JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - Originally twenty-two accused persons were tried under divers sections of Indian Penal Code. Five of them have been acquitted and the rest, who are seventeen in number, have preferred this appeal. Appellants 1 to 17 are respectively accused nos, 1, 2, 4 to 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 19 to 22 in the Court of session. 2. Appellant No. 1 was charged u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and has been convicted thereunder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. In addition, he had also been charged under Sections 148 and 337, Indian Penal Code jointly with other accused persons and was also convicted thereunder but no separate sentence has been passed against him. Appellants 2 to 17 were, as indicated above charged under Sections 148 and 337, Indian Penal Code who have been convicted under Sections 147 and 336, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to R.T. for two months each on each count, sentences to run concurrently. Appellants 14 and 16 were charged u/s 302/109, Indian Penal Code but have been acquitted of that charge. Similarly, Appellants 2, 7 and 17 were charged u/s 436, Indian Penal Code who have also been acquitted of that charge. 3. The Appellant and their co-accused who have been acquitted in the Court below all belong to Harijan sahi of village Balichaturi under the jurisdiction of Choudwar Police Station. There was a prevailing party faction amongst the Harijan residents of that Sahi regarding a dispute relating to Akhadaghar (club house). On account of this dispute, the Akhadaghar had been closed down for some time During the night of 7-5-1968 Appellant No. 2 was sleeping in the Akhadaghar. P.w. 7 who belongs to the counter party of the accused persons, seeing this, protested and a quarrel ensued between them. Hearing this, Appellants 3, 4, 7, 13 and 16 came up to the place of quarrel and assaulted P.W. 7 his father Bhima and P.W. 9 Gandharba Samal as a result of which all of them were injured. P.w. 14 carried these injured persons in his rickshaw to the Choudwar Police Station despite protest from the Appellants. P.w. 7 made a station diary entry (Ex. 19) at Choudwar Police Station, and all these injured persons were medically examined by the doctor of E.S.I. Hospital on Police requisition. The injury reports issued by the doctor are Exts. P.w. 14 carried these injured persons in his rickshaw to the Choudwar Police Station despite protest from the Appellants. P.w. 7 made a station diary entry (Ex. 19) at Choudwar Police Station, and all these injured persons were medically examined by the doctor of E.S.I. Hospital on Police requisition. The injury reports issued by the doctor are Exts. 4, 5 and 6 which relate respectively to P.W. 7. Bhima Samal and P.W. 9. This incident of the night of 7-5-1968 which is an off shoot of party faction provided an immediate motive for the occurrence of 8-5-1968 following. On 8-5-1968 at about 3 or 3.30 p.m. some of the accused persons, including Appellant No. 2 had congregated near the house of Appellant No. 4. At that time they saw P.W. 4 and 14 coming in a rickshaw and started abusing them who also abused in retaliation, both in relation to the incident of previous night. Then the accused persons chased PWs. 4 and 14 by pelting stones. Leaving the rickshaw in front of the house of P.W. 11, P.W. 14 ran away towards the house of one Doli Samal, whereas P.W. 4 ran towards his house. This first batch of the accused persons chased P.W. 4 up to his house and continued pelting stones at his house. P.w. 4 for some time retaliated by pelting stones back at them. At that juncture of time on hearing this hulla, the second batch of accused persons; including Appellant No. 1, came up to the house of P.W. 4 from the western side armed with knife, lath is and stones. They also joined the first batch in pelting stones at the house of P.W. 4, in consequence whereof P.W. 1, father of P.W. 4 and the deceased Puni Bewa were injured P.W. 4 out of fear entered his bed room and closed the door. Seeing this, Appellants 14 and 16 instigated Appellant No. 1 and some others to force their entry into the house and drag out P.W. 4 for assault. At this, Appellant No. 1 advanced to enter the house when the deceased Puni Bewa, mother of P.W. 1 and grand-mother of P.W. 1, physically barred his entry and hurled abusive words at him. At this, Appellant No. 1 advanced to enter the house when the deceased Puni Bewa, mother of P.W. 1 and grand-mother of P.W. 1, physically barred his entry and hurled abusive words at him. Thereupon Appellant No. 1 cut the throat of deceased Puni Bewa with the knife held by him in consequence whereof the deceased fell down unconscious in a pool of blood. Thereupon, Appellants 27 and 17 and two or three others went in search of P.W. 14 towards his house and thinking that he was inside his house, set fire to it and then left. The house was completely burnt down. After the accused persons had left his place, P.W. 4 came out. P. ws. 1 and 2 immediately left for Choudwar Police Station where P.W. 1 lodged the F.I.R. (Ex. 20) at 8 p. m. on the very day of occurrence, i.e. 8-5-1968. 