GUPTA, J—The petitioner is a diploma-holder in civil Engineering and was appointed as an Engineering Subordinate in a temporary capacity in the Irrigation Deptt. of the State Government by an order dated 13-12-1966 issued by the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation, Udaipur. One of the terms of his appointment as mentioned in the aforesaid order dated 13-12-1966 was that the service of the petitioner was terminable on one months notice on either side. It was also mentioned therein that the appointment of the petitioner was for a period of six months or till persons selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission or surplus hands would become available, whichever was earlier. The petitioner joined as Engineering Subordinate in pursuance of the aforesaid order of appointment on December 27, 1966 and was posted in the Panchayat Samiti, Bhensroadgarh. The petitioner has submitted that although he has worked for more than a year on the aforesaid post, his services were terminated by the order of the Chief Engineer, Irrigation dated January, 17, 1968 under sec. 23 A of the Rajasthan Service Rules. The petitioner has further submitted that he was relieved from his post in the forenoon of February 1, 1968. The petitioners case is that he was a workman within the meaning of clause (s) of sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). His grievance is that he was not paid any retrenchment compensation as envisaged under sec. 25F of the Act. He has also made a grievance that persons junior to him in the category of Engineering Subordinates have been retained in service, while the services of the petitioner have been retrenched and as such the provisions of sec. 25G of the Act have been violated and the normal principle of last come first go has not been followed. The petitioner has therefore, prayed that the order of termination of his services Ex. 2 dated January 17, 1968 be quashed. 2. The respondents have contested the writ petition and they have submitted that one months notice pay has already been paid to the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of sec. 23 A of the Rajasthan Service Rules. They denied the claim of the petitioner that he was a workman within the meaning of sec. 2. The respondents have contested the writ petition and they have submitted that one months notice pay has already been paid to the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of sec. 23 A of the Rajasthan Service Rules. They denied the claim of the petitioner that he was a workman within the meaning of sec. 2 (s) of the Act and have also joined issue on the question that the Irrigation Department of the State Government was an Industry. The respondents have submitted that the provisions of the Act are not attracted to the case of the petitioner as he was not a workman and his services have been properly terminated in accordance with the Rajasthan Service Rules. They have also taken the stand that the petitioner submitted an application for re-appointment on the post of Engineering Subordinate and he was directed to get his name registered with the Man Power Cell in the General Administration Department of the State Government and to furnish his registration number, but he did not comply. They have further stated that the petitioner was appointed as a work-charged Supervisor on Famine Relief Works in Dungarpur district by the order dated May 30, 1969 but he did not join and as such the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition as he must be deemed to have waived his rights, if any. The stand of the respondents is that the present case was one of simple termination in accordance with the terms and conditions of service and is not a case of retrenchment In the alternative the respondents have submitted that the petitioner should have taken recourse to the remedies available under the Act, if he at all considered that his services were retrenched and he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Act. As regards the objection of the petitioner that persons junior to him have been retained in service, while his services were terminated by the order Ex. 2, the respondents have stated in their reply that the services of Surendra Kumar Mango and Dillaram, in respect of whom the petitioner has made a grievance in the writ petition were also terminated by the very order the Chief Engineer dated January 17, 1968 (Ex. 2) by which the petitioners services were terminated and as such the petitioner can have no grievance on that account. 2) by which the petitioners services were terminated and as such the petitioner can have no grievance on that account. As regards Nasib Ali Khan it has been submitted by the respondents that he joined the post of Engineering Subordinate on December 26, 1966 and was not junior to the petitioner who had joined the said post on December 27, 1966. The respondents have, therefore, submitted that the petitioner has no case whatsoever and the writ petition should be dismissed. 3. The first and the fore-most question which requires consideration in this case is as to whether the petitioner is a workman within the meaning of sec. 2(s) of the Act and his services have been retrenched so as to entitle him to receive the benefits envisaged under sec. 25F of the Act. It would be useful at this stage to consider the relevant provisions of the Act. Sub-clause(s) of sec. 2 of the Act it as under:— "2(s) "Workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act. in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute, but does not include any such person— (i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 (34 of 1934) ; or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 4. Thus to come within the ambit of workman for the purposes of the Act, the person should be employed in any industry for hire or reward, but should not be emplo-yed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity or if employed in a supervisory capacity he should not draw wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per month. 5. There is no dispute between the parties that the petitioner was employed by the State Government for hire or reward and he was not working mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity but that he was employed in a supervisory capacity and did not draw wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per month. However, the main dispute between the parties is on the question as to whether the petitioner was employed in any industry. