Ram Saroop Raizada v. Madan Mohan Misra — 1974 DIGILAW 149 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - The question involved in this Execution Appeal is whether a decree for ejectment obtained in respect of a post 1951 construction, before the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) is executable only when one of the grounds of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, has been proved in execution proceedings. 2. The fact necessary to decide the above controversy lie within a very narrow compass. Dr. Madan Mohan Misra, decree holder respondent (hereinafter referred to as the decree holder) filed suit for eviction against Ram Swaroop Raizada, judgment-debtor-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the judgment-debtor) on the simple ground that the judgment-debtor was the tenant of house No. 2/31, Swadeshi Bima Nagar, belonging to him and as he was no longer interested in retaining the judgment-debtor as a tenant therefore the suit. The judgment debtor defended it. He pleaded that since the house was constructed before January, 1951, therefore, the decree-holder could not get the decree without complying with the requirements of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947). The judgment-debtor lost the suit as well as first and second appeals filed by him. The second appeal was decided by the High Court. 3. The decree-holder started execution proceedings when a unsuccessful attempt was first made by the judgment-debtor to plead compromise in erection outside the Court. This objection ultimately failed. 4. In the meantime U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was enforced. The judgment-debtor, in continuation of his bid to thwart the execution, filed a new objection. It was now asserted that the building in his occupation had now come under the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, therefore, the decree, obtained earlier against him, was a nullity and incapable of being executed. The decree-holder contested the objection and contended that decree for dispossession, obtained before the commencement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, remained unaffected by the provisions of this Act, and, therefore, he was entitled to possession. 5. The decree-holder contested the objection and contended that decree for dispossession, obtained before the commencement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, remained unaffected by the provisions of this Act, and, therefore, he was entitled to possession. 5. The Executing counsel appearing for the judgment-debtor has reiterated the objection taken in the Court below and submitted the decree was although obtained before the commencement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, but it is not executable so long as the grounds specified in Section 20 of the said Act were not fulfilled. He referred to the provisions of Section 43(2)(h) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and pointed that the decree-holder should have amended the execution application within sixty days of the commencement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in order to bring it in conformity of the provisions of this Act. The suggestion given further was that after execution application was amended, it could be converted into a regular suit and tried as such. 7. In order to decide the question raised by the appellant it is useful to refer the relevant sections of the provisions of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. This was a temporary Act enacted with a view "to provide for the continuance during a limited period powers to control the letting and the rent of such accommodation and to prevent eviction of tenants therefrom." With regard to unsatisfied decrees obtained for ejectment, the Act provided in Section 14 as follows :- "14. Execution of pending decrees for eviction. - No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act, shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 : Provided that the tenant agreed to pay to the landlord "reasonable annual rent" or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher." 8. This section clearly imposed a statutory bar prohibiting execution of decrees for ejectment passed before the commencement of Act No. 3 of 1947. This section clearly imposed a statutory bar prohibiting execution of decrees for ejectment passed before the commencement of Act No. 3 of 1947. This provision was enacted with a view to prevent eviction of tenants in pursuance of the decree, which were not obtained on the grounds specified in Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. This Act was temporary. Its life was extended from time to time. 9. It seems that the State Government felt that the problem of regulating letting and rent was no longer a temporary one and was required to be tackled on a permanent basis, accordingly, a comprehensive Bill on the same was introduced in 1970. The name given to this Bill was "The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Bill, 1970." The Bill gave its object as :- "to provide for the regulation of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith." 10. As I am required to decide only one question, therefore, I would now refer to the provision concerning it. The said provision was contained in Section 39 of the Bill. It reads as follows : "39. No decree for the eviction of a tenant of a building constructed on or after January 1, 1951, passed before the commencement of this Act shall be executed except of any on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 : Provided that nothing in this section shall bar the execution where either the decree was passed on the basis of a compromise or the execution was postponed before the commencement of this Act on the basis of a compromise or adjustment recorded in the case or otherwise reduced to writing." 