B. K. MEHTA, J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners tenants who were in actual possession of the land in question have filed this petition as their application under sec. 32pp of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 hereinafter referred to as the Act which was made on May 29 1971 along with the stay application against the order of surrender in landlords favour under sec. 32p (2) was held to be incompetent and the stay application had been rejected on that ground. ( 2 ) THE short facts which have given rise to this petition are as under :the petitioners tenants purchase of the land in question was declared ineffective by the order of the A. L. T. on March 8 1964 Thereafter the order of disposal of this land under sec. 32p (2) was made by surrendering to the landlord on August 20 1969 and that order was finally confirmed by this Court. Meanwhile sec. 32pp having been enacted with effect from December 29 1965 the petitioners exercised their option to purchase this land by making an application under sec. 32pp on May 29 1971 and in the same application asked for stay of the order of handing over possession to the landlord. The Mamlatdar without giving any hearing to the petitioners by a mere letter at Annex. A rejected this application on the ground that the petitioners had no rights to purchase the land under sec. 32pp and therefore no slay order could be granted. In appeal The Dy. Collector by the order dated September 23 1971 at Annex. B held that such a reply of the Mamlatdar was clearly in contravention of the principles of natural justice. He however confirmed this order on the sole ground that in view of the settled legal position as laid down by this Court in Spl. C. A. No. 1441/1970 decided on March 3 1971 once the order of disposal was passed under sec. 32p (2) even though actual possession may not have been taken the land must be considered to have been disposed of. In view of that settled legal position application under sec. 32pp was clearly incompetent. Thereafter the Revenue Tribunal by the order at Annex. C dated June 29 1972 has confirmed these orders on the very same ground. Therefore the petitioners have filed this present petition. In view of that settled legal position application under sec. 32pp was clearly incompetent. Thereafter the Revenue Tribunal by the order at Annex. C dated June 29 1972 has confirmed these orders on the very same ground. Therefore the petitioners have filed this present petition. The stay order which had been obtained by the petitioners has been condition even by this Court by granting interim relief on November 10 1972 Therefore the petitioners have remained in possession of the land in question. No affidavit in reply has been filed by the landlord. This matter has been referred to the Division Bench by Divan J. (as he then was) as he was unable to agree with my decision in Sp. C. A. Nos. 324-325/67 decided on July 31 1970 where 1 had taken the view as regards the second condition in sec. 32pp (1) as covering cases of actual disposal by one of the two alternatives : (1) by surrendering to landlord; or (2) by sale to the priority holder distinguishing the earlier decision on facts. The question of resolution of this conflict no longer survives because the legislature has now retrospectively given an explanation to sec. 32pp after sub-sec. (5) as under :explanation:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of any Court tribunal or other authority for the purpose of clause (ii) of sub- sec (1) the land shall not be deemed to have been disposed of till the person entitled to take possession of the land in pursuance of any direction issued under sub-sec (2) of sec. 32p takes actual possession of such land in accordance with lawthis amendment was introduced by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973 and it came into force on the specified date March 3 1973 So far as this explanation is concerned the legislature has given retrospective effect by adding that the explanation shall be and shall be deemed always to have been added. The legal effect of these words is well settled after their Lordships decision in M. K. VENKATCHARAM J. T. O. AND ANOTHER V. BOMBAY DYEING AND MFG. CO. LTD. The legal effect of these words is well settled after their Lordships decision in M. K. VENKATCHARAM J. T. O. AND ANOTHER V. BOMBAY DYEING AND MFG. CO. LTD. A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 875 where an identical question had arisen before their Lordships as to whether an assessment which had been as per the law in force could be said to be vitiated by mistake apparent on the record merely because the law was retrospectively changed by the legislature. At page 880 their Lordships pointed out that prima facie it would appeal somewhat strange that an order which was good and valid which it was made should be treated as patently invalid and wrong by virtue of the restrospective operation of the amendment Act. Their Lordships however held such a result is necessarily involved in the legal fiction about the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act If as a result of the said fiction we must read the subsequently inserted proviso as forming part of the principal Act on the relevant date the conclusion is inescapable that the order in question is inconsistent with the provisions of the said proviso and must be deemed to suffer from a mistake on the record Therefore which the legislature stated that the explanation shall always be deemed to have been added to the relevant law and the effect is given to the explanation not with standing anything contained in any judgment of any Court it is obvious that this must be treated as the state of law at the date when the authorities erroneously decided that