4. The Officer-in-Charge of Choudwar Police Station at the time (P.W.16) gut the F.I.R. recorded by one A.S.I., K.C. Das (Ex. 20), registered the case and took up investigation. He immediately examined P.W. 1 at the police station and proceeded to the spot in a police jeep at 8-30 p. m. accompanied by his A.S.I. and staff. On the way he met the deceased being carried in a rickshaw by P.W. 3 another son of P.W. 1, P.W. 12 and one Udia Bewa. He sent Puni Bewa, P.W. 1 and P.W. 12 to the E.S.I. Hospital for medical examination. They were examined by the doctor P.W. 5. He gave injury reports Exts. 2 and 3, respectively in respect of PWs. 1 and 12 and after giving first aid treatment to the deceased referred her to the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital, Cuttack. The deceased expired on her way to the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital and the dead body was brought back to the police station. In the meantime, P.W. 16 went to the village of occurrence, carried out some investigation in course of which he visited the house of P.W. 1 and found his front courtyard covered with stones and a patch of blood mark just below his thatch in front of the P.W. 4's room. He found a damaged rickshaw at a distance of 8".6" from the blood patch. He found the house of Rama (deceased), brother of P.W. 14, situated to the south-east of P.W. 1's house, facing towards north, completely gutted. He found a damaged rickshaw at a distance of 8".6" from the blood patch. He found the house of Rama (deceased), brother of P.W. 14, situated to the south-east of P.W. 1's house, facing towards north, completely gutted. That was a single house having no other house adjacent or contiguous to it, though the houses of P.W. 12 and of Doli Samal are situated at a distance towards its west. He found near the site of the burnt house half burnt straw, ashes, broken earthen pots and paddy grains in half burnt condition lying scattered about in the courtyard of the "house. He also found stones lying scattered in the village Danda extending from the Akhadaghar on the east to the house of Appellant No. 1 on the west covering a distance of about 300 yards. The houses of P.W. 11 and P.W. 1 are intervened by village Danda which was also covered with brickbats. A cycle rickshaw belonging to P.W. 11 was found lying upset and damaged in front of his house. The front courtyard of the house of one Murali Samal situated to the west of P.W. 11's house was also found filled with brickbats. He searched for the accused persons in the village twice that night, once before midnight and again after midnight but found them absent, He then recorded the statements of PWs. 2. 3 and 4. seized some blood stained earth and some stones lying in front of P.W. 1's house under seizure list Ex.9, some ashes and half burnt straw from the burnt house of Rama, brother of P.W. 14, under seizure list Ex.12, the damaged rickshwa from the front courtyard of P.W. 11 under seizure list Ex.10, and some stones from the village path extending from the Akhadaghar to the house of accused Karuni under seizure list Ex.11. He searched the houses of Appellants 1 and 2 during their absence but found nothing incriminating. He heard at the village that Puni Bewa had succumbed to her injuries and that her dead body was lying at the police station. He, therefore, posted his constable in the village to search for the accused persons and to be on the look out for them and returned to the police station at 7 a. m, on 9-5-1968 and held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and prepared inquest report (Ex. 17). He, therefore, posted his constable in the village to search for the accused persons and to be on the look out for them and returned to the police station at 7 a. m, on 9-5-1968 and held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and prepared inquest report (Ex. 17). At 7-30 a. m. he sent the dead body to Cuttack Medical College Hospital for postmortem examination. At 8-30 a. m. of 9-5-1968 the Appellant No. 2 came to the police station and lodged a counter F.I.R. relating to this very occurrence. P.w. 16, on its basis registered P.S. Case No. 61 of 1968, and also investigated it. He found some injuries on the person of Appellant No. 2 and took him to E.S.I. Cottage Hospital, Choudwar, got him medically examined and took him back to the police station and arrested him. Shortly thereafter Appellants 1, 3, 5 and 7 were produced before him by a constable. He examined them and also arrested them at 11 a. m. that day, and then proceeded to the village and arrived there at 12-30 p. m. and immediately searched for the remaining accused persons but found them absent. Sometimes thereafter, Appellants 4. 6, 8, 10 and some other accused persons were produced before him at the village whom he examined and arrested at 5.30 p. m. On 10-5-1968, he forwarded the arrested accused persons to the Court of the S.D.O.. Cuttack at 9 a. m. and left for the village where he examined PWs. 9, 12, 13, 14 and others. He continued searching for the remaining accused persons including Appellants 9 and 11 to 17 not only in the village of occurrence but also in other villages where they were reported to be hiding but could not find them till the morning of the 12th. On 12-5-1968 while he was at the P.S. Appellant No. 11 along with another accused since acquitted, were produced before him and arrested and forwarded to the Court of S.D.O.. Cuttack on 13-5-1968. The Appellants 9 and 12 to 17 could not be apprehended till 16-5-1968 despite intense search. On 20-5-1968 Appellant No. 16 appeared before him with his surrender certificate from the Court. On being transferred, he handed over the charge of investigation to his successor, P.W. 6 who, after completing whatever was left of the investigation submitted charge-sheet. 5. The Appellants 9 and 12 to 17 could not be apprehended till 16-5-1968 despite intense search. On 20-5-1968 Appellant No. 16 appeared before him with his surrender certificate from the Court. On being transferred, he handed over the charge of investigation to his successor, P.W. 6 who, after completing whatever was left of the investigation submitted charge-sheet. 