Judgment :- 1. The question that arises for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition is one of court-fee. The facts are simple and they lie within a short compass. The plaint schedule property, 35 cents in extent, situated within the Calicut Corporation belonging to the plaintiff-Company, was originally given on licence to Messrs. Dhanalakshmi Corporation as per an indenture dated 22-21966 for storing timber logs. The 2nd defendant was an agent of the said Corporation and he was practically in charge of the activities of the Corporation in the plaint schedule properties. According to the plaintiff, the Dhanalakshmi Corporation left the plaint schedule property on 3131971 and the plaintiff continued to be in exclusive possession of the property. Thereupon, the 1st defendant through the 2nd defendant, who is her husband and duly constituted power of attorney holder, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to allow the defendants to use the plaint schedule property as a licensee for stacking timber under certain conditions which were subsequently reduced to writing. It is the case of the plaintiff that under the agreement the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the premises. The agreement was for one year from 1st April 1971 to 31st March 1972. The case of the plaintiff is that on the expiry of the period of agreement on 3131972 the plaintiff wanted the defendants to vacate the premises within a reasonable time and, according to the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant promised to vacate the premises within one month after the expiry of the licence as there were a number of timber logs remaining in the property and they had to be removed also. 2. As the defendants did not vacate the premises this suit for a mandatory injunction was filed. The defendants in their written statement also raised a contention that the court-fee paid is not correct. An issue on the question of court-fee was framed and that was preliminarily heard by the learned Munsiff. The learned Munsiff came to the conclusion that the court-fee paid is not correct on the ground that the suit is one for recovery of possession also and in that case the plaintiff has to pay court-fee under S.30 of the Kerala Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1960. Accordingly, the plaintiff was directed to file a fresh valuation statement, to amend the plaint and to pay the proper court-fee. Accordingly, the plaintiff was directed to file a fresh valuation statement, to amend the plaint and to pay the proper court-fee. It is against the said order of the learned Munsiff dated 28 31973 that the plaintiff has come up in revision. 3. Before us the contention of the counsel for the revision petitioner is that the learned Munsiff ought to have found that the owner of an immovable property on termination of a licence can maintain a suit against his licensee for mandatory injunction directing him to vacate the property without praying for possession since the possession of the licensee cannot in the eye of law exclude the possession of the owner. 4. The learned Munsiff relying on Sisir Kumar v. Susil Kumar (AIR. 1961 Calcutta 229) has come to the conclusion that on the expiry of a licence the licensee is in the position of a trespasser, what is sought is really a prayer for eviction and hence the value of the relief must be the value of the subject matter, namely, the property, and that must be valued as per S.7 of the Act and court-fee must be paid under S.30 of the Act. The learned Munsiff further states that apart from stating that the property is in the plaintiff's possession, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has not offered a satisfactory explanation regarding the fact whether the defendants are not trespassers. According to the learned Munsiff, the suit is one for ejectment of the defendants and the plaintiff has to pay court-fee under S.30 of the Act in addition to the court-fee already paid, i. e. the plaintiff has to value the subject matter of the suit, namely, the plaint schedule property itself, and pay court-fee under S.30 of the Act. 5. The licence is terminated. But the licensee does not leave the premises. The question that may arise in the suit is whether a suit for a mandatory injunction or a suit for possession is the proper remedy. A mere licence only makes an act lawful which without it would be unlawful. A licensee has only a right of occupation with the permission of his licenser and his possession is not juridical possession. The licensee will be the actual occupant but the licenser will be the person having the control or possession of the property through his licensee. A mere licence only makes an act lawful which without it would be unlawful. A licensee has only a right of occupation with the permission of his licenser and his possession is not juridical possession. The licensee will be the actual occupant but the licenser will be the person having the control or possession of the property through his licensee. Then on the termination of the licence can the licensee be treated as a trespasser? In the possession of a trespasser there cannot but be an element of animus possidendi which will not be there in the possession which a licensee is having. Even after the termination of the licence the licensee may have to continue to be in occupation of the premises for some time, because in many cases the licensee may