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Irrigation Department of the State Government was an industry within the meaning of clause (j) of sec. 2 of the Act while the learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the respondents, strenuously submitted that the said department was not an industry. Industry has been defined in sub-clause (j) of sec. 2 of the Act as. "Industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufature or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workman." Learned counsel for the petitioner also sought to derive support for his argument from the definition of public utility service given in clause (n) of sec. 2 of the Act, which includes amongst others "any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public". He has also submitted that this Court in Viney Kumar Majoo vs. State(l) held that an Engineering Subordinate is a workman. However, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that in this case the question as to whether the Irrigation department of the State is an industry as defined in the Act requires examination. His grievance is that in the writ petition the petitioner has simply stated that he was a workman and was entitled to retrenchment compensation on account of the termination of his services but has not submitted that the Irrigation department of the State Government was an industry and an Engineering Subordinate employed therein was a workman. His grievance is that in the writ petition the petitioner has simply stated that he was a workman and was entitled to retrenchment compensation on account of the termination of his services but has not submitted that the Irrigation department of the State Government was an industry and an Engineering Subordinate employed therein was a workman. The petitioners learned counsel urged that it was not necessary to give details of the functions and duties performed by an Engineering Subordinate in the Irrigation department, in as much as the petitioner referred to the aforesaid decision in Viney Kumar Majoos case (1) in para 7 of the writ petition and on the basis thereof he asserted that the petitioner was a workman within the meaning of sec. 2(s) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. The Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan(2), wherein it was held that the survey and Investigation Division of the Irrigation department of the State Government was an industry within the meaning of the provisions of sec. 2 (j) of the Act. But it has been argued by the Additional Advocate General that the aforesaid decision relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (3), which was however not followed in subsequent cases by the Supreme Court and his submission is that in latter cases their Lordships of the Supreme Court have given a re-thinking to the matter. 6. The earliest case on the point which requires to be noticed is D.N. Banerji vs. P.R. Mukherji (4). There the question raised was an to whether a Municipality was an industryand a person employed as a Sanitary Inspector therein was a workman within the meaning of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in that case that in the ordinary or non-technical sense, industry means an undertaking where capital and labour cooperate with each other for the purpose of producing wealth in the shape of goods, machines, tools etc., and for making profits. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the limited concept of what an industry meant in early times must now yield place to an enormously wider concept so as to take in various and varied forms of industry. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the limited concept of what an industry meant in early times must now yield place to an enormously wider concept so as to take in various and varied forms of industry. Legislation has to keep pace with the march of times and the new situations caused by the process of social evolution have to be provided for. However, it was observed that every activity in which the relationship of employer and employee exists or arises, does not result in an industry. But non-profit-making undertaking are included in the concept of industry, even if there is no private enterprise. Their Lordships also referred to the definition of public utility service contained in sub clause (n) of sec. 2 of the Act and observed that it was very relevant and important in the interpretation of the word industry as employed in the Act. Their Lordships held that if the public utility service such as railways, telephones and the supply of power, light or water to the public is carried on by a Corporation like the Municipality, instead of by private companies or business corporations, it does not cease to be an industry and the only fact that there is nothing like the investment of any capital or the existance of a profit earning motive does not constitute a necessary element in the modern concept of industry. Their Lordships further made the following significant observations:— "There is a necessary element of distinction between the supply of power and light to the inhabitants of a Municipality and the running of charitable hospitals and dispensaries for the aid of the poor. In ordinary parlance, the former might be regarded as an industry but not the latter. The very idea underlying the entrustment of such duties or functions, to local bodies is not to take them out of the sphere of industry but to secure the substitution of public authorities in the place of private employers and to eliminate the motive of profit-making as far as possible. The levy of taxes for the maintenance of the services of sanitation and conservancy or the supply of light and water is a method adopted and devised to make up for the absence of capital. The levy of taxes for the maintenance of the services of sanitation and conservancy or the supply of light and water is a method adopted and devised to make up for the absence of capital. The undertaking or the service will still remain within the ambit of what we understand by an industry though it is carried on with the aid of taxation, and no immediate material gain by way of profit is envisaged." 