Bhimiah, J.- These three petitions are disposed of together by a common order as they are directed against a common committal order made under section 207-A of Criminal Procedure Code by the Judicial Magistrate, I Class (I Court), Bangalore City in C.C.No. 5201 of 1969 on his file. They have been preferred by the 1st, 5th and the 2nd accused respectively. The petitioners were charge-sheeted by Delhi Special Police Establishment for offences under sections 120-B, 409, 420, 477-A read with sections 109 and 34, Indian Penal Code. 3. The facts of the case are: In the year 1953 an educational institution by name Chandrashekhar Education Society was established in Yadgir, Gulbarga District and in the name: of the Society a College of Arts and Science by name Shankar College was started. This institution was originally managed by a governing body of which A-1, A. Konappa alias Nadagowda was the vice-chairman and the college was then affiliated to Osmania University and after re-organisation of States the society was registered in Mysore State and the Colleg;e was affiliated to Karnataka University. A-1 became the Chairman of the society and continued to be so till the filing of the charge-sheet. In 1957. A-3 Rangaswamy was the Principal and sometime later A-2 Ramalingaiah was appointed as Principal and he continued to be so till August, 1962. Again the 3rd accused Rangaswamy succeeded him as Principal till the final closure of the college. A-4 Bendi was a clerk-cumaccountant in the said college. At the inception the Shankar College was a Junior College and the Society had no proper building and equipment for running the college. In about a year 1958 the Registrar of Karnataka University, Dharwar, recommended for the grant of Rs. 32,500 against an estimated grant of Rs. 48,000 to the Ministry of Education, Government of India, on the application by Shankar College, Yadgir, for the construction of a recreation hall-cumauditorium in the premises of the college. In 1959, the University Grants Commission approved the grant of Rs. 32,500. The Government of India released the first and the second instalments of Rs. 10,500 each in the month of March, 1960 and August, 1960, respectively. The conditions of the grant are embodied in Exhibit P-24 a letter dated 16th January, 1959, from the University Grants Commission to the Registrar, Karnataka University, Dharwar. 32,500. The Government of India released the first and the second instalments of Rs. 10,500 each in the month of March, 1960 and August, 1960, respectively. The conditions of the grant are embodied in Exhibit P-24 a letter dated 16th January, 1959, from the University Grants Commission to the Registrar, Karnataka University, Dharwar. The College Authorities failed to abide by the terms and conditions in respect of the above grant and that they also failed to construct the recreation hall-cum-auditorium in the premises of the College. As Shankar College was a Junior College and the University Grants Commission under its scheme of grants for development of such institutions considered an application by the said institution though the Karnataka University, Dharwar, for a central grant for introduction of three years degree course and approved a total non-recurring expenditure for the introduction of three years degree course as noted under: (1) University Grants Commission Share Rs. 80,000 (2) State Government’s Share Rs. 40,000 (3) College Management share Rs. 40,000 The Karnatak University released Rs. 1,20,000 from out of University Grants Commission and the State Government’s share to the college during the period from 16th May, 1959 to 29th June, 1962. The College submitted a statement of expenditure for Rs. 1,61,177-88 Ps. On 15th January, 1963. The certificate was signed by A-3, C.V. Rangaswamy, who was the then Principal of the College. The certificate was countersigned by the Registrar of Kantatak University. The statement contained a certificate which stated inter alia “certified that the expenditure shown in Column 6 was incurred on the approved lines for the implementation of the three years degree scheme.” The expenditure statement reveals that the entire University Grants Commission share of Rs. 80,000 was released to the College. Since a valuation certificate issued by the Executive Engineer in the year 1964 for Rs. 54,300 was not duly signed by him, it was sent back to the college authorities to obtain signature. Inspite of several reminders to obtain signature of the concerned engineer, the same was not complied with by the College authorities. That excited the suspicion of the University authorities and a third instalment of the grant was withheld. In 1964, a Committee was appointed by the University to go into the affairs of the College. The Committee reported that the College had not made much progress in the construction of the College building. That excited the suspicion of the University authorities and a third instalment of the grant was withheld. In 1964, a Committee was appointed by the University to go into the affairs of the College. The Committee reported that the College had not made much progress in the construction of the College building. The Karnatak University Syndicate appointed another Committee to hold a spot enquiry. On 23rd December, 1964 the Committee reported that no progress was made in the construction work except completion of plinth and some signs of trenches having been dug. The Committee was of the opinion that an amount of only Rs. 10,000 might have been spent as against Rs. 84,692 claimed to have been expended by the College. As a result of the aforesaid report a Technical Audit Cell of the P.W.D. was asked to go through the affairs of the College. The said Committee (Cell) submitted a report in February, 1965 to the effect that hardly a sum of Rs. 13,500 had been spent as against the amount of Rs. 84,692 claimed to have been expended on the College building, and a sum of Rs. 58.799 as against a sum of Rs. 73, 308 claimed to have been expended on equipment and library. The findings of these three Committees reveal that the statement of expenditure submitted by the College authorities wee incorrect and false. Consequently the Karnatak University disaffiliated the college with effect from 15th June, 1966. 3. Thereafter the matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation of Home Affairs, Government of India, which then referred the matter to the Special Police Establishment, Eastern Division, Bangalore, which registered a Crime in R.C. No. 19 of 1967 dated 8th August, 1967 for offences under sections 120-B, 406 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, against the governing body of Shankar College, Yadgir, Gulbarga District, Mysore State and others, and sent the First Information Report to the Special Judge (Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore) on 8th August, 1967. The Special Police Establishment investigated the case and filed the chargesheet against five accused formulating 13 charges against them. The Special Police Establishment investigated the case and filed the chargesheet against five accused formulating 13 charges against them. The prosecution filed two applications, viz., one under section 337, Criminal Procedure Code, to grant pardon to the 3rd accused Rangaswamy and another application under section 207-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to follow the procedure in inquiries preparatory to commitment in view of the nature and gravity of the offences complained of. The Special Magistrate by an order dated 18th January, 1973 granted pardon to A-3 Rangaswamy and allowed the prosecution to proceed with the case as a Committal Inquiry. The first accused was the Chairman of the Governing Body of the College, A-2 and A-3 were the Principals of the College during the relevant period, A-4 was the Clerk of the College who maintained accounts, A-5 was the Auditor of the College from April, 1961. A-3, the Approver has been examined as P.W.1 in the committal proceedings. No other witness was examined. 4. The Learned Special Magistrate, on considering the oral evidence and the documents produced by the prosecution under section 173, Criminal Procedure Code committed the petitioners to take their trial before the Court of Session at Gulbarga on the charges punishable under sections 120-B, 409, 409 reed with 34, 420, 420 read with 109 and 477-A, Indian Penal Code. In regard to each of these petitioners, he concluded that a prima jack case had been made out against each of them as follows: 5. Regarding A-1 the charges are under sections 120-B, 409 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code (six counts). 6. Regarding A-2 the charges are under sections [20-B, 409 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code (three counts). 7. Regarding A-4 the charge framed was under section 477, Indian Penal Code. 8. Regarding A-5, the charges are under sections 120-B, 420 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code (two counts). 9. A-4 has not challenged the impugned order passed against him. Therefore the committal order against him is final. 10. In these petitions we are concerned with the committal order passed against A-1, A-2 and A-5, by the Special Magistrate, Bangalore. 11. Before proceeding to examine the contentions urged, it is relevant to refer to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, with refence to certain enunciations of the, Supreme Court. 12. 11. Before proceeding to examine the contentions urged, it is relevant to refer to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, with refence to certain enunciations of the, Supreme Court. 12. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1, the Court has stated the position thus in para. 6 of the above report: "………………………………………………………….. The said, section saves the inherent power of the High Court to mate such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the Magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under section 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any-specific provision of the Code. It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the end of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of the justice. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of the justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceedings the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against accused persons do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusations in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained ………………………. 13. In Khushiram v. Hashim1, it is enunciated in Para. 3 of the said report thus: “…………………………………………………………….. The distinction must always be drawn between absence of legal evidence and absence of reliable evidence. If it could be said with justification that there was no legal evidence at all in support of the prosecution case, it may lead to the inference that the commitment was bad in that it Was not based on any legal evidence at all. But on the other hand where circumstances are relied upon to show that the evidence may perhaps not be believed, they do not lead to the inference that there is no legal evidence on record……..” On a consideration of the above and other decisions the Court in Hazarimal v. Rameshwar Prasad2, has, in para. 12 of the said report, summarised the position thus: “The inherent power of the High Court under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, has been considered by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab3, and State of West Bengal v v. S.N. Basak4. In exercising jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily enquire as to whether the evidence is ‘reliable or not’. Where again, investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the previsions of the Criminal Procedure Code……” 14. Keeping the above principles in view, was shall proceed to examine the several contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. 15. Keeping the above principles in view, was shall proceed to examine the several contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. 15. First and the foremost we shall deal with a contention of mixed fact and law which is common to all the petitions. Before elaborating the respective contentions it is necessary to set 3ut the few relevant facts bearing on it. We have earlier adverted to the fact that the prosecution has been launched fry the Delhi Special Police Establishment by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred under sections 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Ac) (XXV of 1946) (Delhi Act) read with the notifications relevant thereto issued under sections 3 and 5 thereof. Since the only point in controversy hinges on the fact whether the State Government has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Delhi Special Police Establishment as per the provisions of section 6 of the Delhi Act it is relevant to set out the said section in full. But before setting out the said provision, it may be mentioned that this requirement has been enjoined on account of the fact that the power conferred on the Parliament to extend the jurisdiction as such, has been hedged in by a restriction as can be seen from Entry 80 of List I of the VII Schedule to the Constitution possibly with a view to" avoid any conflict with the power exercisable by a State as per Entry 2 of List II thereof. Section 6 of the Delhi Act read thus: ‘‘Consent of State Government to exercise of power and jurisdiction: — Nothing contained in section 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area (a State, not being a Union territory or railway area) without the consent of the Government of that State." In the context of the above constitutional and statutory provisions and also the reorganisation of States under the States Re-organisation Act, as a result of which the New State of Mysore (now Karnataka) came into being the Central Government appears to have sought for a fresh consent from such new State. An Under Secretary to Government of the State communicated the said consent in the undermentioned manner. The letter in question reads thus: GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE No.HA. 141/Pol. (G.I.) The Mysore Govt. Sectt. An Under Secretary to Government of the State communicated the said consent in the undermentioned manner. The letter in question reads thus: GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE No.HA. 141/Pol. (G.I.) The Mysore Govt. Sectt. (Home Department) From The Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Home Department. To Shri K.B. Mandlekar, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. Sir, With reference to your letter No. 6/45/ 56 AVD dated 6th November, 1956, requesting to convey the fresh consent of this Government for the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, I am directed to convey the consent of this Government for the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment within the territory of the Mysore State. Yours faithfully, Sd. P. Bharaniah, For Secretary to Government, Home Department." 16. The entire contention in question is principally based on the form and manner in which the communication is worded and signed. At this stage, a minor contention as to the capacity of an Under Secretary to Government to act as per the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 (3) may be disposed of. It was contended that an Under secretary was not competent to act as per the Rules of Business in force at the time. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Advocate-General placed the relevant Rules of Business before us and we are satisfied that an Under Secretary to Government was competent to authenticate the orders and instruments of Government for and on behalf of the Governor. We shall not, therefore, advert to this aspect again in the course of this order. 17. We shall now turn to the contention of the petitioners. Briefly the contention in outline is this: The consent of the State Government enjoined under section 6 of the; Delhi Act is the result of an executive decision of the Government which ought to be taken in accordance with Article 166 (1) and authenticated as per the Rules of Business framed by the Governor under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution. In the absence of proper authentication such a decision or order will not enjoy the immunity provided for under Article 166 (2) thereof. In the absence of proper authentication such a decision or order will not enjoy the immunity provided for under Article 166 (2) thereof. Since the petitioners have challenged the very existence of such a consent by the State Government, it was the clear duty of the respondent to have placed reliable and credit-worthy material by way of evidence showing that a decision bearing on such consent had been in fact taken by the State Government in accordance with the appropriate rules of Business. In the absence of proof of such consent the Delhi Special Police Establishment would not have jurisdiction to investigate into the offences in point and, therefore, the charge-sheet placed by such Police would not be a police report within the meaning of the provisions of section 173, Criminal Procedure Code. Once such a position is not established, the committal Court has no jurisdiction to adopt the procedure prescribed under section 207-A, Criminal Procedure Code, which is the situation in the case on hand. The order of commitment,, therefore, is clearly one without jurisdiction and therefore requires to be quashed. A further submission ancillary to the above argument, is made that the letter of the Under Secretary reproduced earlier did not prima facie disclose that a decision to accord consent was taken by any one, and muchless by the State Government, and also there is a total absence of authentication as enjoined by Article 166 of the Constitution. In these circumstances the communication of consent in point must be attributed to an Under Secretary in his personal capacity and not as representing the State Government. Reliance in this regard, was placed on several reported decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts vide:. Ghaiomal and Sons v. State of Delhi1 State of Rajasthan v. Sripal Jain2; Somawanti (Smt.) v. State of Punjab3; Management of Advance Insurance Co., Ltd. V. Gurndasmal4; Bijoya Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. State of W.B.5; State of Bombay v. Purushotham Jag Naik6; Chitralekha v. State of Mysore7; Management of Advance Insurance Co. v. Gurdasmal8; Han Das v. The State9 and Barsay v. State of Bombay10. At one stage a contention was sought to be raised that Delhi Police had no authorisation under the Delhi Act to investigate into offences punishable under sections 120-B, 409, 420 and 477-A. On being shown the necessary notification, this contention was not pressed. 17. Mr. v. Gurdasmal8; Han Das v. The State9 and Barsay v. State of Bombay10. At one stage a contention was sought to be raised that Delhi Police had no authorisation under the Delhi Act to investigate into offences punishable under sections 120-B, 409, 420 and 477-A. On being shown the necessary notification, this contention was not pressed. 17. Mr. Advocate General on behalf of the respondents in rebuttal of the above contention urged a five fold contention. He, however, did not dispute the proposition that in case orders and instruments which require to be authenticated under Article 166 had not been so authenticated, it would be open to the Government or any one relying on such a fact, to prove by evidence aliunde that in fact such executive action has been taken by the Government in accordance with the Rules of Business in force. He has also taken note of the fact that there has been no affidavit from any one competent to speak to that fact, on behalf of the State Government. But his submission is that the State Government was not a party to the proceedings at all. Respondent herein has done its best to place such materials as Was in its possession in support of its case that such consent had been in fact accorded and the same had been acted upon both by the Central and State Governments ever since 1956 and even prior to it. These circumstances also to be borne in mind while adjudging the question posed before us. 18. We shall now turn to the contentions of the learned Advocate-General. Briefly they are: (1) The question whether a letter as the one we are concerned herewith amounts to a proper compliance with which section 6 of the Delhi Act is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Major Barsay v. State of Bombay10. (2) In any event, there is ample evidence in the shape of notifications issued by the State Government which would clearly rise to an inference that the State Government had indeed accorded consent as per the provisions of section 6 of the Delhi Act: (3) The illegality, if any, in the investigation does not effect the jurisdiction of the Court as such to try a case as one instituted on a police report. The officers of the Delhi Police Establishment are also police officers governed by the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code. In other words, even if the investigation had been made in breach of section 6 of the Delhi Act, it would not vitiate the trial, unless it is shown to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, to accede to the contention of the petitioners (accused) to the contrary would mean that a person would have a vested right to choose the investigative agency or claim that a particular authority or person alone should investigate into offences with which he might be accused, of. No one could lay claim to such a right in law (Cases relied on: H.N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi1 State of U.P. v. Bhagwant2 Public Prosecutor v. Hatam Bhai3 Hari Das v. The State4 and A.G. Sharma v. Delhi Administration5 ‘). (4) That consent envisaged under Entry 80 of List I of Seventh Schedule and section 6 of the Delhi Act would not require authentication as enjoined under Article 166 (2) of the Constitution, as it is not an ‘order or instrument’ of the kind referred to therein. Consent would mean acquiescence on the part of a party required to consent and therefore does not require a conscious decision as such (Vide Dattatreysa v. The State of Bombay6, and meaning of the word ‘consent’ in Shorter Oxford Dictionary and Websters). (5) That the communication by the under Secretary to Government will give rise to a presumption that the official acts referred to therein have been regularly done or performed, which, if unrebutted by acceptable material placed on record, by those interested in challenging such acts, must prevail as any other conclusive fact. There is no such material placed on behalf of the petitioners. Hence, it must be held that the consent envisaged in section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, and as adumbrated in the letter of the under Secretary in question, had been duly accorded by the State Government in accordance with the procedure established by law. 19. On a careful examination of the contentions, We are of the view that the first two contentions of the respondent must prevail. In that view, we do not consider it necessary to examine the remaining contentions, although, in our opinion, prima facie, they too are not altogether devoid of force. 19. On a careful examination of the contentions, We are of the view that the first two contentions of the respondent must prevail. In that view, we do not consider it necessary to examine the remaining contentions, although, in our opinion, prima facie, they too are not altogether devoid of force. We are not therefore, inclined to agree with the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner. 20. In Major Barsay’s case7, which has been made the sole basis for the first of the above contentions of the respondent, the Supreme Court Was concerned with a similar question in the context of consent to be accorded under section 6 of the Delhi Act. The actual letter of consent concerned there in reads thus: “..........I am directed to state that this Government re-affirms, with reference to section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the consent given for an indefinite period under its letter No. 5042/4-D ‘dated the 6th November, 1946, to the members of the Delhi ‘Special Police Establishment exercising powers and jurisdiction in the area of the province of Bombay’.” 21. The Court, in the context of a contention that such a consent must be in respect of every individual member of the police force, has observed thus: “The authorisation filed in this case sufficiently complies with the provisions of section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. and there are no merits in this contention”. 22. Based on the above enunciation, it is contended for the respondent that the authorisation herein, which is substantially similar to the one concerned in that case, must be held to have similarly complied with section 6 of the Delhi Act in regard to each and every aspect of consent. In regard to the argument for the petitioners that case was not concerned with a question of existence or otherwise of consent and therefore clearly distinguishable, Our attention was drawn to an enunciation of the Supreme Court in the case of Samawanthi and others v. The State of Punjab8, where it was held, inter alia, that the binding effect of a decision did not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced Was actually decided. We are therefore not inclined to accept the distinction pointed out on behalf of the petitioners. We are therefore not inclined to accept the distinction pointed out on behalf of the petitioners. We, therefore, hold that the letter in question substantially complies with the requirement regarding consent enjoined in section 6 of the Delhi Act. 23. We now turn to the 2nd contention. Even if it be assumed that the above conclusion of ours is unacceptable in our opinion, there is ample evidence produced on behalf of the respondent which would indicate that the State Government, subsequent to the letter of consent earlier reproduced, had been responsible for certain acts which would not have had any legal effect had there not been a consent as per section 6 of the Delhi Act, had in fact in mind the earlier consent accorded by it. In this context, it is relevant to observe that this material has been made available for the first time before this Court. But the obvious explanation is that the pleas raised in this regard on behalf of the petitioners in the Court below were vague and indefinite, and embodied in memos, by Counsel without any affidavit filed in support of it. Be that as it may, we think this evidence which is mostly in the shape of statutory notifications ought to be allowed. It may also be stated that there was not any serious objection taken on behalf of the petitioners on this score. 24. It is undisputed that the Central Government had extended the jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police to the State of Mysore (Now Karnataka) by means of an appropriate notification issued under section 5 of the Delhi Act. By two notifications, both dated 3rd February, 1959 the State Government appointed the City Magistrate, Bangalore, who is the one who has made the committal order in question, as Special Magistrate to try offences investigated and instituted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, in exercise of the power conferred on it under section 14, Criminal Procedure Code, and the Sessions Judge, Bangalore, as a. Special Judge to try the cases instituted by the Special Police Establishment. In order to appreciate the specific nature of the appointment, it is sufficient if one of such notifications is reproduced. It reads as follows: "GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE No. HD. 22 CIP. 58 Mysore Govt. Secretariat, (Home Department)Bangalore, dated 3rd February, 1959 14th Maga, 1880. In order to appreciate the specific nature of the appointment, it is sufficient if one of such notifications is reproduced. It reads as follows: "GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE No. HD. 22 CIP. 58 Mysore Govt. Secretariat, (Home Department)Bangalore, dated 3rd February, 1959 14th Maga, 1880. NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act V of 1898), the Government of Mysore hereby appoints the City Magistrate, 3angalore, as a Special Magistrate to try the offences investigated and instituted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Central Act XXV of 1946) and defines that his jurisdiction shall extend through the State. By order and in the Name of the Governor of Mysore, (Sd.) R.J. Rego, Secretary to Government Home Department. * * * * *" The conduct of the Govemment in issuing these notifications cannot be explained except on the hypothesis that the Government had already consented to or acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Delhi Police Establishment in this State. 25. There is also another notification dated 2nd November, 1960, bearing No. H.D. 60 PFG. 59 and issued under section 6 of the Mysore Police Act, 1908, and similar enactments in force in he integrating areas, where by a clear implication arises that there has been such consent accorded. The material portion reads as follows: "........The Government of Mysore hereby directs that whenever a member of the Delhi Police Establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector ‘investigates, at any place in the said area, any offence specified........................he shall be deemed to be an officer-in-charge of the police station within the limits of which such place is situate................‘ * * * * * 26. This notification would clearly imply that the Delhi Establishment were entitled to investigate into offences in the State. When the State recognises this fact, it would follow that it has assented to the exercise of such jurisdiction by the Delhi Special Police. In addition to the above material there is also an affidavit by an official of the Central Government the contents of which would show that the Central Government had accepted and acted on the letter addressed by the State Government, reproduced earlier. Therefore, whether or not compliance with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution was required in the circumstances, would not be of any materiality. Therefore, whether or not compliance with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution was required in the circumstances, would not be of any materiality. Hence, we reject this contention of the petitioners. 27. We now turn to the merits of the case of each of these petitioners. 28.Criminal Petition No. 91 of 1973: This petition is by A-1. Mr. Appa Rao, learned Advocate for the first accused did not argue his client’s case on merits and the only contention urged has been considered as above. Therefore, it is unnecessary to deal with the committal of A-1 on merits. 29.Criminal Petition No. 97 of 1973: This is a petition by A-2. Mr. R.M Patil, for the petitioner strenuously contended that A-2 who was the Principal of the Shankar College was entirely under the control of the management of which A-1 was the Chairman, and according to the resolutions of the governing body he transferred the amounts in question to the account of A-1 and that he has not committed an offence of criminal breach of trust. He also argued that there is no evidence whatsoever to prove prima facie that he was a member of the conspiracy alleged against him. We do not find it possible to accept this contention of Mr. R. M. Patil. A-2 has endorsed the cheques at Exhibits P-51 and P-54 for Rs. 10,500 each and also another cheque Exhibit P-41 for the Rs. 20,000 either in favour of a company called Lingeri Trading Company or in favour of A-1. It is not disputed that the cheques in question were drawn in favour of A-2 by the authorities and the amounts were realised by him and they were intended for a specific purpose. The manner bof disposal of these amounts is the subject matter of the offences with which A-2 stands charged. On an examination of the material produced by the prosecution against A-2, we arc satisfied that the Committal Magistrate is justified in passing the committal order against A-2 and it does not call for interference. The manner bof disposal of these amounts is the subject matter of the offences with which A-2 stands charged. On an examination of the material produced by the prosecution against A-2, we arc satisfied that the Committal Magistrate is justified in passing the committal order against A-2 and it does not call for interference. 30.Criminal Petition No. 92 of 1973: This petition is by A-5, The prosecution case gainst A-5 is that he was a party to a criminal conspiracy between the period 1959 and 1964 to commit offences of cheating and dishonestly inducing the Registrar of the Karnatak University to release funds sanctioned by the Ministry of Education, Government of India, the University Grants Commission, Delhi and the Government of Karnataka for introduction of three years degree course, for a specific purpose of construction of Shankar College building and a recreation-hall cum auditorium in the college campus, by issuing false expenditure certificates marked at Exhibits P-85 and P-89 to A-1 and A-2, superseding the previous auditor one Aralimath, a chargesheet witness, and thereby committed offences punishable under sections 120-B and 42 read with section 109 (2 counts) Indian Penal Code. 31. The learned Committal Magistrate, has observed in para. 6 of his order, that on going through the evidence available in respect of each of the charges it is possible to conclude that each of the accused had misused his position and has intentionally abetted A-1 to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the funds entrusted for the introduction of three years degree course and construction of college building and recreation-hall-cum-auditorium in the college campus. But there is no specific charge framed against A-5, for abetting the commission of an offence of breach of trust under section 409 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code. 32. The learned Committal Magistrate has reached the conclusion that from the year 1959 up to 1964 there was absolutely no progress in regard to the construction of the building and the certificates issued by A-5 giving an expenditure for each year at different figures are clearly false certificates based upon no accounts bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices available in the College to support the expenditure made for construction of the building. 33. The questions that arise for decision in this case are: (1) Whether the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution as required under section 173, Criminal Procedure. 33. The questions that arise for decision in this case are: (1) Whether the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution as required under section 173, Criminal Procedure. Code, and the oral evidence of P.W.1 recorded by the Committal Magistrate make out a prima facie case against A-5 for offences under sections 120-B and 420 read with section 100 (2 counts) Indian Penal Code and (2) Whether Exhibits P-85 and P-89 are false certificates issued without any basis by A-5 being a party to a criminal conspiracy to abet the commission of an offence of cheating? 34. Mr. Venkateswara Rao, learned Advocate for A-5, contended that the figures mentioned in Exhibit P-85 in respect of the items of expenditure such as furniture, laboratory and library are borne out by the audit statement given by one Aralimath for the years ending 31st March, 1959, 31st March, 1960 and 31st March, 1961. The learned AdvocateGeneral does not dispute the correctness of these figures in Exhibit P-85 in respect of those items. What is seriously disputed by the learned Advocate-General is with regard to the items of expenditure on building shown in Exhibit P-85 for the years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 making a total expenditure of Rs. 64,692-31Ps. The learned AdvocateGeneral urged that the figures shown in respect of expenditure of building in Exhibit P-85 are false and intentionally made by A-5 to abet the offence of cheating by the other accused and, then fore, he urged that prima facie case is made out against the accused for the offences with which he stands charged. In view of the submissions made on be half of A-5 and the prosecution, we may conclude that the figures given in the expenditure certificate Exhibit P-85 in respect of furniture, laboratory equipment and library are not false figures an i they are based upon relevant bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices. 35. The question for determination is whether Exhibit P-85 and Exhibit P-89 are false certificates in respect of the building expenditure and that A-5 at the time of issuing these certificates possessed means rea which is an essential element in the offence of conspiracy? 36. The relevant portion in Exhibit P-85 reads as under: "We certify that the following amounts have been spent by the Management of the Shankar College, Yadgir, during the 3 years from 1st April, 1958 to 31st March, 1961. 36. The relevant portion in Exhibit P-85 reads as under: "We certify that the following amounts have been spent by the Management of the Shankar College, Yadgir, during the 3 years from 1st April, 1958 to 31st March, 1961. We have verified with reference to relevant bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices. Building 1958-59 50,468-10 ... ... ... 1959-60 6,590-62 ... ... ... 1960-61 7,633-50 ... ... ... Total Rs. 64,692-31 Exhibit P-89 reads as under: “We certify that the following amounts have been spent by the Management of the Shankar College, Yadgir, in respect of 3-year degree course during the year 1961-1962. We have verified with reference to relevant bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices. Building ... Rs. 20,000 Equipments ... 15,000 Furnitures ... 1,000 Books ... 4,000 Total ... ------- 40,000 ------- Mr. Venkateswara Rao, learned Advocate for A-5, contended that the figures relating to building in expenditure certificate Exhibit P-85 were based upon utilisation certificates issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W. D.,Yadgir, which were produced before A-5 at the time of issuing Exhibit. P-85. He invited our attention to an extract of a report of the Technical Audit Cell of Mysore State, P.W.D., which is an enclosure to draft paragraph relating to grant-in-aid to Shankar College, Yadgir, Mysore State, under the central scheme campus work project and which has been produced by the prosecution. A portion of the extract of para. 43 reads as under: “As seen from the records on 17th January, 1960 the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir, has certified that an expenditure of Rs. 12,279-27Ps. has been incurred on this work. On 27th September, 1960 (vide page 42) the Assistant Engineer, Yadgir, has recorded a certificate for having incurred an expenditure of Rs. 29,600. This has been forwarded to the Registrar, Karnatak University by the Principal, Shankar College, on 13th January, 1960, (vide page-41).” The utilisation certificate dated 17th January, 1960,, issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir for an expenditure of Rs. 12,879 and referred to in the above extract is not forthcoming in the records, but, there is reference to it in the portion of the extract quoted above. Further a. copy of the extract relating to recreation hall-cum-auditorium of Shankar College, Yadgir, prepared by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir, on 20th July, 1960 for utilisation of Rs. 12,879 and referred to in the above extract is not forthcoming in the records, but, there is reference to it in the portion of the extract quoted above. Further a. copy of the extract relating to recreation hall-cum-auditorium of Shankar College, Yadgir, prepared by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir, on 20th July, 1960 for utilisation of Rs. 29,600 inclusive of the material at sight such as brick, steel and cement is found in the records produced by the prosecution In another certificate dated 9th September, 1961 the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir, has certified that upto the end of March, 1961,Rs. 64,692-31 has been utilised for the construction of College main building including laboratory, science hall, dark room etc., in brick masorary with R.C.C. roof into double storeyed building). The figures given in this utilisation certificate clearly tallies with the figures given in Exhibit P-85 towards the expenditure of the building construction. Mr. Venkateswara Rao, learned Advocate for A-5, placed strong reliance on these documents and contended that the certificate issued by A-5 at Exhibit P-85, cannot be said to be based upon no bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices. He urged that the College authorities had produced certificates issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir, at the time when expenditure certificate Exhibit P-85 was issued. The contention of the learned Advocate-General is that the last certificate issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir is dated 9th September, 1961 and it was not available when Exhibit P-85 was issued on 26th May, 1961. His further contention is that if A-5 had looked into the audit statements given by one Aralimath, the previous Auditor, A-5 would have come to know that little or no money was spent on construction of buildings. Therefore, he contended that Exhibit P-85 is a false certificate issued by A-5. There is nothing on record to show that A-1, A-2 or A-3 (P.W.1) had produced before A-5 the audit statements of Aralimath for the year 1960-61. Exhibit P-85 was issued on the basis of bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices and not on the basis of audit statement for the year 1960-61. It might have been suppressed by the other accused in order to obtain the expenditure certificate Exhibit P-85 from A-5 who was newly appointed. It is true that the utilisation certificate was issued on 9th September, 1961 some time after Exhibit P-85 was issued by A-5. It might have been suppressed by the other accused in order to obtain the expenditure certificate Exhibit P-85 from A-5 who was newly appointed. It is true that the utilisation certificate was issued on 9th September, 1961 some time after Exhibit P-85 was issued by A-5. But we must remember that A-5 had issued what is known as advance certificate before the accounts of the Shankar College were audited. The possibility of the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D.,Yadgir, having issued a certificate similar to the one dated 9th September, 1961 in order to oblige A-1, A-2 and P.W.1 (who was A-3 in the case) even without any progress with regard to the construction of the campus building and recreation hall-cum-auditorium cannot be ruled out. At any rate the utilisation certificates issued subsequently or 9th September, 1961, does not render the figure of Rs. 64,692-31 false. It was the duty of the Assistant Engineer, to inspect the spot and give the progress report. When those certificates were placed before A-5 at the time of issue of expenditure certificate, Exhibit P-85, his duty was to verify from those certificates and issue the expenditure certificate. He was not expected to inspect the spot and then issue the expenditure certificate as contended by Mr. Venkateswara Rao. 37. P.W.1 who has been examined to prove conspiracy and creation of false documents in order to get the grants released from the University authorities has not stated on oath that there were no certificates issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir. He could not have given such an evidence for fear of confrontation with the certificates issued by the Assistant Engineer, which are referred to above and found in the documents produced by the prosecution. 33. The learned Advocate-Ceneral placed reliance on the admission of A-1 before the Technical Audit Cell and contended that there were no utilisation certificates issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir. The statement of A-1 on the showing of the prosecution itself is factually incorrect. Mr. Venkateswara Rao, contended that the statement made by A-1 cannot be used against A-5 as A-1 is also an accused. The statement of A-1 on the showing of the prosecution itself is factually incorrect. Mr. Venkateswara Rao, contended that the statement made by A-1 cannot be used against A-5 as A-1 is also an accused. He also relied upon a decision in State v. Shankar Sakharam Jadhav and another1, for the proposition that where the confessional statements made by a Co-accused are made after the object of criminal conspiracy is carried out and the confessional statements refer to past events such statement can have no relevance to any common intention animating the co-conspirators. We dp not want to express any opinion at this stage as to the relevancy or otherwise of A-1’s confessional statements said to have been made by him while determining the intention animating the co-conspirators. Suffice it to say that A-1’s statement about the absence of utilisation certificates is factually incorrect. 39. As regards Exhibit P-89 the certificate issued by A-5 on 26th April, 1962, the contention is that it is also a false expenditure certificate issued by A-5. But the certificate quoted above ex facie shows that it was issued after verification with reference to relevant bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices. A-5 has withdrawn this certificate by his letter dated 18th February, 1963, which is marked as Exhibit P-90, which reads as under: “We write to inform you that we withdraw our certificate dated 26th April, 1962 issued to you in respect of the sum of Rs. 40,000 which was stated to have been utilised by you towards building construction, equipments, furnitures and books during the year 1961-62 towards 3 years degree course as we find after the audit of your college accounts that you have not spent so much. We also request you to kindly forward a copy of this letter to the authorities to whom you have submitted the certificates. Hope you will take the necessary action immediately” The letter clearly states that after audit of the accounts of the College, it was found that the management had not spent the amount of Rs. 40,000 which has been mentioned in Exhibit P-89, and, therefore, it was withdrawn by A-5. He has also requested the Principal to whom it was addressed to forward the copy of the said letter to the authorities to whom it was submitted. 40,000 which has been mentioned in Exhibit P-89, and, therefore, it was withdrawn by A-5. He has also requested the Principal to whom it was addressed to forward the copy of the said letter to the authorities to whom it was submitted. The learned Advocate-General argued that this withdrawal comes after the mischief has been done by the accused and that it was an after-thought on the part of A-5 in order to save his own skin. It is not possible for us to accept the submission of the learned AdvocateGeneral. If A-5 was a party to the conspiracy and had in any manner gained advantage as a result of the conspiracy A-5 would not have the moral courage to send such a letter. Further, of A-5 was a privy to the offence alleged to have been committed by the other accused he would not have been spared by them. The records disclose that A-1 merely told A-2 to file the letter and it was not submitted to the authorities as required by A-5. 40. It is relevant to state that the noncompliance with the request of the university authorities to obtain the signature for the valuation certificate given by the Executive Engineer in 1964, excited the suspicion of the University authorities. It was thereafter that three Committees one after another were appointed in 1964 and 1965 to probe into this matter and eventually the S.P.E. took up the investigation of this case Therefore it may be too much to contend that A-5 knew before he sent Exhibit P-90 that he had given a false certificate as per Exhibit P-89 and withdrew it in order to avoid himself being involved in this case. The learned Advocate-General relied upon certain observations at page 64 of Harris Criminal Law, (XXII Edn., published by Ian Mclean and Peter Morrish) in support of his contention that quite a slight participation in the scheme of conspiracy will suffice and that there is no need that the conspirator should be an accomplice in the crime. The comments of the learned Authors read as under: "There need be no direct communication between the members in order to constitute conspiracy, nor need it be proved that any particular accused concocted the scheme or was present at its origins. The comments of the learned Authors read as under: "There need be no direct communication between the members in order to constitute conspiracy, nor need it be proved that any particular accused concocted the scheme or was present at its origins. The conspirators may join in the conspiracy at various times, any one of them may not know all the other parties......and any one may not know the full extent of the scheme to which he attaches himself." It is sufficient If it is proved that each conspirator knows that there is in existence or coming into existence a scheme which goes beyond the illegal acts which he agrees to do, and attaches himself to the scheme. Quite a slight, participation in the scheme will suffice. There is no need that the conspirator should be an accomplice in the crime." There is no dispute about the proposition of law propounded by the learned authors as stated above. But this commentary relates to actus reus. Proof of actus reus is by its If not sufficient to prove conspiracy without the proof of the mental elements, mens rea which is an essential element in an offence of conspiracy. The learned authors in the next paragraph dealing with mens rea in the same book have stated thus: "Conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, even an offence of strict liability, requires mens rea. The Crown must prove not only an agreement amounting to a conspiracy between the conspirators to carry out an unlawful purpose, but also an intention in the mind of the individual conspirator to carry out that unlawful purpose." In Churchill v. Walton, Viscount Dilhorne, delivering the opinion of the House of Lords, said: "The question is,‘What did they agree to dot?’ If what they agreed to do was, on the facts known to them, an unlawful act, they are guilty of conspiracy and cannot excuse themselves by saying that, owing to their ignorance of the law, they did not realise that such an act was a crime. If, on the facts known to them, what they agreed to do was lawful, they are not rendered artificially guilty by the existence of the other facts, not known to them, giving a different and criminal quality to the act agreed upon". If, on the facts known to them, what they agreed to do was lawful, they are not rendered artificially guilty by the existence of the other facts, not known to them, giving a different and criminal quality to the act agreed upon". With regard to proof of conspiracy the learned authors have further stated at page 65 as follows: "Only rarely will direct evidence of the agreement be available. In the words of the House of Lords, therefore, Proof of a conspiracy in most cases depends on inferences to be drawn from the conduct of the parties." We are in respectful agreement with the above statement of law expressed by the learned authors in the book referred to above. It is clear from the passages quoted above that in order to sustain a charge of conspiracy the prosecution is required in law not only to prove the agreement between the conspirators to carry out the unlawful purpose but also the intention in the mind of the individual conspirator to carry out the unlawful purpose. Further the proof of a conspiracy in most cases depends on inferences to be drawn from the conduct of the parties. If on the facts known to the alleged conspirator what he agreed to do was lawful he is not rendered artificially guilty by the existence of the other facts not known to him, giving a different and criminal quality to the act agreed upon. 41. Mr. Venteswara Rao, submitted that when A-5 was approached by A-1, A-9 and A-3 in the month of May, 1961, for the issue of an expenditure certificate as per Exhibit P-85 there was nothing prima facie to doubt the genuineness of the utilisation certificates issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir nor was there anything to excite his suspicion to probe into the genuineness of the utilisation certificates. He further submitted that A-5 issued the expenditure certificate Exhibit P-89 by verifying from the bills, vouchers, invoices and certificates which were in existence then and which are not available now for the reasons best known to the other accused and not after auditing the accounts of the Shankar College. He further submitted that A-5 issued the expenditure certificate Exhibit P-89 by verifying from the bills, vouchers, invoices and certificates which were in existence then and which are not available now for the reasons best known to the other accused and not after auditing the accounts of the Shankar College. He urged that when the audit was taken up by him for the year 1961-62 he (A-5’) noticed some discrepancies about the expenditure which he had certified and it was for that reason that by his letter Exhibit P-90, he withdrew the certificate Exhibit P-89. According to Mr. Venkateswar Rao that was a time when nobody even suggested any improper utilisation of the several grants. He urged that the very fact that he withdrew the expenditure certificate at Exhibit P-90 beyond all doubt shows that he was not a party either to the conspiracy nor had possessed the mens rea which constitute an offence of conspiracy. He relied upon a decision reported in Limine Kingston Cotton Mills Ltd.,1. The relevant portion of the decision deals with the duties of an Auditor. Lopes L.J. at page 288 has observed thus: "But in determining whether any misfeasence or breach of duty has been committed, it is essential to consider what the duties of an auditor are. They are very fully described In re London andGeneral Bank2, to which judgment I was a party. Shortly they may be stated thus: It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent careful and cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and cautions must depend on the particular circumstance of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or as was said, to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watch-dog, but not a blood hound. He is justified in believing tried servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the company. He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful. ***** 42. He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful. ***** 42. It is not the duty of an auditor to take stock; he is not a stock expert; there are many matters in respect of which he must rely on the honesty and accuracy of others. He does not guarantee the discovery of all fraud.... ***** The duties of audtitors must not be endered too onerous. Their work is responsible and laborious, and the remuneration moderate......... Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing to arouse the suspicion, and when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the "company and are undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the position of an auditor intolerable". In the instant case there was nothing to excite the suspicion of A-5 when he issued Exhibit P-85 and Exhibit P-89. When suspicion arose after A-5 audited the accounts of the institution, he has promptly withdrawn the certificate issued at Exhibit P-89 by his letter at Exhibit P-90. Before Exhibits P-85 and P-89 were issued several items of funds were released without observance of the conditions contained in Exhibit P-23, a letter from the University Grants Commission governing the release of grant towards the construction of recreation hall-cum-auditorium. It has been specifically stated therein that the audit report of the university auditors was a condition precedent for the release of the grant. None of the authorities have insisted upon such an audit report. 43. It was not the duty of A-5 to issue certificates of expenditure at Exhibits P-85 and P-89 after any physical verification. That was the duty of an Engineer who issued utilisation certificates. It may be noted that what A-5 certified is only an expenditure certificate based upon bills, vouchers, certificates and invoices and rot utilisation certificates which are entirely different and distinct from the certificates of expenditure. That was the duty of an Engineer who issued utilisation certificates. It may be noted that what A-5 certified is only an expenditure certificate based upon bills, vouchers, certificates and invoices and rot utilisation certificates which are entirely different and distinct from the certificates of expenditure. It is unfortunate that the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D., Yadgir, who was expected to go to the spot and verify the work done and then issue the utilisation certificates has failed to do so. He must have obliged the College authorities for reasons best known to him. 44. As observed in the decision repotted in Limine Kingston Cotton Mills1 A-5 was not bound to be a detective to approach his work with a suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there was something wrong. He was merely a watch dog, but not a bloodhound. It was not his duty to take’ stock as he was not a stock expert. He merely relied upon the honesty and accuracy of the Assistant Engineer, and the College authorities with regard to the utilisation certificates. He was entitled to assume that they were honest and to rely upon their representation. There is nothing to show that he was lacking in reasonable care, as there was nothing before him to excite suspicion to have a probe into the bottom. He cannot be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when there was nothing to arouse suspicion. 45. In the famous book entitled "Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal. Law", 19th Edition edited by J.W. Cecil Turner, at page 431 dealing with the topic ‘‘mens rea" the learned author has stated as follows: “Since conspiracy is a crime at common law it follows that mens rea must be an essential element in it. Yet perhaps because of the vagueness of ‘Unlawful purpose’ the decisions of the Courts do not seem to have laid down excactly what it is that the accused person must have intended or fore seen, In this connexion a statement made by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Sorsky (A criminal conspiracy consists in the agreement to do an unlawful act without reference to the knowledge on the part of the accused of its illeglity) must be read with caution. The case before the Court turned upon the interpretation of a statutory provision. The case before the Court turned upon the interpretation of a statutory provision. The Court expressly alluded to a ‘statement......that it is a good answer to a charge of having committed a misdemeanour at common law to show that the accused acted under a belief in the existence of a state of facts which, if true would have exonerated him’ and added, ‘we are in no way controverting that general proposition of law.’ It may be, however, that in the crime of conspiracy a claim of right is of no avail, in the same sense in which that claim is understood to provide a defence to a charge of malicious damage of larceny; for in R. v. Sorsky it was also staed: "It follows that, if Sorsky did act under any mistake at all, it was a mistake of law and not of fact, and ignorance of the law affords no excuse." From what we have already discussed relating to the circumstances in which A-5 issued Exhibits P-85 and P-89 we are clearly of the view, that it is not possible to infer that A-5 was a party to the agreement to carry out the unlawful purpose and that he possessed the necessary ‘mens rea’ to carry out unlawful purpose said to have been perpetrated by the other accused. What we have alluded to above in respect of issue of an expenditure certificate by A-5 discloses that the accused acted under a belief in the existence of state of facts which, if true, would have exonerated him. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion, that the learned Magistrate without carefully scrutinising the papers produced by the prosecution to find out whether there is enough material to prove mens rea or the part of A-5, which is an essential element to constitute an offence of conspiracy with which he was charge-sheeted has fallen to an error. As submitted by the learned Advocate for A-5, the learned Committal Magistrate has reached the conclusion that there is a prima facie case made out against A-5, by surmises and imaginary inferences. Therefore, we hold, that the prosecution has failed to make out a prima facie case either for an offence of conspiracy or for abetment of the offence of cheating against A-5. Therefore, we hold, that the prosecution has failed to make out a prima facie case either for an offence of conspiracy or for abetment of the offence of cheating against A-5. Exhibits P-85 and P-89 were issued by A-5 on the facts known to him and that what he did in issuing those certificates was lawful and he cannot be rendered artificially guilty by the existence of other facts not known to A-5 giving a different and criminal quality to the act alleged against him. Therefore, the committal order and the charge framed against A-5 are not sustainable in law and are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we quash the committal order and the charges framed against A-5 by the learned Magistrate and discharge A-5. 46. For the reasons stated above Criminal Petition No. 92 of 1973 by A-5 is allowed and Criminal Petitions Nos. 91 and 97 of 1973 by A-1 and A-2 are dismissed. 47. We must however, warn the trial Court against drawing any inferences as to the guilt or innocence of the other accused from any observations made in this order. The guilt or innocence of the accused is a matter which has to be determined by the trial Court and no remarks made by us should be treated as prejudging the case. Such comments as have been made in this order exclusively bear on consideration of the case for quashing the charges and committal order against A-1, A-2 and A-5. S.V.S. ----- Crl. P.No. 92 of 1973 allowed. Crl. Ps.Nos. 91 and 97 of 1973 dismissed.