JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - In this petition, the validity of Rule 7 of the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 (hereinafter called the Rules) has been questioned. The said Rules were passed by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 241(2) and Section 266(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and section 234(a) and (b) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act and Section 7 of the Police Act for regulating in certain cases the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the award of punishment to members of the public services under the Governor's rule-making control. These Rules came into force with effect from 8th November 1947 and applied to all Government servants under the rule-making control of the Governor as to any acts, omissions or conduct arising before the date of the commencement of these Rules as they are applicable to those arising after that date. A Tribunal known as `Administrative Tribunal' was constituted by the Governor under Rule 3. It consists of two members, one of whom is an officer of adequate seniority to be the head of a department, or the Commissioner of a division, and the other member of the Tribunal is a judicial officer qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. Rule 7 whose vires is questioned in this petition may now be quoted :- 7 "The proceedings of the Tribunal will be in camera and neither the prosecution nor the defence shall have the right to be represented by counsel." The second petitioner, Sri Jawahar Lai Bhargava, was a member of the U.P. Judicial Service and was posted at the material time in district Etah as Judicial Officer. On receipt of various adverse reports against his conduct and after holding an investigation through the Vigilance Department, he was charged under different heads and his case was referred by the Governor for inquiry by the Administrative Tribunal. On 23.10.1973 an application was made by Sri Bhargava before the Administrative Tribunal for permission to engage a counsel to defend him and a Vakalatnama signed by the first petitioner, Sri Amrish Kumar Sharma, was annexed with the said application. On 23.10.1973 an application was made by Sri Bhargava before the Administrative Tribunal for permission to engage a counsel to defend him and a Vakalatnama signed by the first petitioner, Sri Amrish Kumar Sharma, was annexed with the said application. By its impugned order dated 5th of November 1973 contained in a letter to Bhargava (Annexure 2 to the writ petition), the Administrative Tribunal intimated that the Rules did not permit prosecution of the case of the applicant through a counsel, therefore representation through a counsel could not be permitted. This decision of the Tribunal is impugned in the writ petition. 2. In a counter-affidavit sworn by an Upper Division Assistant of the Appointment Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, it has been averred that the witnesses in support of the charges shall be examined before the Tribunal by an Investigating Officer of the rank of Inspector, Circle Inspector or Deputy Superintendent of Police or by the Tribunal itself. It is not disputed that the Tribunal is composed of a senior District and Sessions Judge belonging to the Higher Judicial Service and an officer of the rank of the Commissioner. The second petitioner no doubt is a Judicial Officer belonging to the Judicial Service and can be said to have sufficient knowledge of law but considering the gravity of charges and the consequences involved, the composition of the Tribunal and the qualification of the personnel responsible for leading prosecution evidence he must have thought that a representation through a counsel would be helpful and necessary, and that must have prompted him to make an application to the Tribunal for being represented by a counsel. The Tribunal, as appears to us because of Rule 7 which has been quoted above felt that it had no option or any discretion in the matter and had to refuse the prayer of the second petitioner. 3. Sarvsri Ansari and Chand Kishore appearing for the petitioners before us raised a two fold contentions. The Tribunal, as appears to us because of Rule 7 which has been quoted above felt that it had no option or any discretion in the matter and had to refuse the prayer of the second petitioner. 3. Sarvsri Ansari and Chand Kishore appearing for the petitioners before us raised a two fold contentions. Their first contention was that Rule 7 was ultra vires Article 311 of the Constitution in as much as in all cases, representation through a counsel was barred howsoever difficult the case may be against the Government servant even where he may have no knowledge of English in which language most of the charges against him, the recording of evidence against him and the rules and law applicable are generally expressed and even if he may be ignorant of all kinds of laws and rules relating to the procedure and evidence. The submission was that considering the stakes involved, and where the very reputation and livelihood of the Government servant was in jeopardy, denial to him to take assistance from a legal expert would amount to refusal in affording him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The second contention was that the Rules of the Tribunal are more onerous as compared to Rule 55 of the U. P. Civil Service Classification Control and Appeal Rules in respect of representation through a lawyer and there being no guiding rule as to what cases are to be sent for inquiry under Rule 55 and what cases are to be sent for inquiry before the Administrative Tribunal, the provisions of the Rule would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Sri Ansari raised a subsidiary contention, which appears to us to be an alternative argument, to the effect that if Rule 7 was read and construed as conferring a discretionary power on the Administrative Tribunal to allow representation by a counsel in appropriate cases, then on the faces and circumstances of this case, the discretion not having been exercised at all under a misapprehension that Rule 7 leaves no such discretion, the impugned order was liable to be quashed. 