11. The Bill also gave its statement and objects. Amongst the salient features of the Bill, one of them was :- "Suits for eviction pending against tenants of buildings brought under regulation for the first time shall not be decreed, and decrease (wrongly printed for the word decrees) for eviction already obtained shall not be executed except on specified grounds." 12. The Bill was, therefore, referred to the selection committee. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as passed subsequently, reveals that the select committee did not approve Section 39 of the Bill. It was accordingly dropped. 13. The Bill was, therefore, referred to the selection committee. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as passed subsequently, reveals that the select committee did not approve Section 39 of the Bill. It was accordingly dropped. 13. Sri Rajeshji Verma, however, relied upon the provisions of Section 39 and object clause of the Bill, quoted above, and submitted that it was clear that one of the main object of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is to provide protection to those tenants as well against whom decrees for ejectment had been obtained before the commencement of the said Act. According to this submission, since statement and objects of a Bill play a very vital role in determining the scope of an Act, therefore, applying the principle of interpretation the Court should find the said purpose of the Bill has been served by some other section of the Act. He particularly relied upon Section 43(2)(h) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and urged that since this sub-section contains the provision relating to prohibition of execution of decrees obtained before the commencement of the Act, therefore, the Legislature deliberately omitted Section 39 of the Bill. This omission, according to him, was inconsequential. 14. The first question that arises in this regard is whether a Court of law is entitled to look into and consider the original provision of the Bill for the purpose of construing the Act. The other question allied with the above is the legal justification for seeing the report of the Select Committee for the purposes of understanding the provisions of the Bill. It seems very doubtful that the Courts can interpret the provisions of an Act by reference to the Bill. While dealing with the controversy Calcutta High Court observed in Dahendra Narain Roy v. Jogindra Narain Deb, AIR 1936 Calcutta 593 as follows :- "Nor are we at liberty to construe the Act by any reference to the Bill in its original form." 15. So far, as the question of the report of the Select Committee is concerned, the view taken by the Court is that the same can be referred to and considered for limited purpose of knowing the history and the background for which the Act was enacted. So far, as the question of the report of the Select Committee is concerned, the view taken by the Court is that the same can be referred to and considered for limited purpose of knowing the history and the background for which the Act was enacted. Lord Denning, M.R. while dealing with the right of a Court to consider the report stated the law in Letang v. Cooper, 1964(2) All England Reporter 929 in the following words :- "....... You can get the facts and surrounding circumstances from the report so as to see the background against which the legislation was enacted. This is always a great help in interpreting it. But you cannot look at what the committee recommended, or atleast, if you do look at it, you should not be unduly influenced by it......." 16. The Supreme Court also referred to the report of the law Commission in Mobarak Ali v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 857 and held that it may be valuable as a matter of history, it cannot be a legitimate guide for the construction of an enactment. 17. Considering the legislative history of the new legislation, it would be found that previously under Act No. 3 of 1947, there was a specific section specifically providing that execution of decrees, obtained before the enforcement of that Act, would not be possible unless based on one of the grounds specified in Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The said Act covered the constructions built before January, 1951. There was no legislation for constructions made thereafter. It was thought in 1970 that buildings constructed after January, 1951, be also taken up for controlling rent and eviction. Accordingly a new provision with regard to the same was made. In between 1951 and the proposed Act No. 13 of 1972, a large number of suits for eviction must have been filed against tenants and decrees obtained. Now, buildings in respect of which these decrees were obtained, were also going to be covered by this new legislation. The Bill, accordingly, provided in Section 39 that decrees secured by ejectment of tenants based on one or the other grounds of Section 20(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1973, could not be executed. It seems, however, that when the matter went to the select committee, it did not approve this section. The Bill, accordingly, provided in Section 39 that decrees secured by ejectment of tenants based on one or the other grounds of Section 20(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1973, could not be executed. It seems, however, that when the matter went to the select committee, it did not approve this section. The omission of Section 39 of the Bill in the background of these facts appear to be deliberate as the intention now was not to afford any protection to the tenants against whom decrees for ejectment had been passed and became final before the commencement of new Act No. 13 of 1972. The purpose, behind Section 39 of the bill, could be achieved only when the same was permitted to continue when I will deal with specific sections