JUDGMENT George Abraham Vadakkel, J. 1. The petitioner filed a suit for partition and separate possession of his 1/3 share in the plaint properties including some private forests. The plaintiff in the first instance paid the fixed court-fee of Rs. 100 on the ground that he is in joint possession of the Illom properties. However, he was directed to pay court-fee on the 1/3 market value of the private forests, the market value of which properties have been assessed at Rs. 4,42,187.50. The court-fee payable by him accordingly came to Rs. 33,164.25. Unable to pay the abovesaid court-fee he sought for and was allowed to continue the suit in forma pauperis. The suit was ultimately compromised whereby the plaintiff got a decree for 50 acres of private forests comprised in items 3 and 4 and another property, 1 acre 51 cents of land and a building thereon. Ext.P-1 is the decree. That decree directed, as provided for in Order XXXIII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that the court-fee payable by plaintiff shall be recoverable by the Government and that the same shall be a first charge on the subject-matter of the suit. The decree is dated 15th March 1965. Admittedly the petitioner paid towards the aforesaid liability for court-fee, Rs. 13,720 on 30th September 1965. The balance remaining payable by the petitioner is Rs. 23,597.75. On 23rd August 1971 the 1st respondent published the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, which as per section 1 (3) thereof was brought into force with retrospective effect from 10th May 1971. Under section 3 of that Act with effect from 10th May 1971, the ownership and possession of all private forests in the State were transferred to and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, and the right, title and interest of the owner and other persons in them were extinguished. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioner that by reason of this provision the debt (liability for court-fee) itself has been wiped off pro tanto to the value of the property so vested. 2. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioner that by reason of this provision the debt (liability for court-fee) itself has been wiped off pro tanto to the value of the property so vested. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner put forward his arguments in two forms, viz., that there has been a merger of the charge and the full proprietary right less the charge in one and the same person, viz., the 1st respondent, and that, therefore, there has been a wiping off of the debt for which the charge was created. In a slightly different form it was argued that section 3 of the Act could operate only on the petitioner rights in the property, that is to say, his full ownership less the charge-rights of the 1st respondent which had earlier been created in favour of the 1st respondent as per Ext. P-1 decree in 1965. 3. No authority is required for the proposition that the court-fee payable by the plaintiff in a suit filed in forma pauperis is a charge on the subject-matter of the suit. Rule 10 earlier mentioned itself provides that it shall be a first charge. In view of the fact that the charge arises under the provisions of the statutory rules, it is a statutory charge; Ramachandra v. Laxman A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 49. In Devichand v. Chintaman A.I.R. 1945 Bombay 116 relying on an earlier decision of that court as well as the decisions of the Allahabad, Madras and Calcutta High Courts, it has been laid down that the expression the charge or encumbrance shall be extinguished in the old section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 meant that the debt which was the basis of the charge itself would be extinguished. The discussion therein discloses that the above principle is based on the law of merger. This is what is stated in the aforesaid decision. The effect of discharging and extinguishing that portion of the mortgage debt which was chargeable on the property purchased by him, that is to say, the portion of the debt which bore the same ratio to the whole amount of the debt as the value of the property purchased bore to the value of the whole of the property comprised in the mortgage, discharges and extinguishes that much debt. The earliest decision that has been cited in that case is Lakhmidas v. Jamnadas I.L.R. 22 Bombay 304 where a Full Bench of Bombay High Court said: "It is clear that the plaintiff when the purchased the equity of redemption in the house, purchased it subject to its due proportion of the mortgage debt. That proportion of the mortgage debt thus ceased to exist, and the plaintiff right as mortgagee to recover the money secured by his mortgage was reduced to that extent"�. The effect of the amendment of section 101 is considered in the Commentaries, Mulla on Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (Setalvad 5th Edn. pp. 624-625 and Setalvad 6th Edn. pp. 628-629) as follows-.” "The old section covered the cases of the union of two estates which occurred when the purchaser of the equity of redemption acquired the rights of the mortgagee or when the mortgagee acquired the right of the mortgagor. The amendment of the section does not alter this rule. Where, therefore, a charge is created by the judgment- debtor in favour of the holder of a money decree, this charge is extinguished by the purchase of the property by the charge-holder at the auction sale in execution of a prior mortgagee decree. The debt itself having ceased to exist, it is not open to the charge-holder to seek a personal remedy against the judgment-debtor. (underlining by me). Devichand case A.I.R. 1945 Bombay 116 is cited by the learned Commentators as authority for the abovesaid principle. These propositions have been accepted and followed in two decisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in the same volume, Kunjan Pillai v. Ouseph 1952 K.L.T. 207 and Mathai v. Zacharia 1952 K.L.T. 322. There is an elaborate discussion of these principles in the aforesaid two decisions. In the first case Subramonia Iyer, J. on behalf of the Bench said:” "The principle applies to all obligations whatever be their origin and nature; it applies to obligations arising out of or merged in and evidenced by decrees as well. The principle would equally apply whatever be the manner in which the two characters happen to become vested in the same individual whether by act of parties or by operation of law"�, (underlining by me). The principle would equally apply whatever be the manner in which the two characters happen to become vested in the same individual whether by act of parties or by operation of law"�, (underlining by me). The above passage was cited with approval in the other case, also a Bench decision, by Koshi, J. (as he then was) who was a party to the earlier decision. These two decisions emphasised the principle of merger of two opposite characters, (rather than merger of two estates), of debtor and creditor becoming united in the same person, but this, in my view, is immaterial so far as a mortgagor and mortgagee, or a charge-holder and one liable under the charge are concerned. 4. In my view the submission made on the basis of the above discussed principle and relying on the aforesaid decisions that there has been a protanto extinguishment of the charge liability is well-founded. 5. The other argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is founded on the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in The Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 298= 1955 (1) S.C.R. 1311 . In paragraph 12 of that decision which arose with reference to acquisition of lands under the Land Acquisition Act, the Supreme Court said: "When the Government acquires lands under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, it must be for a public purpose, and with a view to put them to that purpose, the Government acquires the sum total of all private interests subsisting in them. If the Government has itself an interest in the land, it has only to acquire the other interests outstanding therein, so that it might be in a position to pass it on absolutely to the public user". (the underlining is by me). It is argued on the basis of the aforesaid passage that as on the date of coming into force of the Act, the petitioner had no full ownership in the property but only something less than that, less the charge-rights of the 1st respondent, and that section 3 of the Act could operate only in respect of such remaining rights of the petitioner. Even if the section is construed as operative in respect of the full ownership, it is submitted that in so far as the State had already some interest in respect of the property, viz., a charge, there is no question of extinguishment of that interest by the operation of the provision, though after the Act, it may be that, the Government may not and cannot be compelled to release it (the charge). It is also submitted that the provision in section 3 to the effect that the ownership and possession shall stand transferred to and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances can mean only encumbrances in respect of the property made in favour of private parties and not that existing in favour of the State. The learned counsel for the petitioner reinforced this last mentioned argument by referring to the closing portion of that provision which provides that the right, title and interest of the owner. . . .shall stand extinguished. The submission is that as on the date of the coming into force of the Act, he had not the full ownership, and that the 1st respondent need only acquire these 'other' rights which he had on that date. In my view these submissions are also well-founded. If that be so, the principle earlier discussed, viz., extinguishment of the liability by merger of the two characters, debtor and creditor, or, of two estates, is applicable to the case on hand, for that reason as well. 6. The only argument advanced on behalf of the state is that the State has dual capacity, i.e., the State is a creditor in its capacity as a Revenue Collecting Authority whereas the charged properties vested in it in some other capacity-which the learned Government Counsel named as Promotor of Agrarian Reforms. It is pointed out that the preamble to the Act says that the object of vesting under the Act is for Assignment of the private forests to agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. The learned counsel for the State also referred me to section 2 (b),5, 6, 8(3) and 15 and submitted that these provision clearly show that the land has to be managed by a custodian for the purposes envisaged in the preamble. That may be so. The learned counsel for the State also referred me to section 2 (b),5, 6, 8(3) and 15 and submitted that these provision clearly show that the land has to be managed by a custodian for the purposes envisaged in the preamble. That may be so. However, no authority was cited before me to show that the State has got two distinct and separate capacities, a capacity as ˜Revenue Collecting Authority and another capacity as the Promotor of Agrarian Reforms. In my view, both these are functions of the State, but the State remains always one and indivisible juridical entity. I do not think that a State is a different juridical person in respect of each of its multifarious functions and activities. The authorities relied on by the learned Government Counsel, viz., Dulhin Lacchanbati v. Bodh Nath A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 94, Mohammad Abdul Samad v. Girdhari Lal A.I.R. 1942 All. 175, Satar Mohd. v. Saraf-ud-din A.I.R. 1962 J. and K.79 and State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayons Co. 1973 K.L.T. 898 do not in my view lay down any principle that is contrary to what has been stated above. In this connection it is pertinent to notice what the Supreme Court said with reference to an analogous statute in Shivashankar v. Baikunth A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 971: Though in fact the vesting of the Estates and the deemed settlement of raiyat rights in respect of certain classes of lands included in the Estates took place simultaneously, in law the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a vesting of the Estates in the State absolutely, and free of all encumbrances. Then followed the deemed settlement by the State of raiyat rights on the quondam proprietors. (Para 10). The above-quoted passage clearly shows that by, reason of the vesting provision in section 3 the property vests in the State absolutely and free from all encumbrances. The object of the Act may be to assign these lands to agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. Still the State is the owner after vesting and till assignment. 7. After the coming into force of the Act the 2nd respondent, District Collector, it is averred by the petitioner, directed the 4th respondent, the Tahsildar, to attach and sell the 1 acre and 51 cents of land and the building he got as per the decree. Still the State is the owner after vesting and till assignment. 7. After the coming into force of the Act the 2nd respondent, District Collector, it is averred by the petitioner, directed the 4th respondent, the Tahsildar, to attach and sell the 1 acre and 51 cents of land and the building he got as per the decree. It is further averred that though the petitioner filed an application for dropping the proceedings in pursuance of a notice issued earlier, viz., Ext. P-3, the Village Officer informed the petitioner that he has orders to attach and sell 1.51 acres of land aforesaid. According to the petitioner the said land is not liable to be proceeded against and he seeks by this petition to restrain the respondents from taking any steps for recovery of the balance court-fee. I have earlier found that by virtue of the vesting of the private forests he obtained as per the decree in the 1st respondent, there has been a pro tanto extinguishment of the liability for balance court-fee, if any, that remain payable as on the date the Act came into force. The exact liability, if any, that may fall on 1 acre 51 cents of land is a matter for calculation by the concerned authorities. I declare that the respondents, if they choose to proceed for recovery of balance court-fee that will fall on the aforesaid 1 acre 51 cents can do so only after apportioning the liability with notice to the petitioner. No other directions are called for in this original petition. The original petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.