JUDGMENT Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. Petitioner No. 1, Rohtas Industries Limited is an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956, with its head quarters at Dalmianagar in the District of Rohtas of this State. Petitioner No. 2 is the Chairman and a share holder of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the company') is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of cement, asbestos cement products, paper and boards, vanaspati, chemicals, vulcanised fibre board etc. They have filed his application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the notification dated 11th of February, 1974 (Annexure 27) issued by the State of Bihar, respondent No. 1, under clauses (1) (4) of rule 119 of Defence of India Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') applying the rule to the Company and directing the management of the company to pay an ad-hoc increase of Rs. 45/- per month, over and above the amount already being paid to the workmen, to each workman of paper, vanaspati and all other industries, except cement, subject to the decision of the Tribunal in this matter. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 11 are officers of respondent No. 1 and respondent Nos. 4 to 8 are various labour unions of which the workmen of the company are members. Respondent Nos. 9 and 10 were Minister of Transport, and Minister of State for Labour and Employment respectively of respondent No. 1 at the relevant time. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioners is as follows. The Bihar (Central) Labour Advisory Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) is a tripartite body constituted by the Government of Bihar of representative of federation of unions of workmen, representatives of employers and the Government representatives. Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS). 2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioners is as follows. The Bihar (Central) Labour Advisory Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) is a tripartite body constituted by the Government of Bihar of representative of federation of unions of workmen, representatives of employers and the Government representatives. Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS). All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), Bihar branches, have always been represented on the said Board, The Board passed a resolution on 23rd January, 1952, containing procedure for determination of representative character of the unions for the purpose of recognition and in accordance with the recommendation contained in the said resolution a plebiscite was held at Dalmianagar on 8th of April, 1956, to determine the representative character of two rival unions, Rohtas Industries Mazdoor Sangh, respondent No, 4, affiliated to HMS, and Dlamianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh, respondent No, 6, affiliated to INTUC. The plebiscite was conducted by the then labour Commissioner of Bihar, and as a result thereof respondent No. 4 was determined as representative union. On the basis of the result of the plebiscite, the labour Commissioner, vide his letter dated 20th April, 1956 (Annexure 1) requested the company to recognize respondent No. 4, for the purpose of collective bargaining. By memorandum of settlement dated 24th of June 1956 (Annexure 2), the company granted recognition to respondent No. 4. In 1957 the workmen serving under the company went on strike. By a press note dated 12th of September, 1957 (Annexure 3), respondent No. 1 declared the strike illegal and also sanctioned prosecution of 12 persons. On 25th of June, 1960, a conciliation settlement was arrived at between the management of the Company and the recognized union of workmen of staff and labour categories. The settlement was regarding wage structure and other conditions of service and other relevant matters. In September, 1966, the workmen again went on strike, By an order dated 16th of September, 1966 (Annexure 3/a) respondent No. 1 again declared the strike prima facie illegal. On 7th of February, 1967, at the instance of respondent No. 4, the workmen again went on an illegal strike. On 29th of March, 1967, a settlement was arrived at between the management of the company and respondent No. 4. On 7th of February, 1967, at the instance of respondent No. 4, the workmen again went on an illegal strike. On 29th of March, 1967, a settlement was arrived at between the management of the company and respondent No. 4. Salient terms of the settlement were as follow :- (i) Question of dearness allowance was referred to the decision of Shri Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, the then Chief Minister, Bihar. (ii) Question of wage structure was referred to a tripartite committee and the unanimous decision of the Tripartite committee was to be final. (iii) Parties were to withdraw all references regarding wage structure pending before the Tribunal and the workmen were not to agitate the question of wage structure for following two years. 3. On 3rd of April, 1967, Shri Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, gave his decision awarding Rs. 46/- as variable dearness allowance with effect from 1st of April, 1967. The decision of Shri Mahamaya Prasad Sinha was finally incorporated in a settlement (Annexure 4) which was arrived at on 6th of April, 1967, between the management of the company and respondent No. 4, and respondent No. 5, the recognized union of the staff. Supplementary settlements dated 21st of June, 1967 and 2nd of December, 1967 (Annexure 57) were also arrived at between the management of the company and respondent Nos. 4 and 5. A scheme of variable dearness allowance linked with all India consumer price index number was also introduced by these settlements. On 8th of May, 1967, the management of the Company and the recognized unions made a joint petition for withdrawal of the reference pending before the Industrial Tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) for revision of wage structure as also the other matters covered by the aforesaid settlements. The reference pending before the Tribunal as covered by the aforesaid settlements was disposed of accordingly by the Tribunal, vide its award dated 26th of August, 1967. On 21st of March, 1968, the Board passed a resolution (Annexure 14) containing procedure for determining the representative character of trade unions for the purpose of recognition. The reference pending before the Tribunal as covered by the aforesaid settlements was disposed of accordingly by the Tribunal, vide its award dated 26th of August, 1967. On 21st of March, 1968, the Board passed a resolution (Annexure 14) containing procedure for determining the representative character of trade unions for the purpose of recognition. Apart from laying down the procedure, other salient features of its resolution were; (i) Employers should deal with all questions of general interest with the recognised union only provided that the employer shall not enter into agreement with the recognised union about the specific grievances of individual character of workmen who are not members of such registered unions as are not recognised. (ii) A registered Union which was not recognised may raise before the State Implementation and Evaluation Committee any question about: (a) breach of Code of discipline, (b) breach of award or agreement, (c) violation of the resolution and (d) question of implementation and recommendations of the Wage Board, (iii) Cases of individual workmen having no general application to others could be brought up before an employer by a registered union of which the workman was a member even though that union was not recognised and the employer would negotiate with registered trade union. However; in no case would the employer enter into an agreement on matters of general interest with a union which was not recognised. 4. The tripartite committee constituted for revision of wage structure failed to arrive at a unanimous decision and submitted a failure report on 24th of April, 1968. On 28th of June, 1969, the workmen went on lightning strike at the instance of respondent No. 4. On 7th of July, 1969, respondent no. 1 issued an order under section 10 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Annexure 6) prohibiting the strike. On the same day, respondent No. 1 made a reference to the Tribunal regarding the revision of the wage of industrial workers other than those of cement and sugar. This reference No. 60 of 1969 (Annexure 7) was made at the instance of respondent Nos A and 5. Subsequently respondent Nos. 6 and 7 at their written request were also impleaded as parties to the reference and thus they had been participating in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal in the said reference. This reference No. 60 of 1969 (Annexure 7) was made at the instance of respondent Nos A and 5. Subsequently respondent Nos. 6 and 7 at their written request were also impleaded as parties to the reference and thus they had been participating in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal in the said reference. On 30th of December, 1969, the Labour Department of respondent No.1 issued a letter (Annexure 15) which was in consonance with the resolution of the Board dated 21st of March, 1968, and stated that disputes of general nature could not be raised by an unrecognised