4. 4. We do not think for the purposes of deciding this writ petition we should examine the validity and force behind the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, as the decision on the first contention itself in favour of the petitioner would be conclusive. 5. Before we proceed to examine the validity, of the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, we think it appropriate to dispose of the contention which we have mentioned above as an alternative contention raised on behalf of the petitioner i.e. that the Rule leaves a discretion with the Administrative Tribunal to permit representation through a counsel in appropriate cases. Learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh stated that he was prepared as a matter of concession to proceed on the basis, as contended for on behalf of the petitioners that Rule 7 is capable of being construed as leaving and unfettered discretion in the Administrative Tribunal for regulating the procedure of hearing and recording of evidence based on rules of equity and natural justice, and permitting representation of the Government servant concerned through an agent or a trained lawyer as and when the Tribunal considered that step would be equitable and consistent with the rules of natural justice. We do not think on a concession by a counsel at the bar, a court can read something in the statute which is not there. The concession made by the learned Chief Standing Counsel appears to us to amount to that we should read in Rule 7 a discretionary clause that although neither the prosecution nor the Government servant has the right to be represented by a counsel, yet the Administrative Tribunal is authorised to permit their representation through counsel in appropriate cases. The concession will amount to legislating or reading something in Rule 7 as it stands as leaving any choice with the Tribunal. It is the settled law that a Tribunal being the creature of the Rules framed by the Governor, cannot claim to be repository of any higher power other than what has been vested in it or conferred upon it by the Governor. It would be seen that the Rules are fairly exhaustive and lay down provisions as to the extent and scope of the power exercisable by the Administrative Tribunal. It would be seen that the Rules are fairly exhaustive and lay down provisions as to the extent and scope of the power exercisable by the Administrative Tribunal. The Governor having negatived the right to the prosecution as well as to the Government officer proceeded against to be represented through a counsel by Rule 7, it cannot be said that the Tribunal legally can allow representation through a counsel i.e. the Tribunal could confer a right for being represented through a counsel. This would amount to stultifying the Rule itself. No such power, therefore, can be arrogated to the Administrative Tribunal. 6. It was then suggested by the learned Chief Standing Counsel that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 when read with Rule 7 clearly manifests an intention on the part of the rule makers that a discretion vested in the Administrative Tribunal permitting representation through a counsel. That is what also has been urged on behalf of the petitioners on this part of the case. We find it difficult to appreciate how sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 affects the peremptory nature of Rule 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 cannot be read as an exception to Rule 7 or as a proviso or even an explanation to Rule 7. We were not aware of any rule of interpretation, at least none has been brought to our notice, which would make sub-rule (2) of Rule 8, a proviso to Rule 7 or an exception to Rule 7, or for the matter of that explaining anything in Rule 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 enjoins upon the Tribunal conducting the proceedings at the inquiry to be guided by Rules of equity and natural justice, but when Rule 7, assuming the right to be represented by a counsel is a rule of equity and natural justice, bars representation by a counsel, then it is trite to say that the Administrative Tribunal, while conducting the inquiry and not bound by formal Rules relating to procedure and evidence, can permit representation by counsel in the guise of applying the principles of equity and natural justice in the face of Rule 7 prohibiting it to do so. 7. We, therefore, reject the contention based on some supposed discretionary power vesting in the Administrative Tribunal to permit representation through a counsel in the proceedings before it. 8. 7. We, therefore, reject the contention based on some supposed discretionary power vesting in the Administrative Tribunal to permit representation through a counsel in the proceedings before it. 8. Reverting to the main argument in respect of the first contention that Rule 7 is violative of Article 311 of the Constitution, the first question which has to be examined in this context will be as to the status and character of the Administrative Tribunal. 