JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - These two writ petitions raise common questions and can conveniently he disposed of together. The petitioners in these ,two writ petitions are owners of motor car taxis which they ply inter alia between Bareilly and Pilibhit, On the way the taxis.had. to pass through a by pass route which falls within the Town Area Committee, Nawabganj. The Town Area constructed a toll tax barrier near the Nawabganj by pass route and started realising a sum of Rs. 2/- per taxi per trip as toll tax. The petitioners approached the District Magistrate and the Chairman Town Area Committee and pointed out to them that no toll tax was payable but they got no redress. They have, therefore, instituted these writ petitions with a prayer for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing respondent No. 1 not to realise any toll tax in respect of the petitioners taxis passing through the aforesaid by pass route. 2. A copy of the Toll Tax Rules framed by the Town Area Committee Nawabganj, has been filed along with the writ petitions. Schedule `A' to these rules contains the various entries which are liable to pay toll tax, Schedule `3' contains a list of exemptions from toll tax. According to the Town Area Committee the case of the petitioners falls within entry No. 16 of Schedule `A' of the Rules, namely, "16. Laden Motor Lorry or Motor' Truck." 3. The petitioners case is that their taxis carried only passengers who travelled with their personal luggage and no other goods and consequently their taxis cannot be termed "Laden". The question whether vehicles laden with passengers came with in the purview of the entry as "Laden Motor Lorry or motor truck" came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Notified Area Committee Garh Mukteshwar through its Secretary, Sri Khazan Singh v. Addl. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut and other, 1973 A.L.J. 206. In that case a similar toll tax was levied by the Notified Area Garh Mukteshwar and Schedule `A' of the rules of the said Notified Area contained the entries liable to pay toll tax. Entry No. 16 was similar to the entry in the instant case, namely, "Laden motor lorry or motor truck". The Hindi translation of entry No. 16 in the case referred to above was "Bojh se ladi Gari athwa motor truck". Entry No. 16 was similar to the entry in the instant case, namely, "Laden motor lorry or motor truck". The Hindi translation of entry No. 16 in the case referred to above was "Bojh se ladi Gari athwa motor truck". A copy of the relevant notification containing the rules of Town Area, Nawabganj as published in the Hindi edition of part III Gazette dated 17-5-1969 has been produced before us and entry No. 16 says- "Bojh se ladi motor lorry ya motor truck." In the case of Notified Area, Garh Mukteshwar 1973 A.L.J. 206, on the finding that `Bojh' refers to goods or articles and not human beings, it was held that the vehicles laden with passengers were not within the purview of the entry and no toll was payable in respect of them. In view of the aforesaid decision we are of opinion that the taxis of the petitioners cannot be held liable to toll tax merely on the ground that they are laden with passengers. 4. Learned counsel for the Town Area Committee however, emphasised that since the passengers also carried their personal luggage along with them and such personal luggage did not come within any of the exemptions contained in Schedule `B' of the rules, the taxis of the petitioners were still liable to pay toll tax. According to the learned counsel personal luggage constituted goods or articles and the taxis carrying such personal luggage would be deemed to be laden within the meaning of entry No. 16. A similar question was urged in the case of Notified Area Committee Garh Mukteshwart, also but no opinion was expressed ,about it on the ground that on, the facts of that case this question did not arise. Learned counsel for the petitioners has on the other hand sought to bring the case of the petitioners within exemption No. 4 of Schedule `B' to the rules which is to the following effect :- "4. Bonafide personal luggage of a Railway passenger, and house-hold articles of employees coming on transfer." 5. In one of the writ petitions `namely, writ petition No. 7564 of 1972, it has been stated in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that the petitioner usually carries passengers getting down at the Bareilly junction to Pilibhit. Bonafide personal luggage of a Railway passenger, and house-hold articles of employees coming on transfer." 5. In one of the writ petitions `namely, writ petition No. 7564 of 1972, it has been stated in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that the petitioner usually carries passengers getting down at the Bareilly junction to Pilibhit. The trains for Pilibhit are very inconvenient and so the passengers going to and coming from Pilibhit find it convenient to undertake the journey by taxi. The luggage which is loaded in the taxi is the bonafide personal luggage of the railway passengers. 