union. On 28th of January, 1970, respondent No. 1 passed a resolution constituting a tripartite committee to advise it for revision of the wage structure of workmen of all units of engineering industry in Bihar which were registered as factory under section 2 (m) of the Factories Act, 1948. The workmen representatives of this tripartite committee were from State branches of federations of unions of INTUC, HMS, AITUC and UTUC. On 14th March, 1970, the tripartite committee arrived at a conciliation settlement, the salient terms of which were :- (i) All engineering units in Bihar which were employing 251 workmen and above were given an increase of Rs. 25/- per month with effect from 15th October, 1969. (ii) Wherever any reference was pending before any Tribunal/Conciliation officer in respect of wage revision, the parties would approach such Tribunal/Conciliation officer to dispose of the matter in terms of the settlement before the settlement was brought into force. In pursuance of the aforesaid settlement, conciliation settlement (Annexure 8) were arrived at between the management of the Company and the recognised unions. These settlements were dated 9th of June, 1970 and 10th of August, 1970 and were filed before the Tribunal with a prayer to give award in terms thereof. On 24th of December, 1970, the State Government issued another letter (Annexure 16) similar to annexure 15. On 13th of March 1973, respondent No.4 served strike notice on the management of the company demanding, inter alia, increase in dearness allowance. In pursuance of the said notice the workmen commenced strike on 28th of March, 1973. On 15th of April, 1973 a conciliation settlement was arrived at between the company and respondent No. 4, salient terms of which were as under :- (i) An ad hoc increase of Rs. In pursuance of the said notice the workmen commenced strike on 28th of March, 1973. On 15th of April, 1973 a conciliation settlement was arrived at between the company and respondent No. 4, salient terms of which were as under :- (i) An ad hoc increase of Rs. 35/- per month was allowed to workmen other than cement and engineering units with effect from 16th April 1973 and another increase of Rs. 5/- per month with effect from 16th of April, 1974. (ii) An increase of Rs. 10/- per month was allowed to engineering workmen with effect from 16th of April, 1973 and another increase of Rs. 5/- per month with effect from 16th April, 1974. (iii) Workmen agreed not to make any demand for increase in wages or any other demand involving financial implications for a period of three years commencing from date of settlement i.e. upto 14.4.1976. (iv) It was also agreed that the question of revision of wage structure would be taken to have been finally settled. On 16th of April, 1973 the company and respondent No. 4 filed a joint petition (Annexure 9) before the Tribunal with a prayer to give an award in reference cases No. 60 of 1969 in terms of the aforesaid settlement. On 8th of August, 1973, a settlement was also arrived at between the company and respondent no. 5, the recognised union of workmen of staff category, salient features of this settlement were as under :- (i) The wage structure of workmen of staff category was revised. (ii) The workmen of staff category other than cement and engineering were allowed an increase of Rs. 35/- per month with effect from 16.5.1973 and another increase of Rs. 5/- per month with effect from 16.4.1.974. (iii) It was also agreed that workmen of staff category would not make any other demand for increase in wages or other demand involving financial implications for a period of three years. This settlement was also filed before the Tribunal by the company and respondent No. 5 with a prayer to give an award in the said reference No. 60 of 1962 in terms of the settlement (Vide Annexure 12). 5. On 24th of August, 1973, the company and respondent No. 4 entered into supplementary settlement revising the wage structure of workmen other than those of cement and engineering Units. 5. On 24th of August, 1973, the company and respondent No. 4 entered into supplementary settlement revising the wage structure of workmen other than those of cement and engineering Units. The supplementary settlement was also filed before the Tribunal with a prayer to give an award in the said reference 'in terms thereof (vide annexure 10). On the same date a supplementary settlement was also arrived at between the company and respondent No. 4 revising the wage structure of engineering workmen. This was also filed before the Tribunal with a prayer to give an award in the said reference, in terms of the settlement (Vide Annexure 11). On 3rd of November, 1973, a settlement was arrived at between the company and respondent No. 5. Salient features of this settlement were :- (i) The wage structure of engineering staff was revised. (ii) The engineering staff were allowed an increase of Rs. 10/- per month with effect from 16.4.1973, and another increase of Rs. 5/- per month with effect from 16.4.1974. (iii) It was agreed that engineering staff will not make any demand for increase in wage or any other demand involving financial implications for a period of three years. This was also filed before the Tribunal with a prayer to give an award in the said reference No. 60 of 1969 in terms of the settlement vide annexure 13. On 11th of December 1973, respondent No. 6 gave a strike notice under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, demanding, inter alia, a minimum wage of Rs. 395/- per month. The demands being of general nature could not be raised by respondent No. 6 which was an unrecognised union. This strike notice (annexure 17) was received by the company on 17th of December, 1973. The demand regarding revision of the wage structure was pending before the Tribunal. Similar strike notices given by respondent No. 7 (annexure 18 ) and another given by respondent No. 8 (annexure 19 ) were received by the company on 31st of December, 1973 and 1st of January 1974 respectively. On 3rd of January, 1974, the company gave a reply of the said notice to respondent No. 6. On the same day it also sent a copy of the note together with the said reply to the notice to various authorities of respondent no. 1 6. On 3rd of January, 1974, the company gave a reply of the said notice to respondent No. 6. On the same day it also sent a copy of the note together with the said reply to the notice to various authorities of respondent no. 1 6. On or about 7th of January, 1974 Shri Bindeshwari Dubey, respondent no. 9, the then Transport Minister of Bihar and also General Secretary, INTUC, Bihar Branch, Shri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh, President of respondent no. 6 and Shri Khalid Anwar Ansari, Deputy Transport Minister, Bihar, visited, Dalmianagar and addressed a public meeting. Shri Dubey in his speech told the workmen that their demands were genuine and he would talk to the labour Minister, Labour Secretary and the Government of Bihar. On 11th of January, 1974, Shri Suraj Nath Choubey, the then State Labour Minister arrived at Dehri-Dalmianagar. He took active interest in the strike and was in fact instrumental in formation of a joint front of respondent Nos. 6, 7 & 8. In fact, the threatened strike commenced in his presence and he took no interest to avert the illegal strike. In pursuance of a telegram received from Joint Labour Commissioner, Bihar, a meeting was held on 12th of January, 1974 in the office of the Labour Minister, Bihar, which was attended by J. P. Saxena, Executive President and D. V. Singh, Chief Personal Manager as the representatives of the management of the company and P. K. Dubey, General Secretary, on behalf of the workmen of respondent no, 6. Any representative of the recognised union, respondent No. 4, was not invited to this meeting. The stand of the management of the company in the above meeting was that all should await the decision of the Tribunal in reference case No. 60 of 1969. It was pointed out on behalf of the management that the company had given to each workman other than in cement and engineering units an increase of Rs. 35/- and another Rs, 23/- per month in variable dearness allowance. It was also explained that the total impact of the said increase along with benefits of provident fund, statutory bonus etc. worked out at Rs. 84-82 each workman. The further stand of the management was that respondent Nos. 35/- and another Rs, 23/- per month in variable dearness allowance. It was also explained that the total impact of the said increase along with benefits of provident fund, statutory bonus etc. worked out at Rs. 84-82 each workman. The further stand of the management was that respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 which were unrecognised unions were incompetent to press for the issues raised by them which were of general nature and that machinery provided by Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be set in motion and the proposed strike be declared illegal and its commencement may be prohibited. The Labour Minister, Bihar, told the management of the company that it should consider the demands otherwise they would have to face the strike. On 14th of January, 1974, the strike which was illegal commenced from the morning shift. There were violence and intimidation at the factory gates. Loyal and willing workmen were assaulted in the •presence of