Judgment :- 1. These Writ Appeals arise from the judgment of Poti, J. allowing Original Petition No. 4584 of 1971, P.C. Abraham v. State of Kerala and others. The judgment is reported in 1972 KLT. 165. Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972 is by the State of Kerala and the Director of Collegiate Education, respondents 1 and 2 in the said Original Petition and W. A. No. 77 of 1972 is by the 4th respondent therein. The petitioner in the Original Petition is the Ist respondent in Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972 and he is the 4th respondent in Writ Appeal No. 77 of 1972. Respondents 2 and 3 in Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972 are respondents 3 and 4 in the Original Petition, namely, The President, Managing Board, St. Joseph's College, Calicut, and V. P. Abdulla Koya Thangal, Senior Superintendent, St. Joseph's College, Devagiri, Calicut (appellant in Writ Appeal No. 77 of 1972). Respondents 1 to 3 in Writ Appeal No. 77 of 1972 are the State of Kerala, The Director of Collegiate Education and the President, Managing Board, St. Joseph's College, Calicut. 2. The short question that falls for consideration in these cases and the necessary facts for determining the question are these: The appellant in Writ Appeal No.77 of 1972, Abdulla Koya Thangal, who is the 3rd respondent in Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972, and the petitioner in the Original Petition, P.C. Abraham, the 1st respondent in Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972 and the 4th respondent in Writ Appeal No. 77 of 1972 were employees of the St. Joseph's College, Calicut. They were in the non-teaching staff of the College in the cadre of upper division clerks. Abdulla Koya Thangal was senior to P. C. Abraham. There were two vacant posts; one of Senior Superintendent and another of Head Accountant, in the College. Abdulla Koya Thangal did not possess the qualifications neither general nor the test qualifications prescribed by the State Government in what may be compendiously termed the grant-in-aid Code, containing conditions for recognition of Colleges for Grant-in-aid. This Code insisted on certain qualifications for the posts in the institutions and also fixed the staff pattern. This was for the purpose of recognition of the institutions and for the granting of aid. This Code insisted on certain qualifications for the posts in the institutions and also fixed the staff pattern. This was for the purpose of recognition of the institutions and for the granting of aid. Notwithstanding his lack of qualifications, Abdulla Koya Thangal was appointed by the management by a memo dated 30 71971 as a Senior Superintendent with effect from 9 21971 and P. C. Abraham was on the same date promoted as Head Accountant also with effect from 9-2-1971. The Head Accountant was on a lower grade of pay, Rs. 175-350, while the Senior Superintendent's scale was Rs. 310-500. Feeling aggrieved, P. C. Abraham made representations to the Director of Collegiate Education and the Minister for Education. The State Government on getting these representations deemed it fit to grant exemption from the qualifications insisted upon by the Grant-in-aid Code so far as Abdulla Koya Thangal was concerned. The order passed by the State Government is Ext. P9 which is in these terms: "Government are pleased to grant exemption to Sri V. P. Abdulla Koya Thangal. Senior most Upper Division Clerk, St. Joseph's College, Devagiri, from minimum qualification to hold the post of Senior Superintendent in the same College." It was this order that was challenged before Poti J., on two grounds; infringement of Art.14 of the Constitution, and mala fides. The learned judge did not express any opinion on the ground of mala fides but found that there has been an infringement of Art.14 of the Constitution and so quashed Ext. P9. 3. It was not urged before us by P. C. Abraham that the quashing of the order Ext. P9 should be sustained on the ground of mala fides. The only question arising for decision in these Writ Appeals is whether the order Ext. P9 is liable to be set aside on the ground that it is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. 4. Counsel for the appellants in Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972, the State of Kerala, and the Director of Collegiate Education, contended that P. C. Abraham, the petitioner in the Original Petition cannot sustain a petition under Art.226 Of the Constitution on the ground that the terms in the Grant-in-aid Code had not been applied uniformly to the educational institutions within its purview. The submission was that the rales contained in the Code including those relating to the staff pattern and the qualifications are not statutory rules and such rules were framed merely for the purpose of stipulating the conditions on which the State Government would grant recognition and aid to the educational institutions coming within the purview of the Code and that no private citizen though an employee of one of those institutions, would be entitled to complain about the infringement of those rules by the management. If that be so, it was urged that no such employee can complain that the Government had not enforced those rules as against any particular educational institution and that this was discriminatory. The relationship between the employee and the private educational institution was purely contractual and even assuming that the stipulations in the Grant-in-aid Code can at least be impliedly taken to have been the terms of the contract between the employer and employee, any violation thereof Would only be the violation of a contractual right for the redressal of which no writ would lie. It was pointed out that the appointment was made by the management against the terms of the Grant-in-aid Code and the breach was therefore committed by the management and the further fact that the State Government by Ext. P9 order exempted Abdulla Koya Thangal from the qualifications prescribed by the Grant-in-aid Code does not alter the legal position. 