JUDGMENT Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board is a statutory corporation established under the provisions of the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board Act, 1957 (hereinafter called the Act). It is the duty of the Board to organise, develop and regulate Khadi and Village Industries and perform such functions as the Government may prescribe from time to time. It is its duty to prepare and forward to the Government the programme of work in each year on or before such date as may be fixed by the Government. The Government may approve and sanction the programme as a whole or with such modification as they deem fit. The Board shall have its own fund and all receipts of the Board shall be credited thereto and all payments by the Board shall be met therefrom. All property, fund and other assets of the Board is to be held and applied by it subject to the provisions of and for the purposes of the Act. In the discharge of its functions under the Act the Board is to be bound by such directions as may be given to it by the Government. Members of the Board and members of the staff of the Board are to be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of the Act, to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Rule making power is conferred on the Government by section 33 to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Act. Accordingly the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board Rules, 1960 have been framed. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the office of the Khadi and Village Industries Board, Trivandrum (hereinafter called the Board). In 1964 he was posted as Lower Division Accountant in the office of the Village Industries Officer, Quilon. According to the Office Order issued, with effect from 6th October 1964, in the Quilon Village Industries Office, the Lower Division Accountant in the office was directed to attend all matters relating to cash and accounts in addition to some other items of work specified in the order. The petitioner was hence attending to such work. But this order was superseded by Ext. The petitioner was hence attending to such work. But this order was superseded by Ext. P-2 order passed by one Shri Abdul Samad when he assumed charge as Industries Officer, Quilon. According to the petitioner thereafter he had no responsibility for the cash. It is said that Ext. P-2 order was again superseded by Ext. P-3 order. This order provided that the Lower Division Accountant was to deal only with papers relating to accounts and other financial matters so much so, according to the petitioner, even thereafter he had no responsibility for the cash. 3. During the middle of the year 1969 certain complaints arose regarding the funds of the Quilon Office. There was a charge of misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 4,300 received by the officer by crossed-cheque and endorsed by him for encashment in favour of the Peon attached to the office. Some other cases of temporary misappropriation are also said to have been found out at that time. The police, after investigation charge-sheeted the petitioner as well as the Peon of the office and Sessions Case No. 65 of 1969 was tried in the Sessions Court, Quilon. In the meanwhile the petitioner, the Peon as well as the Village Industries Officer has been suspended. Ultimately the petitioner as well as the Peon were acquitted. According to the petitioner, Shri Abdul Samad, the Village Industries Officer examined as P.W. 14 in the Sessions Case was responsible for the misappropriation. In the meanwhile Shri Abdul Samad had been reinstated in service and the Peon also had been reinstated. The Board initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Formal charges were framed and an enquiry was ordered. The enquiry officer was the Secretary of the Board. According to the petitioner the second respondent, the said Secretary, was highly prejudiced against him. He was, in fact, the prosecutor in the earlier criminal proceedings. He gave the first information leading to the trial against the petitioner. He was the first witness in the Sessions Case. The petitioner complaint is that it was such a person that was appointed to hold an enquiry against him and therefore the enquiry was vitiated. The second respondent is said to have been highly biased in favour of Abdul Samad and therefore, it is said, he wanted to exonerate the latter from the charges. The petitioner complaint is that it was such a person that was appointed to hold an enquiry against him and therefore the enquiry was vitiated. The second respondent is said to have been highly biased in favour of Abdul Samad and therefore, it is said, he wanted to exonerate the latter from the charges. An enquiry report was furnished to the Board by the second respondent holding that the charges against the petitioner had been proved and this ultimately resulted in the removal of the petitioner from service by Ext. P-6 order. Against this the petitioner represented to the Board. But the Board rejected the representation by Ext. P-7 order. In the Original Petition these orders Exts. P-6 and P-7 are sought to be quashed. 