7. In Baroda Borough Municipality vs. Its Workman (5), where the workman were employees of the Electricity Department of a Municipality, their Lordships of the Supreme Court re affirmed their earlier decision in D.N. Banerjis case (4) and observed as follows:— "It is now finally settled by the decision of Act, this Court in D.N. Baneijee vs. P.R. Mukerjee (A) (supra) that a municipal undertaking of the nature we have under consideration here is an industry within the meaning of the definition of that word in sec. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes 1947 and that the expression industrial dispute in that Act includes disputes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be regarded as analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business." However, in the case of the State of Bombay vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha(3) the Supreme Court applied the test as to whether an activity of like nature would be an undertaking if it is carried on by a private citizen or a group of private citizens. By applying the aforesaid test a hospital was also held to be an industry. 8. In the Corporation of City of Nagpur vs. Its Employees(6) the Supreme Court while dealing with the case of employee of Nagpur Corporation distinguished between the regal functions and the municipal functions performed by the Corporation. It was observed that the regal functions decribed as primary and inalienable functions of State, though statutorily delegated to a corporation, are necessarily excluded from the purview of the definition of industry and that the service, which, if rendered by an individual or a private person would be an industry, would equally be an industry if performed by a corporation. However, one of the tests applied in that case also was as to whether the service could be performed by an individual or firm for remuneration. 9. However, one of the tests applied in that case also was as to whether the service could be performed by an individual or firm for remuneration. 9. All the aforesaid cases were considered by the Supreme Court again in The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union vs. The Management of the Gymkhana Club (7) and the decisions given in the cases of D.N. Banerjee (4) and Baroda Borough Municipality (5) were approved and it was observed that those two cases laid down that for an activity to be an industry it is not necessary that it must be carried on by private enterprise or must be commercial or result in profit. It is sufficient if the activity is analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business and involves co-operation between employers and employees. This result is reached by extending the meaning of undertaking to cover adventures which may not be strictly trade or business but are very similar to term. The activity of the Municipality was considered to be covered by the term undertaking in the definition of industry in sec. 2(j) of the Act, but the test laid down in the case of the Corporation of City of Nagpur(6) was not accepted. The Supreme Court made the following observations: — "The expansion of Governmental or municipal activity in fields of productive industry is a feature of all developing welfare states. considered necessary because it leads to welfare without exploitation of workmen and makes the production of material goods and services cheaper by eliminating profits. Government and Local authorities act as individuals do and the policy of the Act is to put Government and local authorities on a par with private individuals. But Government cannot be regarded as an employer within the Act if the operations are governmental or administrative in character. The local authorities also cannot be regarded as industry unless they produce material goods or render material services and do not share by delegation in governmental functions or functions incidental thereto. This is There is no essential difference between educational institutions run by municipalities and those run by universities. And yet a distinction is sought to be made on the dichotomy or regal and municipal functions. This is There is no essential difference between educational institutions run by municipalities and those run by universities. And yet a distinction is sought to be made on the dichotomy or regal and municipal functions. Therefore, the word undertaking must be defined as "any business or any work or project which one engages in or attempts as an enterprise analogous to business or trade." This is the test laid down in Banerjis case, and followed in the Baroda Borough Municipality case. Its extension in the Corporation case was unfortunate and contradicted the earlier case." 10. Hidayatullah J., as he then was, in the aforesaid case recounted the principles so far settled as under:— "Every human activity in which enters the relationship of employers and employees, is not necessarily creative of an industry. Personal services rendered by domestic and other servants, administrative services of public officials, service in aid of occupations of professional men such as doctors and lawyers, etc., employment of teachers and so on may result in relationship in which there are employers on the one side and employees on the other but they must be excluded because they do not come within the denotation of the term industry. Primarily, therefore, industrial disputes occur when the operation undertaken rests upon co-operation between employers and employees with a view to production and distribution of material goods, in other words, wealth, but they may arise also in cases where the co-operation is to produce material services." 11. In Cricket Club of India vs. Bombay Labour Union (8) the question whether the Cricket Club of India, Bombay was an industry within the meaning of sec. 2(j) of the Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court accepted the tests laid down in the case of Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union (7) and held that the Cricket Club of India was not an industry and it was a self-service club of its members. 