of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, I will try to show that none of them was even remotely concerned with this subject. On a consideration of the legislative history of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 with particular reference to the report of the select committee within the permissible limits, I find the omission of Section 39 of the Bill was with a definite purpose of not affording any protection to the tenants against whom decrees for ejectment had been obtained before commencement of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 18. Reliance placed by the counsel for the appellant in support of his contention on the object clause of the Bill is also not available. The said clause was enacted with reference to Section 39 of the Bill. With the deletion of this section the object sought to be achieved through it vanished. It therefore, could not longer assist the counsel for the appellant in advancing his argument. 19. I would now consider the argument of the appellant's learned counsel based on the interpretation of various sections of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In order to appreciate this contention it may be useful to refer to the general scheme of the said Act. The Act divides the buildings covered by it into three classes. First class consists of those buildings to which the provisions of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 did not apply and they were taken for the purposes of regulation for the (first) time. Sections relevant for this purpose are Sections 2 and 39 of this Act. The Act divides the buildings covered by it into three classes. First class consists of those buildings to which the provisions of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 did not apply and they were taken for the purposes of regulation for the (first) time. Sections relevant for this purpose are Sections 2 and 39 of this Act. By Section 2 of the Act all buildings excepting those either specifically exempted by this section or built within ten years have been brought under its purview. Now eviction from the buildings could be available to the landlords on the limited grounds specified in Section 20 of the Act. There were, however, a number of cases pending in respect of them in various Courts in U.P. at the time when the Act No. XIII of 1972 was enforced. In such suits landlord were not earlier either to allege any grounds for eviction or to prove them. Section 20 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, however, enumerated various grounds of eviction, applicable to suits to be filed after commencement of this Act. In order to bring conformity and also to apply the provisions of Section 20 to the pending suits, the Act framed Section 39. Since these suits were filed without any ground, the first thing provided in this was conferring of rights on the parties for making amendments in the pending suits. As every tenant was expected to know about his liability to pay rent and arrears Section 39 laid down that the tenant should deposit the arrears within the time specified therein. In case such deposits were made, tenants in that event, would not be liable to eviction on the ground of being in arrears of rent. It may be remembered under Section 20 of this Act as well, default in payment of arrears of rent could be a ground for ejection only when the tenant had not paid the rent within one month of the receipt of notice of demand. But apart from this, if the suit after amendment, established any of the grounds mentioned in Section 20(1) and clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of the said section, then of course, the tenants would be liable to eviction. This interpretation of Section 39 is obvious from its language and words employed. But apart from this, if the suit after amendment, established any of the grounds mentioned in Section 20(1) and clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of the said section, then of course, the tenants would be liable to eviction. This interpretation of Section 39 is obvious from its language and words employed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that this section would apply only to cases of those tenants who deposited rent within the period mentioned therein and to none others, is difficult to be accepted. The language of Section 39 is very clear and does not admit the interpretation suggested by the appellant. In order to accept this contention it would be necessary to read the section only partly and omit the remaining altogether. Such a Courts is not at all open under the law. 20. This submission was made by the learned counsel to show that the section, which really covered the pending suits for the purposes of trial in accordance with the provision of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, was 43(2)(h) of the Act and not Section 39. This submission was made in order to provide strength to his main argument that pending suits and also pending execution applications were covered by Section 43(2)(h) of the Act. I would, however, show subsequently that Section 43(2)(h) had a limited application. Confining myself to the consideration of the scope of Section 39 of the Act presently my view was that the said section applied to all the pending suits on the date of the commencement of the Act, which were brought under it, for regulation for the first time. Section 43(2)(h) did not apply to these suits at all. 21. The second category consisted of those buildings, which were previously governed by the U.P. No. 3 of 1947 and suits, relating to them for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 3(1) of the said Act, were pending on the date of the commencement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Section 43(2)(S) provided that all these suits and any proceeding out of such suit pending at the time of the commencement of the Act would be continued and concluded under the hold Act as if the new Control Act had not come into force. 