question as to whether the land was disposed of merely by an order under sec. 32p (2 ). In view of this settled legal position it must be held that the authorities orders suffer from an error patent on the record because of this retrospective change of the law and this question could only be decided in the light of the explanation now added by the legislature. Such a retrospective amend- ment of law would immediately disclose patent error in the decision of the authorities in view of the aforesaid settled legal position. ( 3 ) THE next question which is urged by Mr. Such a retrospective amend- ment of law would immediately disclose patent error in the decision of the authorities in view of the aforesaid settled legal position. ( 3 ) THE next question which is urged by Mr. Vakharia is as to the extent of this retrospective operation of this explanation In order to consider this question we would have to analyse the relevant scheme of this benevolant amendment which has been enacted to see that such tenants rights were restored in cases where the deemed purchase on the tillers day April 1 1957 was declared to be ineffective under sec. 32g (3) by reason of the tenant failing to appear before the Tribunal or making a statement expressing his unwillingness to purchase the land and the land had not been disposed of in the manner specified. Sec. 32pp (1) runs as under :notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 32g and 32p where before the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1965 (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said dale) (I) any land has been at the disposal of the Collector under sec. 391 on account of the purchase of the land by the tenant thereof having become the Tribunal sub-see. (3) of see. 32g by reason of the tenant failing to appear before the Tribunal or making a statement expressing his unwillingness to purchase the land and (II) the land so at the disposal of the Collector has not been disposed of in the manner provided in sub-see. (2) of sec. 32p the tenant if he is willing to purchase the land may make an application in writing to the Tribunal within a period of one year from the said dale for a declaration that the purchase has not become ineffective. ( 4 ) UNDER clause (2) on receipt of such an application under sub- sec. (1) the Tribunal had to issue a notice to the tenant and the landlord calling upon them to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. Under sub-clause (3) if the tenant appeared and made a statement that he was willing to purchase the land the land shall cease to be at the disposal of the Collector under sec. 32p and the Tribunal shall determine the purchase price of the land in the manner provided in sec. Under sub-clause (3) if the tenant appeared and made a statement that he was willing to purchase the land the land shall cease to be at the disposal of the Collector under sec. 32p and the Tribunal shall determine the purchase price of the land in the manner provided in sec. 32g as if the purchase had not been ineffective. Under sub-clause (4) the provisions of sec. 32 to 32p and sec. 32q and 32r shall so far as may be applicable apply to the purchase of the land by a tenant. Sub-clause (5) which is material provides as under :in the case of land to which this section applies no action shall be taken under sec. 32p unless the tenant entitled to make an application under this section fails to make such application within the period specified in sub-sec. (1 ). ( 5 ) THEREFORE sec. 32pp operated notwithstanding anything contained in secs. 32g and 32p if sec. 32pp application was made by the tenant within the period of one year from the date of coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1965 which came into force on December 29 1965 provided two statutory conditions were fulfilled :- (1) that before the said date 29-12-65 the land had been at. the disposal of the Collector under sec. 32p on account of the purchase of the land by the tenant having become ineffective under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 32g by reason of the tenant failing to appear before the Tribunal or making a statement expressing his unwillingness to purchase the land and (2) the land so at the disposal of the Collector had not been disposed of in the manner provided in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 32p. As this benefit was given only for a period of one year from December 29 1965 the legislature by further amendment by Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1970 which came into force on April 18 1971 substituted this 1970 Amendment for the 1965 Amendment Act in sub-sec. (1) by enacting sub-sec. (1a) permitting this right to be exercised within one year from the said date April 18 1971 if on account of purchase becoming ineffective under sec. 32 (G) (3) such land had been before 29-12-65 at the disposal and had not been so disposed of under sec. 32p (2 ). Sub-sec. (1) by enacting sub-sec. (1a) permitting this right to be exercised within one year from the said date April 18 1971 if on account of purchase becoming ineffective under sec. 32 (G) (3) such land had been before 29-12-65 at the disposal and had not been so disposed of under sec. 32p (2 ). Sub-sec. (1b) was also added provid- ing that where an application for a declaration that the purchase had not become ineffective made by a tenant under sub-sec. (1) before this Amendment Act of 1970 was not admitted by the Tribunal on the ground that the period for making it had expired such tenant shall also be entitled to exercise the right conferred under sub-sec. (1) by making an application within the period specified i. e. April 18 1971 and on receipt of an application from any such tenant the Tribunal had to admit it as if it had been an application made within the specified period. Thereafter sub-clause (1c) was added by the Gujarat Amendment Act No. 5 of 1973 which came into force from March 3 1973 It enacted that notwith standing the expiry of the period specified in sub-sec. (1) read with sub-sec. (1a) the right conferred under sub-sec (1) may be exercised at any time before 31st December 1973; and the amendment Act No. 7 of 1974 has further extended this period upto December 31 1974 That is why sub-clause (1d) was also added on the same lines with sub-clause (1b) by providing that where an application for a declaration that the purchase had not become ineffective was made under sub-sec. (1) by the tenant before the specified date but was not admitted by the Tribunal on the ground that the period had expired such tenant shall also be entitled to exercise the right conferred under sub-sec. (1) by making an application at any time before December 31 1973 which is now extended to December 31 1974 and on receipt of such an application the Tribunal shall admit it as if it were an application made within the period specified for making it. Therefore even through the tenants have been given a fresh opportunity Civil upto December 31 1974 by this amendment in cases of those tenants who had applied to the Tribunal under sub-sec. Therefore even through the tenants have been given a fresh opportunity Civil upto December 31 1974 by this amendment in cases of those tenants who had applied to the Tribunal under sub-sec. (1) but their application was not admitted on the ground that the period had expired they have got the whole period retrospectively extended by the deeming fictions in sub sec. (1b) and (1d) that the application made upto December 31 1974 shall be treated as if it were made within the period specified for making it under sub-sec. (1 ). No such fiction exists in the case of other tenants who had not made any such application but who are given only a concession to exercise this option at any time before 31st December 1974 Similarly new sec. 32ppp has been added which is on the same lines as sec. 32pp but which covers even those cases where on account of such purchase having become ineffective under sec. 32g (3) the land had been at the disposal of the Collector and was not so disposed of under sec. 32p (3) on or after the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1965 i. e. December 29 1965 Therefore in all cases where the purchase had become ineffective under sec. 32g (3) a nd land was at disposal of the Collector under sec. 32 (P) before December 29 1965 or after December 29 1965 these two sections (sec 32pp and 32 PPP) have given a further opportunity to the tenants to purchase the had by exercising their right at any time before December 31 1974 by applying to the Tribunal if it had not been disposed of. As earlier pointed out the only difference in cases of those applicants who had already gone to the Tribunal but whose applications were rejected on the ground that the period had expired. their right is revived without any hiatus by the deeming fiction in sub-secs. (1b) and (1d) that their applications shall be deemed to have been made within the period prescribed in sec. 32pp (1 ). Such a provision was not necessary in the scheme of sec. 32ppp as the right to apply was from the commencement given and extended till December 31 1972 for lands which came for disposal under sec. 32p on or after 29-12-1965. 32pp (1 ). Such a provision was not necessary in the scheme of sec. 32ppp as the right to apply was from the commencement given and extended till December 31 1972 for lands which came for disposal under sec. 32p on or after 29-12-1965. The other salient feature of the scheme is that in the case of a land to which this sec. 32pp or 32ppp applies no action of disposal could be taken under sec. 32p unless the tenant entitled to male an application failed to make the same within the period specified in sub-sec. (1 ). So far as the original sec. 32pp was concerned this period specified had changed from time to time and due to that gap which had been from December 29 1965 to April 18 1971 between the two Amendment Acts Or 1965 and 1970 the retrospectivity had been given only in cases where the application has been made and was rejected on the ground that time had expired by enacting the necessary fiction in sub-secs. (1b) and (1d) of sec. 32pp. Therefore the prohibition in sec. 32pp (5) would apply where that necessary fiction as to original period specified in sec. 32pp (I) applies and not in other cases of fresh applicants till 31-12-74 even if the disposal action was already taken under sec. 32p. ( 6 ) THE further explanation had now been added. The second relevant condition in the scheme of these two secs. 32pp and 32ppp was that the land so at the disposal of the Collector had not been disposed of in the manner provided in see. 32p (2 ). The legislature had therefore male the retrospective amendment in see. 32pp by declaring in this explanation that till actual possession was according to law taken the land shall. not be deemed to have been disposed of notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of any Court Tribunal or other authority for the purposes of exercise of this right of purchase under sec. 32pp (1) (ii) or 32ppp (1) (ii ). Therefore mere order of disposal by surrendering to the landlord or by sale to the priority holder would not be deemed to be disposal in view of this explanation. 32pp (1) (ii) or 32ppp (1) (ii ). Therefore mere order of disposal by surrendering to the landlord or by sale to the priority holder would not be deemed to be disposal in view of this explanation. The legislature has however while amending the law retrospectively by this explanation further provided a limit on this fiction by enacting that the land would not be deemed to have been disposed of only till the person entitled to take possession of the land in purchase of any direction under sec. 32p (2) takes actual possession of land in accordance with law. ( 7 ) IT is this fetter on the fiction which has been the subject of serious controversy between the parties. Mr. Vakharia vehemently argued that the legislature has not only got over the effect of the decision of this Court holding that the land must be considered to have been disposed of when the order was passed under sec. 32p (2) even though actual possession may not have been taken but the explanation goes much further by fully restoring the lost rights because it contemplates the point of time when actual possession is taken in accordance with law by the person entitled to take possession. Mr. Vakharia therefore pointed out that as sec. 32 or sec. 32ppp (5) enacts a prohibition that no action shall he taken under sec. 32p unless the tenant entitled to make an application fails to make the same within the period specified in sub-sec. (1) it is obvious that during this entire extended period till December 31 1974 the land could not be deemed to have been disposed of even though after the order of disposal even actual possession had been taken in execution of that order because taking of such possession was plainly in violation of this statutory fetter created by sub-sec. (5 ). Mr. Shah on the other hand rightly pointed out that the legislature would never have unsettled those cases while actual possession was taken in accordance with law. While giving fresh opportunity by extending the period even upto December 31 1974 to such tenants for fresh purchase. The key to the resolution of this conflict lies in the proper appreciation on the relevant scheme which has been adopted by amending this provision from time to time. While giving fresh opportunity by extending the period even upto December 31 1974 to such tenants for fresh purchase. The key to the resolution of this conflict lies in the proper appreciation on the relevant scheme which has been adopted by amending this provision from time to time. As earlier pointed out the legislature itself has given retrospective effect to the extension of this specified period by covering the time gap between the two amendments of 1965 and 1970 by providing sub-sec. (1b) and similarly sub-sec. (119) when 1973 amendment came into force. These cases have been confined by the legislature to those tenants who had applied under sec. 32pp but whose application was not admitted by the Tribunal on the ground that the period for making the application had expired and therefore the benefit on the extended period was given retro- spectively to such applications by the deeming fiction that the application made super sub-sec (1k) or sub-sec. (1d) shall be treated as if it was made within the specified period. If fresh application was deemed to have been made within the original specified period by such retrospective fiction it is obvious that sale prohibition created by sub-sec. (5) would apply to these cases. even when action was already taken under sec. 32 (P) (2) by making the order or by executing the order by handing over actual posses- sion on the aforesaid settled legal position in the Bombay Dying case. Therefore in such cases only the legal fiction created by the explanation as supplemented by the other fiction would mean that the land could not be deemed to have been disposed of by the purported fiction under sec. 32 which was not in accordance with law even if it attempted to deprive the tenants of his actual possession. Therefore in such cases the application under sec 321pp would be clearly competent as the second condition would be clearly deemed to be fulfilled by resort to these two actions enacted by sub-secs. (1b) and (1d) and by the explanation notwithstanding any purported action under sec. 32p (2 ). Therefore in such cases the application under sec 321pp would be clearly competent as the second condition would be clearly deemed to be fulfilled by resort to these two actions enacted by sub-secs. (1b) and (1d) and by the explanation notwithstanding any purported action under sec. 32p (2 ). ( 8 ) IN other cases however where the benefit of a mere concession accrued and got extended because of the further amendment under sub- clause (IC) and by the amendment Act No. 7 of 1974 extending this right upto December 31 1974 the legislature has not given further retrospectivity by creating a fiction that such later application was also deemed to be an application made within the period specified for making it. Therefore in these cases if the tenants had not made any such prior application but had applied for the first time so that their cases did not come under sub-secs. (1b) or (1d) they would get only benefit of the legal fiction enacted by the explanation. In this case the land would not be deemed to have been disposed of only till the person entitled to take possession takes actual possession of the suit land in accordance with law. Therefore they would have benefit only of this salutary fiction that even though the order may have been made or paper possession may have been sought to be taken away if actual possession has remained with the tenant inspite of the order under sec. 32p (2) or if the possession has not been taken in accordance with law the second condition would be deemed to be fulfilled notwithstanding the passing of the order under sec. 32 (2) of disposal of the had and notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of an Court Tribunal or any other authority. ( 9 ) MR. Shah in that context further relied on sec. 32p (7) which provides that where before the specified date any land has been surrendered to a landlord under sub-sec. 32 (2) of disposal of the had and notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of an Court Tribunal or any other authority. ( 9 ) MR. Shah in that context further relied on sec. 32p (7) which provides that where before the specified date any land has been surrendered to a landlord under sub-sec. (2) of this section as in force immediately before such date and the landlord has taken possession of the land the landlord shall be liable to cultivate the land personally and shall be entitled to the use and occupation of the land so long as he cultivates the land personally and if he fails to so cultivate the land be shall be evicted from the land and the land shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of sec. 84c. That sec. 32p (7) merely enacts that where the landlord had taken possession of the land lawfully before this specified date March 3 1973 under a surrender under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 32p as it was in force before that date the landlord has a liability to put that land only to personal cultivation and he is entitled to such use so long as he fulfils that condition as otherwise he would be liable to be evicted under sec. 84 That sec. 32p (7) so provides because before this sec. 32p (2) (b) which provided surrender of land to the landlord as one of the modes of disposal was deleted by 1973 amendment such surrender was a lawful surrender as per law in force but the landlord had to use that land on the condition of personal cultivation as provided therein. Such lawful surrender would be only in those cases where there was no prohibition under sec. 32pp (5) i. e. cases where persons rights were not retrospectively restored by treating their application as if made within the original period specified in sec. 32pp or where the application under sec. 32pp or under sec. 32ppp was not made before actual disposal was made by delivery of possession to the person entitled as per law within the meaning of the explanation so as to attract the prohibition in sec. 32pp (5) or sec. 32ppp (5 ). Besides sec. 32pp or where the application under sec. 32pp or under sec. 32ppp was not made before actual disposal was made by delivery of possession to the person entitled as per law within the meaning of the explanation so as to attract the prohibition in sec. 32pp (5) or sec. 32ppp (5 ). Besides sec. 2 (18) (d) now includes in the definition of a tenant a person who after the surrender of tenancy in respect of any land at any time after the appointed day June 15 1955 or before the specified date i. e. March 3 1973 has continued or is deemed to have been in actual possession with or without the consent of the landlord. It is such tenant who is also given under sec. 32ff the right to be a deemed purchaser. That is why sec. 84cc (01) further provided that where any person who had surrendered his tenancy in respect of any land or part thereof at any time after March 31 1957 but before December 5 1972 when this Bill of 1979 was published and had continued to remain in actual possession with or without the consent of the landlord had been dispossessed by the landlord at any time during the period between December 5 1972 and March 3 1973 he can apply to the Mamlatdar and even the Mamlatdar can suo motu restore his possession if he finds that the dispossession was effected in anticipation in order to defeat the right of purchase under sec. 32ff. Therefore the whole scheme of 1973 Amendment is to give this right of purchase to the tenant who had remained in actual possession notwithstanding that there had been some order under sec. 32p or an attempt to dispossess him by taking only paper possession. The whole test created by the legislature in this explanation is that the land is not deemed to be disposed of till actual possession is taken under the lawful direction issued under sec. 32p (2) by the person entitled in accordance with law. Therefore if dispossession was not in accordance with law by ignoring of fetter of sub-clause (5) either because of retrospectivity created by the supplementary fiction in sub-secs. (1b) and (1d) of sec. 32p (2) by the person entitled in accordance with law. Therefore if dispossession was not in accordance with law by ignoring of fetter of sub-clause (5) either because of retrospectivity created by the supplementary fiction in sub-secs. (1b) and (1d) of sec. 32pp which restored the rights without any hiatus or because the said mandate was violated by any further action purporting to give actual possession after the person entitled had actually applied under sec. 32pp or 32ppp within the extended period during the pendency of such application or for any other reason if the actual possession had continued with the tenant the second condition by resorting to this explanation would be deemed to be fulfilled notwithstanding the passing of the order under sec. 32p (2) and the application under sec. 32pp would be maintainable. ( 10 ) IN that view of the matter applying the aforesaid test to the primary facts of the present case that the purchase had become ineffective on March 8 1964 and that the right under sec. 32pp was sought to exercised by making application in question to the Mamlatdar on 29 1971 where a further prayer was made in the application to the order of possession once that application was made by tenant the prohibition in sec. 32pp (5) clearly got attracted and the aforesaid order of disposal under sec. 32p (2) dated August Mamlatdar 1969 could never be executed by further action on the part of the Mamlatdar. Therefore even if we were to assume that an attempt was made to dispossess the petitioners after their application under sec. 32 on May 29 1971 it would be in violation of the mandate