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1974 DIGILAW 150 (ORI)

SUDARSAN PANDA v. R. D. DHAWAN

1974-07-11

S.ACHARYA

body1974
JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - The judgment debtors in Title Suit No. 52 of 1964 have Preferred this appeal against the decision of the District Judge, Cuttack in, Miscellaneous Appeal No. 60 of 1973 confirming the decision passed by the Munsif in Misc. Case No. 297 of 1972. 2. The Respondents herein filed Title Suit No. 52 of 1964 for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Appellants herein from disturbing the free flow of water from the Plaintiffs premises. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court and, the said decision was confirmed by the first appellate Court. In Second Appeal No. 331 of 1968, preferred against the confirming decision of the said two Courts, this Court passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants, from interfering with the Plaintiffs' right to discharge natural water through the Defendants land. The Plaintiffs also were, restrained from discharging, any other water excepting rain water from their plots into the plot of the Defendants. Thereafter the Plaintiffs (Respondents herein) levied Execution Case No. 76 of 1972 for execution of the aforesaid decree. In column 10 of the execution petition the decree-holders pray for directing the judgment debtors to remove the obstructions raised by them on the month of the drain and thereby to allow free flow of natural water to their plot. The judgment debtors (Appellant herein) filed a petition u/s 47, CPC inter alia contending therein that the decree passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 331 of 1968 was of a prohibitory nature and accordingly the decree-holders prayer for removal of obstruction was not maintainable. 3. The executing Court dismissed the aforesaid petition of the judgment-debtors holding that the execution petition had been filed in accordance with the decree passed in Second Appeal No. 331 of 1968. The said Court, however, observed that whether the complained of obstruction could be removed in execution of the aforesaid decree would be decided at the time of executing the decree. The Appellant-judgment-debtor preferred Misc. Appeal No. 60 of 1973 before the District Judge, Cuttack against the aforesaid decision of the executing Court, and the said appellate Court confirmed the aforesaid decision of the executing Court, and hence this appeal. 4. It is urged by Mr. The Appellant-judgment-debtor preferred Misc. Appeal No. 60 of 1973 before the District Judge, Cuttack against the aforesaid decision of the executing Court, and the said appellate Court confirmed the aforesaid decision of the executing Court, and hence this appeal. 4. It is urged by Mr. Patnaik, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, that the decree passed by this Court being of a prohibitory nature restraining the Defendants from, interfering with the Plaintiffs' right to discharge natural water through the lands of the Defendants, the said decree in the terms passed by this Court cannot be executed by taking resort to the provisions of order 21, Rule 32, Code of Civil Procedure. According to Mr. Patnaik, the decree in question in its scope and ambit being of a prohibitory nature, enforcement of its terms cannot be ordered by taking recourse to Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21, Code of Civil Procedure. But if it is found that the judgment-debtors have disobeyed the said decree, the decree holders would be entitled to ask the executing Court to commit the judgment-debtors to civil prison, or 1;0 attach their property as provided in Sub-rule (1) of the said rule. In support of his above submission Mr. Patnaik relies on the Division bench decision reported in Evuru Venkata Subbayya Vs. Srishti Veerayya and Others chief Justice P. Jaganmohan Reddy delivering the judgment of the Court in the said decision has on a consideration of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 32(1) and (5)observed in paragraph 9 of his judgment as follows: 9. A perusal of the above, provisions would show that Sub-rule (1) would apply both to mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions. It is not denied that the Respondents not being 'eo nomine' parties to O.S. No. 79/55, no injunction, could be enforced against them and they cannot, therefore, be committed to civil prison. This relief has been refused by both the Courts and there has been no appeal against it. Sub-rule (5) is the only pertinent provision; but that again on the language used, applies to mandatory injuctions. This relief has been refused by both the Courts and there has been no appeal against it. Sub-rule (5) is the only pertinent provision; but that again on the language used, applies to mandatory injuctions. The word "injunction" in Sub-rule(5) has been qualified by the words "has not been obeyed" and the rule says that in the event of disobedience of the injunction the Court may direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court. This could only be a mandatory direction. A prohibitory direction would be not to do on act. A mandatory direction is a command to do a positive act; a prohibitory injunction is a negative one restraining him from doing a, particular act. The difference between the two is obvious and Rule 32(5) can only be construed as applying to mandatory injunctions and not to prohibitory injunctions. (italics are mine) In the said decision there is reference with approval to several other decisions of different Courts holding exactly the same view on this point. Mr. Sen, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, has not been able to cite any decision to the contrary. On hearing the counsel for both the parties and on going through the above and a few other decisions referred to therein and without having any other decision to the contrary, I respectfully agree with the view taken in the above-quoted passage. Mr. Sen has merely urged that as the decree passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 331 of 1968 prohibits the judgment-debtors, Appellants in this appeal from doing something, which the judgment debtors have actually done, the executing Court should, take note of such disobedience and should order for the compliance of the decree by observing each and every direction contained therein. Mr. Sen in making the said submission looses sight of toe fact that this Court has passed a prohibitory, injunction in favour of his clients, the Respondents in this appeal. Undoubtedly Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 does not make provision for the enforcement of the exact terms of such a prohibitory decree. Mr. Sen in making the said submission looses sight of toe fact that this Court has passed a prohibitory, injunction in favour of his clients, the Respondents in this appeal. Undoubtedly Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 does not make provision for the enforcement of the exact terms of such a prohibitory decree. This sub-rule enables the Court at best to issue a direction on the judgment debtor to obey the decree and on the willful disobedience of that direction the Court can enforce the decree only by ordering detention of the judgment-debtor In the civil prison or by attachment of his property or by both, as specifically provided in the said sub-rule. Sub-rules (2) to (4) of Rule 32 undisputedly have no relevance to the facts of this case as they stand at present. Sub-rule (5) says that in the event of the disobedience of the injunction the Court may direct that: "the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable." A prohibitory direction in the decree, in question merely restrains the judgment-debtor from doing a particular act and there is nothing therein which requires the judgment-debtor to do any act. That being so, on the above quoted view taken in Evuru Venkata Subbayya Vs. Srishti Veerayya and Others which is in line with the view taken in Nari Chinnabba Chetty Vs. E. Chengalroya Chetty and Others Ramabrahma Sastri and Ors. v. Lakshminarasimham AIR 1957 A.P. 44 and Angad and Ors. v. Madho Ram and Ors. AIR 1936 All. 416, the provisions of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 has no application to a decree of prohibitory injunction of the nature passed in Second Appeal No. 331 of 1968. 5. Mr. Sen cited the decisions reported in Prag Dutt v. Kedar Nath and Ors. AIR 1945 Oudh. 81, Gundila Manjappa Shetty v. Manijakke Shedthi and Ors. AIR 1961 Mys. 268 Thukalan Poulo Avira v. Mar Basselios Gheevarghese and Anr. AIR 1954 TC 117 and Shyam Sunder Prasad v. Ramdas Singh AIR 1946 pat. 192, in support of his submission that the specific directions contained in the decree in question can be enforced in accordance with the provisions of Order 21, Rule 32. There is nothing in the said decisions to support the said contention of Mr. Sen. A careful perusal of the decision reported in Prag Dutta v. Kedar Nath and Ors. AIR 1945 Oudh. There is nothing in the said decisions to support the said contention of Mr. Sen. A careful perusal of the decision reported in Prag Dutta v. Kedar Nath and Ors. AIR 1945 Oudh. 81, shows that the ultimate ratio decedent of the case is that in the case of a decree of prohibitory injunction if the decree holder wants to confine himself to the remedies contained in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 then he can execute the said decree in that manner. There is nothing in the said decision to say that the provisions of Sub-rule (5) would apply to such prohibitory injunction and/or that the prohibitory direction of the nature contained in the decree in question can be enforced with the said of Rule 32. The decision reported in Gundita Manjappa Shetty v. Mamjakke Shetti and Ors. AIR 1961 Mys. 268, cited by Mr. Sen also does not support his contention. That was a case of a permanent injunction which restrained the judgment-debtor from interfering with the right of the decree-holder to take water from a particular water course which was the subject matter of the suit. The judgment-debtor by depending his own land diverted the free flow of water in the water course, by making it percolate into his land. On the above facts it was held in that case that the act of the judgment-debtor amounted to a clear disobedience of the injunction made against him, and so the decree-holder was entitled to ask the executing Court to direct the judgment-debtor to obey the injunction and in default to commit him to civil prison. This decision merely indicates that the executing Court in a case of prohibitory injunction can only direct the judgment-debtor to obey the injunction, and if he does not obey the same, the Court can commit the judgment-debtor to civil prison. While holding as above it has been observed therein that the judgment-debtor cannot of course contend that since the injunction granted against him was merely in the nature of a prohibition and not mandatory the executing Court cannot find him guilty for having disobeyed the same. The decree-holder therefore would be entitled to ask the executing. While holding as above it has been observed therein that the judgment-debtor cannot of course contend that since the injunction granted against him was merely in the nature of a prohibition and not mandatory the executing Court cannot find him guilty for having disobeyed the same. The decree-holder therefore would be entitled to ask the executing. Court to direct the judgment-debtor to obey the injunction and in case the judgment-debtor does not obey the said direction the executing Court can commit the judgment-debtor to civil prison as provided in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32. The decision reported in Thukalan Paulo Avira v. Mar Basselios Gheevarghese and Anr. AIR 1954 TC 117, also does not support Mr. Sen's contention. In that case the Petitioner's contention was that the proposed ordination of five Bishops was a direct violation of the perpetual injunction issued by the Court, and it should follow that the Petitioner's remedy was not a further injunction from the Court but on enforcement of the decree, already obtained of under Order 21, Rule 32. Code of Civil Procedure. The above contention of the Petitioner was rejected which is evident from the fact that the petition before that Court was dismissed with costs. The head note of this case in the aforesaid Reporter is obviously a mistake. There is nothing in the decision reported in Shyam Sunder Prasad Vs. Ramdas Singh the only other case cited by Mr. Sen to support his contention. The point under consideration was neither mooted, discussed considered or decided in this decision. 6. On the above considerations the specific direction contained in the decree cannot be specifically enforced by the execution of this decree. Of course if the executing court finds that there has been a disobedience of the injunction order contained in the decree then it can at first issue a direction on the judgment debtors to obey the specific directions contained therein, and in case of default it can, if properly moved, commit the judgment-debtors to civil prison or attach their property as provided in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order 21, Code of Civil Procedure. More over for the enforcement of the specific prayer as made by the decree-holder in column 10 of his execution petition the decree-holder can file a separate suit for the proper enforcement of the decree in question. 7. The contention put forward by Mr. More over for the enforcement of the specific prayer as made by the decree-holder in column 10 of his execution petition the decree-holder can file a separate suit for the proper enforcement of the decree in question. 7. The contention put forward by Mr. Patnaik that the Plaintiff-Respondents have not discharged their obligations under the decree by making separate arrangements for discharging water other than natural water appears to be on unacceptable proposition in view of the finding of fact of the two Courts below that the decree-holders have complied with the directions of this Court to that effect by making separate arrangement for discharging water other than natural water by means of pumps. Accordingly the said contention is of no avail. 8. The Miscellaneous Appeal accordingly is partly allowed in the terms aforesaid. The executing Court is to proceed with the execution of the decree in accordance with law and the observations made above in this judgment. On the facts of this case there will be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed