JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - By this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioner seeks to challenge the demand for payment of purchase tax, for the period December 1969 to April 1970, under the U.P. Sugar-Cane Purchase Tax Act, 1961. 2. Petitioner runs a Khandsari Unit in an Area which was reserved for Dhampur Sugar Mills, Section 5 of the U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act provides that there shall be levied and collected in the manner as may be prescribed, tax on the purchase of sugar-cane by the owners of Units, the rate specified therein. The expression Unit is defined in Section 2(c) as meaning Gur, Rab or khandsari sugar manufacturing Unit engaged in or ordinarily engaged in the manufacture or production of Gur Rab or Khandsari sugar in a reserved area. Accordingly, under the Sugar Purchase Tax Act, 1961 as it safood in 1969-70, the petitioner became liable to pay purchase tax in respect of the sugar-cane purchased by him, but in similar circumstances, no such purchase tax was payable by Units situated outside the reserved area. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Section 3 of the U. P. Sugar-Cane Purchase Tax Act 1961, as it stood on 1969-70, contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution in as much as it classified Units into those situated within the reserved area and those situated outside reserved area without any basis. It authorised levy and collection of Purchase Tax from units situated within the reserved area and not from similar Units situated outside reserved area. This section, therefore, is unconstitutional and void. 3. The respondents seek to justify the aforesaid classification of Units between those situated within reserved areas and those situated outside such areas on the ground that on account of concentrated efforts of cane Unions and the State Government in the re-served areas, the quantity of sugarcane produced there is much superior and results in high recovery, giving better margin of profit as compared to the cane produced in free areas where its quality generally is poor. Keeping into consideration the aforesaid fact the State Legislature, for imposition of purchase tax, classified units on the basis of their tax bearing capacity. ln his rejoinder-affidavit, the petitioner merely denied these assertions made in the counter-affidavit, but did not state any facts to show that aforesaid facts mentioned in the counter-affidavit are not correct. Keeping into consideration the aforesaid fact the State Legislature, for imposition of purchase tax, classified units on the basis of their tax bearing capacity. ln his rejoinder-affidavit, the petitioner merely denied these assertions made in the counter-affidavit, but did not state any facts to show that aforesaid facts mentioned in the counter-affidavit are not correct. In our opinion, aforesaid facts provide sufficient basis for classifying Units for purchases of levy of Purchase Tax into those situated in the reserved area and those situated outside such area. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner then relied on the preamble to the Amending Act of 1972 making certain amendments in the U. P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act 1961, as quoted in paragraph 19 of the petition. According to him, the preamble shows that the Amending Act of 1972 was passed with the avowed object of removing discrimination in the levy of Purchase Tax between Units situated in reserved area and those situated out side such area. He contends that this recital in the preamble to the Amending Act of 1972 contains an admission on the part of the State that uptil the year 1972 the provisions of the U. P. Sugar Cane Purchase tax Act 1961 actually suffered from the vice of discrimination. We are unable to accept this argument. The Stale Government has explained its position in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit, wherein it has been mentioned that due to intensive and sustained efforts on the part of the State Government the quality of cane produced in free area has also improved to the level of reserved areas, and the recovery percentage of cane available in free areas has gone at par with the cane produced in the received area. As such the State Legislature, upon coming to the conclusion, that the tax hearing capacity of the Units situated outside the reserved area has improved to the extent that the burden of Purchase Tax can be borne by it enlarged the definition of "Unit", by enacting the Amending Act of 1972, so as to bring units situated in free area also within the purview of the Purchase Tax. The case made out by the respondents is that earlier there was a difference between the tax bearing capacity of the two classes of Units. The case made out by the respondents is that earlier there was a difference between the tax bearing capacity of the two classes of Units. This difference disappeared with the passage of time and because of the incentive provided by the State Government and at present the two types of Units stand on similar footing and as such they have been Taxed in the same manner. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that preamble to the Amending Act 1972 contains an admission on the part of the State that even prior to the year 1972 there was no difference between the Units situated outside the reserved areas and those situated within such areas. 5. In the result, we find no force in the petitioner's submission that Section 3 of the U. P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, as it stood in the year 196-70, was invalid as it contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.