5. Both this case and the counter case were tried together. The counter case, in which most of the PWs. were accused persons ended in acquittal and, it is said that no appeal has been filed from that order of acquittal. That acquittal therefore, has become final. The present case having ended in conviction as aforesaid, the present appeal has been filed. 6. All the Appellants have denied their complicity in the offences charged against them. The specific plea of Appellants 4, 16. 17 and of two other accused persons, since acquitted, is one of alibi. The defence plea of the other Appellants identical with the story related in the F.I.R. of the counter case (Ex. A). The defence story is to the following effect. On 7-5-1968 at about 12 noon Appellant no 2 was sleeping in the Akhadaghar. One Dullav Samal, son of Doli Samal was being chased by some people having committed theft of mango. In fleeing from this pursuit, he accidentally trade upon the sleeping body of Appellant No. 2, who assaulted him. For this there was a quarrel between him and the mother of the boy. On 8-5-1968 Appellant No. 2 had been to village Basti for purchase of rice, but as rice was not available he returned home. On the way, he met PWs. 4 and 14. The former threw a stone at him which struck his hand and in consequence whereof he fell down. Then P.W. 4 grabbed him and along with P.W. 14 first assaulted him with hands and legs. Subsequently, P.W. 14 dealt a knife blow which was aimed at his neck, but due to Appellant No. 2 swerving his head in the nick of time, struck him in his cheek. Then PWs. 4, 14 and other persons of their group' pelted stones at his house and came to the house of P.W. 1. At that time a rumour was spread that Appellant No. 2 had succumbed to his injuries inflicted on him by P.W. 14. Then PWs. 4, 14 and other persons of their group' pelted stones at his house and came to the house of P.W. 1. At that time a rumour was spread that Appellant No. 2 had succumbed to his injuries inflicted on him by P.W. 14. Hearing this, P.W. 12 handed over match box to P.W. 14 asking him to set fire to the house belonging to his late brother Rama Samal. At that time the deceased, who was a blind old beggar woman was living in the premises of that house. On hearing this proposal to set fire to the house, she protested. Then P.W. 1 directed P.W. 14 to kill her. At this P.W. 4 dragged the deceased to his compound and there pressed her to the ground while P.W. 14 cut her throat with a knife. Murder and arson were resorted to on the spur of the moment with the apparent object of falsely implicating the accused persons and thereby avoiding the anticipated charge of the supposed murder of Appellant No. 2 whose death had been rumoured at that time. 7. Whether the defence story is true or not, which will be considered in its proper place later on, it 'corroborates two facts proved by the prosecution, viz., that there was party faction amongst the residents of Harijan Sahi of Balichaturi and that there was some incident on 7-5-1968 which constituted the immediate motive for the occurrence of 8-5-1968. 8. It is also admitted by the defence that the deceased Puni Bewa was murdered on 8-5-1968. under the eyes of P.W. 4's room inside the front courtyard of his father's (P.W.1) house. The doctor's evidence fully corroborates that her death was homicidal. P.w. 5 who first examined her at the E S.I. Cottage Hospital, Choudwar at 11-50 p. m. on 8-5-1968 was of opinion that the neck injury could be caused by knife at one stroke. He found another simple injury, a linear and lacerated bleeding wound with clots of bleeding of the size of about 1" x 1" x superficial on the right big toe extending from the crease joining big toe with the second toe dorsally upwards and backwards, which, according to him, could have been caused by brickbats. He was positive that after injury No. 1 the deceased was destained to die and medical aid could only continue her life for some hours. He was positive that after injury No. 1 the deceased was destained to die and medical aid could only continue her life for some hours. P.w. 10 is the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination. He corroborated P.W. 5 fully and has asserted that the injuries were antemortem and homicidal and that the neck injury was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause her death. He denied the suggestion that the neck injury could be the result of a suicidal act. Death was undoubtedly homicidal. Similarly it appears from the evidence of P.W. 16 and also admitted by the defence that the house of Rama Samal, brother of P.W. 14 was set en fire by human agency. The dispute is as to the identity of that agency. So also, pelting of stones has been admitted by both sides. Each party implicates the other in this 'act. Pelting of stones was indiscriminate and it is alleged that PWs. 1, 12 and the deceased were injured by such pelting. The only question again is which person is the true version. 