22. Section 43(2)(S) provided that all these suits and any proceeding out of such suit pending at the time of the commencement of the Act would be continued and concluded under the hold Act as if the new Control Act had not come into force. 22. In the third category buildings covered would be those in respect of which suits for eviction on the basis of permission under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, were pending immediately before the commencement of the new Control Act. Provision made for such suits is to be found in Section 43(2)(r) of this Act. 23. Uptil now it would be found that neither there was any provision in the substantive section nor in Section 43 dealing with repeal and savings of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the basis of which it could be said that proceeding for the execution of decrees obtained for the buildings not covered by U.P. No. 3 of 1947, would be governed. Learned counsel for the appellant however, relied upon Section 43(2)(h) of the Act and submitted that this is a residuary section covering a case of execution of decrees as well. The section is as follows : "any Court or authority before which any suit or other proceeding relating to the recovery or determination of fixation of rent or eviction form, any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may, on an application being made it to within sixty days from such commencement, grant leave to any party to amend its pleading in consequence of the provisions of this Act." The submission, made in support of the contention, was that the words "other proceedings relating to ..... eviction from any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act," are meant for application to execution proceedings, which are in fact proceedings for eviction. He further urged that the decree holders should make necessary amendment in their applications for execution and if after amendment and full trial, they were able to make out one or the other ground mentioned in Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the judgment debtors of those cases, in that event, would only be liable to eviction. He further urged that the decree holders should make necessary amendment in their applications for execution and if after amendment and full trial, they were able to make out one or the other ground mentioned in Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the judgment debtors of those cases, in that event, would only be liable to eviction. Applying the above law in the present case, he argued that since the respondent did not either amend the pleadings nor prove the grounds of eviction, therefore, the execution was liable to be rejected. He emphasised placing of any other interpretation on this section would be making the law unreasonable and discriminatory. 24. In order to appreciate this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants it is necessary to understand the correct scope and purpose of Section 43(2)(h) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It may be recalled here that old Rent Control Act was a temporary Act. It is a settled law that upon repeal of a temporary Act, all the proceedings taken under it come to an end unless provided to the contrary by means of a separate legislation. In this regard Craies in this book on 'Statute Law' (Sixth Edition) page 408 dealing with this subject observed as follows :- "As a general rule and unless it contains some special provisions to the contrary, after a temporary Act, has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect." 25. In Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly, Municipality, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 396 the Supreme Court, while dealing with this question in relation to this very U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 after its repeal observed : "Moreover, the nature of the Act being temporary, the right, if we can attribute that quality to a disability of other party to enforce his right unless additional grounds were made out, comes to an end where the temporary Act expires at least by efflux of time, if not by premature repeal. The so called is ..... is short lived and its longevity where it is derived under a temporary statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself." A Division Bench of this Court in a decision reported in Allahabad Theatres v. Kusum Kumari, AIR 1974 Allahabad 76 : 1974 ALJ 196 has taken the same view on this question. 26. The so called is ..... is short lived and its longevity where it is derived under a temporary statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself." A Division Bench of this Court in a decision reported in Allahabad Theatres v. Kusum Kumari, AIR 1974 Allahabad 76 : 1974 ALJ 196 has taken the same view on this question. 26. It is, therefore, clear that in order to save past and pending proceedings under the hold Act and for preserving past transaction, it was essential to provide for a saving provision. Precisely, for this purpose that Section 43 was incorporated in U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The saving clause begins with the phrase "not withstanding the repeal". It obviously means that despite the repeal proceedings pending at the time commencement of the New Act, which would have otherwise come to close, could continue under the New Act in accordance with the provisions of the New Act. The general principle is that the Act, which is repealed is to be considered as dead and finished except for the transactions which become final. In order to keep those proceedings alive that this provision was enacted. It is further clear that this was meant for application only to those cases where the old Act applied, otherwise, there was no point in naming this section as "Repeal and Savings" and further dealing with the savings meant to undo the consequences of repeal. Further this provision is not an enabling clause. It has a definite object of dealing with the savings to the extent provided therein. 