JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This is defendants' second appeals. In this appeal learned counsel for the appellant has sought to argue two points : Firstly that no notice was addressed nor served on the appellant company and secondly, the alteration Nos. 3 and 6 were not material alterations. In regard to the first point, learned counsel drew my attention to Ext. 22, the notice dated 27th January 1968. He urged that this notice was not addressed to the company and was also not served on the company. A perusal of the notice shows that the first party in the notice is the appellant company. Second party in the notice is Shri Munna Lal, who is described as proprietor and Partner of Brij Transport Co. (P) Ltd. It is therefore, clear that the notice was addressed to appellant company. Learned counsel further urged that a perusal of the notice would show that it purported to address itself only to Shri Munna Lal. A perusal of the notice show that the entire circumstance leading to the tendency by the appellant company was recited, merely because in the first line of the notice the use of the words "JO KI AAP SHRI MUNNILAL" would not limit the meaning of the word "AAP" to Shri Munna Lal alone. I have perused the notice and in my opinion, the plea that this notice is addressed to Shri Munna Lal and not to the appellant company, cannot be substantiated. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant company cited the case of Tulsi Ram Shaw v. R.C. Pal Ltd., AIR 1953 Calcutta 160. This was a case in which a limited company had taken a premises on rent. Notice to quit was addressed to Shri R.C. Pal Esq. The question for consideration by the Court was whether this was a valid notice to quit. In that case the Court interpreting the notice came to the conclusion that it was a valid notice. It observed in paragraph 28 as follows :- "It will therefore, be insensible, to use the language of Ridley, J. to say that this address in the notice to quit to Sri R.C. Pal, Esqr. was given only to R.C. Pal individually in his individual capacity and not as a Director, especially as Managing Director of the defendant company. It observed in paragraph 28 as follows :- "It will therefore, be insensible, to use the language of Ridley, J. to say that this address in the notice to quit to Sri R.C. Pal, Esqr. was given only to R.C. Pal individually in his individual capacity and not as a Director, especially as Managing Director of the defendant company. Thus R.C. Pal was the duly authorised agent as Managing Director to receive notice on behalf of the defendant company. A company can only receive notice through the hand of a human agency and who could be better than the company's Managing Director himself. It is not necessary, in my opinion for the validity of the notice to say when a letter is addressed to R.C. Pal, Esqr. that it should also have been stated that it was only is his capacity as Director or Managing Director of the company." 3. In the present case notice was addressed to the company also and it is not disputed that Shri Munna Lal was the Director of the appellant company. He was, therefore, a proper person to whom the notice was addressed and since the notice was served on him, it will be deemed that the notice was served on the company itself. I, therefore, find no substance in the first point. 4. In regard to the second point, learned counsel urged that the two alteration Nos. 3 and 6 were not material alterations. Alteration No. 3 has been described by the lower appellate Court as :- "inside the main gate open sahan has been covered by raising walls which has caused paucity of light and danger to the walls on account of the constructions of new walls upon them." Alteration No. 6 has been quoted as follows :- "The walls of the almirah of the south faced room towards east of dokhana room has been removed and a door has been placed in its place for ingress and egress." 5. The lower appellate Court has held that these two alterations amount to the material alterations. Learned Courts submitted that existence of an alteration is a question of fact but where it amounts to material alteration is a question of law. The lower appellate Court has held that these two alterations amount to the material alterations. Learned Courts submitted that existence of an alteration is a question of fact but where it amounts to material alteration is a question of law. However, in view of the decision of the Full Bench is Sitaram v. Johri Mal another, 1972 AWR 114 it has been held that a construction raised on a roof of a shop changes the structure of the building and amounts a material alteration. The Full Bench relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishnu Das, 1966 AWR 839, where in their Lordships have observed as follows :- "The expression 'material alteration' in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises. It may be that such alterations in a given case might not amount to an unreasonable use of the concerned premises or constitute a change in the purpose of the use." 6. Applying the principle laid by the Supreme Court we find in the case of alteration No. 6 that the structure of the building has been changed in asmuch as a door has been opened in a wall which had so far not existed. The almirah in the wall was removed and a door has been opened for ingress and egress. In my opinion this amounts to material alteration because there is a change of the structure itself. It is an important alteration. The wall at the particular place where the door has been opened has been removed. It therefore, materially alters the structure of the wall as well as of the room. Learned counsel cited a decision reported in Sh. Mohd. Ata Hussain v. Haji Qdir Bux and others, AIR 1930 Allahabad 560 to say that the opening of a door is not a material alteration. That case was not under the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Rent Control and Eviction Act, but, under the provisions of U.P. Municipalities Act. Section 178 of Municipalities Act further provides that as alteration would be deemed to be a material alteration provided a bye-laws declares as to what is a material alteration. However, we are not concerned with the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act in interpreting of provision of U.P. (Temporary) Rent Control and Eviction Act. Section 178 of Municipalities Act further provides that as alteration would be deemed to be a material alteration provided a bye-laws declares as to what is a material alteration. However, we are not concerned with the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act in interpreting of provision of U.P. (Temporary) Rent Control and Eviction Act. We are, to be guided by the provisions of that Act and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram v. Nohri Mal and another counsel referred to Ram Sarna Gupta v. Cantonment Board, Lucknow, AIR 1961 Allahabad 263, a decision of a single Judge concerning the Cantonment Act. Here again we are not concerned with the Cantonment Act. Here again we are not concerned with the Cantonment Act. Moreover, this was not in respect of opening any door. I am, therefore, satisfied that the alteration No. 6 amounted to a material alteration and the view taken by the Court below in this respect is correct. 7. With regard to alteration No. 3 it shows that the open sahan had been covered by raising walls. This question too would be covered by the decision of the Full Bench for it was not necessary that the constructions should be inside the building. It could be outside the building and also within the premises. The raising of walls and covering up the sahan would also amount to material alteration. In this view of the matter, I find no error in the Judgment under appeal. 8. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.