5. The Grant-in-aid Code did not contain statutory rules. The orders which constitute this Code were not passed under any statute. They were merely executive or administrative directions. These facts were not disputed before us. Even when an Ordinance issued under a statute by the University in regard to similar matters had been violated by the State Government, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1970 (1) S.C.C. 75) that "The field of operation of this Ordinance appears to be restricted to the question of affiliation of the colleges concerned with the Rajasthan University. It is noteworthy that the University has not through fit to object to these appointments. If there is any violation of a provision of this Ordinance then that may appropriately be taken into account by the Rajasthan University for the purpose of withdrawing or refusing to continue affiliation of the colleges in question. It is noteworthy that the University has not through fit to object to these appointments. If there is any violation of a provision of this Ordinance then that may appropriately be taken into account by the Rajasthan University for the purpose of withdrawing or refusing to continue affiliation of the colleges in question. But clearly that would not render the impugned appointments null and void; a fortiori that cannot confer any right on Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi to approach the High Court by means of petition for writ of Quo-Warranto to challenge the appointments of these three persons." We think that the principle of this decision must govern the matter though those observations were made in a case where the petitioner under Art.226 of the Constitution and the respondents therein who were preferred in the matter of appointment were governed by statutory rules framed by the State Government under Art.309 of the Constitution. The principle settled is that the regulations contained in the Ordinance have only restricted application; that they regulate the conditions for the grant of affiliation of the Colleges concerned to the University. Similarly the Grant-in-aid Code is restricted to the purpose of recognition of and grant of aid by the State Government. If the University in that case could have abstained from taking any action to dis-affiliate, the State Government could have kept quiet in regard to the appointment of Abdulla Koya Thangal as Senior Superintendent. In such a situation, P. C. Abraham could not have approached this Court for any relief. The fact that the State Government went further and exempted the 4th respondent from the qualifications stipulated in the Grant-in-aid Code, 4s only an acceptance of the stand taken by the educational institution. This will not better the position of P. C. Abraham. 6. the decision of the Supreme Court in Kumari Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School and another (AIR. 1971 S.C.1920) is also in point. This will not better the position of P. C. Abraham. 6. the decision of the Supreme Court in Kumari Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School and another (AIR. 1971 S.C.1920) is also in point. The Court observed that: "The enforcement of Part II rules for recognition and aid to private schools is a matter between the Government and the management, and a third party, such as a teacher aggrieved by some order of the management cannot derive from the rules any enforceable right against the management on the ground of a breach or non-compliance of any of the rules." It was held in the same case that Part II rules "cannot be said to be statutory rules framed under S.56"...So it was further observed that: "The result is that the relations between the management and the teachers even in a recognised elementary school have to be regarded as being governed by the contracts of employment and the terms and conditions contained therein. Part II Rules, which cannot be regarded as having the status of statutory rules made under S.56, cannot be said to have the effect of controlling the relations between the management of a school and its teachers or the terms and conditions of employment of such teachers or abrogating the law of master and servant which ordinarily would govern those relations. If such rules were to lay down conditions, the Government can insist that satisfaction of such conditions would be condition precedent to obtaining recognition and aid and that a breach or non-compliance of such conditions would entail either the denial or withdrawal of recognition and aid. The management of a school, therefore, would commit a breach or non-compliance of the conditions laid down in the rules on pain of deprivation of recognition and aid. The rules thus govern the terms on which the Government would grant recognition and aid and the Government can enforce these rules upon the management. But the enforcement of such rules is a matter between the Government and the management, and a third party, such