12. In the Management of Safdar Jung Hospital; New Delhi vs. Kuldip Singh Sethi(9) the question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the Safdar Jung Hospital, New Delhi was an industry and in this case their Lordships clearly laid down what was meant by material services. 12. In the Management of Safdar Jung Hospital; New Delhi vs. Kuldip Singh Sethi(9) the question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the Safdar Jung Hospital, New Delhi was an industry and in this case their Lordships clearly laid down what was meant by material services. It was held in the aforesaid case that material services are not services which depend wholly or largely upon the contribution of professional knowledge, skill or dexterity for the production of a result. Such services being given individually and by individuals are services no doubt but are not material services. Even an establishment where many such persons operate cannot be said to convert their professional services into material services. Material services involve an activity carried on through co-operation between employers and employees to provide the community with the use of something such as electric power, water, transportation, mail delivery telephones and the like. In providing these services there may be employment of trained men and even professional men, but the emphasis is not on what these men do but upon the productivity of a service organised as an industry and commercially valuable. Thus the services of professional men involving benefit to individuals, according to their needs, such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, solicitors etc, are easily distinguishable from an activity such as transport service. The latter is of a commercial character in which something is brought into existence, quite apart from the benefit to particular individuals. It is the production of this something which is described as the production of material services. 13. The Supreme Court in this case over-ruled its earlier decision in the State of Bombay vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (3) and it was observed that the test as to whether such activity could be carried on by private individuals or groups of individuals could not be considered as the right test to be applied for determining as to whether a particular activity was an industry or not within the meaning of the Act. While referring to the definition of public utility service in sec. While referring to the definition of public utility service in sec. 2(a) of the Act it was observed that the named services in that definition answered the test of industries run on commercial lines to produce something which the community can use and that such services were brought into existence in a commercial way and were analogous to business in which material goods are produced and distributed for consumption. 14. In Visagapatnam Dock Labour Board vs. Stevedores Association, Vishakha-patnam (10) their Lordships considered the question as to whether the Stevedores Association, Vishakhapatnam, whose function was to supply workman to registered employers could be considered as an industry under the Act. It was held that applying the principles laid down in Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union (7), the Board was not an industry. 15. In the Bombay Panjrapole, Bhuleshwar vs. The Workmen(ll) the matter as to whether the Bombay Penjrapole, Bhuleshwar was an industry was considered and their Lordships held that the institute by adopting the policy of keeping cattle not merely for their own sake but with an eye to serve human beings, by making large quantity of good milk available to them and by getting an income which would augment its resources, certainly carried on business and the absence of a profit motive is not material. The activity of the Panjrapole was, therefore, held to be an industry. 16. In the Management of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry vs. Their Workman, R.K. Mittal(l2) it was observed that in Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union case(7) all the previous case law on the subject was reviewed and the tests so far established were recounted, which I have already extracted above. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court followed the criteria laid down in Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union(7) and observed that in our view the linchpin of the definition of industry is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging namely whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade, or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employers. If it is that and there is co-operation of the employer and the employee resulting in the production of material services, it is an industry notwithstanding that its objects are charitable or that it does not make profit or even where profits are made, they are not distributed among the members." Applying these principles it was held that Federation of lndian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was an industry within the meaning of sec. 2(j) of the Act. Their Lordships held that the Federation carried on systematic activities to assist its members and other businessmen and industrialists and even the non-members, in taking up their cases and solving their difficulties and in obtaining concessions and facilities for them from the Government and these activities are business activities and as such the Federation rendered material services to businessmen, traders and industrialists. 17. The Gujrat High Court also considered the law on the subject in Dhari Gram Panchayat vs. Shri Brahad Saurashtra Safai Kamdar mandal, Rajkot (13) and held that an organised activity offering service to the community would fall within the definition of the word industry. 