require some reasonable time to remove materials belonging to him and quit the place. But during such time the licenser will be deemed to be in possession through his licensee, because the licensee cannot have any independent or separate interest in the premises. In that case a licensee cannot possibly be treated as a trespasser'. But there will be cases where even after the expiry of the licence the licenser sleeps over the matter and does not take prompt action to neck the licensee out of the premises. No doubt a licensee can continue in occupation of the premises for a reasonable time after the termination of the licence. But if the licenser is not vigilant and the licensee continues in occupation of the premises beyond this reasonable time, what will he be? Will he be still a licensee or will he become a trespasser? If he continues to cling on to the premises why should he still be a licensee? No doubt it will be difficult to make a distinction in actual practice as to when a licensee becomes a trespasser and upto what time he will continue to be a licensee. There can be a more definite test. If on the expiry of the licence an assertion of a hostile title is made by the licensee and the licenser sleeps over the matter then the occupation of the licensee can be considered to have been converted into one of possession of a trespasser. There can be a more definite test. If on the expiry of the licence an assertion of a hostile title is made by the licensee and the licenser sleeps over the matter then the occupation of the licensee can be considered to have been converted into one of possession of a trespasser. Under such circumstances the licenser will have to sue for recovery of possession and a suit for a mandatory injunction under S.39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 will not be the remedy. 6. The decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Milka Singh v. Diana (AIR. 1964 J. & K. 99) was referred to by the counsel for the Revision Petitioner. S. M. Fazl Ali J. (as he then was) has laid down three propositions in Para.9 of the judgment which we extract hereunder: 1. That a suit for an injunction simpliciter against a licensee whose license has been terminated is maintainable. 2. That S.7(iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act clearly applies to such a suit and the plaintiff is given an option of putting any valuation that he likes and the court-fee has to be' paid on such valuation. 3. That where a licenser approaches the court for an injunction within a reasonable time after the licence is terminated, he is entitled to an injunction. On the other hand, if the licenser causes huge delay, the court may refuse the discretion to grant an injunction on the ground that the licenser had not been diligent and in that case, the licenser will have to bring a suit for possession which will be governed by S.7 (v) of the Court Fees Act." In the above case a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Prabirendra Nath v. Narendra Nath (AIR. 1958 Cal. 179) has been relied on. In this case also it has been held that a suit for a mandatory injunction is the remedy available to the owner of an immovable property against his licensee whose licence has been terminated. The counsel for the respondents relies on Sisir Kumar v. Susil Kumar (AIR. 1964 Cal. 229) and contends that a suit against a licensee after termination of the licence must be one for recovery of possession and hence court-fee is to be paid on that basis. This is the decision followed by the court below. The counsel for the respondents relies on Sisir Kumar v. Susil Kumar (AIR. 1964 Cal. 229) and contends that a suit against a licensee after termination of the licence must be one for recovery of possession and hence court-fee is to be paid on that basis. This is the decision followed by the court below. We do not propose to go into this question further since it is not for us to decide here what appropriate relief the plaintiff should seek in the suit. We are concerned only with the question of court-fee on the plaint as it stands. The question whether the suit as framed is maintainable is a matter for decision by the court below in due course. 7. The plaintiff in this case has come to court with a prayer for a mandatory injunction. Going by the allegations in the plaint the suit is one for that relief mainly. The court-fee paid is sufficient for the relief so asked for in the plaint. The court below has gone wrong in going into the question whether the suit is maintainable. Payment of court-fee under S.30 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1960 arises only in a suit for recovery of possession. The question of recovery of possession arises only when the defendants are to be evicted as trespassers. According to the plaintiff, they are not. It may be a matter to be proved in the case whether the defendants were actually trespassers on the date of suit. If the defendants succeed in this, the plaintiff may be ultimately non-suited. But this is a matter which has to be decided on the evidence to be adduced in the case. At this stage the court below will not be justified in coming to the conclusion that the plaint is not properly valued for the purpose of court-fee on the assumption that a suit for recovery of possession will only lie. 8. We set aside the order of the court below. This Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs. Allowed.