JUDGMENT - R.K. JOSHI, J.:---At the out set I must mention on hearing they very elaborate and exhaustive arguments of both the learned Advocates, I am allowing the applicant to convert the Civil Revision Application into a Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The few facts giving rise to these proceedings could be briefly summarised thus : The petitioner before this Court is the tenant and the respondent is the land-lady of the premises is dispute which formed part of a house bearing Municipal No. 5-18-30 situate at Sabzi Mandi, Aurangabad, and these premises were leased out to the petitioner on a monthly tenancy basis, the rent agreed upon being Rs. 50/- per month. Alleging the petitioner-tenant to be a chronic defaulter in particular having remained in arrears of rent for the months of September 1969 to December 1969, the respondent landlady made an application No. A.R.C. 137/-1969 before the Rent Controller, Auragabad for eviction under section 15 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. On referring to a couple of previous litigations in the Civil Courts for the recovery of arrears of rent, the respondent made a pointed reference to the period of default in payment of rent for the months of September to November 1969 and further characterized him as a wilful default giving her a right to possession. The petitioner-tenant, on putting the appearance filed his written-statement. The learned Rent Controller framed certain issues on May 20, 1970. Inter alia, issue No. 1 read as follows : "Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has failed to pay rent to the plaintiff from 4th September, 1969 to 3rd December, 1969 amounting to Rs. 45/- and the default is wilful." The parties led evidence and it seems that the matter was also argued but before the arguments could be concluded the respondent-landlady made an application on June 21st, 1973 to recast issue No. 1 reproduced above in the following manner: "Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent as alleged by him in the plaint." This request of the plaintiff was granted by the Rent Controller and the matter was set down for arguments. At that stage, the petitioner made a request to the Rent Controller that he should be given a further opportunity to cross-examine the landlady and her witnesses and if need be to adduce his evidence in rebuttal on the newly framed issued. The Rent Controller turned down this request observing that there was already full-fledged cross-examination of the plaintiff and evidence was also led by the petitioner-tenant. In this view of the matter, he rejected the request of the petitioner and set down the matter of arguments on October 10, 1973. Feeling aggrieved by his order, the petitioner preferred Rent Appeal No. 41 of 1973 in the District Court Aurangabad. When the appeal came up for hearing the respondent raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal and it found favour with the learned District Judge with the result that he dismissed the appeal as being incompetent without any order as to cost. This order was made on January 7, 1974. Against this order the tenant approached this Court by preferring Civil Revision Application No. 68 of 1974. Apprehending some technical difficulty about the maintainability of such a proceeding in the High Court against the order of the learned District Judge, he made a prayer in the alternative that these proceedings be treated as a revision against the order of the Rent Controller and the intervening delay, if any, be condoned. When all the relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Rent Control Act as well as those contained in the Civil Procedure Code, were referred to at great length, realizing the odds in his way, Mr. Kanade for the petition, made a request that this application be treated as a Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and for reasons to be stated shortly I am disposed to accede to his request. Before dwelling on this aspect it would be worthwhile to consider the debatable points which are of a recurring nature and having far reaching effects on such types of litigations I deem it necessary to refer to certain provisions contained in the Hyderabad Rent Control Act. The preamble only refers to the making of provisions for the better control of rent of houses and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and to preclude the leasing of houses in certain areas of the State of Hyderabad. The preamble only refers to the making of provisions for the better control of rent of houses and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and to preclude the leasing of houses in certain areas of the State of Hyderabad. Section 2, the definition clause, nowhere defines the expression order which has given rise to a good deal of debate and which finds place in the subsequent sections. Section 4 speaks of order for leasing of vacant houses, section 5 envisages leasing of occupied houses. Section 9 deals with determination of rent and the orders made under these sections would be the orders in the sense of formal expression of any decision of a Court not amounting to a decree. Section 15 covers the topic of eviction of tenants on different grounds. As is well known it has been defined to mean a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the courts expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The orders not falling in this category, but which have an effect of adjudicating certain other rights at different stages of the litigation are put in the category and the Civil Procedure Code makes some of them appealable by incorporating them in Order 43 in the Code specifically for the purpose read with section 104. Now section 15 which could be called a substantive section or a section of considerable importance enumerates the grounds of eviction of a tenant. To a certain extent it restricts landlords rights and it lays down that a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section. Sub-section (2) gives numerous grounds one of them