18. A review of all the aforesaid cases on the subject, leads to the conclusion that before the work engaged in can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite character of trade or business or manufacture or calling or must be capable of being described as an undetaking in material goods or material services. Now for the employers, the ambit of industry, under the force of the second part, takes in the different kinds of activity of the employees mentioned therein. Of course, the second part standing alone cannot define what is industry and in either case the activity, whether the enterprise of the employees is to be considered in relation to its being a business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling or the employment, calling or avocation of the workmen, has reference to their rendering services of productive nature on behalf of the employers. Thus, an enterprise, which is an undertaking analogous to trade or business, resulting in rendering material services to the community, would certainly bean industry within the meaning of sec. 2( j ) of the Act. The Irrigation Department of the State Government which is engaged in constructing dams, canals, tanks etc. Thus, an enterprise, which is an undertaking analogous to trade or business, resulting in rendering material services to the community, would certainly bean industry within the meaning of sec. 2( j ) of the Act. The Irrigation Department of the State Government which is engaged in constructing dams, canals, tanks etc. and distributing and supplying water for irrigation purposes, is rendering material services to the community at large or a part thereof with the help of its employees and is, therefore, an undertaking which comes within the definition of industry under the Act. The State Government may not be providing irrigation facilities to the community with profit motive but that would not make any difference as the undertaking is analogous to trade or business, because the irrigation facilities are provided on payment of certain charges. It is essentially a business activity, though the motive might be general welfare of the people. 19. In State of Rajasthan vs.Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan (4) Tyagi J. held Irrigation Department of the State Government as an industry, although one of the tests applied in that case, based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hospital Mazdoor Sabhas case(3), namely that the operations carried on by the Irrigation Department could be carried out by some private individuals, is no longer valid as it was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Madras Gymkhana(7) and Safdar Jung Hospital (9) cases, yet the same conclusion would he arrived at also by applying the well accepted tests. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that the Irrigation Department of the State Government is an industry within the meaning of the Act. The same conclusion was arrived at by the Madhya Pradesh High Court when it held in M. P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (15) that the Chambal Hydel Irrigation Project of the State of Madhya Pradesh was an industry within the meaning of the Act. 20. Once the conclusion is arrived at that the Irrigation Department is an industry there is no difficulty in holding that the petitioner was a workman within the meaning of sec. 2(s) of the Act, as it is not in dispute in the present case that he was employed in the Irrigation Department in a Supervisory capacity as an Engineering Subordinate and that the wages drawn by him did not exceed Rs. 2(s) of the Act, as it is not in dispute in the present case that he was employed in the Irrigation Department in a Supervisory capacity as an Engineering Subordinate and that the wages drawn by him did not exceed Rs. 500/- per month. The objection of the learned Additional Advocate General on this score that the petitioner has not given the details of the work done by him in his capacity as an Engineering Subordinate for establishing the fact that he was a workman, cannot be sustained, for the petitioner has referred in the writ petition to the case of Viney Kumar Majoo (l) decided by this Court, which was also a case of an Engineering Subordinate. In that case Kan Singh J. considered a Standing Order issued by the State Government, defining the duties performed by an Engineering Subordinate or Overseer and came to the conclusion that a person employed in that capacity was undoubtedly a workman as defined in sec. 2(s) of the Act, looking to the nature of the duties performed by him. The petitioner having referred to the aforesaid decision was not required to repeat in detail the functions and duties performed by an Engineering Subordinate. I agree with the view taken by Kan Singh J. in Viney Kumar Majoos case (l). Of course, the other aspect of the matter as to whether the Irrigation Department was an industry as defined in sec. 2(j) of the Act was not considered in that case and that aspect of the matter has been considered by me above at great length, in the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject. 21. Now in the instant case, the services of the petitioner were sought to be terminated by the impugned order and although he had served in the Irrigation Deptt. of the State as an Engineering Subordinate for more than one year, yet he was not given 15 days notice or compensation equivalent to 15 days average pay as required by sec. 25-F of the Act.The Supreme Court has held in National Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs. State of W. Bengal (16) that it is incumbent on the employer to pay to the workman retrenchment compensation at the time when he was asked to go and not later. 25-F of the Act.The Supreme Court has held in National Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs. State of W. Bengal (16) that it is incumbent on the employer to pay to the workman retrenchment compensation at the time when he was asked to go and not later. In the present case, the impugned order of termination of the service of the petitioner, being in contravention of the provisions of sec. 25F of the Act, is invalid and void. 22. The learned Additional Advocate General also faintly suggested that the Irripation Department was not the employer of the petitioner within the meaning of the Act. Employer has been defined in sec. 2(g) of the Act as under: "2. (g). "Employer" means— (1) In relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf or where no authority is prescribed, the Head of the Department; (2) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the Chief Executive officer of that authority." 23. Now by any stretch of imagination it cannot be argued that the Irrigation Department, of which the petitioner was an employee, was not run by or under the authority of the State Government. The argument of the learned Additional Advocate General on this score is that the petitioner was posted in the Panchayat Samiti, Bhen-srodgarh by the order of his appointment (Ex. 1). I may observe in this respect that it is not the case of the State Government that the petitioner was not appointed by the State Government. Moreover, it is also apparent that his services were also terminated by the order of the Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department of the State Government (Ex. 2). As the petitioner was appointed by an officer of the State Government and his services were also terminated by an officer of the State Government it does not lie with the State Government to contend that the petitioner was not its employee. If the petitioner was not their employee, what business had the State Government to terminate his services? 2). As the petitioner was appointed by an officer of the State Government and his services were also terminated by an officer of the State Government it does not lie with the State Government to contend that the petitioner was not its employee. If the petitioner was not their employee, what business had the State Government to terminate his services? It was not at all material that the State Government after appointing the petitioner in its Irrigation Department, posted him in a Panchayat Samiti but merely because of such posting he did not cease to be an employee of the State Government. 24. The next submission made by the learned Additional Advocate General is that the present was a case of termination simpliciter in accordance with the service conditions of the petitioner and it was not a case of retrenchment at all. Sec. 2(oo) of the Act defines retrenchment as under: "2(oo) "Retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include— (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health." 25. I may mention here that in paras 5 and 6 of the writ petition the petitioner came with a definite case that he was retrenched along with two others, but this fact was not denied in the reply. On the other hand it was submitted by the respondents in their reply that the matter regarding retrenchment benefit may be examined by the Law Department for its applicability. The respondents also relied upon a circular dated 26th August, 1967 which directed the Administrative Department that while making fresh appointments, the retrenched employees who were appointed on or before October 1, 1966 should be given preference and the respondents further asserted in their reply that as the petitioner was appointed after October 1, 1966 i.e. on December 27, 1966, he was not entitled to such preference. This averment also goes to show that the respondents did not seriously contest the case of the petitioner that he was retrenched. Further by the order Ex. This averment also goes to show that the respondents did not seriously contest the case of the petitioner that he was retrenched. Further by the order Ex. 2 the services of 39 persons including the petitioner were terminated and it is not the case of the State Government that the whole-sale termination of the services of such a large number of persons employed on the post of Engineering Subordinates was made by way of simple termination. 26. It was also suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General that the case of the petitioner was not covered by sec. 25F of the Act but by sec. 25FFF of the Act. I may at once observe that no case of bonafide closure of the activities of the Irrigation Department of the State has been pleaded or made out on behalf of the respondents. Moreover, the procedure prescribed in sec. 25FFF of the Act was not followed in the present case and as such the said provision cannot be made applicable. 27. Another submission made by learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of the respondents is that the petitioner was offered at alternative post of work-charged supervisor by the order dated May 30, 1969 but he did not join and although his services were terminated by the order dated January 17, 1968 (Ex. 2) with effect from January 31, 1968 and payment of one months emoluments in terms of Sec. 23 A of the Rajasthan Service Rules was duly made and was accepted by him, yet the petitioner filed the present writ petition on October 29, 1969. It has been urged by the learned Additional Advocate General that by his conduct the petitioner was estopped from challenging the order of his termination (Ex. 2) and that the principles of waiver and acquiescence were applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon Andhra Laundry, Madras vs. Additional Labour Court, Madras (17). But that case was in respect of payment of closure compensation payable under Sec. 25FFF of the Act and is distinguishable from the present case which relates to the payment of retrenchment compensation. Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon Andhra Laundry, Madras vs. Additional Labour Court, Madras (17). But that case was in respect of payment of closure compensation payable under Sec. 25FFF of the Act and is distinguishable from the present case which relates to the payment of retrenchment compensation. As a matter of fact, Venkatadri J. of the Madras High Court himself, while deciding the aforesaid case, clarified the matter by making the following observations at page 360— "There seems to be a difference in the wording of the sections between retrenchment compensation and closure compensation. In the case of retrenchment, the parties cannot waive payment of compensation or notice; but it appears that the parties can, in the case of closure compensation, contract themselves out of the statute. This can be seen by looking into the provisions of some analogous statutes, where specific provision has been made that the parties cannot contract themselves out of the statute. For instance, in the Minimum Wages Act, Sec. 25 provides that any contract or agreement relinquishing or reducing the employees right to a minimum rate of wages is null and void. Similarly sec. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act provides that any contract or agreement whereby an employed person relinquishes any right conferred by that Act is null and void in so far as it purports to deprive him of such right Sec. 17 of the Workmens Compensation Act provides that any contract or agreement entered into by a workman with his employer relinquishing any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury arising out of or in the course of employment is null and void in so far as it purports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay compensation under the Act. Again, in the Payment of Bonus Act, S. 10-A says that every employer shall be bound to pay to every employee in an accounting year the minimum bonus whether there are profits in the account year or not But in the Industrial Disputes Act, as far as closure compensation is concerned, there appears to be no provision preventing the parties from contracting out of the statute." 28. However, learned counsel for the petitioner argued in this respect that as this Court decided in Viney Kumar Majoos case(l) that the retrenchment of the petitioner in that case was invalid because of the non-compliance of the conditions envisaged in sec. 25F of the Act, the petitioner hoped that the respondents would retrace their steps and would re-call the impugned order of termination of his services, which was similar to that passed in Viney Kumar Majoos case(l) and it was in this expectation that the petitioner waited, but as the respondents did not set aside his retrenchment he had to approach this Court. In my view if the petitioner did not join the post of a work-charged Engineering Subordinate offered to him by the respondents it cannot be inferred therefrom that the petitioner has waived or that he is estopped from challenging the impugned order of termination of his service. On the other hand, from the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner it appears that he was firm in his stand that the injustice done to him, on account of the order of termination of his services should be rectified. Moreover, it has not been disclosed by the respondents as to for what period the post of work-charged supervisor offered to the petitioner by them was going to last inasmuch as it was a temporary assignment relating to Famine Relief Works and for ought one knows, might be of a very short duration. The petitioners grievance could not have been satisfied by such an offer. 29. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Subong Tea Estate vs. Subong Tea Estate (18) that even the acceptance of retrenchment compensation by the concerned workman should not be held to create a bar against them from taking proceedings to challenge the invalidity of retrenchment, because if sec. 25F is not complied with there can be little doubt that the retrenchment is invalid. The petitioner was, therefore, justified in filing the present writ petition for the redress of his grievance and it could not be rejected for the aforesaid technical pleas. 30. Lastly it was argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under the Act which he should have pursued and according to him the present writ petition should be dismissed on this ground. 30. Lastly it was argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under the Act which he should have pursued and according to him the present writ petition should be dismissed on this ground. In N. Sundaramony vs. The State Bank of India, Kuzhithurai Branch(19) it has been held that where the breach of the provisions of sec. 25F of the Act is found, the impugned order is void in law and a writ petition is a proper remedy. Moreover, no such objection regarding the existence of an alternative remedy was raised by the respondents in their reply to the writ petition. As mentioned above, the writ petition was filed on 29-10-1969 and has been pending in this Court for the last 4 years. In my opinion, the objection, regarding the existence of an alternative remedy cannot be entertained at the fag and of the arguments, when the matter has been heard fully on merits. There is no doubt that the existence of an alternative remedy is an important consideration for the exercise of the discretion of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but the mere existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court. As I have found that the order Ex. 2 is patently erroneous on its very face and is void inasmuch as the provisions of sec. 25F of the Act have been completely ignored and the petitioner, though a workman the meaning of the Act, has not been paid any retrenchment compensation as envisaged under the aforesaid provision at the time of the termination of his services, the order of termination of his service, Ex. 2 cannot be allowed to stand. 31. I may also refer to the other ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner namely, that the order of his termination was also hit by the provisions of sec. 25-G of the Act. as also by Art. 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as persons junior to him have been retained in service while his services have been terminated by the impugned order Ex. 2. In this connection, the reply given by the learned Additional Advocate General appears to be well founded that the services of two of the persons complained of, namely Surendra Kumar and Dhillaram were terminated by the very same order Ex. 2. In this connection, the reply given by the learned Additional Advocate General appears to be well founded that the services of two of the persons complained of, namely Surendra Kumar and Dhillaram were terminated by the very same order Ex. 2 and that the third person Nasib Ali Khan, having joined the service on December 26, 1966 was senior to the petitioner. Thus the aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that persons junior to him were retained in service at the time when his services were terminated by the order Ex. 2 has no substance and there is thus no breach of the provisions of sec. 25-G of the Act or of Art.16 of the Constitution in this respect. 32. However, in view of the conclusion I have arrived at that the impugned order Ex. 2 was perse illegal and void because of non-compliance of the provisions of sec. 25-F of the Act, I allow the writ petition and quash the order of the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Rajasthan dated January 17, 1968 (Ex. 2) so far as the termination of the petitioners service is concerned. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents. Let an appropriate writ be issued.