Judgment :- 1. These cases bespeak how well intended legislations often fail to secure their objects due to the inertia and non-co-operation of those for whose benefit they are enacted. The Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act was enacted with a view to eliminate middlemen and to bring the producer face to face with the consumer. A Regulated market coming within the purview of that Act was established at Changaramkulam within the Alangode Panchayat in 1968. Due to the non-co-operation of the dealers and boycotting by them, it ceased to function, but was revived in July 1973. Under S.5 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act no person shall, within a notified area, set up, establish, or use, or continue or allow to be continued, any place for the purchase and sale of a notified commercial crop, except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted to him by the Collector. Under the. proviso 1 to that section, after the establishment in such area of a market for the purchase and sale of a notified commercial crop, no licence for the purchase or sale of such commercial crop shall be granted or renewed in respect of any place situated within such distance of the market as may from time to time be fixed by the State Government. In the case of the Regulated market at Changaramkulam, the distance under the above clause has been fixed as 3 kilometres. Dealers in arecanut which is a commodity coming under the purview of the Act have to come to the market for the purchase of arecanuts as per the rules of the Malabar Market Committee. Accused in Crl. A. 47/74 is a licensed dealer and he had visited the Regulated market on 17 7 73. According to the complainant, the Secretary of the Malabar Market Committee, the accused did not visit the market on 18 7 73. His shop is situated within a radius of 3 kilometres from the Regulated market. At 3 P.M. on 18 7 73, the accused was seen by Pw.1 the Supervisor of the Regulated market, purchasing 32 kilograms and 500 grams of raw peeled arecanuts from one Chathu of Othallur amsom. Pw.1 is stated to have told the accused not to purchase the arecanuts outside the Regulated market. He did not heed his request. No receipt was issued for the purchase. Pw.1 is stated to have told the accused not to purchase the arecanuts outside the Regulated market. He did not heed his request. No receipt was issued for the purchase. Though Pw.1 tried to get a statement from Chathu that he had sold arecanuts to the accused, Chathu refused to give a statement. Pw.1 did not also succeed in getting the particulars regarding the address of Chathu excepting that he belonged to Othallur amsom. A report was sept by Pw.1 to the Secretary of the Malabar Market Committee, who is authorised under the Act to institute, complaints. A complaint was accordingly presented before court. The accused denied having purchased arecanuts from Chathu. The I Class Magistrate, Ponnani, found that the offence has not been proved satisfactorily and acquitted the accused. 2. Criminal Appeal Nos. 48, 79 and 80 of 1974 arise under similar circumstances. 3. In all the cases, the complainant is the Secretary of the Malabar Market Committee. On the basis of the report of the Supervisor of the Regulated Market Committee, Changaramkulam, cases were initiated against the accused, who are the respondents in the appeals for purchase of arecanuts within the radius of 3 kms. of the Regulated market. 4. In Crl. A. 48/74, the accused is stated to have purchased arecanuts worth Rs. 240/-at the rate of 80 rupees per 20 kilograms from a person by name Govindan of Kololamba amsom at 11 A.M., on 18 7 73. In Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1974, the accused is stated to have purchased 3200 arecanuts from one Kunheen of Nannamukku at 2.30 P.M. on 18 7 73. In Criminal Appeal 80 of 1974 the accused is alleged to have purchased 40 kilograms of raw arecanuts from one Kunhayamu of Nannamukku at 11 A.M. on 23 7 73. In all the three cases, the Supervisor who has been examined as Pw.1 is stated to have requested the accused not to make the purchases as the places of purchase fell within the prohibited distance of the Regulated market. 5. The accused in all the cases are stated to have declined the request. In all the above cases the Supervisor of the Regulated market has been examined as Pw.1. In Crl. A. 79 and 80 of 1974 besides the Supervisor, the Secretary of the Malabar Market Committee has also been examined as Pw.2. 5. The accused in all the cases are stated to have declined the request. In all the above cases the Supervisor of the Regulated market has been examined as Pw.1. In Crl. A. 79 and 80 of 1974 besides the Supervisor, the Secretary of the Malabar Market Committee has also been examined as Pw.2. But this witness does not speak anything about the occurrence as such, but only with regard to the report received from the Supervisor on the basis of which the complaint was filed. 6. The learned First Class Magistrate acquitted the accused mainly on the ground that Pw.1 the Supervisor is an interested witness and as such, his testimony cannot be acted upon for finding that the purchases sworn to by him actually took place. The learned Magistrate also has referred to the fact that even though S.5 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act makes the seller as well as the purchaser liable for conviction, the complainant has omitted to take any action against the purchaser in each of the above cases. This, according to the Magistrate, is a circumstance which should also be taken into account in deciding whether the complaint is true or not. 7. The appellant's main contention is that the approach made by the Magistrate with regard to the testimony of Pw.lis incorrect. 8. The point for consideration is whether the Court was justified in holding that Pw-1 is an interested witness and also whether it is proper to act on his sole testimony. In coming to the conclusion that he is an interested witness, the court relied upon the fact that he is an employee under the Market Committee and as such concerned in seeing that the Regulated market is made a success. Reference has been made to the fact that for some time, the traders were boycotting the market with the result that the market had to be closed down. Pw-1 would, therefore, be inclined to take action against the traders of the locality who were responsible in boycotting the market. 