was on the basis of an admission of Tukaram that he was living in House No. 1316, which defendant No.2 explained by saying that he was paying rent to Manjulabai. The learned civil Judge disbelieved this explanation on the ground that the defendant No.2 did not produce a single receipt to show that Manjulabai had accepted rent. The learned civil Judge disbelieved this explanation on the ground that the defendant No.2 did not produce a single receipt to show that Manjulabai had accepted rent. Whether he was residing in the house or not, having regard to the clear recitals in the said mortgage deed, it was not open to the learned civil Judge to hold that the property was a joint family property. 74. Similarly, the learned Judge was not right in assuming that merely because Tukaram was the next senior most member of the family, that he was the Karta of the family; particularly because defendants Nos. 4 and 5, the heirs of Manjulabai, did not step in the witness box to state that Tukaram was not the Karta of the family after the death of Manjulabai. It was wrong on the part of the learned Judge to place the burden of proof on the defendants to prove that the defendant No.2 was not the Karta of the family, when there was sufficient documentary proof to show that he was living separately even from his brothers and Laxman; and he treated the suit property as separate property when all the members effected the partition of the immoveable property. They did not include the property as the family property. 75. The learned Judge also relied on the fact of the consideration of mortgage deed being paid to Tukaram for holding that Tukaram must be the Manager of the family. If it was so, then it was easy to mention that fact in the deed. It may be that Tukaram needed the loan; other members gave security so that he could raise the loan. It does not mean that they were co parceners of a joint Hindu family for all purposes, particularly, when the recitals in the deed show that the mortgage property was considered as the separate property of Laxman by all the members of the family. We are of the opinion that the learned Civil Judge was wholly wrong in relying on the fact that consideration of the mortgage deed was received by defendant No.2 and in holding that defendant No.2 was the Manager of the joint family of the defendants. It was for the plaintiff to establish, as stated above, that the defendants constituted a joint family; and the defendant No.2 was the Karta, who could bind them by his acknowledgments and payments. 76. It was for the plaintiff to establish, as stated above, that the defendants constituted a joint family; and the defendant No.2 was the Karta, who could bind them by his acknowledgments and payments. 76. On a careful consideration of the oral and documentary evidence in the case and the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge, we find that the plaintiff has failed to establish his case; and the learned Civil Judge was wholly wrong in coming to the conclusion that the defendant No.2 was acting as the Karta of the family of the defendants when he made the payments and acknowledged the suit debt or wrote letters to the plaintiff, as alleged by the plaintiff. It must, therefore, be held that the suit filed by the plaintiff against defendants Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 was barred under Article 132 of the Limitation Act, 1908. There is no evidence to show that the defendant No.2 and his son, defendant No.3 constituted a joint family. 77. Now, it is true that defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 have not filed any appeal against the decree passed against them. But it seems that since it is a preliminary decree, the defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 must be quite sure, having regard to the values of the property in sholapur city, that enough money would be received in the event of an auction sale of the property and they might have ignored the decree. The ends of justice would, however, require, having regard to what we have concluded above, that we should exercise our powers under Order 41, rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code; and the decree must be set aside even against them. 78. For these reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, on December 24, 1964, are set aside; and a decree is passed dismissing the plaintiff's suit with costs. The appeal is allowed; and the respondent No. 1 shall pay costs of the appellants. Appeal allowed.