JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - All the above mentioned eight Government Appeals were taken up in a bunch for hearing the Respondents (accused persons in the Court below) in all these appeals are the same, one set of argument was advanced by counsel appearing for both the parties, the same question of law is involved in all the appeals and the acts alleged against the accused persons are similar in all the cases and are not disputed. These eight appeals, therefore, are disposed of by this, one judgment. 2. Eight separate cases were instituted against the accused persons for exporting outside the State of Orissa thinner solvent, a mixture containing 90% of denatured spirit to different customers on different dates and in differentquantities without obtaining the pass for the same as required u/s 12(1) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). According to the prosecution, the aforesaid act of the accused persons contravened the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act and so the accused persons were liable to be punished u/s 47(a) of the Act. In all the eight cases the trial Court found the accused persons guilty u/s 47(a) of the Act, and sentenced each of them thereunder to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in each case, in default to undergo S.I. for one month. The accused persons preferred Criminal Appeals Nos. 125 to 127 of 1971 and 129 to 133 of 1971, and the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore, by his identically similar judgments in all the cases, excepting the details therein about the place of export, the name of the consignee and the quantity of the said solvent exported, acquitted the accused persons on the finding that the accused persons had no criminal intention or mens rea in exporting the said intoxicant, and so they could not be held guilty for on offence u/s 47 of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge has of course found that the "thinner solvent" exported by the accused persons was manufactured by the Kalinga Chemicals at Balasore, of which the accused persons were the partners; that the accused persons did not contest the fact that they deported thinner solvent manufactured in the Kalinga Chemicals without a pass; and that the thinner solvent sold and exported by the accused persons comes within the definition of "intoxicant" in the Act and so far exporting that intoxicant the accused persons were required to obtain a pass from a competent authority as provided u/s 12(1) of the Act. That Court has also found that as the accused persons exported thinner solvent without obtaining the requisite pass, they ordinarily speaking, violated the provisions of Section 12 of the Act, and so were liable u/s 47(a) of the Act, but as they did not have the requisite mens rea in doing that act, they did not commit any offence. 3. It has been urged by Mr. Patra, appearing for the State, that the finding, of the learned Sessions Judge that mens rea is on essential ingredient of on offence u/s 47 of the Act and as that has not been proved against the accused persons they are not guilty of the said offence, is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the accused persons (Respondents herein) however made the best of efforts to support the said finding of the Court below. He has further urged that otherwise also, on the facts on record the accused persons cannot beheld guilty of any offence. 4. The accused persons have admitted that they were the partners of the Kalinga Chemicals at Balasore and in that capacity they on different dates sold to different firms outside Orissa "thinner solvent" in different quantities and exported the same, outside Orissa to those purchasers. They further pleaded that the Excise authorities very often inspected their records and registers and were well aware of the said export of 'thinner solvent' to different firms of different dates outside the State of Orissa, but they never demanded excise duty of[ the same, nor did they ever ask the accused persons to produce any pass for the export of the said article. The stand taken by them in the trial Court, that the 'thinner solvent' manufactured in the Kalinga Chemicals was a chemical product and was not on 'intoxicant' and so it did not require any pass for them to export such on article, has been given up at this stage, as Mr. Misra for the Respondents fairly stated at the outset that he would not canvass such a proposition and would not contest the findings of the two Courts below to that effect. 5. On the arguments advanced by Mr. Patra for the State and by Mr. Misra for the accused persons, the moot question which arises for consideration is whether mens rea is on essential ingredient of on offence of the nature alleged against the Respondents, punishable u/s 47 of the Act. Mr. Patra has very seriously urged that mens rea is not a requisite ingredient of on offence u/s 47 of the Act. According to him in Section 47 there is absolutely no reference to mens rea of the person who contravenes the provisions of that section by the use of the expression 'wilfully' or 'intentionally' etc., and that section read along with Section 48 and in the context of Section 49 dearly shows that mens rea is not a necessary ingredient of Section 47 and it should not be read into that section even by implication. He has further urged that apart from the above considerations clearly displacing mens rea from that section, the very fact that Section 47 punishes acts which are prohibited in the public, interest, the Courts should not import the ordinary presumption of mens rea into the said section. Mr. Misra, for the Respondents, on the other hand submits that as the statute either clearly or by necessary implication has not ruled out mens rea as a constituent part of the crime, the accused persons cannot be held guilty of on offence u/s 47 of the Act until and unless it is established that they had a guilty mind in committing the acts alleged against them. 6. Mr. Patra, for the State, in support of his above mentioned contentions depends on certain observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Acharya D. Pandey and Others, etc. 6. Mr. Patra, for the State, in support of his above mentioned contentions depends on certain observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Acharya D. Pandey and Others, etc. Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and a portion of paragraph 13 of the said decision are quoted below, as the law on the subject has been very succinctly and clearly dealt with therein: 10. The question whether a crime can be said to have been committed without the necessary mens rea has led to considerable controversy. The broad principles accepted by Courts in this country as well as in England are where on offence is created by a statute, however comprehensive and unqualified the language of the statute, it is usually understood as silently requiring that the element of mens rea should be imported into the definition of the crime, unless a contrary intention, is expressed or implied. In other words, the plain words of the statute are read subject to a presumption, which may be rebutted, that the general rule of law that no crime can be committed unless there is mens rea has not been ousted by the particular enactment. The mense a means some blameworthy mental condition whether constituted by knowledge or intention or other wise. But this rule has several exceptions, as observed by Lord Evershed in Lim Chin Aik v. The Qneen 1963 A.C. 160. Where the subject matter of the statute is the regulation for the public welfare of a particular activity statutes regulating the sale of food and drink are to be found among the earliest examples, it can be and frequently has been inferred that the legislature intended that such activities should be carried out under conditions of strict liability. The presumption is that the statute or statutory instrument can be effectively enforced only if those in charge of the relevant activities are made responsible for seeing that they are complied with. When such a presumption is to be inferred in displaces the ordinary presumption of mens rea. 11. As long back as 1895 Writ J. observed in Sherras v. De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918. When such a presumption is to be inferred in displaces the ordinary presumption of mens rea. 11. As long back as 1895 Writ J. observed in Sherras v. De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918. There is a presumption' that mens rea, on evil intention, or knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is on essential ingredient in every offence; but that, presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words at the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals and both mustbe considered. 12. It is further observed therein that the principal classes of exceptions may perhaps be reduced to three. One is a class of acts which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty. Another class comprehends some, and perhaps all, public nuisances. Lastly, there may be cases in which, although the proceeding is criminal in form, it is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right. But, except in such cases as these, there must in general be guilty. Knowledge on the part of the Defendant or of some one whom he has put in his place to act for him, generally, or in the particular matter in order to constitute on offence. The present case, in our opinion, falls within the first category mentioned above Section 35(1) deals with a quasi-criminal act. 13. This Court in Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State ruled that unless a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of the crime, a person should not be found guilty of on offence against the criminal law unless,he has got a guilty mind. The same view was reiterated by this Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Hans George. But in both those cases this Court recognized that the language of a provision either plainly or by necessary implication can rule out the application of that presumption. Further the Court may decline to draw that presumption taking into consideration the purpose intended to be served by that provision. In fact in Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State, this Court held that the liability imposed u/s 27(A) of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941 is on absolute liability. xxx (underlines are mine) 7. Further the Court may decline to draw that presumption taking into consideration the purpose intended to be served by that provision. In fact in Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State, this Court held that the liability imposed u/s 27(A) of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941 is on absolute liability. xxx (underlines are mine) 7. The general ruler no doubt is that in on enactment which creates on offence one should usually import mens rea as on element of that offence, unless a contrary intention is expressed or implied. But the above mentioned general rule stated in that broad and bald form has several exceptional as can be seen from the passages extracted above. These observations clearly indicate that when a statute makes provisions for penalising on act which is prohibited interest of public welfare then taking into consideration, the purpose intended to be served by the penal provision mens rea should not be read as a necessary ingredient of the said offence, as otherwise the activities to prevent which such provision is made would be rendered ineffective to the great detriment of public interest. The object of the penal provision is on important factor to determine whether means rea is essential ingredient of the said offence. In paragraph 7 of the decision reported in Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants Association Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another it has been held: It is true that for the protection of the liberty of the citizen in the definition of offences blameworthy mental condition is ordinarily on ingredient either by express enactment or clear implication but in Acts enacted to deal with a grave social evil, or for ensuring public welfare, especially in offences against public health e.g. statutes regulating storage or sale of articles of food and drink, sale of drugs, sale of controlled or scarce commodities, it is often found necessary in the larger public interest to provide for imposition of liability without proof of a guilty mind. (Italics are mine) 8. In the present case undisputedly on intoxicant containing 90% of denatured spirit, which certainly is not on innocuous article, was exported outside the State without a pass. (Italics are mine) 8. In the present case undisputedly on intoxicant containing 90% of denatured spirit, which certainly is not on innocuous article, was exported outside the State without a pass. There can be no doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing a condition to obtain a pass for exporting on intoxicant of this nature is to prevent uncontrolled export of such intoxicants in public interest Clandestine or unbridle sale and export of on intoxicant without a pass may prove dangerous to the society and perilous to the human life, and cannot be made innocent and/or harmless merely because of want of means rea on the part of the seller or the exporter. 9. Apart from the above consideration their Lordships of the Supreme Court; in the above-quoted passages have also observed that the language of a penal, provision may also rule out the application of the general presumption of mens rea. A careful perusal of Sections 47 and 48 of the Act, which are connected with each other, leaves one with the impression that Section 47 of the Act, makes provision for on absolute liability and the presumption of mens rea is not to be imported into it Section 48 is as follows: In prosecution u/s 47 it may be presumed unless and until the contrary is proved that the accused person has committed on offence punishable under that S.In respect of (a) any intoxicant or (b)xxx (c)xxx for the possession of which fie fails to account satisfactory. This section by making provision for the presumption contained therein clearly indicates that the provisions of Section 47 are absolute., Sections 47 and 48 read together provide that the liabilities created by the strict language of Section 47 are absolute, but exoneration of the said liability can be sought for only under the specific provisions made in Section 48. In Section 48 there is nothing to import means rea as a ground for exoneration of the liability created u/s 47. 10. My above view in the matter is further fortified by the wordings in which Section 49 is couched. That section provides to penalise on act of altering or attempting to alter any denatured spirit, when that act is done with the intention that such spirit may be used for human consumption or for the other purposes mentioned in the section. My above view in the matter is further fortified by the wordings in which Section 49 is couched. That section provides to penalise on act of altering or attempting to alter any denatured spirit, when that act is done with the intention that such spirit may be used for human consumption or for the other purposes mentioned in the section. Therefore so long the requisite intention specifically mentioned in that S.Is not established, the accused cannot be held guilty of on offence u/s 49. The express provision for 'intention' in Section 49' and the omission of the same in that or in any other form in Section 47 indicates that the legislature did not intend the requirement of means rea as on essential, ingredient of on offence u/s 47 of the Act, or else there was nothing to prevent the Legislature to provide for the same in that section as has been specifically provided in Section 49, closely following Section 47 in the same chapter. 11. On the above considerations I am of the view that mens rea is not on essential ingredient to constitute on offence u/s 47 of the Act. 12. Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, in support of his submission that the general rule of mens rea must be imported into Section 47, cited the decisions reported in Nenchand Dhulabhai v. The State of Gujurat 1969 GLR 370 ; Ghuria Telin Vs. State. State of Orissa v. Nilakantha Sahu and Anr. XXXH (1965) C.L.T. 990 and Srinivas Mall Bairoliya and Anr. v. Emperor AIR 1947 P.C. 135 ; Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State State of Maharashtra Vs. Hans George, and State of Orissa Vs. Gokul Barik. In the aforesaid Gujarat decision and in the decisions reported in Ghuria Telin Vs. State, and State of Orissa v. Nilakantha Sahu and Anr. XXXH (1965) C.L.T. 990, mentioned above, it has been held that, the possession of the article, with reference to which on offence under the Act is alleged, must be shown to be exclusive or conscious possession on the part of the accused, or at any rate he must have guilty knowledge in respect thereof, and that the prosecution cannot merely rely on the recovery of the articles but has further to prove that the articles were in conscious possession of all or any of the accused persons. There is nothing in the said decisions to say that Means rea is on essential ingredient of Section 47. Once conscious possession is proved, on the view held by me above, guilty mind or mens rea of the accused is not required to be proved, to constitute on offence u/s 47 of the Act. The decision reported in Srinivas Mall Bairoliya and Anr. v. Emperor AIR 1947 P.C. 135 , cited by Mr. Misra merely lays down the general rule that the Court should always bear in mind that unless the statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea a constituent part of a crime, on accused should not be found guilty of on offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind. That general rule, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Acharya D. Pandey and Others, etc. State of Maharashtra Vs. Hans George, and Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants Association Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, is subject to certain exceptions as mentioned therein. The present case for reasons stated above, come within some of those exceptions and hence mens rea is not to be read as a constituent part of the offence of the nature alleged against the accused persons. The effective majority decision reported in State of Maharashtra Vs. Hans George more than supporting the contention put forward by Mr. Misra, supports the view taken by me above on the point under consideration. In the decision reported in Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State cited by Mr. Misra, it has been held that where a servant sells petrol to a bogus customer in the absence of coupons in contravention of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order and in the absence of the master and without his knowledge, the master cannot be held vicariously guilty for the said act of the servant. That decision has been given on a consideration of the language of the penal provision in question and the facts of that case, and it does not have any bearing on the present cases before me. The decisions reported In Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State State of Orissa Vs. Gokul Barik, C.T. Prim and Another Vs. That decision has been given on a consideration of the language of the penal provision in question and the facts of that case, and it does not have any bearing on the present cases before me. The decisions reported In Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State State of Orissa Vs. Gokul Barik, C.T. Prim and Another Vs. The State, and Kochu Mohammad Kunja Ismail v. Mohammad Kadejaumma AIR 1959 SC 151, deal with different penal provisions in different statute books. The Hon'ble Judges on a consideration of the particular penal provision with which they were concerned in each case held that mens rea was a necessary ingredient of those penal provisions. The said decisions do not advert to or answer the particular question which is before me and hence have no bearing on the present cases before me. 13. Considering the language in which Sections 47 and 48 are couched, the subject matter with which they deal and the nature of the acts which they intended to prohibit and/or penalise, I am of view that mens rea is not on essential ingredient of Section 47 of the Act. If the acts which are made punishable under the said section are conscious acts on the part of the accused, then guilty mild or knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act or such other blameworthy mental condition whether constituted by knowledge or intention on the part of the accused, is not required to be proved to constitute on offence under that section. 14. In this case there is no controversy that the Respondents exported without a pass large quantities of 'thinner solvent' to different customers. It is not disputed in these appeals that the 'thinner solvent' in question comes within the definition of the word 'intoxicant' in the Act. Mr. Misra contends that the accused persons did not sell or export the said substance in any clandestine manner; they never made any secret of their said transactions with others; they paid all the required taxes for the export of the said substance and produced the papers and account books in that connection before the different authorities as and when they demanded the same and that they did not know or were never told that they required a pass for exporting the said substance, and so they cannot be held guilty of the offence alleged against them. The above facts and the above plea of ignorance of law are of no avail for the accused persons; and they cannot seek Exoneration of the offence, otherwise established against them, on the above score. The above facts can only be taken into consideration while imposing the sentence against the accused persons. 15. On the above considerations and on the facts and circumstances of the cases I hold that the order of acquittal passed by the Court below is based on a wrong and incorrect notion of the penal provision applicable to the facts of these cases; and that on the facts established the accused persons are guilty u/s 47(a) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, and hence the order of acquittal is liable to be set aside. The trial Court had rightly convicted the accused persons for the aforesaid offence, and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case it had sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to undergo S.I. for one month in each case. 16. In the result, therefore, I set aside the order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate Court in each case and convict the accused persons (Respondents herein) u/s 47(a) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, and on a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of these cases I sentence each of the accused persons in each case to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- (one hundred) and in default to undergo S.I. for one month. All the above-mentioned appeals are accordingly allowed. Final Result : Allowed