4. As I said earlier, according to the petitioner he was not responsible for the custody of the cash and therefore the charges against him ought not to have been found. I do not think it is the province of this court to go into this matter. But there is another plea taken which deserves notice of this court. It is said that the Board acted merely upon the report by the second respondent, which report ought not to have been called for, in view of the fact that the second respondent was highly biased against the petitioner. As I said earlier the circumstance that he was figuring as the real prosecutor in the criminal proceedings taken against the petitioner and the Peon are pointed out as relevant and as disqualifying the second respondent from acting as the enquiry officer. It is said that in the earlier proceedings he functioned as the real prosecutor and he has taken the role of a judge in the subsequent enquiry. It is said that therefore the punishment should be found to be bad for the reason that it is in violation of all civilized canons of natural justice and for that reason the orders Exts.P-6 and P-7 are challenged; 5. Of course, it does not require much of an argument to be persuaded to hold that the second respondent was disqualified to hold the enquiry. The first respondent ought to have appointed someone else other than the second respondent to go into the charges against the petitioner. Of course, it does not require much of an argument to be persuaded to hold that the second respondent was disqualified to hold the enquiry. The first respondent ought to have appointed someone else other than the second respondent to go into the charges against the petitioner. That the second respondent figured as the first witness in the charge against the petitioner in the Sessions Court is not a matter on which there can be any dispute. He had taken up a definite stand in the earlier proceedings and it is not natural that he would take a different stand as an enquiry officer. One cannot conceive a stronger reason for disqualification to function as an enquiry officer in the enquiry against the petitioner and if action was based upon his enquiry report such action would certainly be bad. If the case is one in which the jurisdiction of this court could be invoked, this court would not hesitate to act. But the controversy concerns the jurisdiction of this court in a matter of this nature. 6. The contention that the Board is State and therefore this court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash an order of dismissal of one of the employees of the Board need not detain me for long. Article 311 of the Constitution, the protection under which is invoked by the petitioner in this context, refers to members of civil service of the Union or an All-India service or civil service of a State, or persons who hold civil posts under the Union or a State. The definition of State in Article 12 of the Constitution is only for the purpose of Part III, and therefore that will have no application to a case to which Article 311 applies. Therefore even if the Board falls within the scope of the term State in Article 12 no plea of infringement of Article 311 or action contrary to Article 311 of the Constitution could be taken in regard to an employee of the Board. Article 311 is limited in scope to members of the All India Services, the Civil Services of the Central and the States and those who hold civil posts under the Union and the States. 7. Article 311 is limited in scope to members of the All India Services, the Civil Services of the Central and the States and those who hold civil posts under the Union and the States. 7. Apart from the plea that the order of termination is bad as being contrary to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution there is a case that the impugned order cannot be sustained because even as a statutory body the Board is bound to act according to rules laid down by the Statute and in consonance with a fair procedure in matters relating to disciplinary action against its servants and that has not been done in this case. Cases challenging termination of services of employees of statutory bodies vested with public functions have come up before courts from time to time. Whether jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 could be invoked in such cases has been for sometime a matter in controversy. The law of master and servant pure and simple allowed a master freedom to dismiss his servant at will. Even if the dismissal was wrongful and against the terms of the contract governing the parties, there was no scope for compelling the master to continue to employ the servant so dismissed. The remedy of a servant unlawfully discharged from service lay in a claim for damages and not in an action for reinstatement. But three exceptions to this rule were recognised in course of time, Where the employee had a protection like that in Article 311 he could claim to continue in office if there was a violation of the provisions which guarantee such protection to him. The second class of cases were those covered by the industrial law which enabled employees and workmen wrongfully dismissed to seek reinstatement in service. In the third category fell cases where statutory bodies acted in violation of the obligations imposed on them by the statute. In such cases courts extended protection by compelling the statutory bodies to act up to their statutory obligations. These exceptions to the rule that there can be no reinstatement of a dismissed workman is, by this time, well settled. But the question in this case poses a further problem. The Board is a statutory corporation vested with certain public duties. In such cases courts extended protection by compelling the statutory bodies to act up to their statutory obligations. These exceptions to the rule that there can be no reinstatement of a dismissed workman is, by this time, well settled. But the question in this case poses a further problem. The Board is a statutory corporation vested with certain public duties. If it had violated any statutory provision imposing on it a mandatory obligation in terminating the services of its employee the question might be easy to answer. But in the case here it is not the violation of any statutory provision that is complained of. It is not as if in terminating the petitioner services there has been any contravention of any statute or statutory rules regulating, such termination. On the other hand, the complaint concerns the unfairness of the approach to the enquiry resulting in the punishment. The complaint is that there has been violation of principles of natural justice in the manner of holding the enquiry the report of which caused the termination. Whether that would be sufficient to enable a court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 is the question that calls for decision in this original petition. 