JUDGMENT Talukdar, J.: This Rue is at the instance of Sm. Asita Dutta, first party petitioner, directed against an order dated the 1st February, 1974 passed by Sri K. Mondal, Police Magistrate, Sealdah, on an application for the enforcement of an order of maintenance in case No. M/109 of 1973, enlarging the opposite party on bail. 2. The facts leading on the Rule can be put in a short compass. The first-party-filed an application under section 488 of Code of Criminal Procedure, being Case No. M/6 of 1969, against the second party opposite party No.1, Samir Kumar Dutta, on the 10th January, 1969 and ultimately an order, on consent by the parties, was passed by the learned Magistrate on the 25th May, 1970 directing the second-party husband to pay Rs. 600/- per month for the maintenance of the petitioner and her two sons, named, Subir Kumar Dutta and Sushanta Dutta. The payments by way of maintenance were made for a few months but were stopped since the month of December, 1972. Accordingly an application was filed by the wife on the 24th September, 1973 for enforcing the order of maintenance in respect of the arrears. The application was filed before the learned Police Magistrate at Sealdah. The learned Magistrate thereupon by his order of the same date called for the original case records and fixed 1st October, 1973 for consideration. On that date he passed a curious order. Although he extended the time for production of the original records, he straignt-away issued distress• warrant for realisation of the arrears fixing 26th October, 1973 as the next date. On the 22nd October, 1973, which was an intermediate date, the husband filed an application praying that the order of issuing distress-warrant may be stayed and the second-party husband may be given an opportunity to make proper submissions on the 26th October, 1973. Sri R. N. Chakraborty, Police Magistrate by his order of he same date directed the petition of the husband to be put up on the 26th October, 1973 but he rejected the prayer for staying the distress-warrant. On the 26th October, 1973 the first-party appeared and the matter was directed to be put up before Sri R. N. Chakraborty, Magistrate, 1st Class for orders. The next date was fixed on the 7th November, 1973 and on that dale the matter was adjourned. On the 26th October, 1973 the first-party appeared and the matter was directed to be put up before Sri R. N. Chakraborty, Magistrate, 1st Class for orders. The next date was fixed on the 7th November, 1973 and on that dale the matter was adjourned. On the 24th December, 1973, Sri R. N. Chakraborty, Police Magistrate passed the following order:- "O.P. is present today in connection with an application u/s. 489 Cr. P.C. He is directed to clear up all arrears up to date by 24. 1. 1974 failing which he may be put under arrest". On 24.1.74, a warrant of arrest was issued against the husband fixing 4.2.74 as the next date. On an intermediate date viz. 1st February, 1974 the husband surrendered by petition and was directed to be released on a bail of Rs. 500/-, ill default to jail custody. The matter was directed to be put up on the date fixed, viz. 4.2.74. This order has... …. …. …. …. ….. …. …. …. been impugned and forms the subject-matter of the present Rule. 3. Mr. Syed Ataunnabi, Advocate (with Mr. Santi Ranjan Goswami, Advocate) appearing in support of the Rule made a short submission. He contended that there is no provision for releasing the defaulter on bail under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the learned Police Magistrate had erred in directing the second party-opposite party No.1 to be released on a bail of Rs. 500/- in default to jail custody. Mr. Ataunnabi further submitted on merits that this is a sad tale of a wife, whose husband had married earlier, going without her maintenance and consequently facing starvation along with her children. Mr. Ataunnabi further submitted that on one ground or other the matter of payment is being delayed to the serious prejudice, of the first-party petitioner. Mr. N.R. Biswas, Advocate (with Messrs. Gurudas Bhattacharjee and Kamalesh Banerjee, Advocates) appearing on behalf of the second party-opposite party No. 1 opposed the Rule. Mr. Biswas submitted that there may be various reasons for not paying the maintenance and justice demands that the reasons for such non-payment should be allowed to be submitted for consideration before the learned Magistrate before the ultimate order is passed. Gurudas Bhattacharjee and Kamalesh Banerjee, Advocates) appearing on behalf of the second party-opposite party No. 1 opposed the Rule. Mr. Biswas submitted that there may be various reasons for not paying the maintenance and justice demands that the reasons for such non-payment should be allowed to be submitted for consideration before the learned Magistrate before the ultimate order is passed. He contended in the next instance that no opportunity was given to the husband who from the very beginning has been trying to make his submissions and as such there has been a contravention of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Biswas ultimately submitted that the circumstances also have changed and the husband has become impecunious and there it is not possible for him to pay the maintenance. 4. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties and on going through the material on the record, we find that the procedure adopted by the learned Police Magistrate has not been in accordance with law, vitiating the orders, including the order impugned, passed by him. This is a short and simple case under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein the wife and her two children were allowed a maintenance of Rs. 600/-. The amounts remained unpaid uptil December, 1972. The application tiled by the wife for enforcing the order apparently under section 488(3) should have been disposed of by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Under sub-section (3) to section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue warrant for levying the amount due in the manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines. The emphasis is therefore on the absence of any sufficient cause and for good reasons. The principles of natural justice are to be read into such provision as the line of cases of the Supreme Court in such and similar matters clearly indicates. The learned Police Magistrate, after the application was filed by the wife, called for the original case records to apply his mind before passing any final order. The records not being available he extended the time for the production thereof. In the meanwhile however he issued the distress-warrant for realisation of the arrears. The learned Police Magistrate, after the application was filed by the wife, called for the original case records to apply his mind before passing any final order. The records not being available he extended the time for the production thereof. In the meanwhile however he issued the distress-warrant for realisation of the arrears. This he did apparently going through the original records. Be that as it may, the next chapter is even more incongruous. Before the date fixed viz. the 26th October 1973, the husband appeared on 22.10.73 and filed a petition clearly and categorically praying that the order issuing the distress warrant may be stayed and he may be allowed to make full submissions. This again is within the ambit of the principles of audi altearam partem and the court of law, which is certainly a court of justice, should have given that opportunity to the husband. The learned Police Magistrate however rejected straightaway the prayer for staying the distress-warrant, without even hearing the husband on the point as to why the distress-warrant should not be issued. Although he put up the application for hearing on the 26th October, 1973, after some adjournments the matter came up for disposal on the 24th December 1973 when the learned Police Magistrate passed another order which is not also justifiable. He directed straightaway the husband to clear up all arrears by the date fixed, viz 24.1.74 failing which he was to be put under arrest. The husband surrendered by petition on the 1st February, 1974 after the warrant of arrest was issued and the learned Magistrate granted him a bail of Rs. 500/-. This is undoubtedly true that in case of failure to comply with the order of maintenance on the part of the defaulting party, the Magistrate may for such breach issue a warrant for levying the amount in the manner as provided for under the statute but the said provisions are qualified by the words "If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply... ...". The failure to comply without sufficient cause therefore is the sine qua non for the issue of a warrant in this behalf, It is abundantly clear from the records that the husband appeared and prayed for an opportunity to show cause. ...". The failure to comply without sufficient cause therefore is the sine qua non for the issue of a warrant in this behalf, It is abundantly clear from the records that the husband appeared and prayed for an opportunity to show cause. Whether the cause was sufficient or not, whether it was a mere pretence or it was based on good and sufficient reason, would be a question of fact to be determined by the court of inquiry in accordance with law. This unfortunately has not been done. It is expedient therefore in the interests of justice that the said order should be set aside and the matter should be disposed of as early as possible, because we feel that in a maintenance matter, wherein the grievances of the wife are that she is without any pittance for a considerable period, the proceedings should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Any delay in this behalf would be an ill-wind that would blow nobody any good. In view of our aforesaid findings, it is neither warranted for necessary to enter into the merits of the matter, relating to non-payment, which the court below will determine in due course on the materials available. 5. In the result, we set aside the orders passed by the learned' Police Magistrate, Sealdah on and from the 1st October, 1973; and we direct that the matter shall go back to the court below for being disposed of in accordance with law and expeditiously in the tight of the observations made above, from the stage reached on the 1st October, 1973 before the impugned orders were passed. In view of the delay already made, we further direct that the learned Magistrate shall dispose of the matter within three weeks from the date of receipt of the notice of the arrival of the records in the court below, after giving due opportunities to the parties to be heard in support of their respective claims. The Rule is disposed of accordingly. The records may go down expeditiously. Banerjee, J.: I agree.