of sec. 32 and the petitioners would be deemed to fulfil the second condition as land continued to remain at disposal of the Collector and was not actually disposed of by delivery of possession in accordance with law to the person entitled. In fact in the order of the Deputy Collector it is in terms stated that even the Special Secretary who was first moved had given stay on June 2 1971 Even this Court has protected the petitioners by granting complete interim relief by restraining the respondent from taking or recovering possession of the suit land from the petitioners or in any manner disturbing the possession of the petitioners. Therefore the prohibition of sub-clause (5) of sec. Therefore the prohibition of sub-clause (5) of sec. 32pp being in operation no question could arise of dispossession of the petitioner. Therefore the petitioners being in actual possession their application under sec. 32pp in view of the retrospective amendment in law by the explanation added to sec. 32pp was clearly competent. ( 11 ) MR. Shah however raised a technical contention that the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction because the order under sec. 32p was sought to be stayed and the stay application having been rejected appeal could have been filed before the State Government. Mr. Shah ignores the relevant fact that the question of stay was only an incidental question while the substantial prayer was the application under sec. 32pp for exe- rcising the right as deemed purchaser by availing of the fresh opportunity after the first purchase was declared ineffective on March 8 1964 There- fore the Revenue Tribunal alone had the jurisdiction and not the State Government. Therefore even if infructuous proceeding before the State Government was withdrawn by availing of this remedy before the Revenue Tribunal it could never be urged that the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction. That is why no such plea of want of jurisdiction was ever raised. In fact no affidavit has been filed by Mr. Shah and he only wanted to produce evidence showing that the proceeding before the Government was ultimately withdrawn. That would be wholly immaterial because it was only the Revenue Tribunal which had the jurisdiction to decide whether sec. 32pp application was maintainable and the question of stay was only consequential. ( 12 ) MR. Shall next wanted to rely on the fact that there was a paper Panchnama of delivery of possession by the Talati on June 1 1971 and he wanted an opportunity to produce that document. In fact at no. stage any affidavit has been filed and even interim relief was never opposed. Besides as earlier pointed out by us the application having been filed on May 29 1971 under sec. 32pp prohibition under clause (5) of sec. 32pp was fully attracted and thereafter it would never be open to the Mamlat dar to take further action to enforce the order dated August 20 1969 under sec. 32p (2) in any manner. ( 13 ) MR. 32pp prohibition under clause (5) of sec. 32pp was fully attracted and thereafter it would never be open to the Mamlat dar to take further action to enforce the order dated August 20 1969 under sec. 32p (2) in any manner. ( 13 ) MR. Shah however vehemently argued that he had not filed any affidavit because the lower authorities had decided the whole question on the basis as of the existing legal position. The existing legal position was changed by retrospective amendment by the present explanation. Therefore the respondent landlord must be given fresh opportunity for showing whether he had dispossessed the petitioners by that paper Panchnama on June 1 1971 In this case no such question of remand would arise because the petitioners contention that possession all along continued was never challenged. This averment in para 3 of the petition has remained uncontroverted and even the interim relief has not been opposed. Even before the authorities this position was never challenged as it is amply borne out from the various statements made in the relevant order. Besides in any event as pointed out by us once the application was made on May 29 1971 categorical prohibition of sub-clause (5) of sec. 32pp was clearly attracted and thereafter even if the Mamlatdar purported to implement the order under sec. 32p (2) the alleged dispossession would not be dispossession in accordance with law. Therefore even in that case the explanation would clearly protect the petitioners. Therefore we have not allowed Mr. Shah any opportunity to produce the alleged document of the Panchnama of June 1 1971 or the withdrawal pursis of the proceedings before the Special Secretary on August 20 1971 and we do not think that any useful purpose would be served by a remand in view of the aforesaid legal position and when in fact all along the petitioners have continued in actual possession. Therefore the petitioners having fulfilled the necessary statutory conditions their application under sec. 32pp was clearly maintainable. In that view of the matter all the three impugned orders must be set aside and the matter shall now go back to the A. L. T. for expeditious disposal of this application under sec. Therefore the petitioners having fulfilled the necessary statutory conditions their application under sec. 32pp was clearly maintainable. In that view of the matter all the three impugned orders must be set aside and the matter shall now go back to the A. L. T. for expeditious disposal of this application under sec. 32pp dated May 19 1971 and the landlord shall be restrained from interfering in any manner with the possession of the petitioners of the land in question by reason of the aforesaid direction under sec. 32p (2 ). Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs in the circums- tances of the case. .