JUDGMENT - M.S. APTE, J.:---This is an appeal by the original plaintiff whose suit for recovery of possession of the suit property with mesne profits has been dismissed by the lower Appellate Court by reversing the decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. 2. The suit property is a house situate within the Municipal limits of Satara City and it bears No. 42 Plaintiffs case was that the property belonged to him and that he had leased it out to the defendant as a tenant. It appears that plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 71 of 1961 against the defendant under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act for eviction of the defendant. That suit, however, was dismissed on the ground that the alleged tenancy was not proved. In appeal also, that decree was upheld. Thereafter the present suit in which this appeal arose was instituted by the plaintiff on November 11, 1964, on the allegation that the title to the property vested in him and that the defendant was in permissive possession of the suit property as his licensee. In other words, the suit in substance was one based on title of the plaintiff. 3. The defendant denied plaintiffs title and that he was in possession as a licensee of the plaintiff. On the other hand, he set up title by adverse possession. 4. The trail Court found that plaintiff succeeded in establishing his title to the property and also that defendant was residing in the suit property with the leave and licence of the plaintiff. Defendants plea that he had acquired title by adverse possession and his plea that the suit was barred by res judicata were rejected and it was found that the plaintiff was in possession within 12 years before suit. In the end, therefore, the trial Court held that defendants licence was duly revoked by the plaintiff and consequently that Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff directing delivery of possession with mesne profits. 5. In appeal, the learned Assistant Judge found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was in possession of the suit property with the leave and licence of the plaintiff. 5. In appeal, the learned Assistant Judge found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was in possession of the suit property with the leave and licence of the plaintiff. According to the learned Judge, this was a suit to which Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies, because in his view this was a suit by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit property on dispossession and, therefore, it was found by that Court that the plaintiffs suit was bared by limitation inasmuch as it was not brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Alternatively the lower Court also considered the question as to whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to the case and came to the conclusion that it did not apply and that the defendant had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. On the question of bar of res judicata the finding of the lower Appellate Court was in favour of the plaintiff. 6. Now, it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant in this appeal that the lower Appellate Court was in error in holding that Article 65 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the present case but it was Article 64 that applied. According to Mr. G.R. Rege who appears for Mr. R.C. Samant for the appellant, the entire approach of the learned Appellate Judge in this respect is wrong. There is considerable force in this contention, in as much as a bare perusal of the plaint would show that in the present suit the plaintiffs claim of possession has been based on title and not on the allegation that while he was in possession he was dispossessed by the defendant. Article 64 applies cases where the suit is for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed and the period of 12 years of limitation starts from the date of dispossession. That, however, is not the case of the plaintiff in the present case. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that he is the owner, and title to the property is vested in him and the defendant was in permissive possession. That, however, is not the case of the plaintiff in the present case. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that he is the owner, and title to the property is vested in him and the defendant was in permissive possession. Therefore, Article 65 which applies to a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title is applicable to the present suit, and the period of 12 years prescribed for such a suit starts when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. It is, therefore, obvious that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in holding that Article 64 was attracted to this case. It is true that the lower Appellate Court was in the alternative considered the question as to the applicability of Article 65; but the reasoning given by the learned Judge in this respect is entirely wrong. The fundamental approach in this respect is even wrong. The learned Judge has observed: "If a person is in possession of the property for long and without any attempt at concealment and if his possession is overt, then the person against whom time is running ought to know that time is running against him." But this is not a correct proposition of law. In order the possession should amount to adverse possession, it must be open, hostile and adverse to the knowledge of the true owner. The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, wrong in observing that it was not necessary that a person seeking to prescribe adverse title to real owner must inform the real owner that he is denying his title. It is true that he need not inform, but at least he must openly assert title to the property to the knowledge of the true owner. It is not enough if he quietly in his mind every day says that he holds the property adversely to the true owner: he must make his claim known to the true owner. 7. It appears to me, therefore, that the lower Appellate Court was obviously in error in holding that the suit was not governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 7. It appears to me, therefore, that the lower Appellate Court was obviously in error in holding that the suit was not governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. In fact, since Article 65 was the appropriate Article applicable to this case, the lower Appellate Court ought to have first gone into the question of title of the plaintiff and then should have also examined whether defendant proved his adverse possession for the statutory period. That not having been done, it is necessary to remand the matter to the lower Appellate Court to record a finding on the question of title of the plaintiff and the claim of the defendant of having acquired title by adverse possession. 8. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and sent back the matter to the lower Appellate Court to decide the aforesaid two points and to dispose of the appeal according to law, after giving both sides an opportunity of hearing. Costs of this appeal would be costs in the cause. ------