GOVINDA BHAT, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition by a dealer under S. 23 (1) of the Mysore sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter palled the Act) and it is directed against the order of the Mysore Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, dated 2-3-1973 made in STA. 756 of 1972. ( 2 ) THE short question that arises for decision is whether the petitioner's appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes against the order of assessment made oh him by the Additional Commercial Tax officer, V Circle, Bangalore, was within time. ( 3 ) THE petitioner is a dealer registered under the Act. By the assessment order dt. 31-3-1971 made by the Addl. Commercial Tax Officer, V circle, Bangalore a sum of Rs. 6,526 was assessed as tapx payable for the period 1-4-69 to 31-3-70. The assessment was made on the best of judgment basis after rejecting the return submitted by the petitioner. The notice of demand was served on him on 24-11-1971. He applied on 29-12-1971 for a ccpy of the assessment order which had not been furnished to him by the assessing authority. The copy of the assessment order was furnished to the petitioner on 21-1-1972 and he preferred the appeal on 2-2-1972 before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under S. 20 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dismissed the petitioner's appeal on two preliminary grounds viz. , (i) that the appeal had been preferred beyond the period of thirty days from the date of service of notice of demand and (ii) that the appeal was not accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment of tax not disputed in the appeal. Against the said order the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the Tribunal which reversed the decision of the Deputy Commissioner on the second ground, but affirmed his decision on the first ground of the appeal being barred by limitation. Aggrieved by that order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition. ( 5 ) THE Act confers on a dealer aggrieved by any order of assessment made thereunder the right of two appeals to two statutory authorities named under the Act and ultimately the remedy of approaching this Court by way of a revision petition. Aggrieved by that order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition. ( 5 ) THE Act confers on a dealer aggrieved by any order of assessment made thereunder the right of two appeals to two statutory authorities named under the Act and ultimately the remedy of approaching this Court by way of a revision petition. S. 20 is the provision which confers the right of a first appeal to the Deputy Commissioner where the order of assessment is made by a Commercial Tax Officer. Sub-sec. (2)of S. 20 prescribes the period of limitation for an appeal under sub-sec (1) of that sections sub-sec. (4) of that section states that the appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. Sub-sees. (1) and (2) of Section 20 of the Act read thus :" Appeals :- (1) Any person objecting to an order affecting him passed under the provisions of this Act by,- (1) an Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, may appeal to the Assistant commissioner : and (ii) a Commercial Tax Officer, may appeal to the Deputy Commissioner. (2) The appeal shall be preferred within thirty days,- (i) in respect of an order of assessment, from the date on which the notice of assessment was served on the appellant, and (ii) in respect of any other order, from the date on which the order was communicated to the appellant : provided that the appellate authority may admit an appeal preferred after the period of thirty days aforesaid if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period. (underlining italics is ours): it is clear from a reading of the above provision that the period of limitation for a first appeal under the Act is thirty days from the date on which the notice of assessment was served on the assessee. Neither the expression, 'notice of assessment' nor the word- 'assessment' has been defined under the Act. The contention of Sri A. V. . Albal, learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the clause, 'the date on which the notice of assessment was served on the appellant' occurring in Sub-sec. Neither the expression, 'notice of assessment' nor the word- 'assessment' has been defined under the Act. The contention of Sri A. V. . Albal, learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the clause, 'the date on which the notice of assessment was served on the appellant' occurring in Sub-sec. (2) (i) of the Act means the date on which the assessment order recording the reasons for such assessment is served on the assessee and it is not the date when only the notice in Form 6 unaccompanied by the assessment order recording the reasons for such assessment is served on the assessee. Sri chandrakantaraj Urs, learned Senior High Court Government Advocate contended that the notice of assessment has been prescribed in Form 6 of the Rules framed under the Act and the limitation for an appeal under s. 20 commences from the date on which the notice in Form 6 is served and that there is no provision either under the Act or the Rules, requiring the furnishing of the assessment order giving reasons for such assessment along with Form 6 notice. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied on an earlier judgment of this Court in Giriyappa Setty and Sons v. State of Mysore, (1966) 2 Mys. L. J. 689=1966 Kar. L. J. 133=19 STC. 197, delivered by Hegde, J. That decision no doubt, supports the contention of Sri Urs. In the said cage notice in Form 6 had been served on the assessee en 13-8-1958 and the appeal was filed only on 28-2-1963, nearly five year after the service of notice in Form 6. After setting out the notice in Form 6, this is what Hegde, J. stated. ""that notice purports to be a notice of final annual assessment and demand. No other form entitled as 'notice of assessment' was brought to our notice. In our opinion, Form 6 combines a 'notice of assessment' as well as a 'notice of demand'. That being so, the sarvice of notice in Form 6 must be considered as a service of a 'notice of assessment' as contemplated by Section 20 (1 ). ( 6 ) THERE is no provision in the aforementioned Act or the rules framed thereunder requiring the assessing authority to serve a copy of his order of assessment on the assessee. If the assessee required a copy. ( 6 ) THERE is no provision in the aforementioned Act or the rules framed thereunder requiring the assessing authority to serve a copy of his order of assessment on the assessee. If the assessee required a copy. of that order, rule 22 provides that he should be given a copy of the same on an application for the starting point of limitation for filing an appeal under S. 20 is not the service of a copy of the order of assessment, but the service of a 'notice of assessment'. Hence, the appellant's apppeal before the Deputy Commissioner was clearly barred by time. Since the decision in Giriyappa Setty's case (1) concludes the question raised before us, ordinarily we should have referred the question to a Full bench as in our opinion, the said decision has not taken a correct view of the law. But it is unnecessary to refer the question to a Full Bench, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court tp which we shall presently refer. ( 7 ) BEFORE the decision in Giriyappa Setty's case (1) another Bench of which Hegde, J. himselt was a member had taken the view (vide CRP. 401 (60 decided on 10-1-62) that the expression 'notice of assessment' in S. 20 should be construed as an 'order of assessment'. The; earlier decision however, was explained by the learned Judge on the ground that it had proceeded on the basis of certain admissions made by the Counsel for the revenue. When there was an earlier decision by a Bench, the proper course was to refer the question to a Full Bench, had Hegde, J. doubted the correctness of his own earlier decision. ( 8 ) IT is a settled rule of construction of statutes that the provisions of an Act are not tp be construed with reference to the Rules made thereunder or the Forms prescribed by the Rules. On the contrary, the Rules have to be construed with reference to the provisions of the Act under which they are made. When the Legislature enacted S. 20 of the Act conferring the right of appeal to an aggrieved assessee and also prescribed a period of limitation thereunder, it did have before it Form 6. Therefore, it was not right tp construe the provisions of S. 20 with reference to a form of notice prescribed under the Rules. When the Legislature enacted S. 20 of the Act conferring the right of appeal to an aggrieved assessee and also prescribed a period of limitation thereunder, it did have before it Form 6. Therefore, it was not right tp construe the provisions of S. 20 with reference to a form of notice prescribed under the Rules. ( 9 ) THE Bench which decided Giriyappa Setty's case (1) did npt notice s. 12 of the Act which throws light on what was intended by the expression 'notice of assessment'. S. 12 occurs in Chapter V under the heading "returns, assessment, payment, recovery, composition and collection of tax". Sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 provides for submission of returns by every dealer Sub-sec. (2) provides that if the assessing authority is satisfied that any return submitted under sub-sec. (1) is correct and complete, he shall assess the dealer on the basis thereof. Sub-sec. (3) provides "that if no return is submitted by the dealer under sub-sec. (1) before the date prescribed or specified in that behalf, or if the return submitted by him appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the assessing authority shall assess the dealer to the best of his judgment recording the reasons for such assessment. " (underlining (italics) is ours ). Assessment contemplated under S. 12 is one either under sub-sec. (2) or under sub-sec. (3 ). The assessment under sub-sec. (2) is where the assessing, authority accepts the return submitted by the dealer. The assessment tinder sub-sec. (3) is one where the assessing authority does not accept the return as correct and complete. In an assessment under sub-section (3) the assessing authority is required to record the reasons for such assessment; he may not accept the turn-over submitted or the rate of tax in respect of the goods concerned. If the dealer is not satisfied with such an assessment order he has the right of appeal provided under the Act. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 20 to which reference has been made in the earlier part of this order states that the appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. In the form of appeal prescribed the appellant has to show the disputed turn-over and where the rate of tax is disputed, such rate. He has also to state the grounds of appeals. In the form of appeal prescribed the appellant has to show the disputed turn-over and where the rate of tax is disputed, such rate. He has also to state the grounds of appeals. The 'assessment' referred to in clause (i) of sub-sec (3) of S. 20 is obviously the assessment made under sub-sec, (3) of S. 12 of the Act. That 'assessment' ought to contain the reasons for making it. Before the aggrieved assessee could prefer any appeal raising the grounds of appeal in the appeal petition, it is common sense that tells that he should know the reasons for the 'assessment' which he challenges in the appeal. ( 10 ) A question arose before the Supreme Court as to what constitutes 'notice' of an award for the purpose of making an application for reference to the Civil Court under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. under S. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector, after enquiry, makes his award. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 12 of the said Act requires that the collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by the representative when the award is made. Where any person interested does not accept the award, he has to make an application to the Collector requiring him that the matter be referred for determination by the Court. The proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that every such application shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award ' where the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award and in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the 'notice' from the Collector under sub-sec. (2) of s. 12 or within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award whichever period first expired. ( 11 ) IN Harish Chanra v. Dy. (2) of s. 12 or within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award whichever period first expired. ( 11 ) IN Harish Chanra v. Dy. L. A. Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 , Gajendragadkar, J. , (as he then was) who delivered the judgment of the Bench said: " Where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order, by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the collector under S. I2 oi the L. A. Act, 1894, either actual or construc- tive is an essential requirement of fair-play and natural justice. Therefore the expression 'the date of the award' used in proviso (b) to s. 18 (2) of the Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. ( 12 ) IT will be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collector's award used in the proviso to Sec. 15 in a literal or mechanical way. " in state of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604 , after reiteraitinng the view of Gajendragadkar, J. , S. K. Das, J. said : " Knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. " ( 13 ) AS stated earlier, the object of prescribing a period of thirty days for preferring an appeal under S. 20 of the Act is that the aggrieved assessee should have sufficient time to prepare his appeal petition, and that he should know the reasons recorded by the assessing authority against which he has to raise appropriate grounds in the appeal petition. In our judgment, the expression 'notice of assessment' occurring in S. 20 (2) (i) of the Act means, knowledge of the assessment order recording the reasons for such assessment. It is only when a copy of the 'notice of the assessment order is served' on the assessee. it can be said that he has notice of assessment. In our judgment, the expression 'notice of assessment' occurring in S. 20 (2) (i) of the Act means, knowledge of the assessment order recording the reasons for such assessment. It is only when a copy of the 'notice of the assessment order is served' on the assessee. it can be said that he has notice of assessment. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, the period of limitation for an appeal has to be computed from the date on which the notice of assessment order was served on the petitioner. With respect, the decision in Giriyappa Settys's' case (1) does not lay down the correct law. For the reason stated above, we reverse the order of the Tribunal on the question of limitation and hold that the petitioner's appeal before the deputy Commissioner was in time. The Tribunal has disposed of the appeal merely on the question of limitation, and has not considered the merits of the petitioner's appeal. The Deputy Commissioner has also not considered the merits of the appeal. Therefore, the matter has to go back to the Deputy Commissioner. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Deputy Commissioner to re-admit the petitioner's appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law. There will be ne order as to costs. --- *** --- .