JUDGMENT R.L. Gulati, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the State of Uttar Pradesh challenging the order of the Distract Judge, Muzaffarnagar, dismissing its appeal arising out of proceedings under the U.P. imposition of Ceiling on. Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'ceiling Act'). The respondents in this case are three brothers, Gopal Raj Swarup, Hari Raj Swarup and Brahma Swarup and their sons and wives. 2. Certain agricultural land stood in the name of the three brothers. Proceedings were taken against them under the Ceiling Act in order to determine the surplus land and under Section 14 (1) certain land belonging to the three brothers was declared surplus. The second set of the respondents, namely, the sons and wives of the three brothers filed separate objections under Section 14 (3) of the Ceiling Act to the effect that they were co-tenure holders of the disputed land before the abolition of zamindari and respondent Nos. 10 to 12 used to look after the manage the joint holding in a representative capacity. In support of their claim reliance was placed on a decree passed in their favour by a revenue court in which this claim of the petitioners was accepted and decreed. 3. The prescribed authority, Muzaffarnagar, rejected the objections on the finding that the decree which was alleged to have been obtained by the respondents was obtained after August 20, 1959, and, therefore, was to be ignored for purposes of the proceedings under the Ceiling Act. The respondents 2 to 9 thereupon preferred three appeals. The District judge, Muzaffarnagar, consolidated the appeal and by a common judgment dated July 26, 1961, allowed all the three appeals. The District Judge had permitted the respondents to file copy of the decree obtained from the revenue court and the petitioner was granted time to file evidence in rebuttal. The respondents filed the decree, but the petitioner the State of Uttar Pradesh, did not hie any evidence in rebuttal within the time allowed. An application, however, was later on made in which a plea was sought to be taken that the decree relied upon by the respondents was collusive and as such not binding. The respondents filed the decree, but the petitioner the State of Uttar Pradesh, did not hie any evidence in rebuttal within the time allowed. An application, however, was later on made in which a plea was sought to be taken that the decree relied upon by the respondents was collusive and as such not binding. It was also alleged that in view of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation, of Holdings Act the decree had no force as it had not been passed by a competent court. The District Judge, rejected this application on the ground that these pleas were not raised before the prescribed Authority; and he was not prepared to allow such pleas to be raised in appeal. The petitioner has challenged the order of the District Judge in this petition. 4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the District Judge was wrong in rejecting the petitioner's application to raise the aforesaid pleas. It is argued that in proceedings under the Ceiling Act no pleadings are to be filed by the parties and as such it was not necessary for the State to file a written statement and raise all the pleas at that stage. 5. Now, the State was a party to the suit before the revenue court filed by the second set of respondents. A decree, no doubt, was passed on a compromise. But the petitioner being a party to the suit, it was open to it to make the plea before the revenue court that the suit was collusive and thereafter to take steps to have the decree set aside on appeal. The question as to whether the decree was obtained by collusion and fraud involves investigation of facts and productions of evidence. Merely because a decree is passed on compromise does not mean that the same is collusive. In the circumstances the decree is binding upon the petitioner and cannot be avoided by it in proceedings under the Ceiling Act. 6. Similarly the other plea that the suit before the revenue court was barred because of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act also involves taking of evidence as to when the consolidation proceedings started and what happened in those proceedings. 7. 6. Similarly the other plea that the suit before the revenue court was barred because of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act also involves taking of evidence as to when the consolidation proceedings started and what happened in those proceedings. 7. That apart the question as to whether an additional ground should be allowed to be raised at the appellate stage is a matter of discretion with the appellant authority. If the authority in the exercise of its discretion refuses to take an additional plea or refuses to allow the production of additional evidence, this Court cannot interfere, unless the discretion is shown to have been exercised in a perverse or illegal manner. This is not the position in the instant case. The learned District Judge has given a very cogent reason for refusing to permit the petition to raise an additional proung and to lead additional evidence. 8. The ground upon which the prescribed authority rejected the respondent's claim is obviously wrong. The Explanation to Section 3 of the Ceiling Act upon which reliance has been placed by the prescribed authority as also by the learned counsel before him is wholly irrelevant. Under Section 4 of the Ceiling Act the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder has to be calculated after taking into account all the land in any holding in the State held by him, in his own right, whether in his own name or ostensibly in the name of any person. The word 'tenure-holder' has been defined to mean the holder of a holding and the word 'person' has been defined to include a 'family'. Thus a family is a unit at par with an individual, except that in the case of a family a larger area is to be allowed depending upon the members of the family. The maximum area permitted to a family of five or less members is 40 acres. If the members are more than five and additional area of eight acres per member is allowed subject to a maximum of twenty-four acres. The word 'family' has been defined in Section 3 (c) to mean as consisting of the holder of a holding and his wife and unseparated sons. If the members are more than five and additional area of eight acres per member is allowed subject to a maximum of twenty-four acres. The word 'family' has been defined in Section 3 (c) to mean as consisting of the holder of a holding and his wife and unseparated sons. It is for purposes of Section 4 that the definition of the word 'family' has been given, the object being that while counting the members of a family the separated son shall not be counted. Similarly the members of a family, who are separate tenure-holders, shall also not be counted. It is in this connection that Explanation to Section 3 becomes relevant. That Explanation provides that a son shall be deemed to be separate, if separate land has been recorded in his name or a separate share has been allotted to him under a family settlement prior to August 20, 1959 or by a decree of a court prior to or in a suit pending on August 20, 1959. In view if this Explanation, the prescribed authority refused to take into consideration the decree of the revenue court on the ground that since they were passed after August 20, 1959, they were to be ignored. The Prescribed Authority has clearly misdirected itself. The respondents are not claiming separate tenancy rights as members of the families of the three brothers. They are claiming separate shares on the ground that from the very inception they were separate tenure-holders and the name of their father was entered in a representative capacity. To such a case Section 14(6) will apply which provides that in disposing of any objection or an appeal, the Prescribed Authority or the District Judge, as the case may be, shall accept any decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of rights of the parties. This provision is independent and has nothing to do with Section 3 or the Explanation attached thereto. Moreover, to a case like the present one, even the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act will not apply. Under that Act objections are filed when there is a contest between a person in whose name the land is recorded and others who claim a right or share in it. Moreover, to a case like the present one, even the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act will not apply. Under that Act objections are filed when there is a contest between a person in whose name the land is recorded and others who claim a right or share in it. In the instant case there was no contest between the three brothers and their sons and wives because the three brothers were holding the land in a representative capacity and as such they were not the real owners. 9. Anyway, as I have already pointed out above, the whole question that arises for decision in this case is as to whether the District Judge has committed any patent error of law in refusing to permit the petition to raise an additional plea and to lead evidence. The matter being purely discretionary, this Court cannot interfere in its writ jurisdiction. 10. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.