6. It was urged for the Town Area Committee that even though it may he true that some of the passengers travelling on the taxis of the petitioners may be Railway passengers but it was not even the petitioners case that no passenger other than the Railway passengers was allowed to travel on their taxis. According to the learned counsel it could not, therefore, be said that all the passengers, came within the aforesaid exemption. 7. Learned counsel wanted us to construe the aforesaid exemption literally and if so done, there was no scope for bringing passenger the exemption any passenger other than a Railway passenger. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of opinion that if a literal construction is placed on the phrase bonafide personal luggage of a Railway passenger, it will become unworkable. After a Railway passenger has alighted from a train and before he boards a taxi or other conveyance for onward journey, he has to hand over the Railway ticket to the Ticket Collector. Thereafter, he does normally have no proof of the fact that he is a Railway passenger which he may be able to furnish at the toll barrier. A literal construction of the phrase will almost render the exemption nugatory and defeat its very purpose. Such a construction has to be avoided. In. Sea ford Court Estates Ltd. v. A-sher, 1949 (2) All England Law Reports 155 Leaning, L. J. at page 164 held :- "....when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. Such a construction has to be avoided. In. Sea ford Court Estates Ltd. v. A-sher, 1949 (2) All England Law Reports 155 Leaning, L. J. at page 164 held :- "....when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature "......... A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but he can and should iron out the creases." 9. In Ramaswamy Nadar v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 56, it was held that if in construing the section, the court has to supply some words in order to make the meaning of the statute clear, it will naturally prefer the latter construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice. 10. In Shanti Prasad Jain v. The Director of Enforcement Foreign Ex-change Regulation Act, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1764 it was held that a construction which leads to a large scale evasion of the Act resulting in its object being defeated must be avoided. 11. In Firm Amar Nath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1548 it was held that although Courts are not concerned with the policy of the Legislature or with the result whether injurious or otherwise, by giving effect to the language used nor is it the function of the Court where the meaning is clear to give effect to it merely because it would lead to hardship. It cannot, however, be gained that one of the duties imposed on the courts in interpreting a particular provision of law, rule or notification is to ascertain the meaning and intendment of the legislature or of the delegate, which in exercise of the powers conferred on it, has made the rule or notification in question. In doing so, we must always presume that the impugned provision was designed to effectuate a particular object or to meet a particular requirement and not that it was intended to negative that which it sought to achieve. 12. We have, therefore, to construe the phrase "Bonafide personal luggage of a Railway passenger" in such a manner as would make the exemption workable and would not negative that which it sought to achieve. In our opinion, the aforesaid phrase is not exhaustive but only descriptive or illustrative. Such personal effects which a Railway passenger normally carries with him is his bonafide personal luggage, for instance, trunk, suit case, or holdall etc. containing clothes, bedding, articles of toilet, food-stuff necessary for use in the journey and the like. On this interpretation the bonafide personal luggage of any passenger and not necessarily a passenger who may have earlier travelled on Railway will fall under the exemption, and a taxi or other conveyance carrying such passenger along with his bonafide personal luggage will not be deemed to be "laden" liable to pay the toll tax. If, however, a passenger travelling in a taxi carries with him such goods or articles which do not fall within the exemptions.., contained in Schedule `B' of the Rule-or which do not constitute his bonafide personal luggage, the position would be different. In the case before us, there is no material to indicate that the taxis of the petitioners carried any such goods or articles. Consequently the respondent No. 1 is not entitled to realise any toll tax from them. 13. In the result both these writ petitions succeed and are allowed and the Town Area Committee Nawabganj respondent No. 1, is directed not to realise any toll tax in respect of the taxis of the petitioners passing through the Octroi post set up by it as referred to above. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs.