Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs are the appellants. Their suit which was for declaration of title and possession and for other reliefs was decreed is their favour by the trial court but was dismissed on appeal. 2. The eleven plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 8 were members of an Ezhava tarwad. In 1073 the Kavalayur Devaswom which is now being managed by the first defendant, the Travancore Devaswom Board (hereinafter palled the Board) leased the suit property, 50 cents in extent, to Mathevan Sankaran, the then karnavan of the tarwad. By the partition deed Ext. P1 of 1945 the second defendant, the then karnavan separated with his share in the suit property, scheduled A in the plaint. There was another partition Ext. P2 in 1949, under which the B schedule (in the plaint) was allotted to the branch of plaintiffs 10 and 11 and defendants 7 and 8, C schedule was allotted to plaintiffs 1 to 6 and defendant 3 and D schedule was allotted to plaintiffs 7 to 9 and defendants 4 to 6. The partition deeds provided that the allottees would pay the rent due to the Devaswom. In 1952 the Board which had taken over the Devaswom instituted O. S.78 for recovery of the property with arrears of rent and damages for waste. Ext. D4 is the plaint in that suit. Defendants 2, 8, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were defendants 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 2 respectively in O. S.78. Defendants 4 and 5 here who were minors were represented by their father Veloo (who was defendant 8 therein). Defendants 2,7,8 and 3 herein filed a written statement Ext. D10 contesting the suit claiming discharge of arrears of rent, and compensation for improvements. No evidence was given in support of these contentions and on 16-1-1954 the court decreed the suit allowing recovery of the property, arrears of rent and damages for waste and directing that the latter items could be set off against the value of improvements which was granted on the admission of the Board. Ext. D3 is the judgment and Ext. P4 is the decree in that case. The Board executed the decree and on 30 61956 took delivery of the land, Ext. D5 being the delivery list and Ext. D6 being the Amin's report. Ext. D3 is the judgment and Ext. P4 is the decree in that case. The Board executed the decree and on 30 61956 took delivery of the land, Ext. D5 being the delivery list and Ext. D6 being the Amin's report. There was obstruction to delivery of the building and pursuant to a further application the Board obtained possession of the building on 26-10-1956 under the delivery list Ext. D7. Ext. D8 is the relative report of the Amin. The property was immediately after, leased to defendant 2 and in 1961 under an auction a further lease was granted to him under Ext. D9 (same as Ext. D12) dated 17-7-61. 3. In 1966 the 11 plaintiffs (of whom plaintiffs 2 to 11 were minors represented by the first plaintiff) brought this suit. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were minors at the time O.S.78 but had not been made parties thereto and the other plaintiffs were subsequently born children. The plaintiffs sought declaration of their title and possession over items B,C and D in the plaint and a further declaration that the decree and execution proceedings in O.S.78 and the lease deed in favour of the second defendant were void. So far as relevant they alleged that the decree was void as karnavans of each of the branches were not impleaded as such, that proper parties were not impleaded that the second defendant who was entrusted with the conduct of that suit defaulted and colluded with the Board and that the decree was vitiated by fraud and collusion. It was also stated that the delivery proceedings were all fictitious, that there was no dispossession of items B, C and D and that the lease deed was void. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit maintaining the validity and regularity of the decree and execution proceedings and of the lease deed. The second defendant further repudiated the allegations against him. 5. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit maintaining the validity and regularity of the decree and execution proceedings and of the lease deed. The second defendant further repudiated the allegations against him. 5. So far as material the trial court held that O. S.78 of 52 was not against the plaintiffs' tarwad for it had been divided but only against the branches; even so it violated S.27, Travancore Ezhava Act 1100, in that the karna-van and senior anandaravans of the several branches were not made parties thereto with the result that the decree was void against the branches of the plaintiffs and items B, C and D, that the execution proceedings were also void for the same reason, that these branches were in possession of the properties obtained by them under Ext. P2 and had not been dispossessed in execution and that the lease deed Ext. D12 had not taken effect. On these findings the plaintiffs were given a decree in their favour. 