HANUMANTH v. MYSORE REV. APP. TRIBUNAL — 1974 DIGILAW 135 (KAR)

( 1 ) THESE three writ petitions filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constn. of india are disposed of by this common order since common questions of law and fact arise for consideration. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in these three petitions are divided brothers. The petitioner in WP. 1714 of 1972 is the owner of lands bearing S. Nos. 241 and 244; the petitioner in WP. 1732 of 1972 is the qwner of lands bearing S. Nos. 258 and 426; and the petitioner in WP. 1733 of 1972 is the owner of S. No. 43. All the lands are situated in Hattahalli village Taluka Indi, Dist. Bijapur. Respondent 8 Savanthrawa was the tenant of all the five lands referred to above. After the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force, the petitioners commenced proceedings under S. 14 of the Act for resumption of portions of these lands. In those proceedings, the petitioners succeeded and it was held that they were entitled to resume one half of land in each of the five lands. Thereafter they instituted proceedings for delivery of partions adjudged in their favour. The Tahsildar executed the orders and put the petitioner in WP. 1714/1972 in possession of his land on 23-10-1971 and the petitioners in WP. 1732 and 1733 of 1972 in possession of their lands on 17-10-1971. Aggrieved by the aforesaid delivery proceedings, respondent 3 filed three revision petitions before the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) under S. 56 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Before the Tribunal, the petitioners contended that the revision petitions were not maintainable in view of sub-sec. (3) of S. 56 of the Karnataka Land Revenue act which provided that no application for revision under S. 56 would lie against any order from which an appeal lay under Chap. V of that Act. The Tribunal over-ruled the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners and allowed the revision petitions setting aside the delivery proceedings and directing restoration of possession of the lands to respondent 3. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Tribunal, the petitioners have filed these petitions. V of that Act. The Tribunal over-ruled the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners and allowed the revision petitions setting aside the delivery proceedings and directing restoration of possession of the lands to respondent 3. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Tribunal, the petitioners have filed these petitions. ( 3 ) SRI V. S. Gunjal, learned Counsel for respondent 3, raised a preliminary objection at the commencement of the hearing of these petitions relying upon S. 91 of the Karnataka Lend Reforms (Amendment) Act (1 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as Act 1 of 1974), which reads as follows :" 91. Disposal of pending proceedings :- it was argued by Sri Gunjal that in view of sub-sec. (2) of S. 91, these petitions should be treated as having abated. It is no doubt true sub-sec. (2) of S. 91 provides that all Applications and proceedings including execution proceedings under the principal Act relating to resumption of land pending before any Court immediately before the date of commencement, shall not have any effect and shall abate. But it has to be observed that the said sub-saction does not and cannot relate to proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India pending before the High Court. Act 1 of 1974 is an Act passed by the State Legislature. It cannot have the effect of depriving this Court of its powers under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constn. This question is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court has decided the above question in State of U. P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj AIR, 1963 SC. 946. , in the following way : " Under the Constitution the Legislature of a State derives its authority to make laws under Art. 245 of the Constn. , which reads : (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the state. " art. 245 is, therefore, subject to Art. 226 of the Constitution. It follows that no law made by the Legislature of a State can be in derogation of the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the, Constn. " art. 245 is, therefore, subject to Art. 226 of the Constitution. It follows that no law made by the Legislature of a State can be in derogation of the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the, Constn. ( 4 ) IT is well settled that Art. 226 confers a discretionary power on the High courts to, make or issue appropriate orders and writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constn. or for any other purpose. While Art. 226 confers a, discretionary power on the high Court, the second part of S. 11 of the Act enjoins on the High court to make an order in a particular way. We should not give such a construction to the section as would bring it into conflcit with Art. 226 of the Constn. and which would have the effect of invalidating it to that extent. On the other hand, the construction adopted by us would be consistent with the second part of the section, for, if the first part is confined only to an order made by any Court or authority, other than the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, both the parts fall in