Venkataswami, J.- In this appeal by the State under section 417(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, the judgment of acquittal by the Sessions Judge at Tumkur, in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1972, has been challenged. That appeal had been preferred by the respondent against his conviction and sentence for an offence under section 408, Indian Penal Code, passed by the Special First Class Magistrate, Madhugiri, in C.C. No. 464 of 1970. 2. The respondent who is an official in a co-operative society was charged with an offence of having misappropriated certain sum belonging to the society thereby committing an offence punishable under section 408, Indian Penal Code. He was convicted by the trial Court for the said offence. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge, placing reliance on sections 70, 109 to 111 and 118 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 19.59 (‘Act’ for short) and rule 18 of the Rules framed thereunder, held that: (1) the amount, which is the subject-matter of the charge, was in the nature of a ‘debt’; (2) its non-payment or non-accounting by the respondent, along with the denial of liability by the respondent, merely gave rise to a dispute between the society and its officer, within the meaning of section 70 of the Act, and, therefore, only cognisable by the Registrar of Societies; and (3) in the absence of previous sanction of the Registrar for such prosecution, the same Would not be maintainable. As a result of the said conclusions, the respondent was acquitted. 3. It may incidentally be noted, that although he has briefly summarised the evidence for the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge has not examined the said evidence in the light of the charge levelled and the reasoning of the learned Magistrate in that behalf. He has, however, concluded thus: — "This is a co-operative dispute which should be adjudicated upon by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the cause of action against these accused may fall within the province of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules made thereunder. This dispute cannot attract the province of the common law Courts." 4. On behalf of the State, Sri J.M. Riazuddin, the learned Assistant State Public Prosecutor, mainly contended that the entire approach to the case by the learned Sessions Judge had been erroneous in law. This dispute cannot attract the province of the common law Courts." 4. On behalf of the State, Sri J.M. Riazuddin, the learned Assistant State Public Prosecutor, mainly contended that the entire approach to the case by the learned Sessions Judge had been erroneous in law. His contention is that the provisions of the Act relied on have no application to proceedings instituted under the Indian Penal Code. Incidentally, in answer to a contention urged on behalf of the respondent that the evidence may be examined by this Court itself, he drew attention to an enunciation of the Supreme Court as to the proof required to bring home a charge of breach of trust, which in our opinion may be usefully reproduced. The case is Jaikrishnadas Manohrdas Desai and another v. State of Bombay1. The relevant enunciation reads: "To establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonset misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure, in breach of an obligation, to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him; or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made." 5. On behalf of the respondent Sri K.C., Shivasubramaniam, who has been briefed as amicus curiae, while not seeking to support the judgment in appeal, submits that this Court should proceed to repair the omission of the learned Sessions Judge to examine the material in the context of the charge, by examining the evidence for itself. 6. On behalf of the respondent Sri K.C., Shivasubramaniam, who has been briefed as amicus curiae, while not seeking to support the judgment in appeal, submits that this Court should proceed to repair the omission of the learned Sessions Judge to examine the material in the context of the charge, by examining the evidence for itself. 6. On a careful consideration of the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge and the provisions of law relied on by him, we are clearly of the view that the contention urged on behalf of the State is sound and deserves to be accepted. We are also of the view that the request of the learned amicus curiae for an examination of the evidence by us cannot be acceeded to and the matter clearly deserves a remittance to the lower appellate Court for a fresh consideration of the appeal in the light of the charge concerned. For this purpose, it is sufficient for us to examine a few material provisions of the Act. We shall now proceed to consider them. 7. Section 70 of the Act refers to disputes which may be referred to Registrar for decision. It provides that "if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society arises, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute". In sub-section (1) thereof; in clauses (a) to (d), the parties to such a dispute have been specified. In subsection (2) therein certain disputes have been enumerated with a mandate that they should be "deemed" to be disputes for the purpose of sub-section (1). 8. On a careful reading of the said subsections together, it seems to us that it is manifest that the disputes comprised therein are almost wholly and exclusively related to those of a civil nature which, but for the bar enacted therein, are ordinarily cognisable by a civil Court. It cannot, in our opinion be stretched to include offences made cognisable by Courts of criminal jurisdiction. It cannot, in our opinion be stretched to include offences made cognisable by Courts of criminal jurisdiction. To say that even criminal jurisdiction is barred would mean that the officials and parties specified therein could commit offences falling under the general criminal law and escape liability for punishment pres cribed therefor, as nowhere in the Act has provision been made, enabling a Registrar to mete out punishment for any such offence. 9. There is yet another reason why We should say that the provisions of section 70 of the Act would not be attracted to a case of the present nature. It is a well established position in law that in regard to a cognisable offence under the Indian Penal Code, if the State, acting for and on behalf of the general public, were to institute a complaint, the complainant at whose instance the proceedings are initiated will have no locus standi. In the instant case although the society is the complainant before the police, the prosecution has been launched on behalf of the State. In this view, and in the absence of any reference to the State in section 70, the provisions of the said section would not at all be attracted. 10. In concluding thus, we are not unaware of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge has approached this question from the point of view of a conclusion that the amount involved, in the charge was in the nature of a “debt”. The latter conclusion in our view, nor was it argued as such before us, is not warranted by the material available. It is not also the stand taken on behalf of the respondent before the trial Court, nor is there any evidence to indicate that the sum in question had been lent with the concomitant obligation to repay. This aspect of the matter clearly falls to be examined by the Court below in the light of the enunciation of the Supreme Court extracted earlier. We, however, do not wish to be understood as having expressed any concluded opinion in this behalf. The view we have taken of this case is clearly based on the fact of the erroneous approach made by the Court below in having placed reliance on the provisions of the Act. 11. We, however, do not wish to be understood as having expressed any concluded opinion in this behalf. The view we have taken of this case is clearly based on the fact of the erroneous approach made by the Court below in having placed reliance on the provisions of the Act. 11. Although the above discussion would be sufficient for the disposal of this appeal, we shall briefly advert to three of the other provisions of the Act on which also reliance has been placed by the learned Sessions Judge. The relevant sections 109 and 111 relate to offences and penalties. Under these provisions certain acts and omissions connected with the affairs of a co-operative society have been expressly made punishable with sentences specified therein. But section 109 nowhere provides that such offences are made punishable by the Registrar or any authority other than a Magistrate. Moreover, it seems to us plain that all these offences have been created by the Act, which is a special statute, for the first time and quite apart from any other general penal law. Indeed that it is so would be clear from the provisions of section 111 of the Act Which reads thus: “Cognizance of offences- (1) No Court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the First-Class try any offence under this Act. (2) No prosecution shall be instituted under this Act without the previous sanction of the Registrar and such sanction shall not be given- (i) without giving to the person concerned an opportunity to represent his case; and (ii) if the Registrar is satisfied that the person concerned acted in good faith.” 12. It is clear from this provision that it has reference to an “offence under this Act”. The “sanction” envisaged in sub-section (2). is clearly referable only to the offences under the Act and not to any other under the general penal law or otherwise. At any rate section 408, Indian Penal Code, is not an offence arising from the provisions of the Act. The view of the learned Sessions Judge, based on section in (2), is therefore, clearly erroneous. is clearly referable only to the offences under the Act and not to any other under the general penal law or otherwise. At any rate section 408, Indian Penal Code, is not an offence arising from the provisions of the Act. The view of the learned Sessions Judge, based on section in (2), is therefore, clearly erroneous. Similarly it is also plain from section 118 of the Act that it enacts a bar of jurisdiction which may otherwise be exercisable in a given case by a civil or revenue Court, and not a criminal Court, only in regard to the matters expressly enumerated in the said provision for which provision has been made in the Act itself. The bar enacted in section 118 of the Act, therefore, is clearly not attracted. 13. As a result of this discussion, the appeal stands allowed. The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, bTumkur, in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1972 is hereby set aside. There Will, however, be a remand of the matter to that Court for a fresh disposal of the appeal. It is so ordered.