9. Before dealing with the evidence on record in determining whether all or any of the charges have been substantially established against the Appellants, a point was raised that as a result of acquittal in the counter case, the defence plea must be discarded as false and cannot be entertained and considered in this case at all. For this reliance was placed in the case of Pritam Singh and Another Vs. The State of Punjab where it has been held: The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim 'res judicata pro veritate accipitur' is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. In this case prosecution was launched on the basis of charge of murder and the murder is stated to have been committed with the aid of fire arm. The prosecution also initiated a separate case u/s 19(f) of the Arms Act or illegal possession of fire arm. This case ended in acquittal. In this case prosecution was launched on the basis of charge of murder and the murder is stated to have been committed with the aid of fire arm. The prosecution also initiated a separate case u/s 19(f) of the Arms Act or illegal possession of fire arm. This case ended in acquittal. In the murder case the question was whether the effect of acquittal in the Arms Act case would debar the prosecution from leading evidence as to possession of the firm arm by the accused. It was held that the possession of that revolver was a fact in issue which had to be established by the prosecution before he could be convicted of the offence u/s 19(f). That fact having been found against the prosecution could not be proved against the accused in the murder case. The evidence against the accused in the murder case was to be considered regardless of the evidence of' recovery of the revolver from the accused. Here the rule was applied against the prosecution and the role of the prosecution and the accused was the same in both the cases. The principle laid down in this Supreme Court case has been referred to as a rule of issue-estoppel in a criminal trial in a subsequent Supreme Court case Manipur Administration v. Bira Singh 1965 S.C.D. 8. Here it is said: The rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of Section 403(2). The rule is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit. The rule does not introduce any variation in the Code of Criminal Procedure either in investigation, enquiry or trial. The rule is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit. The rule does not introduce any variation in the Code of Criminal Procedure either in investigation, enquiry or trial. It also does not prevent the trial of any offence as does autrefois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a Court of competent jurisdiction. The rule thus relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial. Further, Section 403, Code of Criminal Procedure does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue estoppel. The rule being one which is in accord with sound principle and supported by high authority and there being a decision of Supreme Court which has accepted it as a proper one to be adopted, there is no reason for discarding it. The same view was repeated by the Supreme Court in the rase of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Kokkiliagada Meerayya and Another where it has been said: The rule of issue estoppel prevents relitigation of the issue which has been determined in a criminal trial between the State and the accused. If in respect of an offence arising out of a transaction a trial has taken place and the accused has been acquitted, another trial is respect of the offence alleged to arise out of that transaction or of a related transaction which requires the Court to arrive at a conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion reached at the earlier trial is prohibited by the rules of issue estoppel. In the present case there was no trial and no acquittal. The rejection of evidence given in the earlier proceeding to sustain an order for binding over the Respondents to keep the peace does not preclude the trial of the Respondents in respect of the specific incident which together with the other incident was sought to be made the basis of the order of binding over the Respondents. The principle laid down in the two 'earlier decisions of the Supreme Court has also been accepted by this Court in the case of Karan Singh and Ors. v. State AIR 1069 Ori 23. The principle laid down in the two 'earlier decisions of the Supreme Court has also been accepted by this Court in the case of Karan Singh and Ors. v. State AIR 1069 Ori 23. None of the aforesaid cases has directly decided that the principle of issue estoppel can be raised against the accused. It appears to us on the basis of fundamentals that where criminal jurisprudence enjoins upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused persons, it would be inconsistent to such a principle to use this rule of issue estoppel against the accused persons and prohibit them from leading evidence in support of defence plea which has been rejected in an earlier criminal case. Thereby, the accused will be debarred from placing evidence to at least raise reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court, a situation which is unenvisageable within the ambit of criminal jurisprudence. This view appears to get support from the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Andhra Chamber of Commerce where the Supreme Court expressed the doubt as to whether the rule of issue estoppel should be pressed against the accused. They said: That apart, it is doubtful-though for the purpose of this case it is unnecessary to express any final opinion on this point-whether the rule in question could be pressed against an accused, the reason being that while a prosecution cannot succeed unless it proves its case beyond reasonable doubt, the nature of the proof required of an accused in substantiating the plea taken by him is different-it is sufficient if he proves that plea taken by him is reasonable and probable. In that event