9. It is an admitted fact that the Regulated market though it began to function in 1968 had to be closed down due to the non-co-operation of the traders. But it is common case that the market revived on 17 7 1973 with the co-operation of the traders. 9. It is an admitted fact that the Regulated market though it began to function in 1968 had to be closed down due to the non-co-operation of the traders. But it is common case that the market revived on 17 7 1973 with the co-operation of the traders. It is in evidence that many of the traders visited the market on 18-7-1973 but that the attendance dwindled on subsequent days and the market could not function properly. Pw-1 inasmuch as he is a Supervisor of the Market would be interested in seeing that the market functions successfully. It is too much to say that he would be inclined to launch prosecution against traders unnecessarily and would falsely implicate persons solely for the above purpose. In the usual course, he would be only anxious to get the co-operation of the traders which is necessary for the successful working of the market. It is not made out that Pw-1 has any personal animosity against any of the accused in the different cases. It has to be presumed that he was only performing his duty when he detected the cases of purchases contrary to the provisions of the Act. That by itself may, not be a reason for dubbing him as an interested witness. 10. The further question is whether it is legal to convict a person on the sole testimony of a witness who is an employee of the complainant. In this connection, there is no rule of law that prosecution should examine a particular number of witnesses to prove the case put forward. To say so will be to nullify the provisions of S.134 of the Indian Evidence Act, which says that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. The principle underlying the above section is contained in the maxim "evidence has to be weighed and not counted". There is nothing wrong in the court accepting the uncorroborated testimony of a sole witness. Corroboration is desirable in particular cases when the testimony of the sole witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The Supreme Court has decided the question regarding the propriety of acting on the testimony of a solitary witness in cases reported in V. Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR. 1957 S.C. 614) and Ramratan v. State of Rajasthan (1962 S.C. 424). The Supreme Court has decided the question regarding the propriety of acting on the testimony of a solitary witness in cases reported in V. Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR. 1957 S.C. 614) and Ramratan v. State of Rajasthan (1962 S.C. 424). It has been held that when the witness is neither an accomplice nor anything analogous to an accomplice, there is nothing wrong in accepting the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. Unless corroboration is insisted upon by Statute, court should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence that the corroboration should be insisted upon. The question whether corroboration is necessary or not must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. As already stated, there are no circumstances made out as to why the testimony of Pwl should not be accepted. Pw-1 has sworn to the effect that he could not get the particulars of the purchasers excepting their names and places and that was the reason why they could not be examined. It is also stated that the purchasers would be reluctant to figure as witnesses inasmuch as if they failed to get their commodities sold in the Regulated market for some reason or other, they would have to go back to the traders foreffecting sale of their commodities. The explanation is prima facie acceptable. 12. Another flaw that has been referred to in the order of acquittal is the omission on the part of the complainant to take action against the alleged purchasers. It has been pointed out that S.5 of the Act makes not only the purchaser but also the seller of the article punishable for the offence. The argument appears to be that it was because Pw-1 entertained some spite towards the accused that he initiated action against them leaving the sellers. In other words, some kind of malafide motive is attributed to Pw-1 in confining the action against the purchasers alone. But there appears to be not much weight in the contention. In the first place, Pw-1 himself has stated that he could not gather the particulars about the sellers because they came from different localities while the purchasers were traders having their shops within the prohibited distance from the Regulated market and as such easily available. But there appears to be not much weight in the contention. In the first place, Pw-1 himself has stated that he could not gather the particulars about the sellers because they came from different localities while the purchasers were traders having their shops within the prohibited distance from the Regulated market and as such easily available. It has also been pointed out that certain category of persons have been excluded from operation of S.5 as is seen from the proviso to that section. A person selling in commercial crop which has been grown by him is excluded from the category. The sellers in the different cases could as well be persons who were themselves cultivators and might have come to the market for selling the commodities grown by them. Therefore, no adverse inference can be gathered from the fact that the sellers were excluded. 13. A suggestion is seen to have been made at the time of the hearing of the cases before the trial court that the alleged sellers were fictitious persons. But the accused themselves did not have such a contention either at the time of cross-examination of Pw.1 or when they were questioned under S.342 Cr. P.C. For the foregoing reasons, I do not see sufficient grounds for acquitting the accused for the offence charged. It is true that the High Court will ordinarily be reluctant to set aside an order of acquittal and convict an accused; but in proper cases, the High Court has power to set aside the acquittal. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate declined to act upon the evidence of Pw.1 for reasons which are neither proper nor convincing. 14. In the result, I allow the appeals. The accused in each of the cases will stand convicted for offence punishable under S.5 (1) read with S.17 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act. The accused in each of the cases is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/-.