police and magistracy. Some office bearers of the recognised union, respondent no. 4 also received injuries vide injury report (annexure 22). Further meetings were held at Patna on 16th, 22nd and 29th of January, 1974. They were held at the instance of the Labour Minister They were attended to by representatives of the company and of respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8. Representatives of respondent no. 4, the recognised Union, were not invited. In the se-meetings the Government indicated its approach namely, that the recognised union, respondent no. 4, was a dead horse and, therefore, the management of the company should negotiate and settle with respondent no. 6 or alternatively should announce wage increase unilaterally otherwise the strike was to continue. The stand of the company was as stated earlier. On 22nd of January, 1974, Shri Basawan Sinha, President of Respondent No.4, demanded a high level enquiry into the connivance of some Ministers, the police and the magistracy in encouraging reign of terror let loose by respondent nos. 6 and 7 with the help of hired hooligans. On the same date, the company issued an appeal to the workmen to call off the illegal strike and report for duty. Similar appeals were again issued by the company on 24th January, 1974 and 28th January, 1974. On 28th of January, 1974 the company also addressed letter (annexure 26) to the Labour Minister, Bihar, containing proposals for ending the strike. 7. Similar appeals were again issued by the company on 24th January, 1974 and 28th January, 1974. On 28th of January, 1974 the company also addressed letter (annexure 26) to the Labour Minister, Bihar, containing proposals for ending the strike. 7. On 5th of February, 1974, the company filed a writ petition in this Court which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 196 of 1974 for issue of an appropriate writ or direction to respondent no. 1 to institute conciliation proceedings, making reference and prohibiting continuance of the strike. This writ petition came up for admission before a Bench of this Court on 7th of February, 1974. and counsel for respondent no. 1 took time 1lth of February, 1974. Shri Basawan Sinha. President of respondent no. 4 held public meetings at Dalmianagar on 9th, 10th and 11th of February, 1974 and it was decided unanimously at these meetings that the workmen would go back to work from the morning shift of 12th of February, 1974. On 11th of February, 1974 there was a further meeting between the representatives of the company and those of respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8, but no settlement could be arrived at. On the same day, this court admitted C.W.J.C. No. 196 of 1974. In the evening of that day, respondent no. 1 arbitrarily and illegally invoked rule 119 of the Rules and issued the impugned notification (Annexure 27). A copy of the notification was served on J. P. Saxena, representative of the company at his son's residence at Patna at about 10.30 P.M. 8. The impugned notification (annexure 27) is challenged in the writ application on 27 grounds. At the time of hearing of the petition, however, Mr. A. K. Sen, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, urged only the following five grounds :- (1) Though several meetings were held at the instance of Labour Minister and Labour Secretary of the State in which representatives of the company participated, at no stage they were told that Government were thinking to invoke the Rules. Thus, no opportunity was offered to the petitioners to explain why the provisions of the Rules should not be invoked. This amounted to a violation of principles of natural Justice and the impugned order was bad on that score. (2) Rule 119 of the Rules could not be invoked as against a particular concern, a unit of an industry or an individual undertaking. This amounted to a violation of principles of natural Justice and the impugned order was bad on that score. (2) Rule 119 of the Rules could not be invoked as against a particular concern, a unit of an industry or an individual undertaking. The expression 'employment' or 'class of employment' in the Rules must be construed as referring to all concerned dealing in a particular industry in a State or a particular region. In the instant case as by the impugned order the Rules were invoked only as against all individual concern, the company, the notification was illegal. (3) The impugned order was arbitrary. No materials were at all considered by respondent no. 1 before invoking the Rules. It was a case of total non-application of mind. (4) The impugned order was issued malafide to support the trade unions which are supported by the political party which had formed the Government and was in power in this State. It was apparent from the very fact that respondent no. 4, the recognised union, was not even invited to attend any of the meetings. After this Court had admitted C.W.J.C. No. 196 of 1974 and the workmen had decided to attend the factory, the notification was issued in hot haste to give an impression to the workmen that respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8 were able to get some advantages for them which the recognised union, respondent no. 4 could not. (5) Respondent No. 1 could not invoke their power under the Rules when a reference under the industrial Disputes Act, was pending before the Tribunal. 9. As many as 9 counter-affidavits have been filed in the case. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have filed a joint counter-affidavit, whereas each of respondents. 4 to 10 have filed a separate counter-affidavit. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the Labour Minister of the State though she is not a respondent in the case. While respondent No. 4 has virtually supported the case of the petitioners, other respondents have denied the allegations made in the petition. The only allegations made in the writ application which have been denied in the counter affidavit of respondent no. 4 are that the earlier strikes at the instance of respondent no. 4 were illegal. 10. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf or respondent nos. The only allegations made in the writ application which have been denied in the counter affidavit of respondent no. 4 are that the earlier strikes at the instance of respondent no. 4 were illegal. 10. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf or respondent nos. 1 to 3 it is admitted that at the instance of the Board, a procedure was evolved whereby only a recognised union could raise industrial dispute of a general nature. It is further stated that this procedure was adopted as a non-statutory code of discipline which was accepted by all concerned and that the long experience of settlement of industrial disputes in the Labour Department has strengthened the belief in the expediency of adhering to the procedure laid down in the code of discipline. It is, however, denied that in the past reference of the dispute to the Tribunal was refused by the State Government only on the ground that the unions raising the dispute were not recognised. The refusal was also on account of the fact that other workmen who were members of the other unions and who were also substantial in number had not joined hands in raising dispute of such a general nature. It is averred that the settlement dated 14th of April, 1973 was completely changed in the subsequent settlements and the same stood nullified and that for all practical purposes it was not allowed to be in operation. A clear indication on the part of respondent unions of their intention to terminate the agreement on the very date on which they filed the objection petition before the Tribunal amounted to sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 19 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The subsequent conduct of the petitioners participating in the conciliatory talks held in the months of January and February, 1974, also amounted to waiving of the settlement. It is then stated that some of the demands made' by respondent nos. 6 and 7 were neither covered by the settlement nor by the reference pending before the Tribunal. As the petitioners did not listen to the representatives of the unions and expressed their unwillingness to negotiate with them, the threatened strike from 14th of January, 1974 seemed to be imminent. 