6. On appeal the lower appellate court held that there was no violation of S.27 or irregularity in execution proceedings or any fraud or collusion to vitiate the decree or execution. It found that pursuant to the lease, the second defendant was in possession and even if some of the others were in occupation of the building, it could only be under him. The court below accordingly reversed the decree and dismissed the suit with costs. 7. The principal contention in support of the appeal was the alleged breach of S.27, Ezhava Act, but before dealing with it I might dispose of some other contentions. There was some suggestion that the decree in O. S.78 of 52 was vitiated by fraud and collusion. This is not covered by any issue or finding of the trial court and has been rejected by the appellate court for want of evidence. The second defendant had become separate in 1945 and was under no obligation to protect the interests of the others and the case that he was put in charge of the defence of O.S. 78 of 52 is supported only by the evidence of the first plaintiff as Pw.1 but that evidence, apart from being interested, is of no value as he was a mere child at the time of that litigation. No one who is said to have entrusted him with the defence has been examined. No one who is said to have entrusted him with the defence has been examined. It was then argued that the other defendants who had joined in filing the written statement Ext. D10 were negligent in not taking any steps either to prove the plea of discharge of rent or the claim of improvements. But then there is absolutely no evidence that these pleas were sustainable to support the contention that failure to prosecute them spells conduct that is fraudulent or even negligent. Counsel then sard that the defendants failed to invoke the protection of Act VIII of 1950 against eviction by the Board. For one thing such a contention does not appear to have been taken in either of the courts below. That apart, the protection of that Act was not available to tenants who were guilty of acts of waste on the property or were in arrears of rent accrued due after the commencement of the Act. The decree in O.S. 78 Ext P4 had found waste and arrears of rent, and the plaintiffs have no case that rent was not in arrears at the date of eviction. The protection of the Act was not thus available to the defendants and they cannot be blamed or charged with negligence for not taking a plea that was of no avail. There was no defence to the suit or execution and pw.1 himself speaks to none and there is no point in the suggestion that the decree was the result of collusion for the Board stood in no need of such devices to obtain reliefs. I reject these contentions. 8. Turning to the contention based on S.27, a few facts require to be recalled. All the members of the tarwad except plaintiffs 1 and 2 who were minors were parties to O.S. 78 of 52 and among them, defendants 4 and 5 were represented by their father Veloo as guardian. By Ext. P1 the second defendant had divided off taking A schedule property and by Ext. P2 the remaining members divided into branches partitioning the rest of the property into B, C and D schedules. The heads of these branches the karnavathies were impleaded, in O.S. 78 of 52, as also the minors except two in those branches. By Ext. P1 the second defendant had divided off taking A schedule property and by Ext. P2 the remaining members divided into branches partitioning the rest of the property into B, C and D schedules. The heads of these branches the karnavathies were impleaded, in O.S. 78 of 52, as also the minors except two in those branches. The contention that these karnavathies were not impleaded or described "as such" which is the expression used in S.27 has no merit for there is no magic in that expression, because "In determining whether a decree was obtained against a karnavan as representative of the tarwad, Courts have attached more importance to the nature of the debt and the substance of the claim and have not insisted upon any particular form of words in the frame of the suit." (Vaaradachariar, J. in Pappi Amma v. Rama Iyer, AIR. 1937 Madras 438) 9. This passage was cited with approval and followed in Kesava Pillai v. Govindan Nair, 1954 KLT 620 (F.B.), where it was further laid down: "It is enough that the person was in fact the karnavan and the action was to enforce a claim against the tarwad. " 10. Both these decisions were followed by this Court in Padmanabhan Nair v. Vasudevan Nair, 1959. KLT 984. 11. 1954 KLT 620 and 1959 KLT 984 were concerned with S.31, Travancore Nair, Act, but nothing turns on that circumstance as that section is identical in terms with S.27 of the Travancore Ezhava Act. 12. It was then contended that so far as the third defendant's branch was concerned, the third defendant, the karanavathi, was alone impleaded in O. S.78 of 52 but not the first plaintiff who was the senior anandaravan and this again constituted a breach of S.27. In contrast counsels pointed out that in the sixth defendant's branch, defendants 4 and 5 had also been impleaded. This contention proceeds on erroneous premises. While S.4(8), Ezhava Act, defines "Anandaravars" as meaning all the members of a tarwad other than the karnavan, S.4(9) defines "Senior Anandaravan" as the major Anandaravan who for the time being is next in the order of succession to karnavasthanam in the tarwad. The