Judgment :- 1. A Society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act and its Vice President, Secretary. Treasurer and Committee Members have come up in appeal from a decree invalidating its decision to suspend the membership of the plaintiff for a period of twelve years The plaintiff was accused of causing wrongful loss to the society while functioning as an office-bearer thereof. The committee appointed by the general body of the society bad enquired into the allegations against him and submitted their report finding him guilty in the matter. In the general body meeting of the society, convened on 30th June, 1968 this report was to be presented as per the agenda fixed for the meeting. The plaintiff was given notice of the meeting but he was not present. It is at this meeting that it was decided to suspend the plaintiff's membership of the society for 12 years. 2. According the plaintiff this decision was taken violating all principles of natural justice. He contends that he was not given any notice as to the charges against him nor was he afforded an opportunity to give his explanation in regard to the allegations made against him. In the suit he had also asked for the consequential relief of an injunction to restrain the defendants, who are appellants here, from implementing the decision. The trial court dismissed the suit but the lower appellate court differed from the trial court and hence setting aside the trial court's judgment and decree, decreed the suit, but without costs. Hence the defendants have come up in appeal. 3. The lower court was of the view that there was no evidence in the case to show that the plaintiff was made aware either expressly or impliedly that the general body proposed to take a decision on the committee's report at the meeting. The general body neither framed any charges against the plaintiff nor was he given an opportunity to state his case. Therefore, the court found that the impugned decision of the society taken at that general body meeting was void ab initio and hence could not be implemented. The general body neither framed any charges against the plaintiff nor was he given an opportunity to state his case. Therefore, the court found that the impugned decision of the society taken at that general body meeting was void ab initio and hence could not be implemented. The court gave the plaintiff the decree as prayed for but at the same time made it clear that it was open to the general body to take a decision on the report submitted by the enquiry committee after giving sufficient opportunity to the plaintiff to offer his explanation, if any to vindicate his position. 4. It was strongly contended for by Sri. Joseph Augustine, learned counsel for the appellants that the decision was taken by the society in accordance with its rules and practice. In the circumstances the court has no jurisdiction as such to interfere in the internal management of the society. The plaintiff cannot come forward with the case that he was not given an opportunity to state his case as he was given notice of the meeting. Under R.28 of the bye-laws the general body could take any action against a member of the society. The bye-laws also provided that the general body could remove any member if he acted against the interest of the society. The court cannot override the action taken by the general body acting within the framework of the bye-laws. 5. Sri. K. N. Narayana Pillai, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff contended that the decision of the general body was taken in violation of the principles of natural justice. The agenda of the meeting held on 30 6 68 only indicated that the report of the committee was to be presented on that day. If the general body proposed to take any action on the basis of the report, a regular procedure had to be drawn up which should afford an opportunity to the plaintiff to state his case against the report. The agenda drawn up cannot alert the members that disciplinary action was being taken against the members. Apart from the fact that the rules of the society do not allow such decision to be taken in the circumstances, even if the rules so permit, then such rules being violative of the principles of natural justice could have no legal force. I have no hesitation in accepting the plaintiff's contentions in the case. Apart from the fact that the rules of the society do not allow such decision to be taken in the circumstances, even if the rules so permit, then such rules being violative of the principles of natural justice could have no legal force. I have no hesitation in accepting the plaintiff's contentions in the case. Gardner in his well-known treatise on Administrative Law, second edition, page 230 states:. , . "It was also gradually established that whereas parties were prima facie bound by the rules of the association which they had joined, and to which they must therefore be implied to have assented, those rules would not be construed in such a manner as to enable the domestic tribunal to disregard the principles of natural justice in coming to its decisions. In the leading case of Lee v. Showman's Guild of Great Britain 1952-1 All. E.R. 1175 Denning L. J. Went even further than this: "Although the jurisdiction of a domestic tribunal is founded on contract, express or implied nevertheless the parties are not free to make any contract they like. There are important limitations imposed by public policy. The tribunal must, for instance, observe the principles of natural justice. They must give the man notice of the charge and a reasonable opportunity of meeting it. Any stipulation to the contrary would be invalid. They cannot stipulate for a power to condemn a man unheard... Another limitation arises out of the well-known principle that parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdiction... They can of course, agree to leave questions of law as well as questions of fact, to the decision of the domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, make the tribunal the final arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on questions of law. They cannot prevent its decisions being examined by the courts. If parties should seek, by agreement, to take the law out of the hands of the courts and into the hands of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to the courts in the case of error of law, then the agreement is to that extent contrary to public policy and void." 6. If parties should seek, by agreement, to take the law out of the hands of the courts and into the hands of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to the courts in the case of error of law, then the agreement is to that extent contrary to public policy and void." 6. In Andrews v. Mitchell (1905 A.C. 78) it was held by the House of Lords that a power to expel a member who committed a breach of the society's rules did not confer a power to expel a member summarily; he must be given notice of his alleged offence and an opportunity of expressing his views on the matter. 7. In the leading English case on private clubs Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881-17 Ch. D. 615) it was held that the courts would not interfere with the decision of the members of a club professing to act under their Rules, unless it could be shown either that the rules were contrary to natural justice, or that what had been done was contrary to rules of the club, or that there had been malafides or malice in coming to the decision. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 5 at page 263 it is stated under the heading 'prerequisites of decision to expel: "It is necessary that a power of expulsion should be exercised in good faith for the benefit of the club, and not from any indirect or improper motive. The principles of natural justice must also be observed in exercising a power of expulsion, unless it plainly appears, on the true construction of the rules, that the power was intended to be absolute. If the rules, refer to consideration of questions concerning the conduct of members to the committee, the committee is in a quasi-judicial position, and must give reasonable notice to any member whose conduct is impugned, and also a reasonable. opportunity of defending himself and meeting the accusations brought against him; and it should not act on exparte evidence." See Daly's Club Law, 4th Edn. page 23, where it is stated: "Where the rules empower the committee to expel a member for conduct injurious to the Club they must not only act bonafide they must exercise their discretion judicially, 'with reasonable and probable cause' inquiring what the interests and objects of the club are, and not in any arbitrary fashion. page 23, where it is stated: "Where the rules empower the committee to expel a member for conduct injurious to the Club they must not only act bonafide they must exercise their discretion judicially, 'with reasonable and probable cause' inquiring what the interests and objects of the club are, and not in any arbitrary fashion. The power of expulsion must be exercised according to the principles of natural justice; and unless such a power is on the face of the rules absolute those exercising it (a club committee for instance) are in a quasi judicial position, and must give notice to the offending member, who must have every reasonable opportunity of defending himself". 8. It might be noted here that there is no rule as far as this society is concerned which says that principles of natural justice could be dispensed with. In the agenda for the particular general body meeting, what is stated is i that the committee's report would be presented: Shackleton in his book'Law and Practice of Meetings' 2nd Edn. at page 30 says: "As to the essentials of a notice, it must state clearly the nature of any special business to be transacted, as no other business can be transacted in addition or otherwise, unless the notice refers to ordinary business which it is competent for the meeting to transact. As to what is special business depends upon the regulations and the kind of body concerned. The true test would appear to be the construction an absent member would put upon the notice for the nature of the business may largely determine whether such member shall absent himself from the meeting or not. It is, however, always desirable to state clearly the nature of any special business to be transacted, and if the regulations provide for notice of such special business, any resolutions passed without due notice will be invalid." At page 29 the learned author refers to a particular case: "A member of a club was informed by the secretary of the club that her name had been removed from the list of members, for conduct alleged to be inconsistent with the rules of the club. The agenda for the committee meeting at which it was decided to remove her name did not state the fact that there was an intention to expel her, and it was also ascertained that an important member of the committee had not been summoned. Held, that even though the absent member of the committee was alleged to have no interest in its proceedings, this was not a sufficient reason for withholding the notice unless that person was too ill to attend. Through failure to summon this member the meeting was invalid, and the resolution for expulsion irregular. The fact that the question of expulsion was not stated specifically on the agenda was also deemed to be a defect in the notice." Therefore, it was not legal or proper for the general body to have taken this decision to expel the plaintiff at the meeting because by the agenda that was not a subject which could be decided at that meeting. Also as the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to meet the case against him for expulsion from the society the decision was void. 9. Therefore, the lower court was right in decreeing the suit. The appeal is dismissed with costs.