he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. This aspect was noticed by the Court in Manipur Administration's case 1965 S.C.D. 8, where it was observed: Before parting, we think it proper to make one observation. The question has sometimes been mooted as to whether the same principle of issue estoppel could be raised against an accused, the argument against its application being that the prosecution cannot succeed unless it proved to the satisfaction of the Court trying the accused by evidence led before it that he is guilty of the offence charged. The question has sometimes been mooted as to whether the same principle of issue estoppel could be raised against an accused, the argument against its application being that the prosecution cannot succeed unless it proved to the satisfaction of the Court trying the accused by evidence led before it that he is guilty of the offence charged. We prefer to express no opinion on this question since it does not arise for examination." The underlying object of the rule of issue estoppel is only for the benefit of the accused persons. Considering from that angle also it appears to us to be unequitable to apply that rule here and debar the accused persons from leading evidence in support of their plea. This contention on behalf of the prosecution cannot be upheld. 10. The prosecution has examined sixteen witnesses to prove its case of the 7th and 8th May, 1968. The occurrence of the 8th May comprises of various phases for each of which there is a parallel defence story. Of the 16 p. ws., PWs. 1, 2,3, 4, 12 and 14 are eye-witnesses. P. ws. 7 and 9 are witnesses to the occurrence of 7th May, 1968 and P.W. 11 is a witness to a part of the occurrence of 8-5-1968. P. ws. 5 and 10 are medical witnesses of which P.W. 10 is the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body. P.w. 15 has been examined to prove the relationship of deceased Puni Bewa with P.W. 1, P.W. 8, apart from being a seizure witness, also proves this relationship. P.w. 16 is the junior S.I. of Choudwar P.S. who recorded the F.I.R. and conducted the best part of the investigation till he handed over charge to P.W. 6 who did nothing except examining a few accused persons and submitting charge-sheet. 11. As to the incident near Akhadaghar during the night of 7-5-1968 the prosecution has proved its case through PWs. 7 and. 9. According to them, P.W. 7 took exception to Appellant No. 2's user of the Akhadaghar whereupon he, his father and P.W. 9 were assaulted by Appellant No. 2 and some of his associates. After the assault was over, P.W. 14 took the injured persons to Chowdwar Police Station, despite persuasion to the contrary from the erstwhile assailants, where P.W. 57 made a station diary entry (Ex. 19) at 6 p. m. on 8-5-1968. After the assault was over, P.W. 14 took the injured persons to Chowdwar Police Station, despite persuasion to the contrary from the erstwhile assailants, where P.W. 57 made a station diary entry (Ex. 19) at 6 p. m. on 8-5-1968. On police requisition the injured persons were medically examined by the Medical Officer (P.W.5) of E.S.I. Hospital, Choudwar. Exts. 4. 5 and 6 are the injury reports granted by P.W. 5. Thus, the testimony of PWs. 7 and 9 is corroborated by the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station (P.W.16), the station diary entry (Ex. 19) and the injury reports, 4, 5 and 6. Nothing substantial has been brought out from the evidence of PWs. 7, 9 and other official medical witnesses to discredit their story. As regards the parallel defence story, no materials have been brought forward to substantiate the same. There i no evidence as to why PWs. 4 and 14 would be interested in this assault of Dullav Samal by Appellant No. 2 or in the subsequent quarrel between the latter and the boy's mother. The prosecution case is that when the injured persons were taken to the Chowdwar Police Station by P.W. 14 despite persuasion from the accused persons-to the contrary, it naturally caused anger in the minds of the accused persons and provided the immediate motive for the occurrence of the subsequent day. This appears to be logical and natural. We think the learned Sessions Judge was justified in accepting the prosecution version of the incident during the night of 7-5-1968 and discarding that of the defence. 12. The occurrence of 8-5-1968 may be split up into three phases. The first phase is when the Appellants 2, 4. 7, 10, 13, 16 and 17 seeing PWs. 4 and 14 returning home in a rickshaw started abusing them and later on pelted stones at them and chased them. The second phase may be said to be what happened inside the front courtyard of P.W. 1's home. The third phase is the burning of Rama Samal's house. The witnesses who have been examined to prove all the three phases are PWs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 and 14. Two other witnesses, namely PWs. 11 and 13, have also seen a part of the occurrence. As already stated, PWs. 1 and 4 are respectively father and son. The third phase is the burning of Rama Samal's house. The witnesses who have been examined to prove all the three phases are PWs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 and 14. Two other witnesses, namely PWs. 11 and 13, have also seen a part of the occurrence. As already stated, PWs. 1 and 4 are respectively father and son. They have one house in the village though one of its room is occupied by P.W. 4 for his own use. The prosecution story has been narrated by P.W. 1 in the F.I.R. lodged by him at Choudwar Police Station on 8-5-1968 at 8 p. m. The occurrence commenced at about 3-30 p. m. and the whole transaction