J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filed by the original plaintiff against the opponents-defendants under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the order passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge Senior Division dated 5-2-1974 in Special Civil Suit No. 50 of 1972 below application Ex. 13. ( 2 ) THE facts leading rise to this revision petition briefly stated are as under:petitioner filed Summary Civil Suit No. 1877 of 1969 in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad on 28-8-1969 to recover a sum of Rs. 10 500 the opponents. Preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction was raised and it was held that the City Civil Court Ahmedabad had no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit. The plaint was therefore ordered to be returned to the plaintiff (petitioner) for its presentation to the proper Court on 25 Against that order the petitioner had filed Civil Revision Application on 23-10-1972 in this Court and that was rejected by this Court on 25-10-1972. The petitioner took the plaint from the City Civil Court on 25-15-1972 and presented it to the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Mehsana on 26-10-1972 and it came to be numbered as Special Civil Suit No- 50 of 1972- In that suit petitioner filed application Ex. 13 for permitting him to amend the plaint. One amendment sought for was to incorporate the facts necessary for condoning the delay made in filing the matter before the Mehsana Court on the ground that he was bona fide prosecuting the suit on the same cause of action in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad but the said Court has returned the plaint to him for presenting it to the proper Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to hear the suit. That amendment is allowed by the trial Court. We are therefore not concerned with that amendment. ( 3 ) THE second amendment sought for was for adding a claim for the interest amount that is alleged to have fallen due till the date of presen- tation of the suit before the Court. That amendment has been disallowed by the trial Court on the ground that it was necessary to include this claim of interest which had become due till the date of the presentation of the plaint before the Court while presenting the plaint before the Court. That amendment has been disallowed by the trial Court on the ground that it was necessary to include this claim of interest which had become due till the date of the presentation of the plaint before the Court while presenting the plaint before the Court. But as the petitioner had not done so it assumes the position of the relinquished claim in view of the provisions of Order 2 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Code 9 ) and in view of sub-rule (2) of rule (2) of Order 2 of the Code plaintiff shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. According to the learned trial judge it was the legal right that accrued in favour of the defendents and any such amendment taking away that right cannot be allowed. It is on this reasoning that he has disallowed this prayer made by the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE petitioner by this amendment sought for including his claim of interest of Rs. 3 790 for the period from 28--8-1969 to 25-10-1973. Interest was calculated on the principal amount of Rs. 10 0 at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. He also prayed for consequential changes in the prayer clause on that basis. ( 5 ) MR. B. R. Shelat appearing for Mr. C. N. Desai for the petitioner has contended that the reasoning of the learned trial Judge is not sound. The learned trial Judge submitted Mr. Shelat has not borne in mind the relevant provisions of Order 2 rule 2 of the Code and has mis-understood its real content. ( 6 ) ORDER 2 rule 2 of the Code reads: (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. MR. Shelat has submitted that it was true that at the time of re-presentation of the plaint in the trial Court this interest amount had become due. (2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. MR. Shelat has submitted that it was true that at the time of re-presentation of the plaint in the trial Court this interest amount had become due. At the time of representation of the plaint this claim could have been included and it had remained to be included. It was therefore evident that it was omitted to be included in the plaint that came to be presented in the Mehsana Court. But the important part of sub-rule (2) of rule 2 of Order 2 of the Code in terms states that the plaintiff shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. The petitioner has not filed any other suit in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. In this very suit plaintiff wants to amend his plaint and include the claim which through mistake came to be omitted. There could not therefore be any bar of Order 2 rule 2 of the Code. The learned trial Judge submitted Mr. Shelat has overlooked this latter part of sub-rule (2) of rule 2 of Order 2 of the Code which creates a bar to sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished subsequently. As there is no such suit filed wherein the claim is made for such a portion of the claim omitted or relinquished and in this very suit only prayer is made to include that claim there cannot be any bar of the provisions of Order 2 rule 2 of the Code. The language of this sub- rule (2) of rule 2 of Order 2 of the Code itself clearly indicates the soundness of the argument advanced by Mr. Shelat. ( 7 ) IN UPENDRA NARAIN ROY V. JANAKI NATH ROY 45 I. L. R. CALCUTTA 305 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court had an occasion to consider this question. At pages 315 and 316 Woodroffe J. has observed:. . AS regards the other point it has more ingenuity than substance. It proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the amendment was prohibited by Order 11 rule 2 This rule does not touch the matter before us. At pages 315 and 316 Woodroffe J. has observed:. . AS regards the other point it has more ingenuity than substance. It proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the amendment was prohibited by Order 11 rule 2 This rule does not touch the matter before us. It refers to a case where there has been a suit in which there has been an omission to sue in respect of portion of a claim and a decree has been made in that suit. In that case a second suit in respect of the portion so omitted is barred. That is not the case here. In the present case the suit has not been heard but a claim has been omitted by it is said inadvertence. To hold that in such case an amendment should not be allowed would be to hold something which the rule does not say and which would be absurd. The rule says he shall not afterwards sue that is it assumes that there has been a suit carried to a decision and a subsequent suit. It does not apply to amendment where there has been only one suit. As the plaintiff had in law a right to apply for an amendment before the conclusion of his suit it cannot be said that any rights of the appellant in the Pabna suit are affected. Such a contention is based on the erroneous assumption that nothing could be done by way of amendment of the Calcutta suit to remove the objection that the claims on the previous mortgage or charge were not sustainable. A case would fall within Order 11 rule 2 only if a plaintiff fails to apply for amendment before decree and then brings another suit. The plaintiffs are not doing that but asking for amendment in the one and only suit they have brought. This is therefore not a case in which the amendment either affects rights accrued to the other party or otherwise prejudices him. ( 8 ) IN KRISHNAJI RAMCHANDRA V. RAGHUNATH SHANKAR AIR 1954 BOMBAY 125 at pages 127 and 128 Dixit J. has observed:now Mr. Madbhavi argues that what we have to look to for the purpose of determining the bar of Order 2 rule 2 is the point of time when the suit is instituted. ( 8 ) IN KRISHNAJI RAMCHANDRA V. RAGHUNATH SHANKAR AIR 1954 BOMBAY 125 at pages 127 and 128 Dixit J. has observed:now Mr. Madbhavi argues that what we have to look to for the purpose of determining the bar of Order 2 rule 2 is the point of time when the suit is instituted. In this connection the language of Order 2 rule 2 (2) may be contrasted with the language of Order 2 rule 2 (3 ). Order 2 rule 2 (2) speaks of an omission to sue or intentionally relinquishing a portion of the claim. While Order 2 rule 2 (3) speaks of a person being entitled to more than one relief in respect of the cause of action and while considering order 2 rule 2 (3) one has to consider the question of the leave of the Court. No question of the leave of the Court arises under Order 2 rule 2 (2 ). In a case where the leave of the Court is to be sought it may be possible to argue that the point of time is not the point of time of the institution of the suit but the point of time is the point of time of the passing of the decree. But here again it is unnecessary to express any final opinion upon the question because that question does not strictly arise Confining therefore my observations to Order 2 rule 2 (2) the question for consideration is whether as Mr. Madbhavi contends the point of time is not the date of the filing of the suit but the date of the passing of the decree. But if one closely looks at the language of Order 2 rule 2 (2) it is clear that the point of time under Order 2 rule 2 (2) is the point of time of the institution of the suit. This is clear from the language of the rule itself because some meaning has to be given to the expression afterwards occurring in Order 2 rule 2 (2) and the expression afterwards can be construed only with reference to what precedes it viz. omits to sue. When therefore the two expressions omits to sue and afterwards are considered together it must follow I think that the point of time is not the date of the passing of the decree but the date of the institution of the suit. omits to sue. When therefore the two expressions omits to sue and afterwards are considered together it must follow I think that the point of time is not the date of the passing of the decree but the date of the institution of the suit. If that is so then it is clear that when the plaintiff filed Suit No. 633 of 1942 he did not include in that suit the whole of his claim in respect of the cause of action and therefore the plaintiff must be taken to have invited the operation of Order 2 rule 2 (2) because the plaintiff must be taken to have either omitted to sue or intentionally relinquished a portion of his claim. Whether it is the result of an omission or the result of a relinquishment it makes no difference not any difference even when the plaintiff subsequently files a suit and that is the bar imposed by Order 2 rule 2 (2 ). It was suggested that in this case the persons in possession were different to bring separate suits. But that I think cannot clearly be the case in view of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in MAHOMED KHALIL KHAN V. MAHBUB ALI MIAN A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 78. IT is significant to note that in the instant case we are not concerned with any such question of point of time whether the point of time would be the institution of the suit or the passing of a decree as the plaintiff has not filed any other suit. We are concerned with the very suit in which such claim came to be omitted and the petitioner in that very suit now wants to include by the amendment of the plaint. ( 9 ) IN JAGAT SINGH V. SANGAT SINGH AIR 1940 PRIVY COUNCIL 70 the Privy Council has at page 73 made the following instructive observationsthe High Court would seem to have assumed that sec. 19 (of the Civil Procedure Code 1882 was not merely permissive: also that the claim to recover possession of the Lyallpur lands and the claim to a declaration as regards the other lands were claims in respect of the same cause of action: of. 41 I. A. 142. Their Lordships think that both assumptions are highly debateable. 19 (of the Civil Procedure Code 1882 was not merely permissive: also that the claim to recover possession of the Lyallpur lands and the claim to a declaration as regards the other lands were claims in respect of the same cause of action: of. 41 I. A. 142. Their Lordships think that both assumptions are highly debateable. But in any case the claim of the present appellants as reversioners of Ishar Singh would not have been barred so far as regards the question whether Ishar Singhs will gave to his widow an absolute interest or an interest for her life. Moreover so long as the suit of 1906 was undis- posed of it was always possible that the Court if it thought that there was anything in the point as to Order 2 rule 2 would give leave to the plaintiff to amend by including a claim to recover possession of the ornaments and Lyallpur lands. IT is thus evident that such an amendment can be allowed and there cannot be any bar of the provisions of Order 2 rule 2 (2) of the Code. The learned trial Judge has in my opinion clearly committed an error in holding that there would be such a bar and consequently a valuable right has accrued in favour of the opponents defendants and so such an amend ment application should not be allowed. ( 10 ) REVISION petition is allowed. The order passed by the trial Court that this second amendment cannot be allowed is set aside and that amendment is also allowed and the petitioner is permitted to include the said claim of interest in his amended plaint. Opponents to pay the costs of the petitioner in this revision petition. Rule is made absolute. ( 11 ) THE learned trial Judge will give reasonable time to the opponents after the amendment is carried out by the plaintiff petitioner to file a written statement to the amended plaint. It is needless to say that it will be open to the opponents to contend a portion of this claim included is time barred. .