JUDGMENT - G.N. Vaidya, J.:---The point which arises in the above Second Appeal is fully covered by the decision of this Court in (Annasaheb Bhausaheb Patil v. Gangabai Annagonda Patil)1, 73 Bom.L.R. 407. 2. The appellant-defendant No. 2 resisted the suit filed by respondent No. 1 Channappa Nagappa Shilwant her paternal uncle for the recovery of possession of house bearing Municipal No. 1505 on the ground that although her mother Ratnabai, widow of Chanappas brother Veerpakshappa had executed an agreement that she would enjoy the suit house during her life time and Ratnabai died in year 1962. Ratnabai had become a full owner of the property under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The two courts below over-ruled this contention relying on the agreement by way of compromise between Ratnabai and the plaintiff. 3. The view taken by the two courts below is contrary to the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, in Annasahab Bhausaheb Patils case. In that case the widow of a coparcener who dies before the coming into force of the Hindu Womens Rights of Property Act, 1937, was put in possession of certain joint family property for he lifetime in lieu of maintenance under an award decree passed in 1903. Her right to alienate the property was confined to raising of a loan on the security of the property for the purpose of paying Government revenue. She was in possession of the property on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. On the question whether she got full ownership of the property under section 14(1) of the Act, it was laid down, that on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act the widow was limited owner within the contemplation of section 14(1) of the Act, and that, therefore, she was entitled to become the full owner of the property on that date. 4. In the present case we have a compromise decree in respect of the suit property land on an agreement in respect of the suit property which was in possession of Ratnabai. Ratnabai was entitled to maintenance and also to a right to reside in the property independent of the compromise decree as she was the widow of the deceased coparcener. In the present case we have a compromise decree in respect of the suit property land on an agreement in respect of the suit property which was in possession of Ratnabai. Ratnabai was entitled to maintenance and also to a right to reside in the property independent of the compromise decree as she was the widow of the deceased coparcener. The following observations at page 412 of Palekar, J. as he then was, in this connection are relevant :--- "The grant, instrument or decree will have only to be regarded as working out the Hindu females antecedent right to property which is thereby recognised." It is also stated at page 414 :--- "Nevertheless, a right to maintenance is a right attached to the family property. The question is whether this distinction determines the application of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, as the case may be. In our opinion, this emphasis on the nature of the antecedent right is not as important as the question whether the instrument, decree or award in sub-section (2) is the real source or originate or of the restricted estate granted thereunder." 5. It cannot be disputed that if Ratnabai became absolute owner of the suit premises, the plaintiffs suit must be dismissed as the appellant, Ratnabais daughter is the only heir of Ratnabai and the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the estate of Ratnabai of which she had become the full owner under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. 6. In the result the Second Appeal is allowed. The decree passed by the two courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs throughout. ------