comprising of all the three phases must have taken some time to be completed. The village of occurrence is about ten miles from Choudwar Police Station. Thus, considering everything there was no delay in lodging the F.I.R. at 8 p m. that very day. Thus, there was little scope for consultation and concoction of the prosecution story falsely, specially when the neck of the deceased, their own relation, had been cut in their own front courtyard. In this setting it is impossible to conceive that p w. 1 would go into consultation for hatching a story against the accused persons. Therefore, the story narrated in the F.I.R. must be taken to be a genuine one. According to the story, P.W. 1 was sitting in the verandah of his house at about 3.30 p. m. when he found PWs. 4 and 14 returning home in rickshaw. When they were at some distance from his house Appellants, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16 and 17 coming from the direction of Appellant No. 4's house, started abusing them. Seeing these accused persons coming towards them, P.W. 14 stopped his rickshaw and fled towards Dalia's house while p w. 4 ran towards his house. The accused persons came up to his house and pelted stones. At that: juncture of time Appellants 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 a few others who are not Appellants here, appeared from the western side of the Sahi and joined the first batch of accused persons in pelting stones at his house. Then the two batches jointly proceeded towards the front courtyard of his house pelting stones all along. Some of these stones hit his right foot injuring him. Then the two batches jointly proceeded towards the front courtyard of his house pelting stones all along. Some of these stones hit his right foot injuring him. On receiving this injury he sat down on the verandah. Appellants 7, 14 and 16 proposed to enter the house and drag P.W. 4 from his room and to assault him. Appellant No. 1 was armed with a knife at that time and some of the other accused persons, namely Appellants 3, 12 and 14 were armed with lathis and stones or brickbats. When they proceeded to enter into the house, the deceased Puni Bewa who is the Informant's mother came and barred their entry and abused them. Appellant No. 1 them dragged the deceased and cut her neck as a result of which she fell down in a pool of blood. Then the accused persons left his courtyard and went in search of P.W. 14 and proceeded towards the house of Musha Samal and Laxman Samal. Shortly thereafter he found the house of Rama Samal, brother of P.W. 14 burst out in flames. He has also stated in his F.I.R. that the accused persons looted the house of Laxman Samal and Musha Samal and they looted some utensils and money. This part of the version in the F.I.R. has also been stated to be based upon hearsay and not on account of his own knowledge. The story in this F.I.R. is substantially the same as the story unfolded in the Court by the eye-witnesses. P.w. 1 has consistently stuck to the story unfolded before the pal ice and also in the Court that the Appellants 1, 2, 14 and 16 had assembled in the front courtyard of his house and pelted stones at him and that on account of such pelting of stones he himself, P.W. 12 and the deceased were injured. He has also stilted that before the second batch of accused persons joined the first batch P.W. 4 standing in his front courtyard was retaliating by picking up the stones thrown at him and pelting them back at the accused persons. He has also stilted that before the second batch of accused persons joined the first batch P.W. 4 standing in his front courtyard was retaliating by picking up the stones thrown at him and pelting them back at the accused persons. It will be worthwhile in remembering here that Appellant No. 2 was in the first batch of accused persons, and it is quite likely that some of the stones pelted back by P.W. 4 at them might have hit the Appellant and caused the injury which is much made of by the defence. This story of P.W. 1 has been substantially corroborated by PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 12. This story is also corroborated by the injury reports Exts. 2 and 3 granted by the doctor (P.W.5) after examining PWs. 1 and 12. The doctor has opined that the injuries on PWs. 1 and 12 could be caused by pelting of stones or brickbats though he does not rule out other means for causing those injuries. The I.O. (P.W.16) immediately after lodging of the F.I.R. visited the spot. He found the house of Rama Samal completely gutted by fire and stones lying scattered in the village Danda right from Akhadaghar in the east up to the house of Appellant No. 1 on the west. The village Danda between the houses of PWs. 1 and 11 was also screwn with brickbats; so also the front courtyard of the house of Murali Samal. He found blood stains under the eves of P.W. 4's room in the front courtyard of P.W. 1's house indicating the place of murder. This scene amply corroborates the prosecution story in the F.I.R. and also as related by eye-witnesses in the Court. Another significant fact which appears from the evidence of P.W. 16 is that all the accused persons named in the F.I.R. had fled from the village immediately after occurrence and some of them remained bantered for a number of days. P.w. 16 examined P.W. 1 immediately after recording the F.I.R. and PWs. 2, 3 and 4 at the village that very night. P. ws. 1, 2 and 4 were examined in the committal Court and there 15 no contradiction between their statement in that Court and in the Court of session. The seizure of blood from the courtyard of P.W. 1 also affords corroboration. 