8. In Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunil Kumar A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 847 the termination of services contrary to an order made under the Life Insurance Corporation Act was challenged by the petitioner. It was contended that the termination was in violation of Article 311. Of course, there was no case for entertaining this plea raised by an employee like that of the Life Insurance Corporation. But all the same the court found that the order made by the Government under the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act had been contravened in terminating the services of the petitioner and it was further found that in cases where a statutory body acts in violation of its mandatory obligations under the statute the court would be quite justified in interfering. In the case before the Supreme Court in S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680 the court was concerned with the challenge to the termination of the service of an Engineer employed by the District Board, Agra. In the case before the Supreme Court in S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680 the court was concerned with the challenge to the termination of the service of an Engineer employed by the District Board, Agra. The discharged employee contended that there was no power in the District Board to terminate the services and there was also no justification to give effect to the resolution terminating the services of the employee. Though at the hearing before the Supreme Court it was argued by Sri Tewari counsel that termination was actually one of dismissal and if so it contravened the relevant statutory provisions relating to dismissal of the Board servants, the Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to deal with this plea for want of proper pleading. Considering the plea raised by the District Board that Article 226 will not enable the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the reinstatement of the discharged employee in view of section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act which prohibits enforcement of a contract of such service, the Supreme Court expressed the view that ordinarily the master is free to terminate the services of the employee, but this is subject to three exceptions. The court said: Counsel for the Board contended in limine that the appellant not being a member of the civil service of the State was not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution and the relief claimed by him being in substance one for an order restoring him to the service of the Board from which he was dismissed, the jurisdiction of the High Court even under Article 226 of the Constitution was restricted by section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act and that the relief claimed by him cannot in any event be given, the remedy, if any, of the appellant being to claim damages by suit for wrongful termination of employment and not a petition for writ declaring the termination of employment unlawful, and a consequential order for restoration in service. Reliance was placed in support of this plea upon Municipal Board, Shahjanpur v. Sardar Sukha Singh (I.L.R. 1937 All. 434): (A.I.R. 1937 All 264) Ram Babu Rathaur v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India. (A.I.R. 1937 All. 502) and Dr. S. B. Dutt v. University of Delhi, (1959 S.C.R. 1236): (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050). Reliance was placed in support of this plea upon Municipal Board, Shahjanpur v. Sardar Sukha Singh (I.L.R. 1937 All. 434): (A.I.R. 1937 All 264) Ram Babu Rathaur v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India. (A.I.R. 1937 All. 502) and Dr. S. B. Dutt v. University of Delhi, (1959 S.C.R. 1236): (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050). In our judgment none of these cases can be used to support the view that the High Court has no power to declare the statutory obligations of a statutory body. Under the common law the court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well recognised, exceptions. It is open to the courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do. The learned Judges concluded: "Prima facie, jurisdiction of the court in an appropriate case to declare an order passed by a statutory body, even if the order relates to the termination of the employment of a servant of the body, may not be denied 9. It is necessary to refer to two later cases of the Supreme Court wherein, according to counsel for the first respondent a different view has been taken by the Supreme Court. In U. P. Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. C.K. Tyagi A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244 and in Indian Airlines v. Sukadeo Rai A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828, the rule laid down in Tewari case was accepted by the Supreme Court. It is evidently not as if the court took a view differing from Tewari case in these two decisions. In U. P. Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. C.K. Tyagi A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244 and in Indian Airlines v. Sukadeo Rai A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828, the rule laid down in Tewari case was accepted by the Supreme Court. It is evidently not as if the court took a view differing from Tewari case in these two decisions. But on the facts of the cases the court was of the view that there was no occasion to apply the 3rd exception enunciated in Tewari case to the cases before the Supreme Court. In U. P. Warehousing Corporation case the enquiry proceedings against the discharged employee were found to be in violation of Regulation 16 (3) framed under the relevant statute. These regulations were held to be rules framed for the purpose of determining the terms of contract between the employer and employee and did not, according to the Supreme Court, create statutory obligations. Therefore the court said” "An order made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such terms and conditions, but would not be in breach of any statutory obligation, as was the position which this court had to deal with in the Life Insurance Corporation Case."� It may be noticed here that in the case in Life Insurance Corporations v. Sunil Kumar A.I.R. 1961 and S.C. 847 the regulations which governed the matter of the action against the employees were found to be in contravention of the order made by the Government under the Life Insurance Corporation Act and therefore it was held that in acting according to the regulations there was a breach of statutory obligations imposed by the order made under the Life Insurance Act. Both in the U. P. Warehousing Corporation case as well as the Indian Airline Corporation case the regulations which were said to have been contravened were held to be merely those defining the terms and conditions of service. They were to be treated only as terms of contract between the parties and not as statutory provisions imposing obligations upon the employer, the violation of which might have to be viewed in a different light altogether. These cases well establish the rule that where the complaint is one of violation of statutory obligation by a statutory authority the court will be competent to direct reinstatement of a dismissed employee. 10. These cases well establish the rule that where the complaint is one of violation of statutory obligation by a statutory authority the court will be competent to direct reinstatement of a dismissed employee. 10. The question whether in regard to an employer who is a statutory authority there could be scope for a plea that since the employee has been dismissed following a procedure which could be characterised as unfair he could claim to be reinstated is also not without any precedent. Courts have considered the duty of the employer in such cases to determine questions of termination of the employee as quasi-judicial in character and therefore the requirement of confirmity to rules of natural justice has been read into to the procedure to be adopted by such authorities. In Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Jaffar Imam A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 282 Gajendragadkar, C. J. dealing with this question said : "There can be no doubt that when the appellant purports to exercise its authority to terminate the employment of its employees such as the respondents in the present case, it is exercising authority and power of a quasi-judicial character. In cases where a statutory body or authority is empowered to terminate the employment of its employees, the said authority or body cannot be heard to say that it will exercise its powers without due regard to the principles of natural justice. The nature or the character of the proceedings which such a statutory authority or body must adopt in exercising its disciplinary power for the purpose of terminating the employment of its employees, has been recently considered by this court in several cases: vide the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur v. P. N. Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1964, dated 9th December 1964: (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1595) and Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, Civil Appeal No. 764 of 1964, dated 1st March 1965: (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1767), and it has been held that in ascertaining the nature of such proceedings with a view to decide whether the principles of natural justice ought to be followed or not, the tests laid down by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. 40, are relevant. In view of these decisions, Mr. Sen has not disputed this position and we think, rightly". In view of these decisions, Mr. Sen has not disputed this position and we think, rightly". The respondents who were employees of the Calcutta Dock Labour Board complained against the termination of their employment as registered dock workers on the ground that the orders of termination were illegal and inoperative. The complaint was that in holding the enquiry sufficient opportunity had not been afforded to the respondents to defend themselves. They had been, earlier, detained under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 to prevent them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. After their release from detention notices were served on them to show cause why their services should not be terminated on 14 days notice in terms of clause 56 (2) (d) of the Calcutta Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1951. There was no material against them other than that they had been detained and that their representations to the Advisory Board were not successful. The schemes under which the action was taken against the workers in that case required that the person concerned shall be given an opportunity to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken against him. It is in this context that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court said that the orders called for interference. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Barot v. Divisional Controller, State Transport, Mehsana A.I.R. 1966 S.C 1364. That was a case where a permanent employee of the State Road Transport Corporation, Gujarat was told that his services were terminated on the ground of long absence. The plea was that reasonable opportunity had not been granted to him to show cause. Dealing with this question, the court said: "It is true that the respondent may visit the punishment of discharge or removal from service on a person who has absented himself without leave and without reasonable cause, but this cannot entail automatic removal from service without giving such person reasonable opportunity to show cause why he be not removed. The appellant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause which includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can do only when he knows what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. The appellant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause which includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can do only when he knows what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. In our judgment, the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him". 11. Though the decision to which I have adverted to related to cases of statutory bodies dealing with the services of their employees, the same could be said even in regard to non-statutory bodies which are performing public functions. But this may not be the case with such bodies as companies which are neither statutory bodies nor are public authorities. They are not performing any public duties. A writ may not issue to a company as observed by the Supreme Court in P. T. Corporation v. Imanual A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1306. In that case the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the court in proceedings relating to dismissal of employees. That question arose because the High Court, against whose decision the matter was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court, had while holding that no writ for a mandamus or to re-employ the dismissed employees would lie, granted a declaration in favour of three of the workmen that they have been validly dismissed from service. This direction was also challenged before the Supreme Court. The case was that such declaration, if at all could issue, only against public bodies or companies or corporations set up or controlled by statutes for any breach of the provisions of such statutes. Dealing with this question, the Supreme Court said: The grievance of the company, however, is that though the High Court held rightly that no such petition was maintainable, it nevertheless granted a declaration in favour of three of the said workmen, a declaration which it could not issue once it held that the, said writ petition was misconceived. The argument was that such a declaration, if at all, could only issue against public bodies or companies or corporations set up or controlled by statutes in respect of acts done by them contrary to or in breach of the provisions of such statutes. The argument was that such a declaration, if at all, could only issue against public bodies or companies or corporations set up or controlled by statutes in respect of acts done by them contrary to or in breach of the provisions of such statutes. If a public authority purports to dismiss an employee otherwise than in accordance with mandatory procedural requirements or on grounds other than those sanctioned by the statute the courts would have jurisdiction to declare its act a nullity. Thus, where a Hospital Services Board dismissed a clerk for reasons not authorised by the relevant conditions of service a declaration was granted to the applicant by the House of Lords. [Mc Clelland v. Northern Ireland General Health Services Board, (1957-1 WLR 594)]. Even where a statutory power of dismissal is not made subject to express procedural requirements or limited to prescribed grounds courts have granted a declaration that it was invalidly exercised if the authority has failed to observe rules of natural justice or has acted capriciously or in bad faith or for impliedly unauthorised purposes [See Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 A.C. 40) and Short v. Poole Corporation, (1928 Ch. 66 at pp. 90 and 91)]. Declarations of invalidity have often been founded on successful assertions that a public duty has not been complied with. See Attorney General v. St. Ives R. D. C. [ 1961 (1) Q.B. 366 .] It is, therefore, fairly clear that such a declaration can be issued against a person or an authority or a corporation where the impugned act is in violation of or contrary to a statute under which it is set up or governed or a public duty or responsibility imposed on such person, authority or body by such statute. 