Judgment :- K. Veeraswami, C.J. The appellant applied under S.33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to compute the bonus amount due to him in the sum of Rs. 2, 100. He claimed that when his services were terminated on March 31, 1966, his bonus was not settled. According to him, the bonus for the year 1965-1966 had not been even declared by the management. The respondent-management resisted the claim on the ground inter alia that on April 2, 1966, the appellant was paid a consolidated sum of Rs. 3, 000 towards all the benefits due to him, inclusive of bonus for 1965-1966. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, posed for his determination the question, whether the petitioner (appellant herein) was entitled to bonus for 1965-1966, as claimed by him. He answered the question in the affirmative. Ramaprasada Rao. J., allowed the management's petition for certiorari. He was of the view that the dispute in the instant case was such as would not fall within the scope of S.33C (2) of the Act and that the appellant's remedy was to apply under S.22 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. The aggrieved erstwhile employee is before us on appeal. 2. In our opinion, the learned Judge was right. Section 33C (2) is a machinery section. Even so, it has been construed by Courts to have a wide scope, the computation embracing not merely simple airthmetical calculation. Whatever claim may or may not be attracted within the scope of S.33 C(2), an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, as we think, will not clearly be within the purview of that provision. This is because of the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, which provides for a specific forum and procedure for adjudicating industrial disputes.Section22 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, deems any dispute that arose between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under the Act to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That being so, such a dispute will have to be adjudicated in the regular way and not resolved by an application under S. 33C (2). Our attention was invited to S.39 of the Payment of Bonus Act, but that does not assist us or compel us to take a different view. That being so, such a dispute will have to be adjudicated in the regular way and not resolved by an application under S. 33C (2). Our attention was invited to S.39 of the Payment of Bonus Act, but that does not assist us or compel us to take a different view. Our view is not that S.22 of the Payment of Bonus Act overrides S.33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But when S.22 of the former Act deems a dispute with respect to bonus payable under the Act to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, then the forum and the procedure under the Industrial Disputes Act will be the only means by which the dispute can find a solution and it is not through S. 33C (2). 3. It is contended for the appellant, supported by Allahabad Labour Supply Agency v. First Labour Court, Nagpur, 1970 (39) FJR 409, that an individual dispute will be outside the scope of S.22 of the Payment of Bonus Act. With respect, we are not inclined to share this view, for apart from the fact that a plural includes a singular, after the amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act so as to attract individual disputes too within the scope of an industrial dispute, it does not appear to us to be reasonable that S.22 of the Payment of Bonus Act will be inapplicable to individual disputes. 4. Yet another contention for the appellant is that since the first respondent did not question the appellant's entitlement to bonus but only pleaded that the consolidated payment made to the appellant included bonus too, the dispute would not be comprehended within the scope of S.22 of the Payment of Bonus Act. But, in our opinion, the words "any dispute with respect to bonus payable under the Act" are wide enough to cover not merely questions relating to entitlement but also the quantum and a plea of discharge. 5. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.