2, 3 and 4 at the village that very night. P. ws. 1, 2 and 4 were examined in the committal Court and there 15 no contradiction between their statement in that Court and in the Court of session. The seizure of blood from the courtyard of P.W. 1 also affords corroboration. The name of Appellant No. 1 as the person who cut the throat of the deceased has been mentioned in the F.I.R. and his implication in the murder has been consistent through out. We have, therefore, no reason to differ from the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge that it is Appellant No. 1 who committed the murder of the deceased Puni Bewa. 13. The defence story in this connection is that it is P.W. 14 who dragged the deceased from the house of Rama Samal into the courtyard of P.W. 1 and there cut her neck. There are certain objections to the acceptance of this story. The first one is inherent improbability that P.W. 14 would be committing a senseless murder for the purpose of building up a defence for an apprehended murder charge of killing Appellant No. 2 when there was no evidence before them at the time that in fact Appellant No. 2 had died. There is no evidence as to who spread the rumour that Appellant No. 2 had died as a result of P.W. 14's assaulting him with a knife at the commencement of the occurrence on 8-5-1968. The second objection is that the deceased is not a blind begger woman as contended by the defence, but is a relation of PWs. 1 and 4. There is nothing to disbelieve the evidence of PWs. 8 and 15 who give the corroborative evidence as to relationship of deceased Puni with PWs. 1 and 4. It will be further seen that the accused persons were not traced during the night of 8-5-1968 when the I.O. (P.W.16) searched for them in the village. They lodged their counter F.I.R. substantially containing this defence story next day. There is no credible theory forthcoming explaining the delay in lodging this counter F.I.R. P.W. 5 had examined Appellant No. 2 and as it appears from his medical report the injuries sustained by him on his cheek could not be due to any knife attack. Therefore, the defence story that P.W. 14 assaulted Appellant No. 2 with knife is obviously false. Therefore, the defence story that P.W. 14 assaulted Appellant No. 2 with knife is obviously false. For these reasons the entire defence story as not believable. 14. It is argued by the defence counsel that the prosecution witnesses are interrelated apart from being partisan witnesses and, therefore, their testimony should not be accepted without independent corroboration. As already shown, the evidence received corroboration from the circumstances like finding of brickbats and blood, medical report and flight of the accused persons from the village soon after the occurrence. That apart, it is well known that the prosecution witnesses who are relations of the deceased would hardly let the real culprit escape and implicate an innocent man in the murder. The relationship of the deceased with PWs. 1 and 4 assures a guarantee of truth to their testimony. The prosecution witnesses are indeed partisan witnesses. But their testimony cannot be rejected solely on that ground. Partisan witnesses cannot be equated to accomplices so as to be governed by the rule applicable to accomplice evidence that without corroboration their testimony cannot be accepted. All that is necessary is to weigh the evidence of partisan witnesses with care. We have already found that there are no serious discrepancies in the evidence of these witnesses and that their evidence is genuine and the story disclosed by them to be true. The parallel story of the defence in this respect as found elsewhere does not appear to be true. For these reasons we are one with the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution has brought home the charge of murder u/s 302, Indian Penal Code to the Appellant No. 1. 15. Vie will now take up the conviction of the Appellants u/s 148, Indian Penal Code. The charge states the common object of the unlawful assembly to be to chase and pelt stones and in prosecution of such common object the offence of rioting was committed. The' members of the unlawful assembly at the time were alleged to be armed with deadly weapons such as lathis and brickbats. The charge states the common object of the unlawful assembly to be to chase and pelt stones and in prosecution of such common object the offence of rioting was committed. The' members of the unlawful assembly at the time were alleged to be armed with deadly weapons such as lathis and brickbats. For sustaining a conviction u/s 148, Indian Penal Code the prosecution must prove that the assembly was unlawful and that the common object of such assembly was one of the objects as enumerated in Section 141, Indian Penal Code and one or more or all of the members of the assembly used violence or force in prosecution of the common object of such assembly. The common object expressly stated in the charge is vague and does not appear to be covered by Section 141, Indian Penal Code. The whole incident occurred inside the Basti where people of the Basti itself are likely to congregate when incidents of this nature take place and though, as a matter of law, it is not the rule that unless an overt act is proved against a person who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member thereof nevertheless, in the particular background of this case when the occurrence took place inside a village Basti, prosecution should prove clearly and unambiguously some overt act against the accused persons charged under this section. The evidence