9. Under the provisions of the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Summoning of witnesses and Production of Documents) Act, 1953 (U. P. Act No. 21 of 1953) the Administrative Tribunal, constituted under the Disciplinary Proceedings Administrative Tribunal Rules, 1947, is empowered to summon witnesses and to compel the production of documents in the same manner as a Commissioner under Section 8 of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850 (Act No. 37 of 1850). There is also a provision to impose penalty for disobedience of the process issued by the Administrative Tribunal. It is clear from the provisions of the said Act that the Administrative Tribunal has the power to summon witnesses and call for production of document s in evidence. The Administrative Tribunal, therefore, cannot be said to be a mere Domestic Tribunal. In the case of Lennox Arthur Patrick O'Reilly v. Cyril Cutbbert Gitten's, A.I.R. 1949 Privy Council 313 the Judicial Committee had occasion to lay down as to what a Domestic Tribunal is. At page 316 the Judicial Committee approved of the observations of Maugham, J, in Maclean v. The Workers' Union, 1929 Ch. 602. It was observed. "A Domestic Tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer an oath and a circumstance which is perhaps of greater importance, no party has power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; It is indeed probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them are themselves both the witnesses and the Judges. Before such a tribunal counsel has no right of audience and there are no affective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made." 10. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them are themselves both the witnesses and the Judges. Before such a tribunal counsel has no right of audience and there are no affective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made." 10. If the above tests were applied, then the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Rules cannot be said to be a Domestic Tribunal as it has power to call for witnesses, to examine them on oath and the members composing it are qualified persons and not laymen who could be said to be witnesses and Judges in the cause. As far as Rule 8 is concerned which says that the Administrative Tribunal is not bound by the rules of procedure and evidence it does not mean that it can act on her say evidence. It has been so observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1245 The Supreme Court in this case had occasion to consider the character and status of the Administrative Tribunal and it observed as follows :- "Even though the Tribunal is not bound by formal rules relating to procedure and evidence. It cannot rely on evidence which is purely hearsay, because to do so in an enquiry of this nature would be contrary to rules of equity and natural justice." 11. Thus the Administrative Tribunal cannot act upon hearsay evidence. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Rules is a mere Domestic Tribunal. There is no doubt in our mind that the Tribunal constituted as it is and considering its function and the procedure required to be followed in the proceedings taken before it, it is a quasi judicial Tribunal under a duty to act judicially. This being so, the contention of the learned Chief Standing Counsel that a right to be represented through a practising lawyer before the Administrative Tribunal cannot be a constituent of a right of hearing or right to be heard cannot be accepted. This being so, the contention of the learned Chief Standing Counsel that a right to be represented through a practising lawyer before the Administrative Tribunal cannot be a constituent of a right of hearing or right to be heard cannot be accepted. In the case of C. L. Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2178 in paragraph 17 at page 2181 of the reported judgment the learned Judges of the Supreme Court after examining certain cases cited before them summarised as follows : "The learned Counsel for the State relied on the decisions mentioned above in support of his contention that the appellant was not entitled to have the assistance of a legal practitioner. This contention is without force. In those cases this Court considered whether a person proceeded against in an enquiry before a Domestic Tribunal had a right to be represented by someone else on the basis of the principles of natural justice. Therein this Court was not called upon to consider either the limits of the reasonable opportunity to defended oneself guaranteed under Art. 311 or the scope of a statutory rule. The question that falls for decision in this case did not arise for decision in those cases." 12. It is clear from the above extracts from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case cited that a right to be represented by a counsel and taking assistance of a legal expert by a Government servant before a Tribunal which is not a Domestic Tribunal to defend himself is a constituent part of the principles of natural justice and of the reasonable opportunity to defend himself guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution. Any rule, therefore, which absolutely prohibits a Government servant from taking assistance of a legal practitioner in the enquiry proceedings and does not leave any scope whatsoever for such representation in appropriate cases and circumstances would be ultra-vires Article 311 of the Constitution as the guarantee to defend himself by making an effective representation will be violated. We have already held above that the impugned Rule 7 does not leave any scope whatsoever with the Administrative Tribunal for permitting representation through a counsel even when a case is made out considering the complexity of the charge, the nature of evidence and the law and the rules applicable. We have already held above that the impugned Rule 7 does not leave any scope whatsoever with the Administrative Tribunal for permitting representation through a counsel even when a case is made out considering the complexity of the charge, the nature of evidence and the law and the rules applicable. It appears to us as the settled law and we need not cite authorities for the same that the right to be represented through a counsel before a Tribunal or authority taking disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant has been recognised and sanctioned in appropriate circumstances. Not a single authority was cited before us by the learned Chief Standing Counsel in which an absolute bar against the exercise of a right by a Government servant to be represented through a counsel in which an absolute bar against the exercise of a right by a Government to be represented through a counsel has been upheld. Rule 7, therefore, in the terms in which it has been enacted is repugnant to the guarantee conferred on a Government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution. 13. It was however, urged by learned Chief Standing Counsel that as Rule 7 prevents the prosecuting agency also from being represented through a counsel in the proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal the guarantee of reasonable opportunity or effective opportunity of being heard will not be violated in act permitting the delinquent Government servant to take assistance of a trained lawyer in the proceedings before the Tribunal. We do not think there is any substance in this submission. May be the prosecuting agency in denied representation through a counsel but it is well known that whoever appears before the Administrative Tribunal to prosecute the case would be a trained Officer in this regard. We have noticed in the counter affidavit that an Investigating Officer of the rank of Inspector or Deputy Superintendent of Police has been appointed to examine the witnesses and lead evidence, by the very nature of their work such Officers are trained and are expected to have sufficient knowledge of the law and the rules of procedure and evidence. No serious prejudice, therefore, is caused by denying the right to the prosecuting agency to engage a trained lawyer for conducting the case against a Government servant. No serious prejudice, therefore, is caused by denying the right to the prosecuting agency to engage a trained lawyer for conducting the case against a Government servant. As to the submission that the Government Servant in the instant case himself is a law man and not a layman, being a Judicial Officer and Magistrate we can do so better quoting the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of C. L. Subramaiam v. Collector of Customs. In paragraph 22 at page 2182 of the reported judgment the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed that:- "Moreover when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him as it has proved to be. In such a situation be cannot be expected to act calmly and rite deliberation." (Italicising is our) 14. It is common experience that even a trained lawyer when facing accusation before an authority under a duty to act judicially may find himself in an embarrassing position for he may not be able to apply a detached or objective mind upon the questions and the problems arising at the trial or enquiry. Under pressure and stress he may become the victim of his emotions and thus lose the thread of sound reasoning in the exposition in an objective manner of the case. The mere circumstance that the Government servant proceeded against is a lawman or is trained in law of procedure and evidence will thus not be a sufficient guarantee by itself that he would effectively defend himself. The Supreme Court has appreciated this human fraility and has considered it as a circumstance justifying the right of representation through a counsel. 15. A further argument was also advanced on behalf of the petitioners in support of their contention. Reliance was placed on Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and on its basis it was submitted that an Advocate enrolled in the High Court was of right can appear before an Administrative Tribunal as under the law the Tribunal is authorised to call for evidence by summoning witnesses and calamining them. Reliance was placed on Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and on its basis it was submitted that an Advocate enrolled in the High Court was of right can appear before an Administrative Tribunal as under the law the Tribunal is authorised to call for evidence by summoning witnesses and calamining them. Though arguments were addressed to us at the bar at some length on this question, but we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on it as we have already held above that the impugned Rule 7 is violative of the guarantee conferred on a Government Servant by Article 311 of the Constitution. Whether Rule 7 worded as it is can prevail as against Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 is a question which we leave open. For the same reason we also do not examine the validity of another subsidiary argument raised on behalf of the petitioners that Rule 7 was violative of the guarantee under Article 19 of the Constitution. It was suggested that the first petitioner being an enrolled Advocate, who has been refused an audience by the Administrative Tribunal, has a legitimate grievance of his fundamental right to carry on his profession has been denied to him. 16. The result of the above discussion is that the later part of Rule 7 "and neither prosecution nor the defence shall have the right to be represented by counsel" is struck down as being ultravirus of Article 311 of the Constitution. 17. For the reasons given above, we allow this petition quash the impugned order of the Administrative Tribunal contained in its letter dated 5.11.73 (annexure 2 to the writ petition) and direct it to reconsider the matter in accordance with law and the rules. 18. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs.