( 1 ) THIS revision petition under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the, 'act') is by a, tenant against whom a decree for eviction was made by the, Munsiff and affirmed by the District judge in appeal. ( 2 ) THE demised premises consist of a vacant site in which the tenant had put up structures for carrying on certain manufacturing activities. The lease was for 7i years under the registered lease deed dated 13-5-1955. On 15-11-1965 the landlord issued a notice determining the lease. As the tenant did not vacate the premises, the landlord made a petition under s. 21 (l) of the Act seeking for eviction of the tenant on the ground specified in Cls. (h), (f) and (1) of that sub-section. The tenant resisted the petition. ( 3 ) THE landlord's case is, briefly, as follows: He has been residing in his house adjoining the demised premises. That house is inadequate for his family. He wants to extend his house by constructing a building in the demised premises. Both the Courts below held that the landlord had established that he reasonably and bona fide required the demised land for his own occupation for the purpose of erecting a building therepn. On the question of comparative hardship, both the Courts below held that greater hardship would be caused by refusing a decree fox eviction than by granting sucn decree. ( 4 ) IN this petition, Mr. P. Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the petitionertenant urged the following contentions: (i) The notice determining the tenancy was not valid; and (ii) The requirement of Cl. (1) of Sec. 21 (1) of the Act has not been satisfied; elaborating his first contention, Mr. Subba, Rao argued that as the lease was for a manufacturing purpose six months' notice was necessary to determine the tenancy and that the notice issued by the landlord did not fulfil this condition. The period of 7 years specified in the registered lease deed d/. 13-5- 1955 had expired belore the petition for eviction was brought. Though the landlord received rent after the expiry of the period of lease, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement between him and the tenant for renqwal of the lease. As pointed out by this Court in A. Hassan Sab v. Kakubalappa 1969 (1) Mys L. J. 295. Though the landlord received rent after the expiry of the period of lease, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement between him and the tenant for renqwal of the lease. As pointed out by this Court in A. Hassan Sab v. Kakubalappa 1969 (1) Mys L. J. 295. , where the period of tenancy has expired and the tenant is continuing by virtue of the statutory protection, no notice determining the tenancy is necessary before the landlord brings a petition for eviction under S. 21 (l) of the Act. ( 5 ) THUS, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Subba Rap that the petition for eviction is not maintainable on Account of the landlord not issuing six months' notice to determine the tenancy. Mr. Subba Rao next contended that as the landlord intended to erect, a new building in the demised premises which consist of a vacant site, the ground for eviction came under Cl. (I) of Sec. 21 (1) of the Act, that according to that clause, the landlord must have obtained approval or permission from a local authority or ether competent authority to erect a new building on the vacant site and that as the landlord had not shown that he had obtained such approval or permission, he could not bet granted a decree for eviction. ( 6 ) ON the Other hand, Mr. C. N. Seshagin, learned Counsel for the respondent landlord, contended that the ground on which the landlord sought fcr eviction, namely, that he reasonably and bonafide requires the premises for his own occupation, came under Cl. (h) of S. 21 (l) of the Act and that, hence it was not necessary that he (the landlord) should have obtained approval or permission from a local authority or other competent authority for erection of a new building on the vacant site. ( 7 ) IN R. P. Mehlha v. I. A. Sheth AIR 1964 SC. 1676 . the Supreme Court considered the question whether the landlord's petition for eviction on the ground that he required the demised premises for his own use after demolition and reconstruction, fell under Cl (g) or Cl (hh) of S. 13 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Cls. (g) and (hh) of S. 13 (l) of that Act correspond to Cls. Cls. (g) and (hh) of S. 13 (l) of that Act correspond to Cls. (h) and (g) respectively of S. 21 (l) of the karnataka Rent Control Act. Raghubar Dayal, J. , who spoke for the court, observed thus at pages 1678 and 1679 : the provisions of S. 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlord's general right to eject his tenant. There is therefore no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds bet read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that Cl. (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i. e. to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. There is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word premises' or to the word occupies' which have been construed by this Court in Krishnalal ishwanal besai v. Bai Vijkor (CA. 804/1962 d. 18-1-1963) referred to later. . . . . . . . . The provisions of Cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a, landlord reasonably and bona, fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish premises and to erect a, new building on them. The prqvisions of Cl. (hh) apply to cases where the, landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a, new building which is to be let qut to tenants the above ruling of the, Supreme Court was fqllowed by this Court in M. Munswaniah and Sons v. E K. Govinda Raj AIR. 1965 Mys. 156. . That was a case under the mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Sub-sec (3) of s. 8 of that Act corresponds to Cl (h) to S. 21 (l) of the present Act and cl (ix) of S. 8 (2) of that Act corresponds to Cl (g) of S. 21 (l) of the present act. There, the landlord sought to evict the tenant on the ground that he (the landlord) required additional accommodation fop the purpose of his business which he was carrying on and that he intended to demolish the old house and reconstruct a new hquse. There, the landlord sought to evict the tenant on the ground that he (the landlord) required additional accommodation fop