6 and 7 were neither covered by the settlement nor by the reference pending before the Tribunal. As the petitioners did not listen to the representatives of the unions and expressed their unwillingness to negotiate with them, the threatened strike from 14th of January, 1974 seemed to be imminent. Respondent No. 1 in its anxiety to avert it and to find out solution called a meeting of the representatives of the unions and of the management of the company for conciliatory talks. As the efforts failed, the workmen went on a general strike. It is further denied that the respondent No. 1 or its machinery dealing with the situation acted with any bias with the idea of favouring any union or workers to the prejudice of establishment in disregard of the relevant consideration of maintaining peace and supplies and services essential to the community, In paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit, respondent nos. 1 to 3 set out the facts in detail which represent correct state of affairs and claim that as efforts of conciliation proved futile and it was not possible to make a fresh reference for a dispute relating to increase relating to wage and dearness allowance were pending before the Tribunal in the reference made in the year 1969 and the management of the company did not agree even to a suggestion that they should accept an arbitration of some independent person like a retired High Court Judge, respondent No. 1 after taking into account the relevant consideration for the maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community and for maintenance of public order and keeping in view the manifest as also the likely effects and consequence of the industrial unrest and the strikes which were continuing made the impugned order in exercise of their powers under section 119 of the Rules regulating the wages of workmen for the interim period till the making of the award. It is also denied that respondent No. 1 in the Labour Department was in any way politically motivated and was trying to pressurize the management of the company for their coming to a settlement with INTUC union. The charge of malafide is also denied. 11. Respondent No. 5 in its counter affidavit has asserted that respondent No. 1 could pass orders under rule 119 of the Rules though reference No. 60 of 1969 was pending before the Tribunal. 12. The charge of malafide is also denied. 11. Respondent No. 5 in its counter affidavit has asserted that respondent No. 1 could pass orders under rule 119 of the Rules though reference No. 60 of 1969 was pending before the Tribunal. 12. Respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in their counter-affidavits justify the strike which commenced from 14th of January, 1974. It is claimed that there is no law providing for recognition or non-recognition of a union and all the unions could raise disputes of general nature. It is further averred that any settlement by respondent No. 4 could bind only the members of that union and not the members of other unions. 13. Respondent Nos. 9 and 10 in their counter-affidavits deny the personal allegations made against them. Similarly the Labour Minister has denied in her counter affidavit the allegations that decisions of respondent No.1 were biased and prejudicial to the management of the company and were taken malafide to help INTUC. 14. I first propose to take up for consideration the second ground, as mentioned in paragraph 8 of this judgment, urged by Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the petitioners. Rule 119, sub-rule (1) of the Rules firstly lays down that the rule applies to all employment under the Central Government or the State Government and then proceeds to state that it applies to any employment or class of employment which the Central Government or the State Government being of opinion that such employment or class of employment is essential for securing the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, may, by notification, declare to bean employment or class of employment to which this rule applies. The question which arises for consideration is whether the expression) Employment or class of employment' can mean employment or class of employment in an individual concern. The impugned notification, annexure 27, says that employments in Rohtas Industries and Ashoka Cement Ltd., Dalmianagar, were declared essential employments and rule 119 of the Rules was made applicable to them as they were essential for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It was vehemently contended by Mr. The impugned notification, annexure 27, says that employments in Rohtas Industries and Ashoka Cement Ltd., Dalmianagar, were declared essential employments and rule 119 of the Rules was made applicable to them as they were essential for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It was vehemently contended by Mr. Sen that respondent No. 1 could not declare the employment in the industries of cement, asbestos cement products, paper and boards, vanaspati, chemicals, vulcanised fibre board etc. carried on by the company essential for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community without making similar declaration in respect of employments in those industries carried on by other concerns in The State. According to Mr. Sen, if employment in any of these industries was essential for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it was so in all concerns carrying business in these industries and not only in the concern of the company. He, therefore, submitted that rule 119 (1) of the Rules must be given a construction not empowering the Central Government or the State Government to use the power arbitrarily and declare employment in only some of the concerns carrying on a particular industry as essential for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community while leaving other concerns carrying on business in the particular industry. He conceded that under sub-rule (4) of rule 119, the Central Government or the State Government may pass orders regulating the wages and other conditions of service of persons or of any class of persons engaged in an employment or class of persons engaged in an employment or class of employment even in a particular concern if it was not at par with the wages and other conditions of service of persons or of any class of persons engaged in an employment or class of employment even in a particular concern if it was not at par with the wages and other conditions of service of persons or of any class of persons engaged in the same employment of other concerns, but contended that the power under sub-rule (4) should be exercised only if there was a valid notification under sub-rule (1) of rule 119. In support of this contention, learned counsel has drawn our attention to the use of the expression 'undertaking' in rules 114, 115 and 118 of the Rules and establishment in sub-rule (3) (c) (ii) of rule 119 itself where the intention was to deal with a particular concern. He has also drawn our attention to rule 114 (3) (j), according to which, the Central Government or the State Government may require 'any employers or class or classes of employers and not a particular employer only to supply to all or any class of their employees or to any class of dependents of such employees such articles or things in specified quantity and at specified price. 15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has also placed reliance on the decision in Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Association V Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Civil Lines, Nagpur AIR 1958 Bom. 332 wherein a Bench of Bombay High Court held that the expression 'employment' in the Minimum Wages Act, was to be construed in its most general sense and not with reference to any particular trade, business or occupation. The question which arose for determination in that case was different from one under consideration in the instant case. The case, therefore, is not of any real help for decision of the question arising in this case. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that if the expression 'employment' in rule 119 was to be given a different meaning than as contended by him, it would lead to discrimination at the hands of the State, respondent No.1, between persons similarly placed without any rational differentia and the provision of the rule shall have to be declared ultra vires on that ground. According to him, a court of law must give such an interpretation to a law which makes it intra vires and not ultra vires. He drew our attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court (1) Suraj Malla Mohta and Company Vs. A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and another AIR 1954 SC. 545 and (2) Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.. Madurai and others Vs. He drew our attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court (1) Suraj Malla Mohta and Company Vs. A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and another AIR 1954 SC. 545 and (2) Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.. Madurai and others Vs. A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and another AIR 1955 S, C 13 that on account of such a discrimination, sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 was held offending against the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, void and an unenforceable after coming into force of the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1954. Though the facts of these two decisions and the facts of the Case before us are not identical, but the principle of interpretation of statutes as enunciated by learned counsel for the petitioners is well recognised. If the expression 'employment' in a particular concern, thus giving power to the Central or the State Government to make rule 119 applicable to employment or class of employment in such concern only, leaving employment or class of employment in other similarly situated concern in the State or region, the Act, of the State making rule 119 applicable to only such concern will be bad on the ground of violating the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. The expression 'employment' therefore, should be given a wider meaning as contended by learned counsel for the petitioners to cover employment or class of employment in all concerns dealing in a particular industry in a State or in a particular region. This also appears to be the intention of the makers of the rule, for, wherever they intended to refer to a particular concern only, they have used the expression 'undertaking' or 'establishment' in the Rules. 