JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is a tenant?s application for a writ of certiorari to quash the revisional order passed by the District Collector of Koraput in a proceeding under the Orissa Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The original authority decided against the Petitioner. The Petitioner lost before the appellate authority and the impugned order of the Collector is on affirming order in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 2. There is no dispute of existing relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the disputed property prior to the present litigation. According to the tenant he has been continuing in possession while according to the landlord the tenant voluntarily gave up possession and the landlord entered into possession thereafter. 3. Annexure B-2 is the application made by the tenant Petitioner which came to be registered as O.L.R. Case No. 3 of 1969. That application was purported to be under Sections 18 and 65(1) of the Act. The Petitioner alleged that he was inducted into the property as a tenant under a lease dated 7-3-1965 and while he was continuing in possession as a tenant the landlord applied for a declaration that she was a person under disability and therefore, the Petitioner would not be entitled to have the benefits of the Act in respect of this property. It is alleged that during the pendency of the proceeding the landlord trespassed into the property and unduly interfered with the possession of the tenant. Therefore, by the aforesaid application the tenant wanted penal action to be taken against the landlord for undue interference and claimed restoration of possession in exercise of powers u/s 65(1) of the Act. 1 he landlord took the stand that the application was barred on account of the special limitation provided in the statute. It was further claimed that the application was also barred under the provision of Order 9, Rule 9, CPC inasmuch as, on earlier application had been made for the self same relief and that application stood dismissed for default of the Petitioner. Instead of applying for restoration thereof the Petitioner came by way of on independent application. It may be stated that on application was made for restoration, but that had been dismissed subsequently. The original authority accepted the objection raised by the landlord on both counts and on merits also took a view against the tenant. Instead of applying for restoration thereof the Petitioner came by way of on independent application. It may be stated that on application was made for restoration, but that had been dismissed subsequently. The original authority accepted the objection raised by the landlord on both counts and on merits also took a view against the tenant. The appellate forum was; moved by the tenant and the objections raised by the landlord were affirmed. Against the dismissal of the appeal a revision was taken to the Collector who by the impugned order dismissed the revision and upheld the orders of the forums below. 4. Mr. Mohanty for the landlord opposite party takes a preliminary objection that a further revision against the impugned order lay to the Board of Revenue and since a statutory remedy was available this Court should not entertain the application for a writ of certiorari as the instance of the Petitioner. We find force in the contention. But since the entire matter was argued, we think it appropriate not to dispose of this petition on the technical ground so as to permit the Petitioner to move the Board again on the same matter in revision. We would accordingly deal with the merits of the matter without disposing of the application on the preliminary point. 5. As already indicated, the application was labelled to be under Sections 18 and 65(1) of the Act. Section 65 seems to be more or less a provision corresponding to restitution provided for u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure. We are inclined to take that view, as upon reference to Rule 47 of the Orissa Land Reforms Rules, 1965 we find that on application u/s 65 of the Act has to be backed by a certified copy of the order on the basis of which delivery of possession is claimed. Mr. Murty does not seriously dispute this view of ours. We would accordingly hold that the application laid u/s 65(1) of the Act was misconceived and relief for possession cannot be granted unless there be on order under the Act directing delivery of possession to the Petitioner. 6. The next point for consideration is whether relief u/s 18 of the Act is available. The Courts below have treated the application of the tenant to be u/s 12 of the Act. Mr. 6. The next point for consideration is whether relief u/s 18 of the Act is available. The Courts below have treated the application of the tenant to be u/s 12 of the Act. Mr. Murty rightly points out that Section 12 would not be applicable because the Petitioner is not a raiyat, but is only a tenant. The contention of Mr. Murty is absolutely correct. The corresponding provision under while relief of the nature claimed could be given is Section 15, Sub-section (1) where of provides: Any claim for recovery of arrears of rent by a landlord and any dispute between a landlord and his raiyat or tenant, as the case may be, as regards. xxx (b) tenant's possession of the land and his rights to the benefits under this Act; or xxx shall be decided by the Revenue Officer on on application to be filed by any party interested. xxx If the Petitioner, was interested in getting back possession on the allegation that while he was entitled to possession under the provisions of the Act the landlord had turned him out, the appropriate provision to resort to is Section 15. The Courts below were, therefore, wrong in referring to Section 12. This mistake, however, is not a material one in relation to the plea of limitation. Both u/s 12 as also u/s 151 the special limitation of 60 days has been provided for making of on application. Admittedly from the given date of dispossession the application which came to be registered as O.L.R. Case No. 3 of 1969 was made more than 60 days after. Obviously there was no application for condoning the delay. Therefore, even if we consider the application to be one u/s 15, relief in relation to possession cannot be granted as the application has become barred by limitation on the date of presentation. 7. Next remains the question regarding Section 18 of the Act. Mr. Murty contends that there is no limitation in regard to the relief claimed therein. The provision authorises the Revenue Officer to take suo motu, jurisdiction as also on being moved by the tenant. Therefore, Mr. Murty contends that even if relief of restoration of possession was not being granted, the matter should be sent back for enquiry regarding the tenant?s contention that his possession had been unduly interfered with and, therefore the landlord should be penalised. Therefore, Mr. Murty contends that even if relief of restoration of possession was not being granted, the matter should be sent back for enquiry regarding the tenant?s contention that his possession had been unduly interfered with and, therefore the landlord should be penalised. It has been brought to our notice by Mr. Mohanty for the landlord that there is still pending on application for restitution. In fact this Court on 24-9-1973 had given leave to the Revenue Officer to dispose of that restitution application in accordance with law. It is not known to the learned Counsel of either party as to what has happened to that application. As we have already indicated, the landlord?s plea in these proceedings has been that the tenant voluntarily surrendered the land and the landlord has come into possession thereafter. Therefore, it is necessary to have on investigation into the rival contentions of the parties the tenant claiming dispossession and the landlord claiming voluntary surrender and thereafter taking possession. It is appropriate that such a matter should be gone into in that proceeding and in case it is found that the tenant?s contention of forcible dispossession is correct it shall be open to the Revenue Officer to take such action as is considering necessary u/s 18 of the Act. It is not necessary to revive this proceeding for that purpose. The writ application is disposed of with the aforesaid direction. There would be no order as to costs. K.B. Panda, J. 8. I agree.