of pelting of stones by the accused persons is of general nature and is not very specific, as indeed, it cannot be in that situation at that time. P.w. 1 has been found to embroider his story in Court by adding names of some accused persons not named in the F.I.R. The learned Sessions Judge has, on the contrary, found that there was no concerted intention to drag out Padan for assault, that even though the accused persons had assembled in the house compound of Padan Samal, most of them appeared to be more interested in trying to do some harm to Padan from a distance and not by getting into his house to bring him out. As the evidence goes, there was a barrage of stones coming from the crowd. In the circumstances whoever were witnessing it must have been careful to watch that they did not get hurt by the barrage. As the evidence goes, there was a barrage of stones coming from the crowd. In the circumstances whoever were witnessing it must have been careful to watch that they did not get hurt by the barrage. In the circumstance, it is difficult to expect the witnesses to be so meticulous as to identify the accused persons who were engage in pelting of stones, though correct identification by some of them cannot be ruled out. At the same time erroneous identification cannot also be ruled out. The evidence is also not very dear and categorical that those who chased PWs. 4 and 14 were the very persons who continued pelting stones. In this state of evidence, coupled with vagueness of the common object as stated in the charge, it would be risky to sustain the conviction under that section. Further, the Sessions Judge has not given a finding that the prosecution has established any common object and without such a finding conviction cannot also be maintained. In these circumstances, and for the aforesaid reasons we think that the Appellants should be given the benefit of doubt. The Appellants are, accordingly, acquitted of the charge u/s 148, Indian Penal Code. 16. It was contended by the Counsel of the Appellants that in view of the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 the conviction should be made u/s 304 rather than u/s 302. As already found the evidence is clear that Appellant No. 1 intended to cause the death of the deceased; at any rate, he must be imputed with the knowledge or intention of causing such bodily injury as he knew was likely to cause the death of the deceased. The doctor's evidence is that the nature of injury which was caused with one blow of the knite was such that death must be the inevitable result. Appellant No. 1 must, therefore, be credited with the knowledge of the consequence of his act. In the circumstances, we do not think that this contention can be accepted. 17. We will now proceed to deal with the conviction u/s 336, Indian Penal Code. Appellant No. 1 must, therefore, be credited with the knowledge of the consequence of his act. In the circumstances, we do not think that this contention can be accepted. 17. We will now proceed to deal with the conviction u/s 336, Indian Penal Code. All the Appellants were originally charged u/s 337, Indian Penal Code for having pelted brickbats towards the house of P.W. 1 and P.W. 12, an act which was so rash and negligent as to endanger the human life and personal safety of people, and, as a matter of fact, caused hurt to PWs. 1 and 12, but the conviction has been made u/s 336, Indian Penal Code. It is contended by the learned Counsel relying upon the case of Kala Bhika Baria v. State, that an act cannot be called rash and negligent for the simple reason that i, was an intentional act in the beginning with the object of causing injury to a specified person or persons and such act being done by the accused with that consideration cannot be called rash or negligent. We accept the construction given to Section 336, Indian Penal Code that if the act is intended to hurt and injure a specific object, the perpetrator of the act must be inputted with an intentional act done with consideration and cannot amount to a rash and negligent act. That apart, we cannot be reasonably sure as to who of the accused persons actually pelted stones because there is a large possibility of error being committed by the prosecution witnesses in identifying specific accused person with act of pelting stones or brickbats having regard to the entire situation, as to the locality rapid movement of accused and the quick shifting of scenes and large barrage of stones and brickbats flying in the air. We are, therefore, hesitant to uphold the conviction of the Appellants u/s 336, Indian Penal Code. 18. Since, for reason aforesaid, we are acquitting all the accused persons of charges under Sections 148 and 336, Indian Penal Code. It is needless to deal with the defence plea of alibi adopted by some of the Appellants. In the result, therefore, we uphold the conviction and sentence of Appellant No. 1 but set aside the conviction and sentence of all the Appellants under Sections 148 and 336. Indian Penal Code. Appeal is, therefore, allowed in respect of Appellants 2 to 17. In the result, therefore, we uphold the conviction and sentence of Appellant No. 1 but set aside the conviction and sentence of all the Appellants under Sections 148 and 336. Indian Penal Code. Appeal is, therefore, allowed in respect of Appellants 2 to 17. But so far as Appellant No. 1 is concerned, his appeal against the conviction u/s 148, Indian Penal Code is allowed but the appeal so far as his conviction u/s 302, Indian Penal Code is concerned is dismissed. P.K. Mohanti, J. 19. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed