B. J. DIVAN, T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in revision application No. TEN. 746 holding that the petitioners herein are not the tenants of the disputed fields which are situated in Dehen village of Olpad taluka in Surat District. The proceedings before the Tribunal arose out of the application filed by deceased Keshavlal Pragji husband of petitioner No. 1 and father of petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 under sec. 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to obtain a decision that he is the tenant of the disputed lands. The Mamlatdar Olpad held that the petitioners are the tenants and this decision of the Mamlatdar was confirmed by the Prant Officer Olpad in appeal preferred before him by the respondent herein. The Tribunal reversed the decision of the Prant Officer while acting under its revisional jurisdiction under sec. 7o of the Act. ( 2 ) THIS matter initially came up for hearing before our learned brother S. H. Sheth J. before whom the petitioners raised the contention that the proceedings before the Tribunal were vitiated as no appeal against the findings of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) that a particular person is a tenant is provided by law and hence the appeal preferred by the respondent before the Prant officer was incompetent. The contention was that if appeal before the Prant officer was incompetent even the revision application before the Tribunal against the order of the Prant officer was equally incompetent. For the proposition that the Act does not provide any appeal against the decision of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act the learned advocate of the petitioners relied upon the decision of our learned brother J. B. Mehta J. in Sureshchandra Dhirajlal Store and others v. R. R. Shrotriya District Collector (1970) 11 G. L. R. 821. For the proposition that the Act does not provide any appeal against the decision of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act the learned advocate of the petitioners relied upon the decision of our learned brother J. B. Mehta J. in Sureshchandra Dhirajlal Store and others v. R. R. Shrotriya District Collector (1970) 11 G. L. R. 821. In this case Mehta J. has held that the Legislature has failed to provide any appeal against adjudication as to whether a person was a tenant or a permanent tenant and when the Legislature keeps a lacuna it is not open to the Court to fill up the lacuna by any presumed intention of the Legislature and therefore the Deputy Collector has no appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Mamlatdar that a particular person is a tenant or not under sec. 74 (1) of the Act. The other side i. e. the respondent put reliance on the contrary decision given by Bakshi J. in Spl. C. A. No. 93/62 decided on 28/29th April 1964 wherein the learned judge has held that even though sec. 74 of the Act does not specifically provide for an appeal against the order passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act the said appeal is by necessary implication provided for in sec. 74 (1) (a) which refers to an order under sec. 4 of the Act. Sec. 4 of the Act as will be presently seen deals with the cases wherein persons are deemed to be tenants. In view of this conflict between the two decisions of this Court Sheth J has referred this matter to a larger bench and this is how this matter comes before us for decision. ( 3 ) BEFORE touching the controversial points involved in this writ petition it would be necessary to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Act. Sec. 70 of the Act prescribes several duties of the Mamlatdar. Clause (b) of this section as it stands at present is in the following terms (b) to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a Permanent tenant. Sec. 74 of the Act provides for appeals and enumerates certain orders of the Mamlatdar against which an appeal can be filed to the Collector. Clause (b) of this section as it stands at present is in the following terms (b) to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a Permanent tenant. Sec. 74 of the Act provides for appeals and enumerates certain orders of the Mamlatdar against which an appeal can be filed to the Collector. The enumerated list of the orders which are covered by this section does not specifically refer to the order passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act but clause (a) of sec. 74 (1) is found to be In the following terms (A) an order under sec. 4. It is thus apparent that an appeal against the order of Mamlatdar or specifically provided in sec. 74 if the said order is an order under sec. 4. It is therefore necessary to refer to the provisions of sec. 4. This section as already stated above refers to the persons who are deemed to be tenants but since in our opinion this section is comprehensive enough to cover even the real tenancies it would be necessary to quote the exact terms in which this section is enacted. It is as under:- A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated Personally by the owner and if such person is not (A) a member of the owners family; or (B) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owners family or (C) (c) a mortgagee in possession. Explanation (I) :--A person shall not be deemed to be a tenant under this section if such person has been on an application made by the owner of the land as provided under sec. 2a of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 declared by a competent authority not to be a tenant. Explanation (I) :--A person shall not be deemed to be a tenant under this section if such person has been on an application made by the owner of the land as provided under sec. 2a of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 declared by a competent authority not to be a tenant. Explanation (II) :-Where any land is cultivated by a widow a minor or a person who subject to physical or mental disability or a Serving member of the armed forces through a tenant then notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation I to clause (6) of sec 2 such tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of this section Sec. 2 of the Act provides for several definitions in different clauses Clause (10a) defines permanent tenant as under: (10a) permanent tenant means a person (A) who Immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Ahmedabad) Act 1955 (hereinafter called the Amending Act 1955 (I) holds land