27. A reading of Section 43(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 shows that clauses (a) to (g) dealt with suits and proceedings, which were commenced or started under the old Rent Control Law. A nursery reading of clause (a) to (g) of Section 43 of the Act would show that while clause (g) speaks of suits, clauses (a) to (f) deal with proceedings under the Old Act. Therefore, construing clause (h) of Section 43(2)(h) as one which concerns itself with the suit and proceedings dealt earlier would only serve the purpose and object of the section. Therefore, construing clause (h) of Section 43(2)(h) as one which concerns itself with the suit and proceedings dealt earlier would only serve the purpose and object of the section. After having provided in these clauses that the proceedings mentioned therein would be disposed of and decided in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the New Act, it was stated in Section 43(2)(h) that amendments required in the pending proceedings of clause 43(a) to (g) for bringing them in conformity with the requirements of New Act, that the amendments would be permitted to be made in the pending proceedings Legislature did not want to leave the matter of amendment in doubt therefore it incorporated therein that in every case of amendment sought, the same should be allowed. 28. The words used and language employed in Section 43(2)(h) also indicate that this only meant to govern the cases arising out of the old Act and not which were filed under the general law unconcerned with the old Act. 29. The scope of Section 43 recently came for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality. In this case Bareilly Municipality has filed a suit for eviction against Qudrat Ullah on the ground principally that he was a licensee of a premises belonging to the Municipal Board. Qudrat Ullah defended the suit and pleaded the status and protection of a tenant under U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The trial Court having held that Qudrat Ullah was a tenant of a premises, which was covered by U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, dismissed the suit. The Municipal Board, Bareilly, filed an appeal in the High Court. Both the parties felt aggrieved against the decision of the High Court. Consequently, two appeals were filed in the Supreme Court. By the time the Supreme Court came to decide the appeal, U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was enforced. It was found by the Supreme Court that the buildings belonging to a Municipal Board were although not exempted from the operation of the earlier Rent Control Act but since they were now out of the operation of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, therefore, the Bareilly Municipality was entitled to a decree for eviction against the tenant i.e. Qudrat Ullah. It was in this connection that one of the questions, considered by the Supreme Court, was as to what the scope and effect of Section 43(2)(h). The Supreme Court made the following observations with regard to the same. "It is, therefore, clear that even if the Statute for recovery of possession being one under the earlier Rent Control Law latter will apply and the necessary amendment in the pleading can be made. This definitely indicates that its latter Act that must govern pending proceedings for recovery of possession or recovery of fixation of rent. However, with which we are concerned is not even one under the Act, but proceedings on the footing that the defendant is only a licensee. So much, so, none of the savings clause in Section 43(2) applies the landlord is that the application of the old Act is repealed by the general rule that on repeal a Statute is deemed not to have been on the Statute Book at all." 30. These observations of the Supreme Court make it clear that where a suit was not filed under the Old U.P. Act No. III of 1947 none of the savings clause of Section 43(2) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would apply. It necessarily follows, therefore, that Section 43(2)(h) would also not apply to "other proceedings" which were not under the provisions of U.P. Act No. III of 1947. 31. Another word used in Section 43(2)(h) of the new Act, which provides some clue for finding out its meaning is "pending". The dictionary meaning of the words "pending", is "not yet decided". The use of this would, therefore, in the section is indicative of the intention of the legislature that it wanted the application of this provision only to those cases where the lis between the parties was still pending and had not come to a final termination. It, therefore, appears to me that the legislature was thinking only in terms of those suits, while using the said expression, where a final executable judgment had not come into existence. In other words, this section was applicable only to those cases where rights of the parties had not been finally determined. It, therefore, appears to me that the legislature was thinking only in terms of those suits, while using the said expression, where a final executable judgment had not come into existence. In other words, this section was applicable only to those cases where rights of the parties had not been finally determined. In Dayawati v. Indrajit, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1923 the Supreme Court considered the effect and meaning of the word 'pending' in relation to preliminary decrees prepared in a suit filed for the recovery of money on the basis of mortgage. The facts of the said case are that Hazarilal and Jagatnarain executed a simple mortgage with interest. The payment of interest was at 9 per cent per annum or in default of payment of interest for the three months at rupee one per cent per month for the period of default. It appears that the mortgagors made default in payment of interest. Consequently, a suit was filed for the recovery of money. The mortgagors defended the said suit and pleaded that the rate of interest was penal and excessive. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. An appeal was filed against the decree of the trial Court to the High Court. In the meantime the legal representative of Hazarilal filed an application under Section 3 of Usurious Loans Act as amended by Section 3 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act and claimed that interest in excess of 7 per cent per annum could not be awarded in the suit. The provisions of the Act under which application for reduction of the decretal amount was made was applicable to pending suits. In these set of facts, the question, which was considered by the Supreme Court, was as to whether the suit could be said to be pending when only an appeal from the judgment in suit was pending. In that connection the Supreme Court found :- "It would, therefore, appear that in speaking of a pending suit in Section 6 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934, the Legislature was thinking not only in terms of the suit proper but also those stages in the life of the suit which ordinarily take place before a final executable document comes into existence. The words of Section 6 speak of a suit pending on the commencement of the Act and it means a live suit whether in the Court of first instance or an appeal Court where the judgment of the Court of first instance is being considered. It only excludes these suits in which nothing further needs to be done in relation to the rights of clause litigated because an executable decree which may not be re-opened is already in existence." 32. This principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court is applicable to the facts of the present case as well. Since in the present case an executable decree had been obtained before the enforcement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, therefore, there was no suit which could be said to be pending for the purposes of attracting Section 43(2)(h) of the Act. 33. The use of the word "pleadings" in Section 43(2)(h) is again indicative of the fact that the provisions of this sub-section were not meant for execution proceedings. The meaning of the word "pleading" is well known. It includes only the plaint and the written statement. There is no question of plaint and written statement in the execution proceedings. 34. There is yet another difficulty in accepting the contention of the appellant. According to his submission, Section 43(2)(h) of the Act would cover only cases of pending execution. It would, thus, not cover those executions, where although decrees had been obtained before the commencement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 but they had not been put into execution. There is no provision in the Act which is applicable to such cases. It is also not acceptable that the legislature only provided for the pending execution proceedings to be decided on the basis of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act and left the fresh executions, which were going to be started few days after without providing the similar safeguards of Section 20 of the New Act. Acceptance of this argument would mean rendering the provision of Section 43(2)(h) discriminatory without any nexus or object to be achieved. It is a settled rule of interpretation that no Court should accept an interpretation, which may make a provision unconstitutional unless that is the only result flowing from it. 35. Acceptance of this argument would mean rendering the provision of Section 43(2)(h) discriminatory without any nexus or object to be achieved. It is a settled rule of interpretation that no Court should accept an interpretation, which may make a provision unconstitutional unless that is the only result flowing from it. 35. The counsel for the appellant, thereafter, shifted his emphasis and submitted that a case of execution proceedings was covered by the word "other proceedings". This submission also does not appear to have any merit. It may be noted that this sub-section uses the expressions "Court or Authority" before which any suit or other proceedings is pending. It appears to me that whereas the word "Court" has been used with reference to the suit the words "other proceedings" have been used with reference to the "authority". This interpretation or the manner of reading this sub-section could not make anything redundant. It is too well known that an execution of a decree obtained from a Court of law can be done only by making an application to the Court and, therefore, it cannot be said that the words "other proceedings" would govern a case of execution when the execution could not be started before the authority. In my opinion, therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the words "other proceedings" cover the case of execution application. 