17. Learned Advocate General and Mr. T. K. Das, however, have advanced elaborate arguments on the meaning to be assigned to the word 'employment' in rule 119 (1) of the Rules and they have to be considered before recording a definite finding on the question. They have referred to various statutes wherein the expression 'employment' has been used. Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, empowers the appropriate Government to fix the minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in Part I or Part II of the Schedule to the Act. They have referred to various statutes wherein the expression 'employment' has been used. Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, empowers the appropriate Government to fix the minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in Part I or Part II of the Schedule to the Act. Section 27 of this Act, confers power upon the appropriate Government to amend the Schedule by adding to it any employment in respect of which the Government is of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be fixed under the Act. Section 2 (e) defines the expression 'employer' and refers to therein to the expression 'scheduled employment' which is defined in clause (g) of the said section as follows :- “Scheduled employment 'means an employment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment,” It was the meaning of the expression 'employment' in this Act, which was considered by the Bombay High Court in Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Association's case, which has been noticed earlier and in respect of which it has been observed that the decision is not of any real help for decision of the question arising in the case before us. It may, however be stated here that the said decision of the Bombay High Court went in appeal before the Supreme Court and the judgment of the Supreme Court is reported in A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 1968. The Supreme Court over-ruled the decision of the Bombay High Court. The former had held that item No. 8 of Part 1 of the schedule, employment in stone breaking or stone crushing, intended to cover the breaking or crushing of stones incidental to the mining operations as well. The Supreme Court held that stone breaking or stone crushing operations which are carried on in mines are not included in Item No. 8. It did not give as wide meaning to item No. 8 with reference to the expression 'employment' as was given by the Bombay High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court also is of no real help for deciding the question arising for decision before us in the present case. 18. As held in the Imperial Tohacco Co. It did not give as wide meaning to item No. 8 with reference to the expression 'employment' as was given by the Bombay High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court also is of no real help for deciding the question arising for decision before us in the present case. 18. As held in the Imperial Tohacco Co. of India Ltd. V. The State of Bihar and others AIR 1970 Pat 193 by a Division Bench of this Court, the word 'scheduled employment' in the Minimum Wages Act, does not mean industry or undertaking or establishment, rather it has got a wider connection. In that case a printing section of a Cigarette company which did the work of printing cartoons and labels was held to be a scheduled employment as 'employment in any tobacco manufactory' under item No. 3, Part I of the Schedule. Facts of that case are also different, but it supports the view taken earlier so far the case lays down that employment does not mean only undertaking and establishment but it has to be given a wider meaning. 19. Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, defines 'industrial dispute' as follows :- “industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, or any person.” This definition uses the expression 'employment' or 'non-employment'. It is obvious that in ,this definition the expression 'employment' has been given its dictionary meaning, i.e., an Act, of employment, what engages or occupies, occupation. In section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the expression 'employment' has been used and there too it has to be assigned its dictionary meaning. The Factories Act, also contains certain provisions as to employment of young persons in a factory and there too the expression 'employment' means the Act, of employing. 20. The expression 'employment' undoubtedly means Act, of employing, what engages or, occupies, occupation, the meaning assigned to it by dictionaries and it must have the same meaning also in rule 119 of the Rules, But the question is whether in that rule the expression 'employment or class of employment can mean employment in a particular concern. 20. The expression 'employment' undoubtedly means Act, of employing, what engages or, occupies, occupation, the meaning assigned to it by dictionaries and it must have the same meaning also in rule 119 of the Rules, But the question is whether in that rule the expression 'employment or class of employment can mean employment in a particular concern. In my opinion, in the context the expression has been used in that rule, it cannot mean employment or class of employment in a particular concern only. How the expression has been used in other statutes brought to our notice by learned Advocate General and Mr. T. K. Das undoubtedly is relevant but not decisive in deciding the aforesaid question. 21. Learned Advocate General has strongly relied on the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar Jain V, The State AIR 1950 Pat 436 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the same case when it went up in appeal before that Court, reported in A.I.R. 1951 S.C.201. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this Court. In that case their Lordships were interpreting section 3 (1) and (2) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary) Powers Act. 1946 and they were called upon to decide whether the term 'notified order' in that section was wide enough to cover special orders relating to matters specified-in that section. The section ran as follows :- “3. (1) The Central Govt. so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution & availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply & distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein. (1) The Central Govt. so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution & availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply & distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made there under may provide-(j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the entering and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorized to make such search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to believe that a contravention of the order has been, is being, or is about to be committed, the grant or issue of licences, permits or other documents, and the charging of fees there for.” From sub-section (2) of Section 3 itself it is manifest that a special order as to search of any premises and seizure from that could be issued under that section and their Lordships were considering whether such a special order of search and seizure issued by the Government was valid or not. They held that it was valid. The language of that section is different from the language of rule 119 (1) of the Rules and on the basis of those decisions it cannot be held that the Central or the State Government can make rule 119 applicable to an employment or class of employment of a particular concern only. 22. The language of rule 119 itself makes it dear that an order under sub-rule (1) of that rule applying the rule to employment or class of employment must be general in nature. Sub-rule (2) empowers the Central or State Government to issue directions under that sub-rule by general or special order. Sub-rule (1) does not confer any such power on the Central or State Government. The notification under sub-rule (1) applying the rule to employment or class of employment must therefore, be general in nature. 23. It was also contended by learned Advocate General that it has not been averred in the petition that whole of employment in the State was not covered by the impugned notification. The notification under sub-rule (1) applying the rule to employment or class of employment must therefore, be general in nature. 23. It was also contended by learned Advocate General that it has not been averred in the petition that whole of employment in the State was not covered by the impugned notification. Some arguments were advanced at the Bar as to on whom the onus lies in this regard, whether it was for the petitioners to plead and establish that whole of employment was not covered or for the State Government to prove that whole of employment was covered. In my opinion, the question of onus is not very material in the circumstances of the case. The impugned notification itself makes it clear that it is not general in nature and was not intended to apply to whole of employment, i.e. similar employment in other concerns. It is special in nature and was intended to apply to employment only in a particular concern namely the company. After having given most anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on this question. I am of the view that the impugned order of respondent no. 1 applying rule 119 to the company only is illegal. If the application of rule 119 to the company itself is illegal, the regulation of wages under sub-rule (4) is also illegal. 