latter definition is explicit that an anandaravan qualifies as the "Senior Anandaravan" not only by being next in the order of succession to karnavasthanam but by being a major. The latter definition is explicit that an anandaravan qualifies as the "Senior Anandaravan" not only by being next in the order of succession to karnavasthanam but by being a major. First plaintiff who was the senior member in the third defendant's branch was admittedly a minor and going by his deposition, only 5 years old at the time of the institution of O.S. 78 in 1952. He was by no means the "Senior Anandaravan" in terms of the definition; he had no right to be impleaded nor was the Board under any statutory obligation to implead him. That being so, the ordinary principle of Marumakkathayam law applied under which a suit was competent against the karnavan alone as representing the tarwad. The contention that where the karnavan is a major and the other members are minors, all should be made party defendants, if necessary by invoking 0.1, R.8, Code of Civil Procedure, is supported neither by statute nor by precedent nor by the principles of Marumakkathayam law. 13. Now the persons sued were in fact the karnavars of respective branches and the suit O.S. 78 was to enforce a claim against the tarwad that the claim was against the tarwad is proved not only by the original lease deeds Ext. D2 in favour of Mathevan Sankaran but also by the partition deeds Exts. P1 and P2. Considering the nature and substance of the claim and the parties impleaded there is no doubt that the suit was one against the tarwad and as already shown it was in conformity with the terms of S.27. Balakrishna Pillai v. Gourikutty Amma, 1965 KLT 635 (F.B.), which was quoted by counsel in support of his contention has no application. In a suit to enforce a hypothecation on a property which was allotted to the sub-tarwad of the 8th defendant in a partition subsequent to the hypothecation, the representatives of the sub-tarwad were not impleaded; and the persons impleaded were the karnavan and senior anandaravan of the main tarwad which had no right to the property. The 8th defendant was made a party not as representing her sub-tarwad but only as a subsequent encumbrancer and the:senior anandaravan was not impleaded at all. The 8th defendant was made a party not as representing her sub-tarwad but only as a subsequent encumbrancer and the:senior anandaravan was not impleaded at all. It was on those facts that this Court held that the suit contravened S.31 of the Travancore Nair Act and that the decree and execution proceedings were not binding on the sub-tarwad of the 8th defendant. The decision will hardly apply to the facts in the present case and affords no support to the appellants' contention. I reject these contentions based on S.27, Ezhava Act. The decree in O.S. 78 of 52 is valid and unaffected by any infirmity. 14. It only remains to consider the appellants' argument that even if the decree in O.S.78 of 52 is not void, there was no effective delivery of the property and as the suit is for declaration of possession as well, the plaintiffs are entitled in any event to such a declaration. I have already referred to Exts. D5 and D7, the delivery lists, and Exts. D6 and D7 the relative reports submitted by the Amins. Neither the Amins nor the attestors to the delivery lists have been examined by the plaintiffs to challenge the presumption of regularity that attaches to these proceedings. It is also worth mentioning that Veloo, father of defendants 4 and 5 is an attestor to Ext. D7. There is no material to doubt the regularity of the delivery proceedings. Immediately after the delivery the property was leased to the second defendant and this was followed up by a regular deed Ext. D9 of 1961. The delivery was. in 1956 and from 1957 we find the second defendant regularly paying the rent as evidenced by the receipts Ext.D11 series. That the lease was regular and effective is even otherwise clear from the testimony of Pw. 3 who deposes that at the auction for granting the lease he and Veloo were also present and that after taking the lease the second defendant had given the property to others as well. This "giving" can only be as a matter of grace, out of his relationship with them. That also accounts for the tax receipts Ext. P3 series for the year 1965 and house tax receipts Ext. P7 series for the years 1964, 1965 and 1967 produced by the plaintiffs. This "giving" can only be as a matter of grace, out of his relationship with them. That also accounts for the tax receipts Ext. P3 series for the year 1965 and house tax receipts Ext. P7 series for the years 1964, 1965 and 1967 produced by the plaintiffs. All these receipts were obtained either just before the suit or after the suit and carry no evidentiary value especially in view of the circumstance that no earlier similar receipts and no rent receipts have come into court on behalf of the plaintiffs. I agree with the lower appellate court that even if some of the parties are in occupation of the building it can only be under the second defendant and not in any independent right. 15. I confirm the decision of the lower appellate court and dismiss the appeal with costs one set.