36. There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this place. The Legislature can be presumed to know the execution Courts cannot go behind the decree. In case the argument of the counsel for the appellant is accepted, it would necessarily mean in every case that all these decrees, which had become final before the coming into force of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, would have to be re-opened. The language of Section 43(2)(h) would indicate that the said provision only empowers a Court to permit an amendment in the pending proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the new Act. It does not go any further. This provision, therefore, could not achieve the purpose of nullifying the decrees, already passed and entitling the Courts to reopen the proceedings for deciding the rights afresh in accordance with the provisions of the new Act, the legislature was required to go further and to confer power on the Courts specifically in this regard. It does not go any further. This provision, therefore, could not achieve the purpose of nullifying the decrees, already passed and entitling the Courts to reopen the proceedings for deciding the rights afresh in accordance with the provisions of the new Act, the legislature was required to go further and to confer power on the Courts specifically in this regard. In the absence of specific and clear power it is not possible to hold that the Courts before which execution application was pending could re-open the proceedings and decided the rights of the parties relating to eviction from the plots on the basis of the provisions of the new Act. In case the legislature wanted to confer such a right on the executing Courts in respect of pending proceedings, it would have conferred power specifically and clearly as was done under the old Rent Control and Eviction Act. 37. Obtaining of a judgment and decree by a decree-holder in his favour is a valuable and vested right. A decree-holder, who has obtained a decree, is further entitled to execute the same and enjoy its fruits. It is, therefore, not conceivable that the legislature would have desired to deprive a decree-holder of such a valuable right without making a clear provision on the same in the Act. As already pointed out there is no provision in the Act which lays down that the decrees obtained before the commencement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, would become inexecutable as result of the passing of this new Act. 38. The learned counsel for the appellant, thereafter, suggested that acceptance of the view that the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, did not intend to provide protection to the tenants against whom decree for eviction had been obtained before the commencement of the Act would lead to great hardship. It was pointed out by him that whereas such protection was open to tenants against whom suits were filed after the commencement of the new Act but the same would not be available to similarly placed other tenants against whom the decree for eviction obtained few days earlier had become final. I am unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. I am unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The first principle of interpretation is that whether the language used in a Statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense. In this connection I may refer a passage from Craies on Statute law, Sixth Edition, page 87 :- "But where the words of an Act of Parliament are plain, the Court will not make any alteration in them because injustice may otherwise be done. "Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the Statute speak the intention of the legislature." And Viscount Simon in an appeal from India said "Again and again the Board has insisted that in construing enacted words, we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise which may follow from giving effect to the language used." 39. The argument of equity and unreasonableness made by the learned counsel for the appellant is also devoid of merits. The protection, which the legislature intended to provide to the tenants against the execution of decrees for the ejectment, lay within the domain of Legislative wisdom. Therefore, the mere fact that such a provision has not been made would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that any injustice has been done to the tenants against whom decrees for ejectment had been obtained before the commencement of the Act. 40. The last and not the least important point in this connection is that where the legislature has used different language in the earlier statute and has not followed the same in a subsequent statute relating to the same subject, it can be fairly presumed that alteration in language was intentional. In the present case we find that Section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, was altogether in a different language than one which has been used and employed in Section 43(2)(h) of the new Act. It can be reasonably presumed that the legislature would have used the same language, in case it desired the same protection to be made available as was intended by Section 14 of the 1947 Act. It can be reasonably presumed that the legislature would have used the same language, in case it desired the same protection to be made available as was intended by Section 14 of the 1947 Act. The two Acts are in pari materia and, therefore, assistance in ascertaining the meaning of enactment could be obtained by comparing its language with that used in the earlier statute relating to the same subject. 41. Camparing the two it is impossible to come to the conclusion that Section 43(2)(h) employed the same language as was intended by Section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. In this respect, I may quote certain observations of Coolburn, C.J. which have been extracted in Craise on Statute Law :- "There was, therefore, a material difference between the language employed in the two Statutes, "and when" said Coolburn, C.J. "the Legislature in legislating in pari materia and subsistuting certain provisions for those which existed in an earlier Statute, has naturally changed the language of the enactment, it must be taken to have done so with same intention and notice." 42. The motive and intention was very clear in the present case. It was that the Legislature did not provide the protection to the judgment debtors, against whom decrees for eviction had been obtained, before the commencement of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 43. In the result, the appeal has no merits. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.