24. In view of decision on ground no. 2 the writ application has to be allowed and in that view of the matter, it is not necessary to examine other grounds raised by learned counsel for the petitioners in detail. However, I would like to deal with each of those grounds briefly. I. take up now for consideration ground no. 5 as stated in paragraph 8 of this judgment that respondent no. 1 could not invoke the power under the Rule when a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, was pending before the Tribunal. However, I would like to deal with each of those grounds briefly. I. take up now for consideration ground no. 5 as stated in paragraph 8 of this judgment that respondent no. 1 could not invoke the power under the Rule when a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, was pending before the Tribunal. In reply to this ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to section 37 of the Defence of India Act, 1971, which reads as follows: “The provisions of this Act, or any rule made there under or any order made under any such rule shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.” He contended that on account of the provisions of this section in case of any inconsistency with another statute the Defence of India Act, and the rules made there under or any order made under any such rule were to prevail and, therefore, pendency of a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, could neither debar the State Government from applying rule 119 of the Rules to an employment or class of employment nor from passing an order under sub-rule (4) of the said rule regulating the wages of persons or any class of persons engaged in any such employment or class of employment. This argument of learned Advocate General must prevail and, in my opinion there is no substance in the aforesaid ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioners. 25. Another ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioners as stated in paragraph 8 of this judgment, was that the impugned order was arbitrary for, no materials were at all considered by respondent no. 1 before invoking the rule and it was a case of total non-application of mind. True it is that from the materials available on the record it appears that respondent no. 1 namely the State Government never brought it to the notice of the representatives of the company that it intended to apply rule 119 and regulate the wages, but that by itself is not enough to establish that no materials were at all considered by respondent no. 1 before invoking the rules and it was a case of total non-application of mind. 1 before invoking the rules and it was a case of total non-application of mind. It is the case of the petitioners themselves that at the meetings which were held at Patna in the months of January and February, 1974 the representative of the company brought all the necessary facts relating to strike and pendency of reference before the Tribunal to the notice of those who were attending the conference on behalf of respondent no. l. Thus, it cannot be said that no materials were at all considered by respondent no. 1 before invoking the rules and it was a case of total non-application of mind. 26. The impugned order is in two parts. By the first part it makes rule 119 of the Rules applicable to the company and by the second part, in exercise of powers under sub-rule (4) of the rule, it directs the company to pay an ad hoc increase of Rs. 45/- per month over and above the amount already being Paid to the workmen to each workman of paper, vanaspati and all other industries except cement subject to the decision of the Tribunal in this matter. The first part of the order, in my opinion, is arbitrary, for, as already held respondent no. 1 had no power to make rule 119 applicable to employment or class of employment in the company only by special order. On the materials available on the record I do not find it possible to hold that the second part of the order is also arbitrary, for, the decision appears to have been taken by respondent no. 1 after it was in full possession of necessary facts which were placed before it by the representative of the company themselves and further because it was mere ad hoc increase subject to the final decision of the Tribunal in the matter. 27. I next take up for consideration the ground pressed by learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order was issued mala fide. Undoubtedly respondent no. 6 is affiliated to INTUC, a labour organization in which the Indian National Congress Party which was in power in the State of Bihar at the relevant date and is in power even today is interested. It is also not in dispute that respondent no. 9, the then Transport Minister Bihar, was the General Secretary of INTUC Bihar branch. 6 is affiliated to INTUC, a labour organization in which the Indian National Congress Party which was in power in the State of Bihar at the relevant date and is in power even today is interested. It is also not in dispute that respondent no. 9, the then Transport Minister Bihar, was the General Secretary of INTUC Bihar branch. It further appears that respondent no. 1 ignored respondent no. 4, the recognized labour union, and did not call its representatives to attend the meetings which were held in the months of January and February, 1974. I also find no reason to disbelieve the allegations made on behalf of the petitioners that respondent no. 9, the then Transport Minister of the State Government, and respondent no. 10, the then Minister of State for Labour and Employment of the State Government, had visited Dehri Dalmianagar at the relevant time. It may be that they addressed some of the meetings organised by respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8 there. Question arises can mala fide on the part of respondent no. 1 be inferred from those facts, In N. P. Mathur and others AIR 1972 Pat 93 (FB) V. State of Bihar and others, the question what is meant by judicial review of administrative action on the ground of malafides was fully discussed by Untwalia, J. (as he then was) I may say so with respect he correctly summarized the law on the question as follows :- “What is meant by judicial review of administrative action on the ground of malafides? What is the scope of such an enquiry? I have found in numerous cases a challenge to all sorts of governmental actions and orders on grounds of malaildes with vague, wild, certain, uncertain, true or false allegations, as they may be. The learned Professor S.A. De Smith in his book Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Second Edition, has pointed out at page 302 that there are several forms of abuse of discretion in "exercise of the governmental powers, and these forms overlap to a very great extent and run into one another. Yet they are recognized as forming distinct legal categories, and in majority of cases, separate identification is not impossible. Yet they are recognized as forming distinct legal categories, and in majority of cases, separate identification is not impossible. An order may be bad because of its having been made in excess of power or abuse of power or wrong exercise of power in violation of law-exercise of power in bad faith for an ulterior motive or purpose. In other words, a dishonest exercise of power is commonly and generally characterised as exercise of power malafide. If a power granted for one purpose is exercised for a different purpose, that power has not been validly exercised. But the exercise of power for a different purpose may not be necessarily in bad faith or dishonest. In such a situation, my view is that it cannot be attacked on the ground of malafides although it is vulnerable on other principles of law. There may be a plurality of purposes in exercise of the power. If the dominant purpose is good and valid, the action cannot be struck down (vide para 8 of P. V. Jagannath Rao V. State of Orissa : AIR 1969 SC 215 ). But if the dominant purpose or motive was bad and dishonest for some ulterior reasons, the order will be struck down as having been made malafide. It is a well settled principles of law that a dishonest exercise of power an order made in bad faith-is no exercise of power in the eye of law. Such an order is invalid and must be struck down by a court of law. Courts of law enforcing the rule of law cannot tolerate and allow to stand governmental actions or orders which are glaringly tainted with malafides. Theoretically the principle is very sound and wholesome. But in application of the principle difficulties are insurmountable in a large number of cases. On mere suspicion that the order has been made malafide, it cannot be struck down. To interfere with it on the ground of such an attack, very cogent reasons and crystal grounds are necessary. The facts must be proved by a person who wants to attack an executive order on the ground of malafides to show that the irresistible conclusion is that the sole motive or purpose or in any event the dominant one was such as was neither legal nor honest. The facts must be proved by a person who wants to attack an executive order on the ground of malafides to show that the irresistible conclusion is that the sole motive or purpose or in any event the dominant one was such as was neither legal nor honest. It is only then that an order can be held to have been made malafide and can be struck down as such.” The learned Judge has referred to various authorities, books by well-known jurists and decisions of Courts of law on the subject. It is not necessary to repeat all that in this judgment. According to the petitioners own case, the decision was taken at the instance of the Labour Minister and Labour Secretary of the State of Bihar and, in my opinion, on the materials available it is not possible to hold that respondent No. 1 or its Labour Minister or Labour Secretary acted malafide. A finding of malafide cannot be recorded on mere suspicion and I do not find it possible to hold in this case that the dominant purpose or motive in issuing the impugned order was bad and dishonest for some ulterior reasons. The fact that the impugned order was passed after the admission of the Company’s writ petition which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 196 of 1974 is also not sufficient to establish that the impugned order as malafide. 