being default. The relevant portion covering this ground of default would read thus: "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Sub-section (2) gives numerous grounds one of them being default. The relevant portion covering this ground of default would read thus: "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause the application, is satisfied--- (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the house, within fifteen days after the expire of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month following that for which rent is payable". Pausing for a while here and with a little disgression I may add that this section runs on some what different lines from the provisions contained in the Bombay Rent Control Act. The landlord can get rid of the tenant even if there is a default in the payment of rent for a period of one month provided he is given the grace period of 15 days to clear the arrears or he complies with the other alternative. The proviso, no doubt, has created his interest but it is a qualified one. It would be worthwhile to reproduce the proviso ad verbatim: "provided that in any case falling under Clause (1) (reproduced above) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenants default to pay or to tender rent was not wilful he may, before making an order as aforesaid, give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding 15 days, to pay or tender the rent to the landlord upto the date of such payment". Reduced to simplicity it makes twofold provisions. If the tenant is a wilful defaulter very title discretion is left with the rent controller but if he is not then such a tenant could be relieved against forfeiture by giving him a reasonable time to secure the arrears. It is needless to refer to the intervening sections 16 to 18. Section 19 casts a duty upon the Controller to pronounce the order in open Court on the day on which the case is finally heard or on some future day of which due notice shall be given to the parties. It is needless to refer to the intervening sections 16 to 18. Section 19 casts a duty upon the Controller to pronounce the order in open Court on the day on which the case is finally heard or on some future day of which due notice shall be given to the parties. No doubt the opening words of section 19 are every order passed by a Controller under this Act but looking to the scheme of the Act and the context and having due regard to the subsequent words used in this very section the day on which the case is finally heard the very words postulates an order to be made finally or which would adjudicate upon the rights of the parties involved in the application. Otherwise there is no propriety in compelling the rent controller to pronounce the order in open Court or to give a fixed date for making an interlocutory order or an order of a formal nature. For instance taking a simple case if there be a request to adjourn the matter Controller need not follow the procedure laid down in section 19. Therefore, to my mind, when section 19 uses the opening word every order it is not wide in its import to cover those orders which have the force of a decree or which adjudicate finally on the rights of the parties. Section 22 speaks of costs to be awarded by the Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authorities referred to in section 25 but they are as usual in all civil proceedings, left to the discretion of the authority deciding the matter. Then comes section 24 which is of considerable importance and which has a bearing on the procedure for making enquiries under the Act. It runs thus: "24. For main enquires under this Act, the Controller shall follow as nearly as possible the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the regular trial of suits, the substance only of the evidence and findings being recorded as in unappealable cases and shall record in brief in brief the reasons for his findings." The three features of these sections cannot be lost sight of. Without telling the controller that he should follow the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code in entirely, it given him a directive to follow it as nearly as possible. Without telling the controller that he should follow the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code in entirely, it given him a directive to follow it as nearly as possible. The intention of the legislature seems to be that he should conduct the enquiry within the channels defined by the Civil Procedure Code as for as they affect the substantive rights and also of procedure which would vitiate the proceedings if certain stages are over looked or discarded. That is why there is an agenda that this procedure which is laid down for the regular trial of the suit should be followed with certain reservations. The exceptions carved out are that the substance of the evidence should be taken down and he is under no obligation to record the evidence or the parties at great length. No doubt he has to answer the issues formulated or record his findings thereon as in appealable cases. The expression does not seem to be happy. If the Tribunal or the Court is called upon to record the findings on the issues where the case is appealable or non-appealable the findings have to be noted down in proper manner. Concluding portion of the section gives one more charter to the Rent Controller that he should record his reasons in brief for arriving at the conclusions. If permitted to say so I may add that he is supposed to follow the procedure which is generally followed by the Small Causes Courts in trying certain category of suits against which in some cases remedy of appeal is provided and in others not. What the Small Causes Courts are expected is to take down the notes of evidence and not the evidence in extenso. They have to formulate their points for determination or frame the issues and to record the findings thereon. When this section casts a duty upon the Controller to follow the procedure as nearly as possible, it is implicit that he has to take the written statement of the defendant, receive the documents and if required to give and take inspection and discovery, to frame the issues, record the evidence and on hearing the addresses of arguments of both the sides to proceed to pronounce the judgment. In this case the procedure seems to have been properly followed inasmuch as the Rent Controller did frame the issues on going through the pleadings of the parties and documents, if any, then placed before him. He has taken down the evidence and seems to have allowed the parties to cross-examine the adversary or their witnesses giving them a full latitude. This procedure he has followed being aware of the fact that his order is open to an appeal. This takes me on to section 25 which speaks of an appeal to the District Court. Sub-section (1) says: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an appeal from an order made by the Controller shall lie within 30 days from the date of such order to the District Judge. In computing the said period of 30 days, the time taken in obtaining a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded." The expression an appeal from an order made by the Controller as observed in one of the foregoing paragraphs has given rise to a good deal of conflict in the interpretation of this expression and its import as well as ambit. But to my mind at the present stage no difficulty arises about the interpretation put on the expression, if regard we had to the words used in sections 4, 5, 9 15 of the Act read with section 19 which speaks of the pronouncement of the order in open Court. Virtually these are the orders in the form of judgments or final adjudication of the controversy. It is against such orders which determine the rights of the parties one way or the other an appeal is provided. I find it difficult to read in this expression that every order is made appealable by section 25(1). It could not be the intention of the legislature, is further made but from the subsequent provisions also. Sub-section (3) lays down that the Appellate Authority shall send for the record of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal. Sub-section (3) lays down that the Appellate Authority shall send for the record of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal. Here again I may point out that these provisions appear to have been drawn on the lines contained in Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code which speaks of the production of additional evidence in Appellate Court or the authority of the Appellate Court to require any document to be produced or to examine any witness for enabling it to pronounce the judgment or for any other substantial cause. Sub-section (3) as the language runs, clothes the Appellate Authority with full powers of adjudicating the matter as far as possible finally and if need be, in a given case, on taking additional evidence. Sub-section (4) says that save as provided in section 26 the decision of the appellate authority and subject to only such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal. These provisions are not without substance. The landlord intends to put an end to the litigation as speedily as possible and that is why it says that subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority the Rent Controllers order shall be final. The provisions contained in sub-sections (3) and (4) have some bearing on one of the points advanced by Mr. Kanade, who submitted that the District Courts order in holding the present case that the appeal is incompetent is final and a revision would lie under section 26. This argument is fallacious and does not appeal to me. The order envisaged in section 25 in an appeal are those which have the effect of a decree and which would be executable against one party or the other. They have no bearing whatsoever on the order, some of which ultimately may affect the merits of the case but do not as such decide the controversy or the subject-matter involved. This takes me on to section 26 which deals with revisions. The relevant portion would read thus: "26. They have no bearing whatsoever on the order, some of which ultimately may affect the merits of the case but do not as such decide the controversy or the subject-matter involved. This takes me on to section 26 which deals with revisions. The relevant portion would read thus: "26. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, an application for revision shall lie to the High Court from any final order passed on appeal by an appellate authority on certain limited grounds." The grounds enumerated are failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the original or appellate authority or over stepping the jurisdiction or acting illegally or with material irregularity in following the procedure or passing the order. The last Clause (c) of section 26 is of considerable importance. The entire section seems to have been drawn on the lines of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. But the only restriction put is that a party cannot straight away approach the High Court in revision from the order of the Rent Controller even if he has fallen into an error envisaged by Clauses (a), (b) (c). The right of revision is conferred against a final order passed on an appeal by an Appellate Authority. Going back to section 25 and the language of sub-sections (3) and (4) at the cost of repetition I may point out that "if the Appellate Court decides the appeal", which expression means decides it on merits rightly or wrongly then alone a revision is competent. I have referred to these aspects at some length because it was one of the points of Mr. Kanade that the revision against the order of the District Court would be competent under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or under section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Control Act. Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code stands excluded by the very words of section 26 of this Act. Section 26 is further circumscribed by the limitation laid down therein. The limitations to repeat are the order must be final one made in an appeal by the Appellate Authority. In other words, it means if the District Judge while sitting as an Appellate Court, decides the matter on merits and either confirms or reverses the decision of the Rent Controller or remands the matter then only the revision would be competent. In other words, it means if the District Judge while sitting as an Appellate Court, decides the matter on merits and either confirms or reverses the decision of the Rent Controller or remands the matter then only the revision would be competent. When Mr. Kanade realized these great lacunas, he submitted that he may be allowed to convert this application into a Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the interest of justice I have granted leave to do so and I am treating it now as a Special Civil Application. Before proceedings further, in this respect I may refer to an unreported judgment of my learned brother Deshpande J. in (Civil Revision Application No. 290 of 1971, decided on September 25, 1972)1, in which the proceeding arose under the Hyderabad Rent Control Act. The facts were somewhat similar. The landlord had claimed possession from the tenant on various grounds one of which was a denial of the title of the landlord. On the various contentions raised by the tenants numerous issues were framed. All the issues were decided in favour of the landlord and the landlords prayer for possession was rejected on the sole ground that he had not proved the quit notice served by him on the tenant before the institution of the eviction proceedings. Therefore subsequent proceedings in which the tenant had challenged his jurisdiction of the rent controller of entertain the above as he has not admitted the title of the landlord to the suit premises. By his interlocutory order the rent controller had overruled the objections raised by the tenant and held that he had jurisdiction. This interlocutory order was challenged by the tenant in appeal before the learned District Judge, Nanded. The appeal was summarily rejected on the ground of being incompetent and the Judge being of the view that no appeal could lay against such an interlocutory order. Against the said order the tenant had approached the High Court in revision. His Lordship Deshpande, J. dealing with the various sections referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the scheme of the Act in particular wording of sections 15, 19, 25 and 26, concluded that there can be no appeal against an interlocutory order. An appeal could lie only against the order which would finally decide the matter in controversy. His Lordship Deshpande, J. dealing with the various sections referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the scheme of the Act in particular wording of sections 15, 19, 25 and 26, concluded that there can be no appeal against an interlocutory order. An appeal could lie only against the order which would finally decide the matter in controversy. As he upheld the view of the learned District Judge that the appeal was incompetent he concluded that the revision also would be incompetent. With respect this view seems to be correct and I share the same. Therefore, I have allowed Mr. Kanade to convert this application into a Special Civil Application. Now this takes me on to the merits of the case. As observed by me a little earlier all the evidence was closed on June 21, 1973 and the respondent submitted an application for recasting Issue No. 1. The objections of the petitioner were twofold. In the first instance he contended that it was not necessary to do so nor had the Court any jurisdiction to recast the issue after such a good deal of laps of time. The second submission which was pressed into service by Mr. Kanade was that in case the application of the plaintiff is allowed then he should be given a chance for cross-examination of the respondent and his witnesses and also to lead evidence in rebuttal if necessary. The learned Rent Controller, on a reference to the provisions contained in Order 14, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code which speak of the power to amend or to strike out the issues at any time before passing the decree, did recast the issue. In his opinion there was full-fledged cross-examination of the parties and their witnesses. Therefore, he felt no necessity of extending any further opportunity to the present petitioner of leading evidence on the recast issue and set down the matter for arguments on the 8th of October, 1973. The learned Rent Controller was justified in recasting the issue. As I read the plaint, the previous instances culminating in the decrees may reflect on the conduct of the tenant in committing defaults but they can not be necessarily wilful defaults unless there is evidence to that effect brought on record. The learned Rent Controller was justified in recasting the issue. As I read the plaint, the previous instances culminating in the decrees may reflect on the conduct of the tenant in committing defaults but they can not be necessarily wilful defaults unless there is evidence to that effect brought on record. The issue as it stood before amendment was confined to the period from September 1969 to December 1969 and whether the default in that behalf was wilful. Bearing the limited scope of the issue in mind the parties might have adduced evidence and the cross-examination, might have been limited to this period or restricted to the ambit of the issue. But when the issue is recast it cannot be gainsaid that the course of the enquiry is widoned as a mater of fact. Looking to the language of section 15 and the proviso it is clear that one of the basic requirements is wilful default and not a bare default. It is only on the proof of wilful default, being a fact that the landlord would be entitled to get the relief of possession. The emphasis is on the word wilful. The expression wilful even its plain dictionary meaning connotes intentional or deliberate default or due to perversity. By quoting previous instances wherein decrees have been obtained by the landlord in the past or as a matter of fact there have been some occasions on which default was committed, it cannot be said that the requirements are fulfilled. The entire question would turn upon the character of default being wilful or otherwise. Therefore, it is quite essential to invite the attention of the parties before they adduce evidence on this aspect of the case and to call upon the landlord in the first instance to establish that the default was wilful with an opportunity to the tenant to rebut the same. Now going back to the facts, given a chance, it is not unlikely that the petitioner before this Court may be in a position to convince the Rent Controller that he was not a master of his own in the past or was in distress or he could not clear the dues for sufficient reasons or grounds beyond his control. Now going back to the facts, given a chance, it is not unlikely that the petitioner before this Court may be in a position to convince the Rent Controller that he was not a master of his own in the past or was in distress or he could not clear the dues for sufficient reasons or grounds beyond his control. He may have his own explanations which may convince the Rent Controller that the past instances, although ending in decrees, could not be instances of wilful default so as to criticize the tenant as a chronic defaulter, nor could those instances be tagged on to the default in the period under consideration so as to conclude the defaults being wilful. If the tenant succeeds in showing either by further cross-examination of the landlady and her witnesses that the defaults were not deliberate or if he were to adduce his own independent evidence in rebuttal to review the charge of perversity levelled against him then he would be entitled to the statutory protection. Similarly he would be in a position to offer his own explanation as to how and why the defaults occurred not only in the past but in the period covered by the original issue occurred not only in the past but in the period covered by the original issue No. 1. Under these singular circumstances when by recasting the issue the learned Rent Controller has himself widened the scope of the enquiry it was incumbent upon him to give a fair chance to the tenant to rebut the evidence. Rebuttal may be either by further cross-examination of the landlady and the witnesses or by adducing his own independent additional evidence or making statements afresh to meet the case covered by the new issue. These considerations apart, even on first principles when an issue is recast, it opens a new avenue and I am of the opinion that the litigants have a right to clear their way by legitimate means permissible under the law. In the procedure adopted by the learned Rent Controller virtually he has shut out the relevant evidence and a possibility of condemning tenant without hearing him on the newly raised point cannot be ruled out. Therefore, on this ground alone, in the interest of justice and fair play, he should have been given an opportunity. In the procedure adopted by the learned Rent Controller virtually he has shut out the relevant evidence and a possibility of condemning tenant without hearing him on the newly raised point cannot be ruled out. Therefore, on this ground alone, in the interest of justice and fair play, he should have been given an opportunity. For reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs I am disposed to allow this Special Civil Application but with a direction that the Rent Controller should give top most priority to this proceeding and should dispose it of within three months from the receipt of the writ of this Court. The matter is pretty old and the parties are litigating since 1969. One can fairly visualize the hardship of one side or the other and the very hanging sword of the litigation by itself is a source of torture to both the sides. To relieve them earlier should be the aim of justice. The record and proceedings are already with the Rent Controller and there should be no difficulty for him to dispose of his matter within the time referred to above. If needs be, he is directed to ascertain from the parties whether they want to lead additional evidence either by examining themselves or witnesses and to take adequate steps to get the entire evidence brought before the Court which both the sides may desire. Bearing in mind this direction the matter should be disposed of without any further loss of time. Before parting with this judgment I may refer to a small but equally important point raised by Mr. Kanade, about the costs. He submitted that for no fault of his the learned District Judge has compelled him to go to the High Court and he is entitled to the cost of this proceedings here. It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the petitioner himself is partly responsible for choosing a wrong remedy and with respects I may add that the learned District Judge has contributed him mite. For these short coming the plaintiff need not be deprived of the costs. She is at no fault for the orders made either by the Rent Controller or by the District Judge. Moreover, I find no equity in saddling the land-lady with the cost when she already being tossed up and down. For these short coming the plaintiff need not be deprived of the costs. She is at no fault for the orders made either by the Rent Controller or by the District Judge. Moreover, I find no equity in saddling the land-lady with the cost when she already being tossed up and down. Under these circumstances I make no order as to costs so far as these proceedings are concerned. In the result, the application is allowed. The order made by the learned Rent Controller is modified. He is directed to dispose of the matter on merits according to law in the light of the observations made confining himself to the ambit of the enquiry of the recast issue and liberty given to both the sides to adduce evidence. No order as to costs. -----