a piece, and we would not only be giving a natural meaning to the express words used in the section but we would also be saving the section from the vice of constitutional invalidity. ( 5 ) THE Supreme Court in the above case was considering S. 11 of the U. P. Act 14 of 1956 which provided that where before the commencement of that Act any Court ox authority had, in any proceedings under the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1948 set aside any assessment made by an addl. Collector or Addl. Asst. ( 5 ) THE Supreme Court in the above case was considering S. 11 of the U. P. Act 14 of 1956 which provided that where before the commencement of that Act any Court ox authority had, in any proceedings under the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1948 set aside any assessment made by an addl. Collector or Addl. Asst. Collector in charge of a sub-division merely on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to make an assessment any party to the proceedings might at any time within ninety days from the date of commencement of that Act apply to the Court or authority for a review of the proceedings in the light of the provisions of that Act, and the Court or authority to which the application was made should review the proceedings accordingly and make such order, if any, varying or revising the order previously made, as might be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act as amended by Ss. 2 and 8 of U. P. Act 14 of 1956. In the above decision, the supreme Court repelled the contention that S. 11 of U. P. Act 14 of 1956 had the effecfe of requiring the High Court to exercise its powers under art. 226 of the Constn. in the manner set cut therein. The Supreme Court held that the said provision applied to an order made by any Court or authority other than the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under art. 226 of the Constn. These petitions, as already mentioned above, have been filed before this Court under Arts 226 and 227 of the Constn. requesting the court to quash by the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal. S. 91 (2) of Act 1 of 1974 cannot have the effect of taking away the jurisdiction of this Court under art. 226 of the Constn. It is no, doubt true that this Court while disposing of several revision petitions filed u|s. 115 CPC against the orders passed by the dist. Judge in appeal u/s. 118 of the Act has held that S. 91 (2)of Act 1/1974, is applicable to those proceedings. But that however would not make any difference because proceedings under S. 115 CPC which is in List III of the 7th Sch. Judge in appeal u/s. 118 of the Act has held that S. 91 (2)of Act 1/1974, is applicable to those proceedings. But that however would not make any difference because proceedings under S. 115 CPC which is in List III of the 7th Sch. of the Constn. are different from the proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constn. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by Sri Gunjal is over-ruled. ( 6 ) I shall now proceed to consider the contention urged by Sri Savanur, learned Counsel for the petitioners. Sri Sayanur argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petitions and to reverse the orders passed by the Tahsildar under S. 116 (2) of the Act. S. 116 (2) of the Act authorises the Tahsildar to execute any order awarding possession in the same manner as an order passed by a revenue officer under the karnataka, Land Revenue Act. Incidentally it was argued by Sri Gunjal in the course of these petitions that there was a doubt regarding the Act under which the execution proceedings could take place. It was argued having regard to the language of S. 116 (2) of ther Act that it was quite possible that the execution proceedings could be treated a,s proceedings under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act also. It is unnecessary to resolve the above question because irrespective of the Act under which the execution proceedings could be taken, the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction under S. 56 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act to dispose of the revision petitions. If the execution proceedings are treated as proceedings under the act, then an. appeal would lie under S. 118 of the Act and no revision petition would lie to the Tribunal from the appellate order. If the execution proceedings are treated aft proceedings under the Karnataka Land Revenue act, then an appeal would lie to the Asst. Commr. who is the next higher authority under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and under sub-sec. (3) of S. 56, no revision petition would lie to the Tribunal from an order against which an appeal would lie under Chap. V of the Karnataka Land revenue Act. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition and to interfere with the delivery proceedings taken before the Tahsildar. These writ petitions, therefore, succeed. V of the Karnataka Land revenue Act. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition and to interfere with the delivery proceedings taken before the Tahsildar. These writ petitions, therefore, succeed. The impugned orders of the Tribunal passed under S. 56 of the Karnataka land Revenue Act are quashed, on the ground that they were without jurisdiction. The petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs. --- *** --- .