28. I lastly come to the ground urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that no opportunity was offered to the petitioners to explain why the provisions of the Rules should not be invoked and, therefore, there was violation of principles of natural justice by respondent No. 1 in applying rule 119 of the Rules to the company. It has already been stated that there were several meetings in the months of January and February, 1974 at the instance of the Labour Minister of respondent No.1 in which representatives of the company and respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8 took part. It is not the case of the respondents that at any of these meetings it was made known to the representatives of the company that respondent No.1 was thinking to apply rule 119 of the Rules to the company, of course, it was emphasised at that meeting that the company should increase the wages of the workmen. It is not the case of the respondents that at any of these meetings it was made known to the representatives of the company that respondent No.1 was thinking to apply rule 119 of the Rules to the company, of course, it was emphasised at that meeting that the company should increase the wages of the workmen. When respondent No.1 intended to issue a special order making rule 119 of the Rules applicable to the employment or class of employment in the company alone, it should have asked the representatives of the company who were attending the meeting that they had to say in the matter. In the circumstances, therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned order is bad on the ground of violation of Principles of natural Justice. 29. Mr. B. C, Ghose, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4, has drawn our attention to Article 352 of the Constitution, preamble to the Defence of India Act, and Section 38 of that Act, and contended that as there was no longer any grave emergency existing whereby the security of India was threatened by external aggression, the provisions of the Rules could not be invoked so as to interfere with the ordinary avocations of life of a citizen. According to him, therefore, the impugned notification was ultra vires. It is not one of the grounds which have been pressed by learned counsel for the petitioners in support of their writ application. I do not, therefore, consider it necessary to go into this question which has been raised on behalf of respondent no 4 in support of the petitioners, writ application, 30. Mr. Ali Ahmad appearing for respondent No. 7 urged that the writ application was defective as all the workmen who were entitled to derive benefit from the impugned order were not made parties to it and that the writ application could not be allowed in their absence. Various unions which represent the workmen of the company have been made parties to the writ application. In my opinion, all the workmen serving in the company are not necessary party to this writ application and it cannot fail on that ground. 31. Various unions which represent the workmen of the company have been made parties to the writ application. In my opinion, all the workmen serving in the company are not necessary party to this writ application and it cannot fail on that ground. 31. In view of the findings recorded earlier that the impugned notification is bad and illegal for violation of principles of natural justice and absence of power in respondent No. 1 to apply rule 119 of the Rules to the employment or class of employment under the company by special order, the said notification has to be quashed, The writ application is accordingly allowed. Let a writ issue quashing and canceling the notification dated 11th of February, 1974 (annexure 27). The respondents are also prohibited from giving any effect to the impugned notification and making any order or demand there under. It is, however, made clear that this order would not debar respondent no. 1 from issuing in accordance with law general order as to application of rule 119 of the Rules. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. H. L. Agrawal, J. 32. I have had the opportunity and advantage of going through the judgment of my learned brother, Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. and I share his views that the impugned notification dated the l1th February, 1974 (Annexure 27) is bad and illegal for violation of the principles of natural justice and absence of power in respondent No. 1 to apply rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules to the employment or class of employment under the petitioner company alone. I, however, propose to add a few comments of my own to the same. 33. In relation to the third ground of attack made by learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned notification was arbitrary, for no materials were at all considered by respondent No.1 before issuing it, long arguments were advanced by the learned Advocate General that the subjective satisfaction of respondent No.1 was not justice-able and it was not open to a Court to see if the opinion of the authority Was justified by objective tests and, accordingly, this Court could not examine the adequacy of the materials on which the opinion rested. The principle, as such, is well settled. The principle, as such, is well settled. But it is equally well settled that the Court could examine as to whether the opinion was at all formed before the issue of the notification and that the opinion was relevant and germane to the circumstances which fell to be considered under the Rules, and whether they were such as could possibly and rationally support the conclusion drawn by the authority, i.e. it is open to the Court to see as to whether a reasonable man can come to that conclusion in the context of the employment, that is, the opinion must be an honest opinion. In other words, if it is shown that the circumstances do not exist at all or that they are such that it is impossible for anyone to form an opinion there from suggesting the aforesaid things, the opinion is challengeable on the ground of non application of the mind. The existence of the circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine qua non for action must be demonstrable as the existence of the circumstances is a condition fundamental to the making of an opinion. The contention of the learned Advocate General, therefore, that this Court could not examine the correctness of the notification on this ground must be rejected. 34. While considering the question of malafide, in paragraph 27 of the judgment my learned brother has found that it was not possible in this case to hold that the notification was bad and dishonest for some material reasons. Form the facts stated in the judgment, however, it would appear that it was only respondent No. 4, namely, Rohtas Industries Mazdoor Sangh, affiliated to Hind Mazdoor Sabha which was the recognised union, and the other unions, namely, respondents 6, 7 and 8 were not recognised ones. From the detailed facts set out in the judgment of my learned brother, it would appear as to how this respondent had been asserting and fighting for the cause of the workmen right from 1957 to improve their service conditions. I shall very briefly state the relevant facts. While some disputes were still pending before the Labour Tribunal in Reference Case No. 60 of 1969 in terms of the settlement (Annexure 13), respondent No. 6 gave a strike notice under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, on 11.12.1973 demanding, inter alia, a minimum wage of Rs. I shall very briefly state the relevant facts. While some disputes were still pending before the Labour Tribunal in Reference Case No. 60 of 1969 in terms of the settlement (Annexure 13), respondent No. 6 gave a strike notice under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, on 11.12.1973 demanding, inter alia, a minimum wage of Rs. 395/- per month Annexure 17). Similar notices were given by respondent Nos. 7 &; 8 (Annexures 18 and 19 respectively) only a few days thereafter. The demands being of a general nature, could not be raised by these unrecognized unions under the law, which fact was brought to their notice by the petitioners and the matter was also reported to the various authorities of the Government. Soon thereafter the then Transport Minister of Bihar (Respondent No. 9), who happened to be the General Secretary of INTUC, and the then Deputy Transport Minister (Respondent No. 6, the President of Respondent No. 6, visited Dalmianagar and addressed public meetings in the first week of January 1974 and supported the demands of respondents 6, 7 and 8 and assured them to pursue the matter with the Labour Minister and other authorities of the State Government. On 11.1.1974, the State Labour Minister also arrived at Dalmianagar and took active interest to support the demands of the workmen and organise them. Rather the strike commenced from the morning shift of 14.1.1974 in his very presence and acts of violence and intimidation at the factory gate were resorted to and loyal and willing workmen were assaulted. In the various meetings that were held at Patna on 12th, 16th, 22nd and 29th of January 1974 at the instance of the Labour Minister, representatives of the Company and respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 attended the same, and no representative of the recognised union (Respondent No. 4) was invited. In the various meetings that were held at Patna on 12th, 16th, 22nd and 29th of January 1974 at the instance of the Labour Minister, representatives of the Company and respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 attended the same, and no representative of the recognised union (Respondent No. 4) was invited. The plea advanced on behalf of the Government was that the said recognised union was a dead horse, and thereby respondent No.1 and its officers were adopting an attitude of coercion and compulsion against the petitioner company to negotiate and settle the matter with respondent No. 6 by bye passing respondent No. A, It is interesting that Basawan Sinha the President of respondent No. 4, on 22.1.1974 demanded a high level enquiry into the connivance of some Ministers the police and the magistracy to enquire into the reign of terror at the hands of respondent Nos. 6 and 7. He held public meetings at Dalmianagar on 7th, 10th and 11th February 1974 and it was decided unanimously to call off the strike and that the workmen would go back to work from the morning shift of the 12th February 1974. It has also been seen that a writ application, namely, C.W.J.C. No. 196 of 1974, filed by petitioner No. l with a prayer for issue of an appropriate writ or direction to respondent No. 1 to institute conciliation proceedings and prohibiting continuance of the strike in question was admitted on the 11th February 1974, which was earlier adjourned at the instance of the State counsel. It is in this background and the sequence of events that the impugned notification (Annexure 27) was issued in all hot haste, even without seeing the result of the call given by the President of Respondent No. 4 to the workmen to resume their duties from the morning of the very next day (12th February 1974). A copy of this notification was served at 10.30 P. M. on the same day on Mr. J.P. Saxena, the Executive President of the petitioner company, at his son's residence at Patna. A copy of this notification was served at 10.30 P. M. on the same day on Mr. J.P. Saxena, the Executive President of the petitioner company, at his son's residence at Patna. Being conscious of the legal position that on mere suspicion, any administrative or governmental action cannot be struck down as being malafide, and to interfere with it on ground of such an attack, very cogent reasons and crystal grounds are necessary, I, feel satisfied to take a view that the action of respondent No. 1 in issuing the impugned notification was tainted with bad faith to support the trade unions, namely, respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8, who were supported by the political party which formed the Government and was then and still is in power in this State, with a view to create an impression amongst the workmen that it was only respondent Nos. 6. 7 and 8 who fought for them and could bring for them the said advantage, and in this way to hijack their sympathy and support from respondent No. 4 in their favour. 35. In view of all these findings, it is not very necessary to examine the validity of the second part of the notification (Annexure 27) issued under sub-rule (4) of rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971, which directed the petitioner company to pay an ad hoc increase of Rs. 41/- per month, over and above the amount already being paid by it to the various categories of workmen, as this part of the notification automatically falls in view of the finding in relation to the notification issued under the first part of the said rule. This part of the notification was challenged by Mr. Sen on the ground of non-application of mind to any relevant material. I, however, venture to take a different view from my learned brother who has, held in paragraph 26 of the judgment that it was not possible to hold that the second part of the notification issued under sub-rule (4) of rule 119 of the Rules was also arbitrary as the same was issued on a consideration of the relevant and necessary facts in full possession of respondent No. 1. There is paucity of decided cases on rule 119 of the rules. 1 may, however, refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam and another Vs. There is paucity of decided cases on rule 119 of the rules. 1 may, however, refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam and another Vs. Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. and others AIR 1967 S C 1766 which was a case under rule 126-AA of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 which is of considerable assistance. This rule corresponds to rule 119 of the present Rules. In that case the Governor of Assam had issued a notification under the rule to a large number of employments or securing the public safety and for maintaining supplies and services necessary to the life of community”. On the same day another notification was issued under sub-rule (4) of rule 126 AA ordering payment of ad-hoc cost of living allowance of Rs. 10/- per month to all workers drawing pay upto Rs.400/- per month engaged in the employments notified for the purpose of sub-rule (1). Both the notifications were challenged on various grounds. While considering the validity of the second notification, it was held in the said decision that the power conferred by sub-rule (4) is consequential to the issue of a notification under sub-rule (1) in case of employments other than those under the Central or State Government. Once the notification under sub-rule (1) is issued, the Central Government or the State Government has the power to regulate the wages and other conditions of service of the persons engaged in the employment concerned. The powers under this sub-rule are of far-reaching consequence and may be exercised to disturb all settled industrial relations between employers and employees concerned which may be existing for a long time. In view of the nature of the impact that the exercise of powers under this sub-rule might have, which have to be exercised in case of a real emergency, the Government should consult the interests concerned before taking any action there-under. It cannot be disputed, in my opinion, that the exercise of the powers under sub-rule (4) is consequential on the issuance of a notification under sub-rule (1). It cannot be disputed, in my opinion, that the exercise of the powers under sub-rule (4) is consequential on the issuance of a notification under sub-rule (1). It was further laid down in the said case that the Government must adopt and follow some procedure, such as issue of a public notice and inviting representatives from all those interests, and, if necessary, calling for date from them and also giving an oral hearing to the representatives of those interests concerned or the like, and after such consultation and consideration of date collected by the Government itself as well as supplied by the interests concerned, it would be open to Government to pass an order under sub-rule (4) indicating that it has considered the date and consulted the interests concerned (emphasis supplied). In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it seems to me that the-notification under sub-rule (4) has to follow after the notification under sub-rule (1) has been issued, after complying the various formalities. The dates if any, in possession of the Government itself cannot be held to be sufficient in themselves without any consultation with other interests likely to be affected by issue of any notification under sub-rule (4). In my view, therefore, the second part of the notification (Annexure 27) is also bad and vitiated on account of non-observance of a proper procedure for collecting the relevant materials and date in fixing the ad-hoc increase of Rs. 45/- per month to each workman for payment by the petitioner. 36. I, therefore, agree with my learned brother, Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. that this application must be allowed and the notification (Annexure 27) must be cancelled for the reasons given in his judgment and also for the further reasons given by me. Application allowed