12. The Supreme Court in Sirai Municipality v. C.K.F. Tellis A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 855 had occasion to examine whether the decision in Tewari case was not reconcilable with the decision of the U.P. Warehousing Corporation case and the Indian Airlines Corporation case. Incidentally, I may say, the question whether the termination of employment by a statutory authority in violation of the principles of natural justice could be noticed by the High Court under Article 226 and appropriate relief of reinstatement granted could also be answered with the assistance of this decision of the Supreme Court. In paragraphs 18 and 19 Justice Ray, as he then was, said : "18. In paragraphs 18 and 19 Justice Ray, as he then was, said : "18. Termination or dismissal of what is described as a pure contract of master and servant is not declared to be a nullity however wrongful or illegal it may be. The reason is that dismissal in breach of contract is remedied by damages. In the case of servant of the State or of local authorities or statutory bodies, courts have declared m appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statutes. Apart from the intervention of statute there would not be a declaration of nullity in the case of termination or dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory bodies. 19. The courts keep the State and the public authorities within the limits of their statutory powers. Where a State or a public authority dismisses an employee in violation of the mandatory procedural requirements or on grounds which are not sanctioned or supported by statute the courts may exercise jurisdiction to declare the act of dismissal to be a nullity. Such implication of public employment is thus distinguished from private employment in pure cases of master and servant". It may also be profitable to extract the following passage where Beg, J. observed: "The case before us undoubtedly falls within the category of cases where dismissal must be based upon a decision arrived at quasi-judicially about a wrong done by the servant. This elementary and basic procedural safeguard flows not merely from an implied rule of natural justice, but, in the case before us, it is actually embodied in a rule which we cannot interpret as anything other than a legal limitation or fetter on the power of the Municipal authority to dismiss. It constitutes a condition precedent to a valid decision to dismiss whether contained in a resolution or an order of the local authority. As the local Government authority had failed to see that a mandatory duty, embodied in a basic rule, had been carried out, the resulting decision must necessarily be held to be void. 13. It constitutes a condition precedent to a valid decision to dismiss whether contained in a resolution or an order of the local authority. As the local Government authority had failed to see that a mandatory duty, embodied in a basic rule, had been carried out, the resulting decision must necessarily be held to be void. 13. The decision in the Airlines Corporation case as also in the U.P. Warehousing Corporation case have been distinguished from the decision in Tewari case on the ground that the violations complained of in the former sets of cases were not of statutory provisions but merely of terms of the contract between the parties. The decision in the Calcutta Dock Labour Board case and Mafatlal Naraindas case has evidently been approved by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Sirai Municipality case. 14. To sum up: In cases where statutory authorities public functionaries or public authorities act in violation of principles of natural justice in matters relating to termination of service of employees the court will be justified in interfering under Article 226 of the Constitution. The rule that reinstatement can be granted ill exceptional cases could be invoked in such cases. Where a party is aggrieved and he has no other remedy against the injustice that is by itself an exceptional circumstance warranting invoking jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. I have already considered the facts of the case to show that the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer, the second respondent in the case, could not be sustained. It is true that counsel for the respondents Sri T. C. N. Menon seeks to sustain the action of the second respondent on the ground that the bias of the second respondent could not be said to be pecuniary bias and further that at the enquiry the question of bias of the second respondent was not raised by the petitioner. Pecuniary bias is not the only category of bias which may vitiate the decision in a case. The bias of the second respondent in this case was not one about which he had to be alerted. It was self-evident. As I said he was a person who gave the first information and proceeded to substantiate the first information by his evidence. The bias of the second respondent in this case was not one about which he had to be alerted. It was self-evident. As I said he was a person who gave the first information and proceeded to substantiate the first information by his evidence. He was evidently the prosecutor not in any other case but in the same cause in which he was subsequently functioning as an authority to make a report. May be that nevertheless be could, in fact, exercise an independent judgment, though such a case, it appears to me, would rather be the exception than the rule. But even assuming that was the case here, in fairness, he ought not to have taken up the decision of the dispute himself. The decision based upon such report could be successfully challenged as unfair. In the result, the original petition is allowed and Exts. P-6 and P-7 are quashed. The first respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within six months from to-day in case, by that time, no fresh proceedings by way of a proper enquiry is commenced and proceeded with. In case any proceedings are so commenced, that will be expedited and the matter disposed of as early as possible. Parties are directed to suffer costs.