as a teacher' aggrieved by some order of the management, cannot derive from the rules any enforceable right against the management on the ground of a breach or non-compliance of any of the rules." We think, the principle of these decisions must govern the. State as well. State as well. The matter has again been dealt with at some length in Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College and another (AIR. 1972 S. C. 1450). A statute framed under the Lucknow University Act came up for consideration before the Court. It was interpreted to mean that it only provided that the terms and conditions mentioned therein have to be incorporated in the contract to be entered into between the college and the lecturer concerned and that it did not say that the terms and conditions have any legal force until and unless they are embodied in the contract. It was therefore held that without the contract they have no vitality and confer no legal rights. Reference was made to the decision in S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra (1964-3 SCR. 55 = AIR. 1964 S.C.1680) wherein the Supreme Court had formulated exceptions to the general rule that when there is a termination of a contract of service, a declaration that the contract of service still subsisted would not be made in these terms: "But this rule is subject to certain well recognised exceptions. It is open to the Courts, in an appropriate case, to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of An. 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly, under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act, the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by the statute even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do." 7. Referring to the third exception formulated, Mathew J., speaking for the Court, observed thus: "13. Besides, in order that the third exception to the general rule that no writ will lie to quash an order terminating a contract of service, albeit illegally, as stated in 1964-3 SCR. 55 = AIR. 1964 SC. Referring to the third exception formulated, Mathew J., speaking for the Court, observed thus: "13. Besides, in order that the third exception to the general rule that no writ will lie to quash an order terminating a contract of service, albeit illegally, as stated in 1964-3 SCR. 55 = AIR. 1964 SC. 1680 might apply, it is necessary that the order must be the order of a statutory body acting in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. The college, or the Managing Committee in question, is not a statutory body and so the argument of Mr. Setalvad that the case in hand will fall under the third exception cannot be accepted. The contention of counsel that this Court has sub silentio sanctioned the issue of a writ under Art.226 to quash an order terminating services of a teacher passed by college similarly situate in (1965) 2 SCR. 713 and, therefore, the fact that the college or the managing committee was not a statutory body was no hindrance to the High Court issuing the writ prayed for by the appellant has no merit as this Court expressly stated in the judgment that no such contention was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court." We are not concerned in this case with this aspect of the matter, for, the writ in this case is directed against the Government and the prayer is for quashing Ext. P9 order passed by the State Government, the first appellant in Writ Appeal No. 58 of 1972. We therefore express no opinion on this larger question and for that reason we have dismissed the petition, C.M.P. No. 10452 of 1974 moved by the All Kerala Private College Teachers' Association as the contention that the petitioner wishes to raise that a writ would issue against a private management does not arise in this case. 8. Assuming that for any reason the order Ext. P9, exempting Abdulla Koya Thangal from possessing the qualifications prescribed for the post of Senior Superintendent, can be quashed, without the additional relief of setting aside the appointment made by the management of the said Abdulla Koya Thangal as Senior Superintendent, P. C. Abraham would not be benefited. 8. Assuming that for any reason the order Ext. P9, exempting Abdulla Koya Thangal from possessing the qualifications prescribed for the post of Senior Superintendent, can be quashed, without the additional relief of setting aside the appointment made by the management of the said Abdulla Koya Thangal as Senior Superintendent, P. C. Abraham would not be benefited. And from what we have stated above, it is clear that no relief can be granted to P. C. Abraham as against the management, even if they had violated the terms contained in the Grant-in-aid Code. The quashing of Ext. P9 order would, therefore, be only of academic value. This Court will not exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution in such circumstances. This is yet another reason for refusing the prayer for quashing Ext. P9 order. 9. The point urged before us as was indicated in the Order of Reference seems to have not been taken before the learned judge and naturally therefore, not considered in the judgment under appeal. The question being one of law based on admitted facts, we have dealt with it and in the light of the discussion, the petition under Art.226 of the Constitution by P. C. Abraham cannot be sustained. We therefore allow these Writ Appeals, set aside the judgment under appeal and dismiss the Original Petition. We direct the parties to bear their costs throughout.