as mulgenidar or mirasdar; or (II) by custom agreement or the decree or order of a Court holds the land on lease permanently or (B) the commencement or duration of whole tenancy cannot satisfactorily be proved by reason of antiquity; and includes a tenant whose name or the name of whose predecessor-in-title h been entered in the record of rights or in any public record or in any other revenue record as a permanent tenant immediately before the amendment of the Amending Act 1955clause (14) defines protected tenant as under:-14 tenant means a person who is recognised to be a protected tenant under sec. 4a. Clause (18) defines tenant as under:-18 tenant means a per on who holds land on lease and include (A) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under sec. 4; (B) a person who is a protected tenant; and (C) a person who is a permanent tenant; (D) a person who after the surrender of his tenancy in respect of any land at any time after the appointed day but before the specified date has continued or is deemed to have continued to remain in actual possession with or without the consent of the landlord of such land till the specified date; and the word landlord shall be construed accordingly. ( 4 ) FROM reference to the provisions of sec. ( 4 ) FROM reference to the provisions of sec. 74 it is apparent that as his section stood at the relevant time it did not refer specifically to the orders passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act. However it should be mentioned here that by Gujarat Act 19 of 1973 this section was amended and following clause was added to it:- (A) an order passed under (b) of sec. 70. It appears that this amendment was introduced in sec. 74 as a result of the decision given by J. B. Mehta J. that an order passed by the Mamlatdar holding that a particular person is a tenant or not is not appealable under sec. 74 However the fact remains that at the relevant time this amendment was not there and therefore the question which arises to be determined Is whether in absence of this amendment it can be said that the. decision of the Mamlatdar given on the question whether a particular person is a tenant or not was appealable or not. ( 5 ) IF a reference is made to the decision given by our learned brother J. B. Mehta J. in the above referred case of Sureshchandra it will be found that be has recorded his conclusions on this point in the following words:- In the present case there was no dispute about the respondents being tenants. The dispute was as to the nature of their tenancy whether they were permanent tenants or protected tenants. The Legislature has failed to provide any appeal against such adjudication as to whether a person was a permanent tenant or a protected tenant which has been made under. 70 (b) by the Mamlatdar. It is of course a lacuna as the Legislature would never have failed to provide an appeal on such a substantial adjudication. Where however the Legislature keeps a lacuna it is not open to this Court to fill up the lacuna on any assumed intention of the Legislature. It is found that the above referred judgment of Bakshi J. was not brought to the notice of Mehta J. when he gave this decision. 6 But the question which thus arises to be considered is whether by not making a specific and pointed reference to the orders passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. It is found that the above referred judgment of Bakshi J. was not brought to the notice of Mehta J. when he gave this decision. 6 But the question which thus arises to be considered is whether by not making a specific and pointed reference to the orders passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act in the list of appealable orders contemplated by sec. 74 (1) of the Act the Legislature has kept a lacuna or whether the legislature did so because the same was not found necessary in view of the fact that appeal against an order under sec. 4 of the Act was already provided. This brings us to the construction of the provisions contained in sec. 4 of the Act. 7 While construing the provisions of sec. 4 of the Act one important fact which is to be borne in mind is that if the language of this section is closely read it will be found that it is comprehensive enough to cover the cases of even those tenants who hold land on contractual leasehold rights. This becomes evident be reference to the opening words of the section which confer the status of tenant on a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person. The section is designed to cover all persons lawfully cultivating the land irrespective of the question whether such persons are lawfully cultivating under a contract of lease or under a licence custom grant or otherwise. The primary requirement of this section is that a person should be lawfully cultivating the land in question. It is true that the definition of the expressions permanent tenant protected tenant and tenants are separately provided by the Act in clauses 10a 14 and 18 of sec. 2. But it appears that to make the protection granted by the Act complete the Legislature has made the position of lawful cultivation doubly sure by enacting sec. 4 in a more comprehensive manner which would cover all different modes of lawful cultivation. It cannot be gainsaid that the contractual tenant or a permanent tenant or a protected tenant is a person lawfully cultivating land in question and; therefore the case of even such tenants would be covered by sec. 4. of course sec. 4 in a more comprehensive manner which would cover all different modes of lawful cultivation. It cannot be gainsaid that the contractual tenant or a permanent tenant or a protected tenant is a person lawfully cultivating land in question and; therefore the case of even such tenants would be covered by sec. 4. of course sec. 4 speaks of deemed tenants but that is because of the fact that it also covers cases of those who are not actual tenants by virtue of contractual rights but who are required to be treated as tenants on account of the fact that they are lawfully cultivating the disputed land. This however does not mean that the operation of sec. 4 is confined only to those persons who are required to be protected by the deeming fiction. The result therefore is that sec. 4 cannot be confined in its operation only to those who are required to be protected by invoking the deeming fiction of the section. In our opinion therefore sec. 4 is covering the cases of actual tenants who are on the land by virtue of their contractual rights or otherwise as well as those who are required to be protected on account of their lawful cultivation by virtue of the deeming fiction contemplated by this section. 8 On further scrutiny of sec. 4 it is found that it contemplates that the land in question should not be cultivated personally by the owner. This is another requirement of sec. 4 and this requirement shows that the land must be in possession of the person who claims to be cultivating it lawfully. So far as this requirement is concerned it is not found to be inconsistent with the spirit of the Act because if a further reference is made to the provisions contained in sec. 14 of the Act it will be found that under the provisions of that section notwithstanding any law agreement for usage or the decree or order of a Court the tenancy of any land shall not be determined unless the tenant has failed to cultivate the land personally. Therefore even in case of a tenant who claims contractual leasehold rights over the land his tenancy is liable to be terminated and put to an end if he is found to have failed to cultivate that land personally. Therefore even in case of a tenant who claims contractual leasehold rights over the land his tenancy is liable to be terminated and put to an end if he is found to have failed to cultivate that land personally. Under the circumstances personal cultivation of the land even by a contractual tenant is found to be an essence of the protection of his tenancy. This being the position the requirement of sec. 4 that the land in question should not be cultivated personally by the owner is found to be quite consistent with the spirit of the Act. Therefore we are of the opinion that sec. 4 covers the cases of a tenant a permanent tenant or a protected tenant in as much as it also covers the cases of deemed tenants If this is so whenever a Mamlatdar gives his decision with regard to a particular person that he is a tenant he virtually does so under the provisions of sec. 4. Even otherwise if a person is found to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of sec. 4 he is covered by the definition of the word tenant given in clause (18) of sec. 2. Therefore whenever a Mamlatdar holds that a particular person is a deemed tenant under sec. 4 there is implicit in that decision a finding that he is a tenant. If that be so we are of the opinion that every decision of the Mamlatdar on the question whether a particular person is a tenant or not is the decision which is covered by sec. 4 and is as such appealable under sec. 74 (1) (a) of the Act. 9 In this connection it should be noted that though sec. 74 ( a) refers to an order under sec. 4. Sec. 4 itself does not speak of an order nor does sec. 70 which refers to the duties and functions of Mamlatdar provide for any decision of the Mamlatdar under sec. 4. This is probably because of the reason that the Legislature has enacted sec. 4 in such a comprehensive manner that it would cover the cases of deemed tenants as well as the actual tenants. 70 which refers to the duties and functions of Mamlatdar provide for any decision of the Mamlatdar under sec. 4. This is probably because of the reason that the Legislature has enacted sec. 4 in such a comprehensive manner that it would cover the cases of deemed tenants as well as the actual tenants. 10 Even otherwise if we look to the real intention of the Legislature the question which arises to be considered is can it be said that the Legislature wanted to protect the cases of deemed tenants more than the cases wherein the Mamlatdar finds that a particular person is either a tenant or a permanent tenant or a protected tenant. Reference to the definition of the expression permanent tenant shows that it involves good deal of evidence as regards customs or agreement. In many cases the evidence as regards custom and agreement would be complicated. The question therefore is could the Legislature have ever intended that such complicated questions which are decided by the Mamlatdar should be kept beyond the challenge of appeal while the other questions which relate to deemed tenancy should be made subject to appeal ? We cannot attribute any such intention to the Legislatures and since we find that the Legislature has intentionally not provided a specific clause with regard to the appeal against the order passed under sec. 70 (b) because of the comprehensive nature of sec. 84 we do not find any substance in Miss Shahs contention that appeal preferred by the respondent before the Prant Officer was incompetent. 11 Now so far as the facts of this case are concerned even presuming that the appeal which the respondent preferred before the Prant Officer was incompetent we find that it makes no difference. Here we should make a reference to sec. 76a of the Act which says that where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it the Collector may suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government at any time call for the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal as the case may be and pass such order thereon as he deems fit. This provision of sec. 76a thus invests the Collector with revisional powers and these powers can be invoked either suo motu or on a reference made by the State Government. Thus when the Prant Officer Olpad heard the appeal preferred by the respondent in this case he can be presumed to have heard it if not under any appellate powers then under the revisional powers vested in him by sec. 76a of the Act. 12 The Tribunal while invoking its revisional jurisdiction under sec. 76 is not fettered in its revisional powers by the question whether the Collector or the Prant Officer has acted under his appellate powers of revisional powers because sec. 76 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act 1957 an application for revision may be made to the Tribunal against any order of Collector on the grounds stated in the section. It is thus clear that the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be invoked against any order passed by the Collector. Therefore it does not matter whether the Collector has passed a particular order under his appellate powers or under his revisional powers. The Tribunal can exercise its revisional jurisdiction provided any of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) (b)and (c) of sec. 76 (1) are satisfied. [ The Rest of the judgment not material for the Report. ] Matter remanded. .