the purpose of his business which he was carrying on and that he intended to demolish the old house and reconstruct a new hquse. Dealing with the question whether the landlord's case came within sub-sec (3) or sub-sec (2) of S. 8 of that Act, this is what Kalagate, J. , said at page 161: the mere fact that he (the landlord) intends to repair and reconstruct the house either on account of his own volition or on account of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his own occupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition in the language of Cl (c) of S. 8 (3) of the Act or in the other provisions of the Act, to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house without making any alterations in the house. There could not be any logical reason for such a prohibition. ( 8 ) THEREFORE, it would not be right to hold that Cl (c) of S. 8 (3) of the act applies only when the landlord bonafide needs to occupy the house without making any alterations in it. . . . . A similar view was taken regard to Cls (h) and (j) of S. 21 (1) of the act in Venkappmah v. M. S. Pananna 1968 (1) Mys. L. J. 435. . Venkataswami, J. observed thus at page 440 : there cannot be any doubt that when a landlord claims eviction in respect of a leased premises on the ground of personajluse and occupation, and also pleads that he has to demolish and reconstruct the same to suit his convenience both together constitute, one and a single ground. It goes without saying that if a landlord were to claim eviction on the ground that the premises are required for his personal use and occupation, he need not further make a claim under S. 21 (l) (j) of the 'act'. It goes without saying that if a landlord were to claim eviction on the ground that the premises are required for his personal use and occupation, he need not further make a claim under S. 21 (l) (j) of the 'act'. The reason for this conclusion is that a landlord after securing the premises under S. 21 (l) (h), he need not further ask for permission for demolishing and reconstructing the building which is not subject to any right of tenancy in favour of any other person. Stating this in another way, it means that a landlord who secures possession of a leased premises on the strength of a decree for eviction has a natural and proprietary right to deal with the premises as he chooses in order to make it more convenient or suitable for his residence. ( 9 ) IN this view, it is unnecessary to deal further with the question arising under S. 21 (l) (j), which relates to demolition and reconstruction of a premises when eviction is sought specifically for that purpose. " the reasoning in the aforesaid decisions namely, the mere fact that the landlord intends to demolish the demised premises and to erect a now building in place thereof does no|t affect the question of his requiring the house resonably and bonafide for his occupation applies, in my opinion, with equal force to a case where the landlord requires the demised land for his OWn occupation for erecting a new building thereon. To such a case it is Cl (h) and not Cl (1) of S. 21 (l) of the Act that applies. The landlord, after obtaining under Cl (h) ot S. 21 (l) of the Act, eviction of the tenant from the, demised land, has a, natural and proprietary right to deal with that land as he chooses in order to make it suitable for his occupation. The provisions of Cl (l) of S. 21 (l) apply, in my opinion to a, case where the landlord requires the demised land for erecting a new building which he does not intend to occupy for himself but intends to let out to others. However, Mr. The provisions of Cl (l) of S. 21 (l) apply, in my opinion to a, case where the landlord requires the demised land for erecting a new building which he does not intend to occupy for himself but intends to let out to others. However, Mr. Subba Rao contended that Cl (h) of S. 21 (1) must be regarded as a general provision applicable to all kinds of premises-land with building thereon as well as with vacant land, whereas Cl (l) of that sub-section as a special provision applicable to premises which consist of vacant land only and that hence if a case comes within the scope of the special provision, the application of the general provision is excluded to that extent. Cl (l) of S. 21 (l) of the Act is applicable where the landlord reasonably and bonafide required the demised land for erecting a new building thereon whereas Cl (h) of that sub-section is applicable where the, landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the demised premises for his own occupation. The scope of each of these two clauses is different from the other. I am unable to see how Cl (l) of S. 21 (l) can be regarded as a special provision and Cl (h) of that sub-section as a general provision. As I have affirmed the findings of the Courts below that the landlord reasonably and bonafide requires the demised land for his own occupation, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether he has also satisfied one of conditions specified in C1 (I) of S. 21 (l) of the Act, namely, of having obtained the approval or permission of the Corporation of the City of bangalore to erect a new buiding on the demised site. Thus, bqth the contentions urged by Mr. Subba Rao fail. In the result, i dismiss this petition. ( 10 ) IN the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Mr. Subba Rao requested that the petitioner-tenant might be given two months time to vacate the premises and to remove the structures thereon and the machinery erected therein. But, Mr. Seshagiri submitted that before the decree, for eviction was stayed by this Court, the landlord took possession of the demised premises and the question of granting time to the petitioner-tenant for vacating the same, does not arise at this stage. But, Mr. Seshagiri submitted that before the decree, for eviction was stayed by this Court, the landlord took possession of the demised premises and the question of granting time to the petitioner-tenant for vacating the same, does not arise at this stage. It ig not necessary to go into the question whether or not the landlord has already taken possession of the demised premises. It is sufficient to to the petitioners-tenant for vacating the same, does n'ot arise at his stage. turea and the machinery remaining in the demised land. --- *** --- .